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Abstract 
In this thesis, the ways in which organised violence function- 
ed as an economic power in two historical periods - Aztec and Con- 
quest Mexico - are discussed. The fundamental socio-economic char- 
acteristics of the Aztec and Conquest social formations are out- 
lined in materialist terms. This is followed by a discussion of 
thý ways in which particular forms of organised violence functioned 
both to maintain a dominant class in a position of power in relation 
to subordinate classes, and to enforce a particular set of econo- 
mic relations within the social formation which benefited this do- 
minant class. 
- 
The interconnections between specific forms of organised vio- 
lence in Aztec and Conquest Mexico and the economic context in 
which they occurred are, therefore, illustrated. Through this ap- 
proach, a sense or underlying coherence is brought to the discus- 
sion of organised violence in these two historical periods. Organi- 
sed violence is discussed as part of the mechanics of a social for- 
mation, not as events separated from a social context. 
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... the economy always had the ' upper 
hand while 
violence served and advanced its cause, removing 
obstacles from its path. Lukacs, History and 
Class Consciousness, 1968. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of modern social science has been to leave behind its 
humanistic infancy and turn to the maturity of hard science. Indeed 
it has been the dream of modern Western man to: 
* be freed from his passions, his unconscious, ýis 
history, and his traditions through the li- 
berating use of reason... (Rabinow and Sullivan, 
1979: 1). 
Such a desire has led to the structuring of a way of understanding 
man and his social world through a social science which struggles 
to go beyond value judgements and individual insIght. The assump- 
tion is that there exist verifiable, provable truths in the sciences 
of man which can be established with the same sort of certainty as 
physical properties if only one studies them in a scientific way. 
The social-sciences, however, have not been able to establish agreed- 
upon paradigms with which to operate as have the natural sciences; 
not been able to establish paradigms which silence opposing view- 
points with what Rabinow and Sullivan (1979: 2) call Newtonian auth- 
ority. And increasingly, the idea has come to be developed that 
efforts to do so are largely futile. 
T. he Lndh. through into the paradigm stage even for natural science 
itself is largely illusory since the greatý. paradigms such as Newton- 
ian physics are after a time replaced by other paradigms such as re- 
lativity theory and quantum mechanics.. The failure. of the human 
a1 
sciences to achieve paradigm takeoff can be seen not merely as the 
result of methodological immaturity, but as a reflection of something 
fundamental about the human world (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979: 3-4). 
This fundamental something is that in the sciences of man there 
is no outside objective position from which to study phenomena. The 
ocial scientist is as much a, -. part of the social world as the object 
f his studiet and he cannot divorce himself from his own experience 
and study human social phenomena as if it had fixed meaning in a 
context free experimental environment. But the growing empiricism of 
the social sciences is a reflection of a desire to do just this -a 
desire to go beyond human subjectivity. The limitations of such an 
empiricist social science are the result of the attempt to structure 
social enquiry so that it at least gives the impression of hard sci- 
ence. 
If, however, one accepts the proposition that the social world 
cannot be studied in the same manner as the physical world, the pro- 
position of nom-objectivXty, what remains to be established is an 
acceptable Alternate approach from which to study the social realm. 
If there are no verifiable truths to be discovered or context free 
laws to be established, what then are we'about in studying the sciences 
of man? Charles Taylor, in a chapter entitled "Interpretation and 
the Sciences of Man " explores what he calls an interpretive approach 
to the sciences of man. Interpretation, he maintains: 
. is the attempt to make cliar, to make sense 
O*i an object of study. This object .... in some 
ways is confused, incomplete, clO4udy, seeming- 
ly contradictory - in one way or another unclear. 
The interpretation aims to bring to light an 
underlying coherence oýr sense... (Taylor, 1979: 
25). 
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The goal of study, therefore, if one adopts such an interpretive 
approach is not the uncovering of immutable laws, or the presenting 
of the "facts" of social history as if they exist in a vacuum, but 
the offering of interpretations which will make sense of certain ob- 
jects of study. But this ýipproach in itself entails a number of dif- 
ficult problems. The offering of an interpretation involves appeal- 
ing to certainunderstandings of readings. But, how is one to know 
that such an offered interpretation is correct? Taylor comments: 
What if someone does not see the adequacy of our 
interpretation, does not accept our reading? We 
try to show him how it makes sense of the origin- 
al non- or partial sense .... We have to show him 
through the readin&-of other expressions why 
this expression must be read in the way we pr07 
pose .... What we are trying to establish is a 
certain reading of text or expressions, and 
what we appeal to as our grounds for this read- 
ing can only be other readings (Taylor, 1979: 
27-28). 
If an interlocutor fails to share our readings and interpreta- 
tion of those readings we appeal to still further readings in an at- 
tempt to convince him that our interpretation is coherent. But this 
sets up a hermeneutical circle, a continuing appeal further and fur- 
ther back into still other readings. How does one break through this 
circle of reference and interpretation? As Taylor points out, one 
empiricist answer to this question has involved an attempt to break 
out of the circle entirely. It is an attempt to go beyond subjecti- 
vity. 
The attempt is to reconstruct knowledge in such 
a way that'there is no need to make final appeal 
to readings or judgements which cannot be check- 
ed further... the basic building block of know- 
ledge in this view is ... a unit of information 
which is not the deliveiýance of a judgement, 
which has by definition no element in it of 
reading or interpretation, --vhich-is brute datum 
(Taylor, 1979: 29). 
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Verification, therefore, depends on the acquisition of brute 
data, and ideally, knowledge is based on the analysis of this brute 
data which cannot be "undermined by further reasoning" (Taylor, 1979: 
30). But within the sciences of man the treatment of facts of so- 
cial history as brute data is to assume for them an objectivity that 
they do not contain. Fundamental theoretical conceptions shape the 
way in which the "facts" that make up social history themselves are 
created and later interpreted. As Hindess and Hirst (1975: 2-3) note: 
"Facts are never given - they are always produced. " Fundamental theo- 
retical conceptions are imbedded within any writing of social history. 
And to assume otherwise, to refuse to specify, to make apparent, and 
therefore subject to question these conceptions, is clearly inade- 
quate. 
One must, therefore, go beyond this empiricist orientation. one 
must accept the fact that there are no verifiable truths outside of 
interpretation, only levels of interpretation with their own forms of 
evidence, and fields of meaning in which given situations find their 
place. By accepting such an approach we leave ourselves in a domain 
in which our definitions can always be challenged by those with dif- 
fering readings (Taylor, 1979: 53-54). But, as Taylor notes: 
There is no verification procedure we can fall 
back on. We can only continue to offer inter- 
pretations... (Taylor, 1979: 66). 
Consistent with this approach, what is offered in this thesis 
is an interpretation, or way of looking at, a specific social prac- 
tice, organised violence, in two particular social formations at two 
concrete historical conjunctures. The organised violence of the Az- 
tec empire has been documented andýdecried since the sixteenth cen- 
tury when the Spanish began using examples of that violence to 
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justify their own violent domination of the MesoAmerican Indian popu- 
lation. Similarly, the violence of the Spanish Conquest and the first 
years of Spanish colonial occupation of Mexico has been widely docu- 
mented. The object of this thesis is not to present new evidence of 
the violence that occurred during these two periods - this has been 
done adequately by others. Nor is the object to yet again condemn 
such violence. The object is, as Taylor has noted, to "make sense" 
of this violence, "to bring to light an underlying coherence" to the 
discussion of this violence. This underlying coherence is brought to 
U33ht by discussing. the organised violence that took place during these 
two historical periods in materialist terms. 
There are those who would disagree with a Marxist approach to 0 
state power, those who would, for example, deny that in many cases 
state power is achieved and maintained through violence and terror. 0 
Max Weber is a classic example. Weber maintained that continued ex- 
ercise of every domination entails some successful claim to legitimacy. 
Weber does not, however, specity in what ways this is always a matter 
of degree. Different types of social organisation apply varying de- 
grees of normative and coercive control, but Veber does not provide 
a classification of the different mixes of carrot and stick - moral 
persuasion and coercion. If he had done so, systems could be seen 
as trying to establish what Weber would call legitimate authority - 
some succeeding more than others and some falling back onto rougher 
measures when necessary. It is surprising that Weber did not more 
.C fully deal with types of domination relying heavily on coercion given 
the importance he attached to the violent nature of state power. 
Weber in fact argued that the state is defined by its monopoly 
of legitimate violence. In "Politics as a vocation" Weber (1982: 73) 0 
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wrote: 
... force is certainly not the nor:. -, al or the only 
means of the state ... but force is a means specific 
to the state. 
If no social institution existed which knew the 
use of violence, then the concept of 'state' 
would be eliminated. 
In Weber's typology, however, there is no such category as non-le-, iti- C) 
mated domination or domination which primarily relies on violence even 
though he clearly recognised it as an empirical possibility. Weber 
(1982: 77-78), for example notes: 
Sociolo, gically, the state cannot be defined in 
terms of its ends ... Ultimately, one can define 
the modern state sociologically only in terms 
of the specific means peculiar to it, as to 
every political association, namely the use of 
physical force. 
I-Teber, then, was insistent on characterising the state as an in- 
strument of violence. The state itself, according to Weber, was de- 
fined by its use of physical force. But Weber implies that no meaning- 
ful distinctions can be made between different kinds of states based 
on the type and nature of the violence they employ since all states 
employ roughly the same means of physical violence (See Parkin, 1982: 
73-78). Weber does not address the question of whether different forms 
of state vary systematically in the degree and type of violence they Cý 
use or the distinctive purposes of this violence with regard to the 
organisation of the economy. Nor does ',, 'eber discuss the issue so im. -t 
portant to Marxist theory of whether the state is selective in its 
use of force, coming down more heavily on some sections than others. 
Much of Weber's writing (for example about power, legitimation 
and bureaucracy) is useful to a consideration of forms of state vio- 
lence and is not to any significant extent, contradictory to histori- 
cal materialisim. However, historical materialism goes further than 
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Vileber in providing an overall theoretical framework within which to dis- 
cuss forms of state violence in relation to the economic structure of 
social formations where, as in the present case, the state relies to 
a great extent on coercion to maintain itself. 
The work of Weber is frequently drawn upon by those wishing to 
make a distinction between the aims and Drocedures of the natural 
sciences and the aims and procedures of the social sciences. Taylor's 
interpretive approach borrows directly from the Weberian discourse on 
the methodology a'propriate to the social sciences. Weber recognised 0p 
and stressed the fundamentally subjective basis of all human activity 
but did no .t preclude the possibility of sociological interpretation 
which was based on logical reasoning, was replicable, or verifiable 
at the level of logical reasoning (See Giddens, 1971: 146-147). As 
Giddens (1971: 141) notes in discussing Weber's approach: 
The fact that the selection and identification 
of the concerns of social science is necessarily 
'subjective'... does not, then, imply that object- 
ively valid cauzal analysis cannot be made. 
Social action, from a Uleberian perspective, is explicable in the 
li-rit of the subjective meanings of actors. The social scientist at- 
tempts to understand social action by putting himself in the place of I 
the actor, by attemptinE to understand the actor's -motives and the 
way in which he saw the circumstances facing him. Weber maintained 
that this method of analysis could be applied to historical events 
even after all the participants were dead. The social scientist at- 
tempts to establish an "understandable sequence of motivation" which 
will explain social action through a process of reconstructing the 
set of choices and constraints facing individuals at the time (T,:, eber, 
1963: 5-13). 
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But as Giddens (1971: 133-140) points out, when the social scientist 
starts reconstructing the array of choices and constraints facing actors, Cý 
starts trying to assess how options and constraints were weighed up 0 
and assessed, the judgements of the social scientist about the impor- 
tance of certain factors necessarily comes into play. Weber himself 
considered certain factors (for example, economic and ideological 
factors) more important than others in the assessment of the array of 
choices and constraints facing individuals. 
I'leber's belief that economic and ideolosical factors were impor- Cj - 
tant in understanding social phenomenon led him into subject areas 
which are of fundamental concern to Mar-., cism. Weber, for example, de- 
lineated n7o sets of circumstances or preconditions necessary for the 
emergence of rational capitalism -a particular rational 'spirit' and 
a particular material 'substance. ' Both, he maintained were necessary 
to the rise of rational capitalism, even though he accords to thepe 
normative and institutional prerequisites a relative independence that 
many Marxists would not go along with. Similarly, Marxists have O'en- ýp 13 
erally considered values and beliefs as growing out of material or 
class interests while Weber often sought in his work to show that the 
path of causality often worked in the reverse direction. But even 
Reber (in his political writings for exwmple) generally discounted 
the notion that ideology could make much of an imprint on the hard 
realities of material existence (See Parkin, 1982-: 40). Weber's re- 
putation as an anti-materialist cones largely from his writings on 
early Protestantism in which he reacted strongly against what he 
called the one sided determinism of the brand of 'Narxism prevalent 
in his day. Much of 'Heber's work, however, such as his discussions 
of the complex role of ideology and its relation to other levels of 
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the social formation do not greatly differ from contemporary Marxist 
Imitings on the same subject. 
Also of interest to Marxist analysis, Ueber devoted much of his 
attention to a consideration of power and the ways in which groups C 
ued that all people in auth- maintain and legitimate power. Weber ar,,,, 
ority attempt to construct myths or rewrite history in a way which 
will justify their superiority and their legitimate right to rule 
(Weber, 1963: 212). Various types of legitimations are offered by 
those higher up in the social hierarchy, those in authority, but the 
acceptance of these legitimations comes from those below. In other 
words, legitimations come from above, but legitimacy is conferred 
from below. Weber defined two opposing types of domination in social 
organisation. One type of domination arises from a monopolistic con- 
trol of economic resources in the marketplace; the other type of dom- 
ination rests on the authority of office. Weber was almost exclusive- 
ly concerned with the latter - domination resting on the authority of C7 
of f ice. 
I 
.; eber (1982: 78-79) defined three types of domination or claims 
to legitimacy - traditional, charismatic, and legal rational - which 
domination. " Traditional domina- he referred to as "legitimations oL 
tion, according to Weber, rested on well established "recognition and 
habitual orientation to conform. " Traditional domination is exer- 
cised and has its focus in a patriarch or patrimonial prince. Sub- 
ordinates base their -ranting of authority primarily on tradition. 0 
The second type of domination - charismatic - is based not on habitua- 
tion or tradition, but on personal devotion to a leader and recogni- C3 
tion of his personal "gift of grace. " The third type of domination - :D C3 
rational legal - is based on a belief in the correctness of legal 0 
6c 
statutes which are based on "rationally created rules. " 
Veber made it clear in his discussion of these different ty-Des 
of domination that a positive corxiitment on the part of the subordinate 
to authority is crucial. Many legitimations can be offered, but legi- C> 
timation only occurs rwiien subordinates to some extent accept the legi- 
tii-ziations. For Irleber therefore, domination is another way of speaking 
of legitimate authority, another way of Speaking of the acceptance of 
domination as a 'valid norm. ' "The merely external fact of the order 
being obeyed is not sufficien i Ca ri t" 
T Teber argued "to signify do-ination 
in our sense, we cannot overlook the meaning of the fact that the 
command is accepted as a 'valid norm"' (Weber, 1968: 946). 
Thus for II-leber, normative endorsement is crucial. To obey from 
a mere sense of fear will not Suffice. The types of domination on 
Which Weber concentrates, therefore, reveal little about structures 
of authority based primarily on coercive mechanisms. In many auth- 
ority syst -ems, such-as the two tinder discussion in this thesis, the 
balance between Physical coercion and normative control is tipped 
toward the former and in this context the applicability of Ueber's 
schema is reduced drasticallv. 
Weber does not deal extensively with the role of coercion in 
bringing about compliance and legitimacy. Compliance can be spontane- 
ous, but it also can be brought about as a consequence of powerless- 
ness. It can also be brought about by the hegemony of ideas of a 
dominant group of people. Even though 'Weber notes that courpliance 
can occur for reasons other than genuine acceptance of the moral 
rightness of commands (TJT eber, 1968: 214), he does not expand to any 
degree on this notion or develop a typology of authority systems based 
primarily on coercion. ileber speci'Lies three types of compliance - 
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empathy, inspiration and susceptibility to rational argument 
(Ueber, 
1968: 946) which correspond to his three types of legitimate domination. 
He also notes that it is possible for legitimacy to be withdrawn. He 
does not, however, specify which type of domination would prevail 
when coercion is the primary mechanism of control in a social system 
or when legitimacy is withdrawn. Weber instead restricts himself to 
a very narrow range of legitimated authority (See Weber, 1968: 953). 
Weber devotes little attention to those types of domination that 
subjectively would be considered illegin-Mate and I would strongly 
agree with Parkin's comment that: 
The upshot of all this is that structures of 
authority which rely more upon coercion than 
upon willing compliance are excluded from 
Veber's typology of domination (Park-in, 1982: 
75). 
For Ifeber then, the three types of domination he deals with at 
length differ only in the particular and limited historical contexts 
within which they apply and the kinds of claims put out by those in 
command concerning the legitimacy of their own rule. In doing so, 
he closes off an important concern of 7. Aarxist analysis by making 
very little distinction between normative compliance which involves 
voluntary commitment and compliance Miich is grounded in immediate 
considerations of survival, or elaborating on forms of domination 
where the balance is tipped toward outright coercion. The relation- 
ship between coercion and compliance are therefore not fully explored 
by Weber's approach. 
Societal violence has also been discussed extensively in the 
literature of social psychology. Very little of this research, how- 
ever, deals explicitly with the focus of interest in this thesis, 
i. e., violence organised by and condoned by the state. The phenomenon 
6e 
of state violence or 
institutional violence is not often seen as a 
problem within social psychological research. The several alternative 
general explanatory frameworks for aggression or violence (for example 
the biological explanations of Lorenz, 1966, or Ardrey, 1966) or Freu- 
than explanations involving a destructive or death-seelking force pro- 
posed to be present in all humans (Freud, 1950), or the physiological 
explanations seeking to find centres of aggression within the neural 
structure of the brain (See for example Moyer, 1971; Sheard and Flynn, 
-ado, 1960) may be instructive in terms of advancing explana- 1967; Del, CD 
tions for the existence of violent behaviour. They, however, reveal 
very little about forms of violence, why particular forms of violence 
occur in particular times or what social factors are related to the 
appearance of violent behaviour. The existence of violence is to be 
explained in these approaches in terms of something inherent in the 
individual. 
Within the learning theories of aggression such as those postulat- 
ing a behaviourist position of aggression as learned through rewards C) LY C3 
and punishments (See for example Buss, 1961; Buss, 1971; Sears, Mac- 
Coby and Levin, 1957) or modelling behaviour (Bandura, 1973) again 
provide explanations for the ways in which aggression may be learned, 
but say little about why particular aggressions are learned at a 
particular time or why role models demonstrating particular aggressions 
are prevalent at any one historical conjuncture and not at others. 
Of the learning theories, the frustration/aggression model has stimulat- 
ed more empirical research than any other theory of aggression. Ac- 
cording to this theory, the presence of some disturbing or ftustrating 
element is postulated to cause a tension that is then discharged through 
so-ne form of a:, r, -ressive behaviour. The expression of aggression 
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reduces the aggressor's 
internal state of anger and his general level C5ý 1ý U 
of ohysiological tension. A,, -,,,, oressive behaviour 
is assumed to be pre- 
ceded by the existence of some form of frustration, and the existence 
of frustration always leads to some form of aggression - even if that 
aggression is repressed or deflected (See for example Dollard, et. 
al., 1939; Berkowitz, 1962; Miller, 1941). 
Obviously within this model much depends on the operational de- 
finition of "frustration" and "aggression" and the major application 
has been with the study of individual hostility through an analysis 
of instigating and inhibitory variables. There have been attempts to 
extend the ap? licability of the frustration/aggression model to social 
action (See for example 11ovland and Sears, 1939). But as Feierabend 
and Feierabend (1966) pointed out, there are difficult methodological 
problems involved in measuring frustration, aggression and inhibitory 
forces when dealing with a nation as the unit of study. 
Not only are there problems in defining the variables, but the 
chain of plausibilities connecting a defined frustrating societal 
situation, the ezmeriencing of that situation as frustrating by a 
C, cyroup of people, and consequent aggressive behaviour, is very lonL-,, 
indeed. And this chain of plausibilities is as yet undocumented 
(See Seeman, 1981: 387 who cornents on this point at length). 
One area of research which looks at first examination promsing 
since it deals specifically with group behaviour is that section of 
the literature known as "collective behaviour. " But in fact, the 
term collective behaviour refers to extra-institutional social forms. 
Turner and Killian (1972: 5) make a clear distinction between what 
they call collective behaviour which is characterised by a lack, of 
objectives defined in advance and no defined procedures for 
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selecting or identifying members or leaders, and organisational or 
or institutional behaviour which is governed by established rules of 
procedure and have the force of tradition behind them. Since collec- 
tive behaviour research deals with the former and not the latter, the 
bulk of the research is in topical areas such as the study of panic 
reactions, riotuous or ecstatic behaviour of crowds or mobs, conta- 
4ý gy gion of sentiment within crowds, and/or recruitment 
into, strate, 
within, or participation in social movements (See Turner and Killian, 
1972; Smelser, 1963; Kelley, et. al., 1965; Mintz, 1951; Toch, 1965; 
Shimbori, 1969; Jackson, et. al., 1960; Backman, 1952; Blumer, 1939; 
Wheller, 1966). 
Obviously spontaneous crowd behaviour - be it panic stricken, 
riotuous or ecstatic - is very different from planned and coordinated 
violence organised and institutionalised by a state. Similarly, par- 
ticipation in a voluntary social movement is very different from 
participation in a series of state-coordinated activities where there 
are laws specifying participation and punishments for non-compliance. 
Again, as with Weber, the focus of interest is not on forms of organi- 
sed group action which involve the explicit and implicit coercion of 
the state. An additional problem with the social movement research is 
that it tells us a good deal about how collective behaviour can be 
effectively organised and what elements help to sustain participation 
and recruitment, but very little about why particular movements spring 
up at awl point in time. 
An area of research which does take as one of its foci group a 
behaviour which characterises nations is that research on the Fascist 
regime in Nazi Germany. Erich Fromm (1969) maintains that the aliena- 
tion and anomie which characterises -modern society leads people to 
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attempt to escape in one way or another from a kind of norm-less freedom 
-ghich is intolerable. One of the ways in which people escape is 
through aligning themselves with a group or social movement like Nazism 
which simplifies choices, provides then with a well defined place with- 
in an organised structure, and a world view which makes some sense of 
existence. This escape represents a search for security within the 
. 7hich is more satisfactory than the sense of isolation character- group I 
istic of individual existence. 
Much of Fromm's analysis, however, relies on a proposed aliena- 
tion which is thought to exist in the modern world. Fro= has very 
little to say about this escape into mass movements in the ancient 
or the medieval worlds where alienation and normlessness were sup- 
posedly much less of a factor. Additionally, Frorna. has little to say 
about the function of those groups aside from fulfilling the psycholo- 
gical needs of the individuals involved with them. Nor does he dis- 
cuss the actions of these groups, the way they use particular forms 
of violent behaviour and to Mhat end. 
Similarly, Adorno postulates the existence of an "authoritarian 
personality" which makes certain individuals more susceptible to move- 
ments such as Nazism which provide clear cut hierarchies, rigid rules, 
and positively evaluate power and strength. Adorno maintains that 
movements such as 'Nazism were successful because of the existence 
of- "deep-lyin- personality trends" of authoritarianism within large 
se. gments of the population. But the body of supportive research 
which has followed Adorno's publication of The Authoritarian Person- 
ality has been largely unpersuasive. As Seeman (1981: 387) notes: 
... the F-scale, taken as an index of "deep-lying 
personality trends", included so m. any things: 
pieces of 
airect 
prejudice (that is, 
"anti4inority 
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statements), and pieces of various theories of 
prejudice (including not only projection and 
frustration-a-gression, but also a convention- 
ality factor that overlapped with social norm 
theory). It is not so much, therefore, that 
authoritarian items (concerning trust, rigid- 
ity, obedience, and so forth) do not correlate 
with prejudice, but rather that the meaning 
conerence, consistency, and stability of these 
correlations were called into nuestion. 
The difficulties mentioned do not add up to the view that per- 
sonality is irrelevant to an analysis of societal violence. one can 
hardly dismiss the evidence regarding mechanisms such as frustration/ 
aggression. But these mechanisms all have situational determinants 
which are often within social psychology regarded as merely secondary 
if at all. I-7h1ile few social psychologists would want to separate 
personality from its situational determinants, in all these social 
psychological theoretical approaches situational determinants become 
merely an active ingredient i-rithin the personality domain. 
The various theoretical alternatives carry different explanatory 
power in relation to particular problems. At least one researcher, 
for example, has maintained that the explanation for Aztec human sa- 
crifice lies within an analysis of the "Aztec personality". The con- 
structing of the outlines of an Aztec personality is one research 
task which perhaps is instructive, but for the sociologist the con- 
structing of the particular situational determinants which played 
the crucial role in developing that Aztec personality (if indeed 
there can be said to be such a thing, which has yet to be shown) 
is the most important task. The sociologist cannot accept the pro- 
position that social phenomena can be reduced to the domain of the 
personality. 
The most coherent way of understanding the or-anised violence .10 
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which occurred in these two social formations, is by conceiving of it 
as instrumental in maintaining a position of dominance of a particular 
ruling state. The intent in offering such an interpretation is to iM7- 
prove upon the "partial sense" offered by other scholars in the field 
who have described the organised violence of these two periods with- 
out giving to this description any clearly defined explanation in a r) 0 
socioeconomic context, or those who have offered explanatory frame- 
works for particular violences (Aztec human sacrifice, for example) 
which are less than satisfactory or comprehensive. 
In order to discuss oTganised violence in this way, it is nec- 
essary to outline the characteristics of the two social formations 
in materialist terms. The intent is to draw a coherent nicture of 
the violence that occurred within Mexico durins, these two periods 
and to point out the interconnections between that violence and its 
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economic context. The reader 
is invited to entertain the interpreta- 
tion presented here, to consider certain readings of texts, to follow 
the arguments, and measure their adequacy and coherence. The appeal 
is not to an establishment of. absolute truth, but to a coherence of 
meaning and adequacy of interpretation. In short, what is posited 
is that the interpretation here offered of organised violence in 
Aztec and Conquest Mexico makes more sense of the available readings 
about this subject than do others. 
A Materialist Approach 
An interpretive approach demands a willingness to acknowledge, 
to make explicit, and therefore open to debate, the fundamental theo- 
retical basis which informs research. Even though it is often argued 
in empiricist oriented social science that research should be free of 
such a theoretical orientation, this supposed objectivity is impos- 
sible to attain. Thus the way in which the historical data avail- 
able about'organised-, ýiviblence--. in Aztec and Conquest Mexico are inter- 
preted in this work is influenced by the particular theoretical orien- 
tation of the writer. And it is the writer's assertion that the lo- 
cation of the historical information about organised violence in Az- 
tec and Conquest Mexico within a materialist theoretical framework 
makes more sense of the available data than do other theoretical 
frameworks. To state clearly at the outset that a materialist theo- 
retical approach informs the present work is only to be explicit-in 
a way in which traditional empiricist socialascience often is not. 
It may at first consideration appear contradictory to argue for 
an interpretive approach which avoids the traps of forcing social 
phenomena into, a naturalistic paradigm, and then begin to talk in 
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terms of a paradigmatic structure such as historical materialism. 
However, fundamental to the idea of an interpretive approach is the 
fact that social enquiry is never free of dependence on a contour of 
previous understandings, formal or informal. In social history, the 
constructs of a theoretical approach are the means through which par- 
ticular events are analysed. In this thesis, the concepts of histori- 
cal materialism, of Marxism, are used to produce a more coherent un- 
derstanding of a specific social practice, organised violence, within 
two social formations and historical conjunctures. The concepts of 
Marxism are the tools which make such an analysis possible. 
To merely state, however, that a materialist perspective informs 
the present study is to make clear little, given the complexities of 
contemporary Marxist debate and the scanty attention Marx and Engel-6 
devoted to pre-capitalist social formations. It is, therefore, nec- 
essary to specify at least in broad outline some of the concepts which 
will influence the substance of this work. The following sections 
rely heavily on the concepts of pre-caoitalist modes of production 
developed by Hindess and Hirst (1975)? 
. 
The Matrix Role of the Economy. First and foremost, a material- 
ist analysis involves the recognition of the central role of the econo- 
mic in shaping the social formation. A materialist analysis, even in 
its most complicated and sophisticated form rests on the postulate 
that the most fundamental and determining relationship is between man 
and his material existence. The ways in which man goes about making 
his living, reproducing himself materially, broadly structures the 
ways in which he organises himself politically and the ways in which 
he thinks about himself. The organisation-of material existence is 
seen as the basis out of which social organisation arises. The 
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fundamental relationship, therefore, between man and his material exis- 
tence must be examined 
in order to formulate any clear understanding 
of specific social practices. 
Such a formulation does not imply a crude economic determinism. 
on the contrary, a materialist conceptualisatian of the structure 
and functioning of the social formation reflects much more complexity 
than a simple qne-way directional causality from the economic. The 
social formation, or society, within a materialist analysis is con- 
ceived of as an articulated combination of structural levels (econo- 
mic, political, and ideological). The term "articulated combination" 
implies a complex interaction of these levels - each level influenced 
by and influencing the-. others in a continuing interaction. This in- 
teraction, however, is not random and it is the economic which struct- 
ures the way in which the interaction'between levels takes place. 
The economy, therefore, plays a dual role in the social formation. 
It is both one of the levels of the social formation and structures 
the way in which the levels of the social formation exist in relation 
to each other. The characteristics of the economic level structure 
the relative importance of the three levels of the social formation 
and their effectivity in relation to each other (See Althusser, 1975 
and Poulantzas, 1973 for the origins of this conception). 
Mode of Productiono Mode of production is a crucial concept in 
understanding this determining role of the economic. For, it is the 
dominant mode of production, the characteristic way in which man or- 
ganises his material existence, which defines the economic level and 
therefore determines which structural level (economic, political, 
or ideological), occupies a position of dominance within the social 
formation. Mode of production is defined as an articulated combination 
a 
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of relations and 
forces of production. The relations of production 
are the mode of appropriation of surplus labourand a specific social 
distribution of the means of production. The forces of production are 
the mode of appropriation of nature, or the organisation of the labour 
process. The two, relations and forces of production, are not conceiv- 
ed of separately, but rather as forming an interactive combination in 
every mode of p ,: 
roduction. 
Marx outlined a number of different modes of production, differ- 
ent general ways in which man organises his material existence, and 
subsequent scholars have refined and elaborated the outlines of these 
modes of production'. The present thesis is primarily concerned with 
three of these modes of production: the tribal-communal and the ancient 
modes of production which characterised the Aztec social formation at 
two stages of its development, and the stage of primitive accumulation, 
the initial phase of capitalism which characterised Conquest Mexico 
after the Spanish intervention. Each of these modes of production de- 
pends for its continued existence on certain conditions being met with- 
in the three levels of the social formation. But as has been stated, 
the characteristics of the economic assign a position of dominance to 
one level in relation to the others, for it is within this level that 
certain primary conditions must be met if the mode of production is 
to c6ntinue. 
In the tribal-communal mode of production, for example, only two 
levels of the social formation exist - the eco nomic and the ideologi- 
cal, and the ideological level. is the dominant of the two. The pri- 
mary conditions for the continued existence, therefore, of the tribal 
communal mode of production are mýt within the ideological level. In 
a social formation characterised by the tribal-communal mode of 
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production. the productive 
forces of the group are extremely limited. 
Each member of the group performs essentially the same function. and 
the group is held together primarily through ideological mechanisms - 
through ideas of kinship and identification with common religious be- 
liefs. Social labour is mobilised and the production of the group 
distributed by means of ideological mechanisms. Members of the group 
labour as they do because of some affinity with the group or common 
identification with a religious totem. Social relations are then pri- 
marily relations between people within the group. 
Within the ancient mode of production, however, the nature of 
social relations changes from being those between people to those 
between classes - classes determined by the individual's relation to 
the means of production specified at the political level through 
rights of citizenship defined by the state. All three levels of the 
social formation then exist - the economic, the ideological, and with 
the rise of classes and the state, the political. And. it is within 
the political level that the predominant conditions for the continued 
existence of the ancient mode of produc tion must be met for the mode 
of production to continue. The mobilisation of labour, therefore, and 
the distribution of the social. product take place within conditions 
worked out and struggles fought out within the political level. 
Within a capitalist mode of production., the economic level is 
predominant. Labour is mobilised and the social product distributed 
not by ideological or political mechanisms, but through economic mech- 
anisms. The economic, therefore, while always determinan+ in the 
sense that it structures the relation of the levels of the social for- 
mation to each other, is not alwals the dominant level of the social 
formation. As Poulantzas (1973: 14) has-expressed it: 
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... the fact that the structure of the whole is determined in the last instance by the economic 
does not mean that the economic always holds the 
dominant role in the structure. The unity con- 
stituted by the structure in dominance implies 
that every mode of production has a dominant - 
level or instance - but the economic is in fact 
determinate only in so far as it attributes the 
dominant role of one instance or another... 
This materialist formulation of the structure of the social for- 
mation is a conceptual tool, a means of organising thought, not a 
static model of causality. And it must be taken to represent ele- 
ments in continual interaction. The characteristics of the economic 
do not simplistically condition the nature of the social formation 
nor the specific social nature of practices, such as organised vio- 
lence.. The characteristics of the economic ) structure a set of condi- 
tions which are met within the different levels of the social fprma- 
tion, but may be met in a variety of ways. And it is when these con- 
ditions of existence cease to be met, the economic changes its form. 
The very complexity of the articulation, or as Poulantzas (1973: 12) 
terms it, "the diversity of combinations " makes. the study of parti- 
cular social practices within particular social formations necessary. 
The State and 2r &anised Violence* A political level and a state 
are conditions of existence of all modes of production in which appro- 
priation of surplus labour and the distribution of the means of pro- 
duction are not communal, i. e., where there is a division of people 
into classes. With the division of the members of a society into 
classes. social relations become antagonistic and the reconcilia- 
tion of differences requires mechanisms beyond the capacity of those 
in existence during the stage of tribal organisation. The mainten- 
ance of an economic system based 6n inequitable access to and distri- 
bution of the social product depends on mechanisms which will 
a 
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contain the social antagonism which such a system generates. 
There 
mustp therefore, within the social 
formations characterised by these 
modes of production be a space for the representation and regulation 
of class antagonisms, i. e., a political level and a state. The state, 
therefore, is a condition of existence. of a mode of production 'in 
which there is a division of people into classes. 
The state arises out of class antagonisms and because it does 
so. it can never be neutral in regard to the interests it represents. 
As Engels (1942: 196) has written: 
... it is normally the state of the most power- 
ful, economically ruling class, which by its 
means, becomes also the politically ruling - 
class, and so acquires new means of holding down 
and exploiting the oppressed class.. 
The ruling class, through the state, attempts to maintain a situation 
in which it exploits and holds down the class on whose production it 
exists. The organised violence of the state, which is the focus of 
this thesis, is but one of the means through which this exploitation 
of a subordinate class is instituted and maintained. State violence 
is the most visible and arguably the least sophisticated means of 
subordinating a class of people. It is used, therefore, primarily 
when other technologies of subordination are either not developed to 
sufficient degree to ensure subordination, or are not effective in 
particular instances. However, even though organised state violence 
is not a particularly sophisticated method of ensuring subordination 
the ideology: surrounding state violence can be, and often is, extreme- 
ly sophisticated. The state which initially arises out of society 
gradually comes to be represented as being separated from society, 
and eventually appears as a forceýabove it (Engels, 1942: 196). As the 
ruling class consolidates its hold over society and develops a 
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cultural hegemony over 
ideas it is able to present through the state, 
its own interests as those of the society as a whole. The state, 
therefore, while perpetrating organised violence which serves the in- 
terests of the ruling class.. also functions as the mechanism through 
which these acts are represented as being in the interests of the 
society as a whole. 
I 
The Economic Context of Organised Violence 
In this analysis a particular social practice which is the ob- 
ject of study- in this case organised violence- is discussed primari- 
ly but not exclusively in terms of the mode of production which char- 
acterised the particular historical period in which the practice 
existed. Certain modes of production have as conditions of their 
existence- coercive state apparatuses. - The mode of production deter- 
mines the existence of such apparatuses. but not necessarily their 
form. This is what is meant by stating that the mod e of production 
defines a complex space of variation in which social practices find 
their form. The particular form which appears at any one historical 
conjuncture is a product of the interaction of various political, 
ideological and economic forces, of concrete historical struggles 
and events. 
This discussion of the forms of organised violence in Aztec and 
Conquest Mexico involves a description of the characteristics of the 
dominant mode of production in each period and then a consideration 
of the various political, ideological and economic forces-which in- 
fluenced the form state violence took. In the following sections, 
therefore, what will first be specified is the outlines of the econo- 
mic context within which organised violence existed in Aztec and 
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Conquest Mexico, and then this will be followed by a discussion of 
the various forces which shaped the forms taken by organised violence 
in these two historical periods. 
The more overt for 1; of organised violence in the Aztec and Con- 
quest social formations - warfare, forced labour, legal sanctions, 
and (for the Aztecs) human sacrifice - will be discussed. In choos- 
ing to discuss these more overt forms of organised violence a nar- 
row definition of violence is used. This is not because a broader 
definition of violence is not acknowledged as acceptable, but be- 
cause the argument is to be located at a levelother than the defi- 
nition of violence itself. Direct physical harm is a definition of 
violence which is popularly accepted. It is difficult to deny the 
violence, for example, of the Spanish forced labour system., Adopt- 
ing an easily agreed upon definition of violence and therefore range 
of organised state violence facilitates the making of connections be- 
tween this violence and its economic context. 
Perry Anderson. in his book Lineages of the Absolutist State 
explains that he wishes to locate his analysis somewhere in beiween 
two different planes of Marxist discourse, between the so-called 
fabstract' plane of the Marxist philosophers, where discourse is 
focused above the level of specific events and institutions, and 
the 'concrete' plane of the Marxist historians who avoid the wider 
theoretical implications of their work. Anderson proposes to try 
to hold together in tension these two levels of reflection. A some- 
what similar approach is adopted for the present study of organised 
violence - i. e., using wider theoretical constructs to inform the 
discussion of the particular. Theoretical concepts, therefore, rela- 
ting to pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production will be 
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used to help establish the economic context within which organised 
violence existed in Aztec and Conquest Mexico. 
The primary contribution of this particular discussion arises 
from its combination of historical, economic and criminological topics 
- its concern specifically with the ways in which organised violence 
fit into the econoiic structures of these two social formations at the 
historical conjunctures: chosen. The attempt is to synthesise the in- 
formation available about this topic in a way which has not before 
been attempted. The violence which occurred in Aztec and Conquest 
Mexico has been discussed in other works, but largely only in des- 
criptive ter - not as or ganised violence designed to serve the in- 
terests of a dominant class and not located within an analysis of 
the economic foundations of the social formations within which this 
violence occurred. Similarly. the economic foundations of these 
social formations has been discussed, but seldom from a Marxist per- 
spective. The attempt in this thesis is to synthesise the available 
information into a coherent whole so that organised violence within 
these two social formations at these two historical conjunctures can 
be seen in relation to the economic context within which it occurred. 
This thesis is a combination of a number of disciplines - history, 
criminology, economics, anthropology and sociology. But, the segmen- 
tation and specialisation of these disciplines is itself somewhat 
false and is part and parcel of the growing trend toward empiricism 
in the social sciences which blinkers and confines discussion. Since 
the present treatment is designed to avoid such a confinement, it 
falls squarely under none of these disciplinary traditions. This 
discussion, therefore, necessaril'y involves the exposition of infor- 
mation which cannot merely'be assumed to be familiar to the reader. 
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Few criminologists have more than a rudimentary knowledge of Aztec and 
Conquest Mexico- It is necessary, then, to give a detailed account of 
the socio-economic context which underlay th1L violence which occurred 
in these periods. 
The intent of this thesis is not the presentation of previously 
undiscovered information but the placing of the information avail- 
able about organised violence in Aztec and Conquest Mexico within a 
particular explanatory framework which makes more sense of the avail- 
able data than do others. A materialist interpretation of organised 
violence in Aztec and Conquest Mexico gives a coherence to the dis- 
parate facts regarding organised violence which have been previously 
written about. 
Organised Violence in Aztec Mexico 
When the Aztecs first came into the central Mexican valley. they 
were a nomadic tribe which secured its existence through hunting, 
gathering, and fishing - appropriating land only temporarily when 
the group broke off from its wanderings. At this stage of social 
development the appropriation and distribution of the social product 
was communal. There were no social classes, no politics and no state. 
In such a social formation, the division of labour was extremely li- 
mited and individual members of the tribe performed essentially the same 
functions. The group, as a group, stayed together only so long as it 
served the interests of those in it - only so long as its members saw 
their needs and interests served by the groupw Durkheim, in The Di- 
vision of Labour in Society, discusses socie ties characterised by 
such social organisation as being, held together by mechanical as op- 
posed to organic solidarity. Since in such societies there is a 
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limited specialisation of labour, members of the group are not inter- 
dependent in terms of their functions within the society. The indivi- 
dual members of the group form a collective of people who perform es- 
sentially the same tasks and are held together largely through ideolo- 
gical mechanisms, by a shared identity or religious belief system 
(See Durkheim, 1933). 
Even though there were leaders within the group. and some degree 
of coordination of group activity, there was no structure to enforce 
a particular set of social or economic arrangements or even a parti- 
cular leadership. Leaders during this stage were in a position to 
offer suggestions, to guide decision making, rather than to enforce 
any particular course of action. Even the continuance of a particular 
leadership depended solely on the leader h0-i'ding the ideological sup- 
port of the members of the group., Because of limited specialisation 
of labour and lack of coercive mechanisms, individuals could vote 
with their feet and leave the group. The leaving of a particular fac- 
tion was not disastrous for the group and there was no coercive mech- 
anism to force the group to stay together. Aztec legend, in fact, tells 
of an instance in which a part of the group decided to remain behind 
ýýhile the rest-moved on. Even though the group that stayed behind 
was left without any clothing after having been tricked into going 
for a swim, this action was more a mild reprisal than a form ofor- 
ganised coercion to remain with the group (See Duran, 1964: 16). 
Just as'there was no mechanism to force the group to stay toget- 
her, there was no mechanism to enforce labour or a particular distri- 
bution of its product. Appropriation and distribution of the social 
product was collective, involvingitemporary or semi-permanent coopera- 
tive groups and resting largely on ideologically determined social 
relations. In simple redistributive arrangements characteristic of 
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nomadic hunting afid gathering tribes, this,, usiually involved temporary 
arrangements about the redistribution of a particular kill. Who did 
and did not participate in the hunt, who was allocated food from it, 
and how much individuals received was determined by a set of ideolo- 
gical relations within the group. Children, for example, who did not 
participate in the hunt were nevertheless given a portion of the food 
because of ideologically established notions about children as a cate- 
gory of people. 
After coming to the central valley, however, the Aztecs eventual- 
ly acquired land for themselves. Following the example of the lar- 
ger, more established Indian groups in central Mexico, they became an 
agricultural people. When )they-did so, decisions *about appropriation 
and redistribution were no longer confined to a particular kill. or a 
particular. -, day's gatherings. but instead involved-more complex issues. 
The use of land as an object of labour required a different, more cour- 
plex structure of relations of production. While hunting and gather- 
ing had involved only short-term temporary organisation, agriculture 
depended on long-term, planning and assurance of food between crops. 
Organisational questions instead of involving, for example, who 
went on and received food from'a particular kill, came to involve 
much more complicated issues such as access to land., storage, deci- 
sions about when to plant, acgumulation of knowledge about weather 
conditions and crops, and distribution of the community's increased 
surplus production. 
The semi-permanent agricultural formation engendered a more com- 
plex and stable set of social relations along with the more complex 
organisation of production. Still, however, the set of relations 
1 
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which governed appropriation and redistribution of surplus were pri- 
marily ideologically determined. Access to land and the distribu- 
tion of the social Produ"ct-of labour were still largely based on id- 
eological social relations, conceptsý about certain categoýries of peo- 
ple and their part in production and distribution. In Aztec so- 
cial formation, for example, kinship groups, or calpulli, which had 
existed during the tribal nomadic stage of development, came to form 
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the basis for the organisation of agricultural production. A portion 
of the available Aztec land was allocated to each of the calpulli. 
The calpullec, or leader of each of the calpulli, then assigned land 
within the allotted division to each of the family units within his 
calpulli, leaving a section of land which was worked communally for 
the support of the calpulli itself. 
At this stage of Aztec social development, however, there was no 
division of people into classes, no political level, and no state. 
Since one of the defining characteristics of this type of social for- 
mation is the absence of the state, there was obviously no state vio- 
lence. This is not to maintain that there was no violence or coercion, 
just that violence and coercion were not organised mechanisms of en- 
forcing the exploitation of one class by another. 
The main barrier, how ever, encountered by settled-peoples in 
their relations to the natural conditions of production - to the land 
as their own is some other community which has already claimed the 
land or wants it. This was especially true for the Aztecs who had 
come into a heavily populated region where most of the land was al- 
ready divided up among competing Indian groups. In such a situation, 
as Marx has noted: 
War is ... one of the earliest tasks of every 
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primitive community of this kind, both for the 
--defense of property and for its acquisition 
(Marx, 1964: 89). 
Because agriculture turned the soil into a 'prolongation of the 
body of the individual' (Marx, 1964: 92), continued possession of land 
came to be a necessary condition of existence for individuals as well 
as the community as a whole. And, the way in which members of the 
group related to natural conditions structured the way they related 
to each other and the community. Once the group ceased nomadic hunt- 
ing and gathering, and settled into agricultural production, this had 
ramifications on the structure of the whole society. The defense of 
territory from other groups became imperative, and the increased ca- 
pacity of agricultural over nomadic production provided the surplus 
which supported warring activity (See Payne, 1892: 1-3). 
As protection of territory from outside groups became necessary, 
the society became more and more dependent on a warrior class. Sup- 
port of this warrior group was necessary for the group as a whole to 
continue. Within Aztec society, therefore, there developed a warrior 
class supported through the surplus production of a labouring class. 
This warrior class increasingly set itself apart from the masses of 
people. When the warrior class. succeeded in conquering an extensive 
empire belonging to a neighbouring Indian group .. and 
distributed the 
conquered land largely among themselves, they laid the groundwork for 
establishing themselves both politically and economically as a ruling 
class. From this position they were to. gain increasing control over 
surplus production and increasing power to enforce inequi-table distri- 
bution of this surplus. 
The existence of the warrior! group and the distribution of the 
newly conquered territories. formed the basis on which arose a class 
. 
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society and therefore a state. This ruling warrior class, through the 
statel organised the appropriation of labour, agricultural and manu- 
factured products from individual producers first within the central 
valley and then over an expanding empire. This appropriation was made 
by right of membership in a body of citizens who were the possessors 
of the dominant state. 
The primary unit of the labour process was the individual pro- 
ducer who held the means of production, the land, provided his own 
subsistence, and contributed part of his production to the state. 
There was little cooperation in terms of the labour process itself, 
only in such activities as warfare and the construction of certain 
communal or public works controlled by the state. As the empire ex- 
panded other labour forms emerged. The Aztec warrior class conquered 
new provinces and set aside large plots of land in these provinces 
which were worked by the local people for the support of the Aztec 
warriors. In some instances plots of land were set aside to be work- 
ed cormminally for a particular Aztec noble. In other cases, nobles 
were awarded a portion of land in a conquered region. and the people 
who lived there became his vassals, paying rent for occupying the land. 
Slavery also emerged as a labour form. Those independent producers 
who failed to meet their tribute demands, for example, could be made 
slaves. Z. Numerous labour forms existed, therefore, but they were not 
the primary form of labour organisation, which remained during the en- 
tire history of the empire the individual peasant producer. 
As has been previously discussed, the determining role of the 
economy lies in assigning to the different levels of the social for- 
mation there relative positions, their precise effectivity in rela- 
tion to each other. With the transformation from tribal-communalism 
I 
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to the ancient mode of production and the. rise of, the state, the rela- 
tions of production, the form of appropriation of surplus labour and 
the distribution of social product, ensured the position of dominance 
of the political level. The members of the ruling state as a body of 
citizens controlled the designation and appropriation'of surplus 
labour and the distribution of its product. Through the state, the 
ruling class enforced the appropriation of surplus and its distribu- 
tion in politically determined ways. 
It was, therefore, with the transition to the ancient mode-of 
production, within the political level rather than the ideological 
level, that struggles about the appropriation of surplus and its dis- 
tribution were fought out - the political level that determined the 
exact nature of class struggle within the social formation. The 
state gradually came to control not only the appropriation of surplus, 
but to some extent access to the means of production, the land. Most 
of Aztec litigation, for example, involved land disputes (Peterson, 
1961: 122). The role of the state as proprietor in the social forma- 
tion was crucial, for not only did the state control permission of 
access to the land it held, and therefore in some limited way to the 
means of production, but it also controlled distribution of the spoils 
of conquest and access to lucrative state positions such as tax col- 
lecting. 
The Aztec social formation moved, therefore, in a relatively 
short span of time through a stage of simple redistribution character- 
istic of hunting and gathering tribes, to the complex redistribution 
of a stable agricultural community, to a class society characterised 
by a state and a political level. ' It is necessary to stress here that 
these transitions and the social practices associated with them are 
22 
considered in a non-evolutionary way. There was nothing inherent in 
the tribal-communal mode of production which irresolutely determined 
a transition to the ancient mode of production and the development of 
the state. Neither was the development of a warrior group, nor any 
other factor or combination of factors a direct and invariable deter- 
minate of the rise of the state. Increased surplus production, the 
competitive environment in the central valley, warfare, the develop- 
ment of a warrior group, were all factors to be taken into considera- 
tion in the development of the Aztec state, but not invariable deter- 
minants of it. The rise of the Aztec state, therefore, was a result 
of a number of complex circum tances not least of which was the strug- 
gle of a particular class of people who found themselves politically 
and then economically able to establish such a state structured to 
their advantage. Particular social practices such as the development 
of a warrior group, what Marx refers to as seemingly 'innocent exten- 
sions, ' however, were the elements on which a new mode of production, 
a new. form of social organisation, arose and the means through which 
the old form was eroded. 
The determinant mode of production, in this case the ancient mode 
of production, had conditions of existence which had to be maintained 
if the mode of production was to continue. And the state was a mech- 
anism used to organise conditions so that these conditions of exis- 
tence were met, and to ensure that basically antagonistic social re- 
lations in which one class laboured andproduced while another lived 
off that labour, could be contained. With the establishment of clas- 
ses and a state in Aztec society, surplus became the property not of 
the group as a whole, as it had bien at the stage of tribal-communal 
organisation, but the property of a particular class. The state was 
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used to manage the appropriation of this surplus, its management, and 
the containment of opposition to this arrangement. As the Aztec ru- 
ling class developed and solidified its position of dominance through 
the state, it also developed and refined the technologies of state con- 
trol which enforced the conditions of its existence. The focus of 
this thesis is four for of state control which involved direct phy- 
sical violence, four forms of organised state violence. The way in 
which these forms of organised state violence functioned to imple- 
ment and maintain a particular set of economic relations is the focus 
of the discussion. For, as Marx (1979: 916) has written: "Forceoeois 
itself an economic power. " 
Organised Violence in Conquest Mexico 
Both Marx and Engels saw conquest as one of the primary disrup- 
tive forces in economic development (See Gandy, 1979: 6), and the Span- 
ish Conquest of Mexico threw into chaos the organisation of production 
which had existed in central Mexico before their arrival. By forment- 
ing rebellion among the vassal Indian groups of Mexico, the Spanish 
were able to bring about the political and economic collapse of the 
Aztec state system. The destruction of the lines of authority of the 
Aztec empire was necessary in order to establish the authority of the 
Spaniards in Mexico. For, as Hindess and Hirst (1975: 260-261) note, 
"... the transition from the domination of one mode of production to 
that of another necessarily involves the effective destruction of one 
articulated social whole and its replacement by another. " 
After the Spanish intervention, Mexico no longer composed a self- 
contained economic, political, and social system which could respond 
only to its own internal demands and events occurring within it. I 
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Instead, with the Conquest, Mexico became a colonial possession of 
Spain, and therefore, part of an interlocking western European divi- 
sion of labour - part of the emerging capitalism of western Europe. 
For even though the political units of western Europe remained se- 
parate, their economies were already interlocked in what Wallerstein 
(1974: 15) terms a "world economy" or a "world system. " Decisions 
could no longer be made in the context of a single political unit, 
but had to be made with regard to the western European economy as a 
whole. Mexico, after the Conquest, was relegated to a particular po- 
sition in relation to Spain and therefore in relation to the western 
European economic system. Events in Mexico were then profoundly in- 
fluenced by the interlocking economic relationships of western Europe. 
Western Europe, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
was undergoing a phase of development which was to pave the way for 
capitalism - primitive accumulation. Within western Europe there were 
a number of constraints on capital accumulation. The small size of 
the working class, for example, was a considerable constraint. Only 
a limited amount of productive capacity could be extracted from the 
production of the working class given that most producers were indep- 
endent and their labour could not be controlled, rationalised, super- 
vised as it was later when workers were forced into. factories. In 
western European countries, the primary structural solution to this 
constraint was strategies to control the work process within the do- 
minant economies. In the periphery, such as in Africa, western Euro- 
pean countries attempted to secure capital by engaging in plunder, 
semi-tributary relations, and the intensification of pre-capitalist 
relations of production such as slavery. 
In Mexico,, the Spanish state would first engage in plunder, 
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then attempt to control the work 17rocess, or organisation of labour, 
by attempting to make of the Indians wage labourers. When it became 
apparent both'because of the opposition of the colonists and the in- 
ability of the Indians to adapt, that a system of wage labour was un- 
workable in New Spain, the Crown would resort to the intensification 
of pre-capitalist relations of production - slavery and forced labour. 
Even though these labour forms were characteristic of a pre-capitalist 
form of production they nevertheless were designed to feed capitalist 
accumulation in western Europe. 
The former means of organising production in Mexico, that used 
by the Aztec state. -in which independent labourers held the means of 
production and contributed part of their produce to the state-was 
not sufficient to feed capital accumulation in western Europe. The 
ancient mode of production, therefore, largely disintegrated in the 
face of Spanish pressure. What evolved were pockets of capitalist 
mining and large scale agricultural production. In other areas pro- 
duction remained in its pre-conquest or tribal-communal form. But 
even in areas not directly affected by the intervention of capitalist 
relations were gradually permeated by the colonial capitalist relations 
which characterised the mining. and agricultural regions. Even though 
a fundamental reorganisation of labour and its relation to the means 
of production was not implemented in all of Mexico, changed social re- 
lations permeated other areas. 
While the old forms of production remained as an underpinning 
of subsistence, the new forms of production took hold, imported by 
the Spaniards and backed up by Spanish force of arms and Spanish law. 
Whereas the Aztec ruling class had appropriated surplus agricultural 
product primarily from individual peasant labourers, agricultural 
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produce was of secondary importance to the Spanish and of value pri- 
marily as a means of supporting the mi ning regions. The real European 
interest in Mexico was precious metals, not foodstuffs, and precious 
metals were intended not for the m. Aintenance of the economy in Mexico, 
but to feed capital accumulation in Europe. Mexico, then, became 
part of an international division of labour and her role was to pro- 
vide precious metals. The colonial economy and social structure were, 
therefore, geared toward this end. 
To get metals out of the ground a labour force was needed, and 
it seemed as if there was an unlimited labour force in Mexico - the 
native population. The task then became mobilising this labour force 
which was economically'and ideologically tied to the land and there- 
fore not easily organised to work in Spanish mines or on Spanish ag- 
ricultural plantations. Labour, therefore, had to be reorganised. 
The separation of Mexico from Spain geographically, of Mexicans from 
the Spanish racially, and the economic pressures for gold in western 
Europe, all helped to ensure that this process of reorganisation 
would be especially violent. The history of Conquest Mexico, the 
first thirty years of Spanish colonial presence under discussion, was 
largely the history of a forced change in the labour process. The 
violence of the time was largely the violence of forcing a changed 
organisation of labour on an unwilling and unprepared people. In this 
period of transition organised violence served to transform the re- 
latiG. -. ship of classes to one another and of classes to the means of 
production. 
Summary 
In this dýscussion of organised violence in Aztec and Conquest 
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Mexico. the primary concern is to demonstrate the ways in which or- 
ganised violence brought about or maintained particular economic ar- 
rangements which were in the interests of a ruling class or ruling 
state, to explore the ways in which state violence functioned in these 
two specific economic contexts. Obviopsly such a discussion requires 
a detailed explanation of the particular economic contexts in which 
the particularstates and systems of state violence existed. In the 
following sections, therefore, the economic context of organised state 
violence in Aztec and Conquest Mexico will be examined and then par- 
ticular forms of state violence discussed in terms of the ways in 
which they served the interests of the ruling st ate. 
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An additionally 
important part of this discussion is the "ideological work" done by 
the state to present the violence it organised as legitimate. The 
violence the state exerts in order to secure and maintain its posi- 
tion is-seldom presented ideologically as in the interests of the 
ruling class, but as in the interests of the society as a whole. The 
very effectiveness of state organised violence is tempered by the ex- 
pertise of the state in presenting this violence as protecting bociety 
as a whole and not designed to protect special interests of a parti- 
cular class., Frequently, the ideological representations constructed 
by the ruling state are accepted on face value by historians and 
scholars and the acceptance of these justifications is one of the 
reasons why other discussions of the organised violence that occurred 
during these two historical periods have been partial or misleading. 
In discussing each form of organised state violence, therefore, a sec- 
tion has been included on the ways in which the state attempted to le- 
gitimateits violence. 
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The wider relevance of this study is two-fold. First, by explor- 
ing ways in which organised state violence was implemented and legiti- 
mated to maintain particular sets of economic relationships in two 
specific historical conjunctures, a considerable insight is gained 
with regard to how pre-capitalist states function in relation to or- 
ganised violence. Second, states have neither ceased to use organised 
violence nor legitimate it and the present study serves as a begin- 
ning in understanding the use and legitimation of organised violence 
in contemporary states. 
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CHAPTER II 
AZTEC MEXICO: THE CONTEXT 
Neither Marx nor Engels wrote extensively about pre-capitalist 
modes of production. And even though they used numerous examples 
from the early histories of Greece, Rome, and Germany in their dis- 
cussions of the origins of the state, they knew almost nothing about 
ancient Mexico. The few references they did make to the social for- 
mations of ancient Mexico (See for example Engels, 1902: 30 and Marx, 
1964: 70) were based on the work of the American anthropologist, Lewis 
H. Morgan, on whose research The Origins of the FamilX, Private Pro- 
perty and the State, was partially based. 
The appeal of Morgan's work was largely its evolutionist approach 
to the transition from stateless to state society and the importance 
of property to this transition. Morgan, for example, maintained that 
all forms of government were of two types - first those founded on 
persons and 'relations purely personal, ' and second those founded on 
territory and upon property (Morgan, 1877: 6-7). As Benjamin Keen 
(1971: 381,506) has noted, however, Marx and Engels virtually ignored 
the non-materialist aspects of Morgan's work. And even Morgan's 
economic analysis was considered inadequate. Engels was prompted to 
write in the preface to the first edition of The Origins of the Family: 
The treatment of the economic aspe cts, which'in 
Morgan's book was sufficient for his purposes 
but quite inadequate for mine, has been done 
afresh by myself (Engels, 1942: 3). 
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Contained in Morgan's work, however, was one of the fundamental 
theses of the Marxist theory of history - that the existence of poli- 
tics was inextricably tied to the existence of the state, and that 
the state and politics existed in some types of societies but not in 
others. Morgan linked the existence of politics and the state to 
ideas of property which posed problems beyond the capacity of the tra- 
ditional forms, of social organisation - those based on kinship and 
collective decision making (See Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 28-29). Morgan 
used as indices of the stages of evolution of these ideas certain 
arts of subsistence. The degree of sophistication of pottery, for 
example, was taken as an indice of the stage of development of a so- 
cial formation. As Hindess and Hirst (1975: 29) remark, however: 
"Indices ... are no substitute for theory. 
" And, Morgan's indices were 
not tied to an elaborated theory of the structure of the economy as 
a system of social relations. 
Whereas Morgan connected the development of politics and the 
state to certain stages in the development of ideas about property 
and territory, within Marxism, the existence of politics and the 
state are seen to be c onditions of certain modes of production in 
which members of a society are. divided into classes. Hindess and 
Hirst (1975: 29) comment: 
... the sequence of arts of subsistence in Mor- 
gan's text appear to be somewhat arbitrary 
while the nature of the connection which he at- 
tempts to establish between economic changes 
and the movement from a gentile to a political 
form of government remain obscure. 
There was, therefore, some affinity between the approach taken 
by Morgan atid that of Marx and Engels and this to some extent ex- 
plains their use of his research. Lýut the inadequacy of Morgan's 
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indices can be clearly seen in his analysis of Aztec society. Based on 
the indices of arts of subsistence, Morgan delineated three stages of 
societal development - savagery, barbarism, and civilisation. 
To 
the Aztec society he assigned the position of 'middle barbarism. ' 
This stage of development, according to Morgan, commenced with culti- 
vation by irrigation and the use of adobe brick and stone in agricul- 
ture. The termination of this stage of development was marked by 
the invention of. the process of smelting iron ore. Having placed 
Aztec society within a particular stage of development according to 
these indices, Morgan then condluded that the Aztec political system 
was a military democracy. and that the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan, 
was a mere pueblo. He denied even the existence of an Aztec empire 
(Morgan, 1877: 11,187-188). 
Morgan had studied and written extensively about the Iroquis In- 
dians of North America, and took their social organisation to be the 
pattern on which all Indian societies were organised. He devoted a 
prodigious amount of time and energy during his career trying to 
show that Aztec social organisation was in essence based on tribal 
kinship ties and communal ownership of land, similar to, though more 
advanced than, the social organisation of the Iroquis. He was, as 
Keen (1971: 382) remarks, "intensely annoyed" to be faced with evi- 
dence to the contrary. 
The body of evidence to the contrary, however, has grown substan- 
tially over the years since Morgan's writing and almost all contempor- 
ary scholars, Marxist and non-Marxist, are in agreement that Aztec 
society had progressed well beyond the stage of primitive communism 
or military democracy, and had established a state system character- 
ised by an hereditary monarchy, well defined social classes and 
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economic functions, and the individual holding of property (See Keen, 
1971: 508; Wolf, 1959: 130-151; Sanders and Price, 1968: 41-49; Peter- 
son, 1961: 117). 
Therefore, while Morgan's (and consequently Marx' and Engels') 
assessment of Aztec society may have been a fairly accurate reflec- 
tion of an early phase in Aztec social development, it certainly did 
not apply to the society that had evolved by the time of the Spanish 
conquest. The economic, social and political characteristics of the 
Aztec social formation by the sixteenth century were very different 
from the economic, -social and political characteristics of the so- 
cial formation of the wandering tribe that first immigrated into the 
central valley. 
Even among contemporary scholars, however, confusion arises when 
all the phases of development of the Aztec social formation are not 
considered. This has led to-radically different conclusions about 
the nature of the society itself. George Vaillant (1961: 268), for 
example, has described Aztec society as "a tribal democracy where In- 
dians worked together for their common good and no sacrifice was too 
great for-their corporate well being. " While Laurette SeJourne (1976: 
14) descHbed a "totalitarian state of which the philosophy included 
an utter contempt for the individual. " Both of these statements are 
an accurate reflection of Aztec society, but at quite different phases 
of development. 
Vaillant in a later work (1962: 246). 'maintained that there were 
two conflicting viewpoints on which aspect of Aztec culture to stress - 
the early tribal democratic, or the stratified class social organisa- 
tion of the later empire. There is, in fact, no conflict. It is a 
matter of choosing not which aspect to stress, but which historical 
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period to discuss. The Aztec social formation cannot 
be treated ac- 
curately as a static type, using development at one point in 
its his- 
tory as a reflection of the entire history of the social formation. 
There were drastic changes in Aztec social organisation over the years 
the Aztecs occupied central Mexico and any discussion of Aztec society 
must take this history of development into consideration. 
While the-general concepts of historical materialism developed 
by Marx and Engels are essential in analysing the structure and func- 
tioning of Aztec society, their writings about the Aztec social for- 
mation in particular are of little help. References to ancient Mexi- 
co are scant, and even these are based largely on Morgan's inaccurate 
assessment of the stage of development of the Aztec social formation. 
Only a handful of contemporary scholars (See for example Frederick 
Katz, 1966) have attempted anything even approaching an in-depth ma- 
terialist analysis of the economic and social formations of central 
Mexico, 'It'i: s necessary, therefore,, to reconstruct a picture of the 
Aztec social formation in materialist terms, 
In order to do so., however, it is important to discuss some of 
the historical antecedents of that social formation and the way in 
which the Aztec state system itself came into being. - 
The Aztec 
empire did not come into being or develop in a vacuum, but was built 
upon and modified by the heritage of previous MesoAmerican civilisa- 
tions. A discussion of the transition of Aztec society from a 
stateless form of social organisation to a class society which in- 
cluded a state is instructive in understanding the violence organised 
by the Aztec state once it was established. 
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The Rise of the Aztec State 
The central Mexican valley in which the Aztecs were to establish 
their empire is a basin which measures about 2500 square miles, riM7- 
med by a horseshoe of mountains and volcanoes. Due to the mild cli 
mate and fertile land of the region it is, simply put, a very good 
place to live. The region had been civilised for almost a thousand 
years before the Aztecs came into it from the north (Davies, 1973: 20; 
Keen, 1971: 4). By at least 1700 B. C. there were settled farming com- 
munities in the central valley. organised mainly around the cultiva- 
I tion of maize (Pina Chan, 1963: 19). 
There were advantages to abandoning nomadic cultivation with its 
low yield in favour of sedentary agriculture in the region. These 
communities soon began to produce a great surplus of foodstuffs. Du- 
ring what is called the Theocratic Period (roughly 200 B. C. to A. D. 
800) a number of large ceremonial centres came into being suppoyted 
by this surplus production. They were characteiised by some degree 
of occupational specialisation, intensive and extensive agriculture, 
temples, a priestly hierarchy, and well organised means of distribu- 
tion and control (PiiTa Cha**n, 1963: 22). The ceremonial centres, 
while producing little themselves, were supported by the agricultur- 
al surplus of surrounding areas. The two most imporpant ceremonial 
centres in the central valley were Teotihuacan, and later Tula. Both 
attempted, and to a certain extent achieved, a limited political 
unity in the central vAlley. They represented attempts at political 
centralisation which were to lay the groundwork for the later, more 
successful Aztec empire. 
Teotihuacan was characterised by impressive architectural achieve- 
ments, the use pf irrigation, and large scale trade conducted with 
35 
other regions of Mexico, It is estimated that at the height of Teo- 
tihuacan development (around 500 A. D. ) the population reached 100,000 
(Helms, 1975: 55). The dominance of Teotihuacan, however, in the cen- 
tral valley was largely based on culture and trade rather than on mi- 
litary force, and by the end of the seventh century, a general decline 
set in. The exact reasons for the decline of Teotihuacan are obscure. 
Some scholars have attributed it to population pressure which exhausted 
the soils of the areas surrounding the ceremonial centre. Others have 
maintained that peasant revolts brought on by excessive tribute re- 
quests destroyed it - the exploited hinterlands rising against the 
wealthy urban areas. Helms (1975: 80-81) suggests as explanations for 
the decline, changes in the ecology of the area and simple over exten- 
sion so that Teotihuacan was no longer able to maintain control of its 
territory (See Wolf, 1959: 105-109 for a discussion of these arguments). 
Whatever the reasons, there was a general weakening of defenses in 
Teotihuacan, and the centre became prey to less civilised invading bar- 
barian tribes. Sometime at the end of the seventh century Teotihuacan 
was burned to the ground (Helms, 1975: 80). 
After the fall of Teotihuacan, the Indian groups that were strong 
enough to attempt to bring about some unity in the central valley 
took on a more militaristic aspect. Warriors took over as rulers, re- 
placing the priestly hierarchy (Peterson, 1961: 71). The change in 
emphasis toward militarism was reflected in painting and sculpture 
which came to be dominated by military figures (Pin^a Chan, 1963: 23- 
24). Benjamin Keen (1971: 7) has remarked about the difference between 
these two periods: 
Priests and kindly natuie gods had presided over 
the hieratic societies of the classic era; war- 
riors and terrible war gods dominated the states 
that'established themselves on the ruins of the 
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Classic world. 
Force and warfare were found to be much more effective instruments of 
political domination than "religious awe and a sense of dependence" 
(Keen, 1971: 7). 
The Toltec civilisation centred in Tula was one of the most im- 
portant militarist civilisations that arose during this period in 
central Mexico, Tula itself, however, did not completely shake off 
the remnants of the classical period and became the scene of a strug- 
gle of ideas between the classic and militaristic eras. This strug- 
gle, although played out between competing religious factions, was 
actually a competition of ideas about social organisation. Ideological 
traditions associated with the benevolent god Quetzalcoatl who demand- 
ed sacrifice only of jade, snakes and butterflies, fought for dominance 
against the new ideas associated with a capricious tribal sky god, 
Tezcatlipoca, who demanded warfare and sacrifice of humans (Wolf, 
1959: 122). Quetzalcoatl, according to legend, lost favour with the 
gods and was banished, promising to return. 
The defeat of Quetzalcoatl, in Keen's words (1971: 8), "signalIzA 
the triumph of Militarist over Theocratic elements in Tula. " The le- 
gend of the ousting of Quetzalcoatl represented in fact the ousting 
of old values and their replacement by new ones mor e closely in line 
with the needs of the emerging military state. Quetzalcoatl, the 
Plummed Serpent, -the benign agricultural god, the symbol of culture 
and learning, was exiled and a more ferocious warlike god took his 
PI ace. The struggle between the competing factions took its toll, 
however, and Tula, its external defenses weakened by internal social 
and economic difficulties, like Teotihuacan, '&u(Cvr1-16, Jat the end of 
the twelth century to invasions from barbarian tribes. With the fall 
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of Tula, the region lapsed once again into a collection of competing 
territorial groups each warring against each other for control of the 
valley. The collapse of the Toltec empire and the invasion of the re- 
gion by barbarian tribes from the north marked the end of the reign of 
the ceremonial centres and the beginning of an era of conflict and 
militarism (See Wolf, 1959: 122-123). The powerful Indian groups in 
the valley began establishing city-states which competed for land 
and the surplus production of other groups in the form of tHbute. 
It was into this climate of fierce competition the Aztecs im- 
migrated sometime around the middle of the twelth century. The chao- 
tic three centuries from 1100 to 13008 preceding the founding of 
what was to be the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan, were characterised 
by alliances, betrayals and shifting power among the various groups 
of Indians in central Mexico. Ifý one had been placing bets on the 
eventuaL-winner of this positioning for power, the Aztecs would have 
most likely been passed over in favour of other more promising groups. 
The Aztecs were distinctly unwelcome in the already densely 
populated region. The three principle Indian groups, the Tepanecs, 
the Culhuas, and the Aculhuas controlled most of the land surrounding 
the west, south, and east of the central lake system. The Aztecs, 
a semi-barbarian wandering tribe, could not compete with these power- 
ful groups. So. for almost a hundred years. the Aztecs were driven 
from place to place by these stronger and more economically viable 
peoples, settling and remaining only briefly where they were toierat- 
ed (Keen, 1971: 1-4). The Aztecs were forced to settle on the most 
unprofitable land available. and required to pay tribute even for the 
right to occupy this land. But Ehey gradually adopted some of the 
religious, political, and agricultural ideas and techniques of these 
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older cultures, and they survived - not, however, without a struggle. 
Because they were a wandering tribe and not a thriving agricul- 
tural community, the Aztecs were limited in what they'were able to of- 
fer as tribute to the powerful groups who had divided up central 
Mexico for themselves. So in order to secure their occupancy of the 
land, they offered the only thing they had - themselves as military 
support to their overlords (Katz, 1969: 135). It was this long appren- 
ticeship as mercenaries of the competing powers in central Mexico that 
was to provide the Aztecs with both the political and military exper- 
tise necessary to become the eventual dominators of the region (Davies, 
1973: 77). The apprentices, in the end, became the masters. 
The struggle of the Aztecs to secure land and free themselves 
from the domination of more powerful Indian groups resulted in their 
reversing the roles of dominator and dominated. They, in fact, were 
to become the most efficient dominators the central valley had yet 
seen. They absorbed well the lessons of Teotihuacan and Tula and 
more successfully than either of these banished the traces of the 
Classic period and emphasised the essentials of a true military state. 
This state was to be centred in the city of Tenochtitlan, but 
when the city was founded in 1325, it was more a refuge than a seat 
of power. When the Aztecs founded Tenochtitlan after being driven 
out of another region, it was merely a small marshy island in the 
middle of a lake. gven to occupy this piece of land they were 
forced to accept the overlordship of the Tepanec Indians of the city 
of Atzcapotzalco. But, unsuitable as the new site was, it had the 
advantage of being difficult to attack. It was the only site from 
which the Aztecs were never driven by competing Indian groups. 
With their, talent for turning to advantage unfavourable 
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circumstances, the Aztecs adapted. Food on the island was abundant 
for the number of people who originally came to it. Raw materials, 
however, such as stone and timber, were not. The enterprising Aztecs 
decided rather than appealing to the Tepanecs for wood and stone, 
they would send people to the local markets with fish, frogs, reptiles 
and birds to trade for the needed supplies (Davies, 1973: 38-40). The 
Aztecs began systematically reclaiming the marshes surrounding the is- 
land by building floating gardens or chinampas, built from alternate 
layers of mud and lake vegetation supported by reeds and sticks. The 
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chinampas were immensely fertile. Slash and burn agriculture in cen- 
tral Mexico required an estimated 1200 hectares of land per year to 
provide adequate food for 100 families. Chinampa agriculture, however, 
required only somewhere between 37 to 70 hectares to feed 100 families 
(Stein and Stein, 1970: 33). Due to the economic strength created 
through chinampa agriculture and also due to the connection of the 
Aztecs with their successful neighbours, the Tepanecs, the Aztecs be- 
gan to flourish. 
The Tepanecs had begun the work of forg,,;,, g an empire for them- 
selves in central Mexico - taking over surrounding territories and 
then demanding tribute from them. The Aztecs served the Tepanecs as 
mercenaries and as vassals, but as the power of the Tepanecs grew 
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so did the power of the Aztecs. As a reward for their services, they 
were awarded more land, and this land provided additional food re- 
sources for the growing population and much needed raw materials such 
as stone and timber. Gradually, with Aztec assistance, most of the 
central valley was brought under Tepanec control (Katz, 1969: 137-138). 
The Aztecs became'less and less mercenaries and more and more allies. 
The Tepanecs, however, eventually came to fear the power of this allied 
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tribe. Diego Duran, a Dominican ftiar who grew up in sixteenth century 
Mexico and wrote his Historia de las Indias de Nueva Espan*^a e Islas 
de Tierra Firme using Indian picture writings and native informants, 
recorded that the king of the Tepanecs warned his people about the 
increasing power of the Aztecs in these words: 
Little by little, the Aztecs are rising, becom- 
ming proud and climbing to our heads (Dura*n, 
1964: 36). 
And indeed, when the Aztecs felt themselves strong enough they 
began to test their association with the Tepanecs. First they peti- 
tioned the Tepanecs for access to a fresh water spring, saying that 
they would find a way of transporting the water if they were allowed 
access. The Tepanecs agreed and the Aztecs built a causeway. The 
causeway, however, built only of clay, proved inadequate and the Az- 
tecs petitioned again, this time for stone and lime and even vassals 
to construct a stone pipe. This final request, or demand, proved too 
much for Tepanec pride. Not only did they refuse the stone and vas- 
sals, but took back permission of access to the water entirely and 
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cut off trade with the Aztecs (Davies, 1973: 45; Duran, 1964: 48). The 
demand for access to a fresh water supply was an important demonstra- 
tion of the growing Aztec independence from the Tepanecs (Padden, 1967: 
10). As a reminder to the Aztecs that they were still subjects, the 
Tepanec ruler demanded twice the usual tribute Atzcapotzalco then re- 
ceived from Tenochtitlan. The Aztecs, however, complied with the 
demand and amazed the Tepanecs. The Tepanec king told his council: 
... this has seemed to me almost a supernatural 
thing. When I ordered this to be done I thought 
it was an impossible task (Duran, 1964: 36). 
1 Even higher tribute demands were laid on the Aztecs and again they 
complied. I 
41 
The meeting by the Aztecs of the tribute demands so impressed the 
Tepanee ruler that he is said to have then regarded them as a super- 
naturally endowed and chosen people (Peterson, 1961: 93; Duran, 1964: 
25-26). This was a reputation which the Aztecs did everything in 
their power to cultivate. The Aztecs did, however, seem to believe 
that, chosen or not, the gods helped those who helped themselves. 
They began establishing ties with other neighbouring Indian groups by 
inviting merchants to their markets and receiving them well. They be- 
gan to intermarry with these other groups and consolidate their rela- 
tions with them (Duraln, I. 964: 44). 
Having established friendly relations with other cities, the Az- 
tecs bided their time and gathered strength. They eventually managed 
to have the Tepanec tribute demands lessened by a series of well cho- 
sen marriages between the Aztec-and Tepanec elite. The enmity between 
the two peoples, however, remained, and with the assumption of power 
in 1426 of a new Aztec leader, Itzcoatl, relations with the Tepanecs 
took on a more threatening tone (Davies, 1973: 40-, 49,63). Both sides 
began to prepare for war. 
The Tepanec rulers inflamed the Tepanec common people, telling 
them that the Aztecs wanted to. make them slaves. The Aztec warrior 
elite in turn began trying to generate support for a war against 
Atzcatpotzalco. The Aztec commoners, however, were fearful and very 
reluctant to pursue a battle with the powerful Tepanecs. Many request- 
ed permission to leave the city. The military leaders wanted war - 
the commoners wanted peace (Davies, 1973: 65),. According to legend 
the new ruler, Itzcoatl, and his warriors spoke to the people and 
promised that if the war against Atzcapotzalco failed they would 
deliver themselves up to the common people to be eaten. "You c7an 
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eat us in the dirtiest of cracked dishes, 
" the leaders were said to 
have told the people, "so that we and our flesh are totally degraded. " 
The common people, so the legend goes, agreed to the war and in turn 
promised that if the Aztec warriors wor the commoners would serve 
them forever (Dura**n, 1964: 57-58). 
in 1427, the death of the Tepanec ruler created a vacuum of power 
and the Aztecs7saw their chance. They formed an alliance with two 
other neighbouring Indian groups in the cities of Texcoco and Tlalpan, 
and the combined forces of this Triple Alliance defeated the Tepanecs. 
The former Tepanee domain was consolidated under the control of a con- 
federation which was for the next hundred years to dominate the cen- 
tral valley (Katz, 1969: 137; Helms, 1975: 98-99). 
Confederationý such as this one were rare in MesoAmerica and al- 
though Prescott (1922: 17) maintains that there were never disputes over 
the spoils of war, others (See for example Vaillant, 1962: 176) present 
a more believable picture of an alliance marked by continual intrigue 
and held together only by mutual dependence on their combined force. 
It is unlikely that any one of these city-states alone could have 
hoped to maintain control over even the inherited Tepanec kingdom, much 
less the expanded empire that was to come later (Davies, 1973: 112). 
So the three - Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlalpan -. remained together 
in an. uneasy alliance which was to become increasingly dominated by 
Tenochtitlan. It was an alliance, notes Mendieta y Nun"ez (1920: 184) 
of force and not of cohesion. 
The defeat of the Tepanecs and the inheritance of their kingdom 
marked a turning point in Aztec social relations. The grossly in- 
equitable distribution of conquered land after the war, most of it 
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going to the ruler and the warriors and very little to the clan organi- 
sations of common people, radically altered the nature of land owner- 
ship and assured the new warrior elite a firm basis of economic power. 
it is probable that the story of the agreement between the warrior 
elite and the commoners in which the commoners agreed to serve the 
elite forever was retrospectively constructed to justify the widen- 
ing of class distinctions and inequilities of power and wealth which 
were a result of the war (Davies, 1973: 78-79). 
From this point onward, interrupted only by the Spanish conquest, 
Aztec social relations were increasingly characterised by'class dis- 
tinctions and the consolidation of centralised state power and dir- 
ection (See Kurtz, 1978: 169-189). The inequitable land distribution 
begun after the Tepanec war was to be a continuing feature of Aztec 
society. Henceforth, the lands of conquered nations were distributed 
in a hierarchy beginning with the ruler and then the warrior elite 
and chieftans (Duran, 1964: 90-91). 
By the middle of the. fifteenth century, this Aztec city-state do- 
minated by a class of non-labouring warriors, had forged an empire 
which not only included territories within the central Mexican basin, 
but had spread over the rim of the valley and to the broders of the 
Gulf of Mexico. By the beginning of the sixteenth c. entury, the Aztec 
empire reached from Atlantic to Pacific, to Guatemala and into Nicara- 
gua (Prescott, 1922: 17-18). During the period from 1455 to 1507 
Tenochtitlan gained increasing importance within the confederation. 
Tlalpan was always the junior partner and with the death in 1516 of 
the powerful ruler of the Texcocans, the Aztecs of Tenothtitlan es- 
tablished their dominance over Texcoco as well (Vaillant, 1962: 88). 
Katz (1966: 173-179) has delineated three stages of development of a 
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A. Ztec society. The first stage began when the Aztecs arrived 
in the 
central valley and ended about the time of the 
founding o. f the capital 
city in the early fourteenth century. During this stage. all 
land 
was owned communally and the Aztecs had no ruler. Decision making 
was largely guided by clan elders. and leaders of four calpulli kin- 
ship groups. The second stage of military democracy lasted for most 
of the fifteenth century. As warfare became the central activity, 
the most valiant warriors began to-set thex. selvep'apart from the rest 
of the people through special decorations and privileges, and from 
the calpulli to which the rest of the people belonged. A ruler was 
chosen by consultation among the clan leaders. The privileges of the 
warrior class at this stage were not heritable, and even though. -the 
ruler was the supreme warrior, his powet was checked to some extent 
by the popular assembly retained its 'power for a while, But as the 
warrior elite grew in power and wealth, it began using its position 
to advance and protect its own interests. The warrior elite wanted 
the lands conquered in warfare to be divided am ng them instead of 
going to the calpulli. They succeeded not only in this design, but 
also in eventually establishing a somewhat hereditary right to these 
lands. Power. during this period came to be centralised and insti- 
tutionalised in the military caste (See Katz, 1966: 175-176). 
The decision to go to war with Atzcapotzalco was clearly made 
through the popular assembly, but after the defeat of Atzcapotzalco, 
the warrior elite gradually eroded the power of the popular assembly 
(Peterson, 1961: 113). Decisions About war and peace came to be made 
with less and less consultation with the people. After the defeat of 
Atzcapotzalco, chroniclers mention the popular assembly less frequent- 
ly. Duran, for example, does not mention any consultation with the 
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people over the attack on Xochimilco which occurred shortly after the 
Tepanec campaign (See Katz, 1966: 175). Decisions about rulers also 
came to be made by the warrior elite. Huitzilihuitl, the ruler who 
#0 came to power in 1404 was, as Duran (1964: 4) notes, "... elected through 
the vote and by consent of everyone. " The people still had some par- 
ticipation in the choosing of Moctezuma 1'(1440-1468) as ruler. They 
did not, howevar, participate in the choosing of his successor, Axa- 
yacatl (1468-1481) (Katz, 1966: 177). 
This gradual take over of power by the warrior elite initiated 
the third-phase of development of Aztec society. Power came to eman- 
ate not from the people to their leaders but from the leaders to the 
people, and then from an entity which was represented as being se- 
parated from the people, the state. This new state society was to be 
characterised by increasing pressure for heritable individual property 
by the warrior elite which declared itself a nobility, the decline in 
the power of the popular assembly, ever widening social class distinc- 
tions, a state system of bureaucratic offices which eventually became 
heritable, and an increasingly powerful monarch. Public power emerged 
separated from the people in the form of a military establishment, a 
justice system, tax collecting, and police. 
Remnants of the older social organisation remained and existed 
simultaneously'with the new in this third phase of development. But 
the old tribal organisation based on communal land holding and kinship 
organisation was overlayed with the new'structure of centralised state 
government with its attached bureaucratic and coercive apparatuses 
and a form of non-collective property (See Chavez Orozco, 1934: 205- 
207). The traditional forms were gradually eroded by the new forms 
and centralised, authority encroached more and more on the traditional 
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democratic organisational patterns. This process was cut short only 
by the Spanish conquest (Soustelle, 1961: 37). 
It is useful on an analytical level to conceptualise these per- 
iods of social development as. distinct entities, but in reality they 
did not exist as such. The three stages of development delineated by 
Katz merged each into the other. And even in the third stage (which 
will be referred to as the later empire) the rise of the state along 
with the changes that radiated out from it did not immediately sweep 
away all that went before. On the contrary, the new state system built 
on the foundation of the old forms while at the same time it gradually 
eroded them. The calpulli division of land and traditional social or- 
ganisation, for example, remained but was overlayed with the new forms 
of appropriation and new forms of land ownership. 
The Aztec state, therefore, --arose out of a complex array of cir- 
cumstances - sufficient surplus production to support a non-labouring 
warrior class, the heritage of previous civilisations at Teotihbacan 
and Tula, the highly competitive social system in central Mexico, the 
struggle of a group of warriors who found themselves in the position 
to establish a state, and finally as Engels put it (referring to Ger- 
many) "directly out of the conquest of large foreign territories" 
(Engels, 1942: 193). None of these factors alone accounted for the 
rise of the Aztec state, nor do they together represent the total ar- 
ray of determining factors - they are, however, the major contributing 
factors which set the context for the rise of the state in this par- 
ticular social formation at this particular historical conjuncture. 
The conditions which set the groundwork for the rise of the Az- 
tec state appeared at the time compatible with the given economy and 
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social organisation. Particular social practices such as the develop- 
ment of a warrior elite, appeared as what Marx (1964: 83) calls "merely 
innocent extensions" consistent with the given form of social organi- 
sation. They were--. in--. fact instances which, 'combined to bring about a 
fundamental change in Aztec social organisation. Part of this funda- 
mental change was a modifying of the relations of individuals to the 
prodfictive process, i. e., the development in the later empire of well 
defined social classes. 
Social Classes 
During the early years of Aztec social organisation, before the 
founding of Tenochtitlan, members of the group had performed essen- 
tially the same functions. A small nucleus of clan elders and priests 
functioned as a leadership group chosen by the people largely on the 
basis of personal qualities and placed in a position to guide deci- 
sion making (Soustelle, 1955: 36-37; Payne, 1892: 34). When the Aztecs 
settled into sedentary agriculture, however, this leadership group 
expanded. As warfare became a more and more important prerequisite 
to the survival and prosperity of the community, the great warriors 
became an elite. Continued wars of conquest and the inequitable dis- 
tribution of the spoils of these wars, entrenched the power of this 
group. Inequalities in wealth and in rights to use of land and tools 
became an integral part of social life (Vaillant, 1962: 93). Increa- 
singly, the warrior elite cam to separate itself from the traditional 
kinship organisations and eventually establi . shed itself as a non- 
labouring ruling class with a state to maintain and enforce its posi- 
tion. 
Social classes were first explicitly mentioned in Aztec picture 
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writings during the reign of Itzcoatl, the Aztec ruler from 1426 to 
1440 (R*adin, 1920: 148). After thist as Duran (1964: 122) notes, there 
were increasing class distinctions and a growing rigidity in their 
enforcement during the reign of Moctezuma 1 (1440-1468). By the time 
of the reign of Moctezuma 11 (1502-1520) they had become institution- 
alised. Under Moctezu-n II, for example, only those of noble birth 
were allowed into the palace except to perform menial tasks. Linguis- 
tically, nouns, pronouns, verbs and prepositions were affected by the 
rank of the person to whom they referred (Padden, 1967: 38). 
Social class distinctions were marked both by dress and housing. 
Even by the mid-fifteenth century, only lords, noblemen and chief war- 
riors were allowed to wear sandals and the common people were for- 
bidden by law to wear cotton clothing - only garments made of rough 
maguey-fibres. Only noblemen and chieftans were allowed to build 
houses with a second story (Duran, 1964: 123-131). Francisco Lopez de 
Comara (1964: 156) who served as Cortefs' private secretary and chaplain 
from 1541 to 1547 and who wrote an account of the conquest published 
in 1552, wrote this description of the housing in Tenochtitlan when 
the Spanish arrived: 
Those of the king and lords and coutiers were 
large and fine; those of others small and miser- 
able, without doors, without windows... I 
Social class inequalities were also reflected in education. ' By 
the later empire there were two different levels of schools, one 
for the commoner in each calpulli: designed to produce good citizens, 
and one attached to the temple of Mexico fori, the sons of the nobility 
to train leaders and warriors (Thompson, 1933: 41-42). Widespread mi- 
litary conquest and trading also provided commodities with which class 
distinctions were marked and the market for such items generated a 
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group of artisans to provide the demarcating luxury items for the 
wealthy. The ruling class, then, composed of the monarch, the no- 
bility, state officials and priests, presided over and increasingly 
set themselves apart in a number of ways from the mass of commoners. 
The Monarch. When the Aztecs first came to the central valley, 
leadership was loosely organised and informal. As the society devel- 
oped, however, ftthis leadership structure became more rigid and power 
eventually came to rest with one ruler. Participation in the choice 
of. the leaders. and the,, rule. r came to be made by a more and more res- 
tricted elite group. When, for example, the Aztecs were still under 
the domination of Atzcapotzalco, the Aztec ruler was elected "through 
.0 the agreement on the part of the electors and all of the people" (Duran, 
1964: 41). As the empire_developed, however, the agreement of the peo- 
ple became less and less important. Chavero (1886: 639) traces the 
successive constriction in the range of political participation of the 
common people from rule by popular assembly, to rule by a group of 
nobles, to rule of a small council presided over ýy a monarch. The 
warrior elite eventually established themselves as a nobility with 
the'right to inherited succession and sole authority for choosing 
the monarch from am ng the royal family came to rest with-a group of 
electors who were chosen by and belonged to the uppeg nobility and 
the priesthood. Eligible males from the royal family were carefully 
educated to prepare them for this position, usually by distinguishing 
themselves as warriors. 
The powers and privileges of the monarchy grew steadily over 
the history of the empire and reached their full hgight under Mocte- 
zuina II to whom everyone was subservient. When, for example, Moctezuma 
11 came out to jQeet Cortes and his men when they arrived in Tenochtitlan, 
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those with Moctezma followed, according to Gomara (1964: 139): 
... hugging the walls, their eyes down cast, for it would have been an act of great irreverence 
to gaze upon his face. 
Bernal Diaz (1963: 217), one of the conquistadors who was with Cortes 
and later wrote an account of the Conquest, described this same meet- 
ing. Moctezuma,. he wrote, arrived in a litter and when he descended, 
lords who were in attendance swept the ground before him and lay 
down cloaks so his feet would not touch the earth. Not even these 
lords dared to look at Moctezuma. Diaz (1963: 225) also noted that 
when great lords came into Moctezuma's presence in the palace they 
had to take off their fine clothes and put on poor ones, thus humbling 
themselves before him. 
Moctezuma was, from all accounts, a powerful autocrat. Duran 
(1964: 227) maintains that he demanded his orders be obeyed immediately 
without question or supplication. He instituted sweeping changes to 
consolidate the power of the monarchy and the ruling class, and de- 
creed that many government positions, previously open to those of 
low birth, restricted to the nobility. Moctezuma II and his-exten- 
sive household were supported by the tribute which came in from all 
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the empire. Gomara (1964: 153) estimated that Moctezuma II's palace 
guard alone constituted 3,000 people. Crown lands were set aside 
and worked specifically for the support of the palace and its inhabi- 
tants. 
The Nobility. Directly below the monarch, there was a wealthy 
and very powerful nobility which consisted primarily of the rulers 
of villages, towns and cities. Some of these were Aztec nobles sent 
I 
out to administer crown affairs in. conquered provinces, others were 
former rulers of conquered territories who had made tribute 
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agreements with the Aztecs. At one time- these leaders had been elect- 
ed by the people, but by the time of Moctezuma II they were appointed 
or at the very least confirmed by central authority. The. nobility 
played a major role in administering conquered provinces and cities. 
The provincial rulers paid no tribute themselves, but were in charge 
of overseeing the collection of the tribute from the people in their 
provinces (Souitelle, 1961: 38-39). Aztec nobles were placed in some 
provinces as much to discourage revolts as to collect tribute (Vaillant, 
1962: 103). 
The nobles held their-titles by authority of the crown and owed 
varying obligations to the crown depending_on the type of tenure they 
held. They lived part of the'year in the palace and when they re- 
turned to their own lands they did so only with the permission of the 
king, and even so left behind a son or a brother as insurance against 
rebellion. In conquered territories they were granted large areas of 
land for their upkeep, worked by the members of the conquered popu- 
lAce (Gomara, 1964: 154). 
By the time of the Spanish Conquest, this aristocracy held vast 
tracts of land which were entirely separate from calpulli lands. They 
were the only. - class permitted to hold land outside'of the calpulli. 
They therefore lived somewhat like feudal barons (Peterson, 1961: 115; 
White, 1971: 143). The lands of some of these nobles were worked by 
men in the position of serfs who owed their overlord a share of their 
crops and certain services (Chevalier, 1963: 20-21). Nobles were not 
obliged to cultivate land in order to secureýltheir liv3. ihood and there- 
fore could devote themselves to warfare and the affairs of state. Pub- 
lic offices were reserved for them,, there-were special tribunals with 
jurisdiction over nobles, and their sons went to special schools. 
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They alone were allowed to use certain distinctive marks of status 
and they alone were permitted several wives (Katz, 1966: 139,141). 
Appointed Officials. As the empire expanded the growing body 
of high level civil servants emerged, most from the lower ranks of 
the nobility. They included appointed governors of certain provinces 
who served largely as administrative officers. The governors gather- 
ed taxes, organised the cultivation of land for tribute, and arrang- 
ed for the transport of tribute to the capital. They kept the ruler 
informed on the state of agriculture and commerce in their provinces, 
took charge of the erection of public buildings, the maintenance of 
roads, and sent supplies of servants to the imperial palace. In the 
event of famine in their regions, they notified the emperor and under 
his authority sometimes exempted an area from taxes and even opened 
the grain stores to the public if the situation was dire (Soustelle, 
1961: 48-49). 
Judges were also an important part of the state machinery within 
the three confederated city-states. The judges were nominated by the 
sovereign and supported by lands set aside for their upkeep. They 
held their positions for life, and had authority over a kind of-police 
force which theoretically could arrest anyone from slave to nobleman 
(Soustelle, 1961: 50-51). 
Priests. Alongside the official state hierarchy existed the re- 
ligious hierarchy which as well was largely confined by the time of 
the later empire to the sons of the nobility. -The uppermost rung of 
clergy formed a council which was consulted frequently by the emperor. 
The religious hierarchy and their functions were supported by the pro- 
duce of lands set aside and worked by the common people for them (Katz, 
1966: 139). 1 
53 
The priests were, in the stage of tribal-communal organisation, 
and remained in the class society of the later empire, the chief re- 
p9sitories of history and learning. Their intimate knowledge of the 
solar calendar had made them crucial economically for the regulation 
of certain agricultural tasks. In the later empire they functioned 
as the chief ideologues of the state, directing the intellectual life 
of the group and divising elaborate theological explanations for Az- 
tec imperialism (Keen, 1971: 24). 
The Calpullec. Since the days of tribal-comunal social organi- 
sation, Aztec individuals had belonged to one of several kinship groups 
called calpulli. At one time extended family units or lineages, soon 
after the founding of Tenochtitlan the calpulli became looser units 
which included friends and allies (Katz, 1966: 118). Traditionally 
the members of each calpulli elected from among their elders a lead- 
er, the calpullec, who managed group affairs, particupated in the set- 
tling of disputes, and acted as a military leader. When the Aztecs 
took up sedintary, %-agriculture., the calpullec's function was extended 
to seeing to it that land held by the calpulli was distributed to 
each family unit according to its needs. In the initial phases of 
this system, the distribution of land changed as the needs of the 
family units changed. No man willing to work went without land. and 
land not cultivated was taken back into communal holding to be distri- 
buted when there was a need (Zorita, 1965: 106-111). As the society 
developed, however, these periodic redistributions of land ceased. 
The calpulli became less a semi-autonomous dlan and more an adminis- 
trative unit (Katz, 1966: 119). The state sought to undermine the 
authority of the calpullec and shift. the focus of popular allegiance 
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from the calpulli to the state. This was done, however, not by abolish- 
ing the calpulli system itself or the office of calpullec, but by build- 
ing a bureaucracy around it (Kurtz, 1978: 176). 
Soon after the founding of Tenochtitlan, the calpulli were divi-r 
ded into four territorial wards. and a military chief was appointed 
over each of the four territorial groups. The military chief did not 
share landvith other calpulli members, as did the calpullec, but was 
supported by the state (Soustelle, 1961: 8). Gradually, the calpullec 
saw his former powers as judge, military leader, and administrator 
elected by the people, eroded. He became a sort of figurehead, a tra- 
ditional focal point in the midst of a state bureaucracy. Even though 
the calpullec was still elected, in the later empire. he was confirm- 
ed by the emperor and held this position only as long as he retained 
the emperor's favour. By the later empire, commoners had little 
chance of becomming calpulli heads (Peterson, 1961: 117). 
The position of calpullec remained in place as a vestige of the 
trAditional tribal organisation while most of his real authority was 
undermined by an increasing battery of civil servants. Over him was 
the appointed military chief. Below him was a layer of officials who 
each oversaw from twenty to a hundred families. These officials saw 
to it that the families they were responsible for paid their taxes, 
and were organised for collective labour such as cleaning or public 
works (Soustelle, 1961: 40-41). Even though the officials beneath the 
calpullec were theoretically under his control, they in fact formed 
part of the central state bureaucracy that was for the most part in- 
dependent of the calpullec (Soustelle, 1961: 41-42-. Chavero, 1886 for 
a discussion of the reduced role of the calpullec). 
While at one time the leaders of the clan groupings had a 
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considerable power, this power gradually decreased as the Aztec'ruling 
class gained sway (Davies, 1973: 43). The warrior nobility which grew 
into a landed aristocracy separated itself quickly from the calpulli 
communal land system. From the defeat of the Tepanecs an ever increas- 
ing division came about between the common people who still lived in 
the traditional way, organised within the calpulli, and the ruling 
class, holders, of property outside calpulli control. These groups - 
the monarchy, the nobility, the appointed officials, the priests and 
judges, and to some extent the calpullec, formed the ruling class in 
Aztec society. Merchants formed a part of this non-labouring class 
although they were neither nobility nor commoner. They occupied an 
intermediate position within the social order. 
The Merchants. The name merchants bore in Aztec society meant 
"the men who get more than they give" (Keen, 1971: 24). By the time 
of the later empire, they formed a wealthy and increasingly important 
group of people. Politically powerful and frequently consulted by 
the monarcb they were a sort of nobility in themselves (Prescott, 
1922: 84-86). Fray Bernardino de Sahagun, who came to New Spain in 
1529 and compiled an account of ancient Indian culture based on in- 
terviews with Indian informants, referred to them as a "nobility by 
fantasy" (Quoted in Chapman, 1957: 120). 
The merchant class was of fairly late origin in Aztec society 
and the merchants held an ambiguous position within it, but they were 
extremely important to and influential w, ithin the state. However im- 
portant they were to the state, though, merchants do not seem to have 
been universally well regarded. The description of the bad merchant 
recorded in the Florentine Codex' 
5 
was: 
A bad. merchant**. makes people desire things - 
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makes them desire many things, makes them covet 
things... (Sahagun, 1961: 43). 
Comara (1964: 125) as well noted that a group of Indians warned Cortes 
not to trust another group because they were: 
... wicked people who were not warriors, but mer- 
chants and two-faced men. 
The merchants took great pains to hide their wealth and avoid 
open confrontation with the jealous nobility which if given the op- 
portunity would strip them of all their wealth. Most of their wealth, 
therefore, was spent giving large elaborate banquets for other traders 
(Sejourne, 1976: 152; Katz, 1966: 72-73). By the later empire, however, 
merchants had made significant inroads into securing for themselves 
the privileges of the nobility. They held land outside the calpulli 
and sent their children to the special schools reserved for the sons- 
of the ruling class. Moctezuma II even allowed merchants to sit at 
his side on important occasions (Davies, 1973: 139) 
The long-distance merchants, or pochteca, also by the later eur- 
pire were awarded the privilege of holding land, a privilege normally 
reserved to the nobility (Chapman, 1957: 120). The pochteca lived 
together in certain districts of the city, inter-married and passed 
on their profeýsion from father to son. They had their own gods and 
their own feasts and even a separate system of law courts (Soustelle, 
1961: 59-65). They paid tribute in the goods with which they dealt 
and were exempted from labour requirements within the empire (Sanders 
and Price, 1968: 161). 
Craftsmen and Artisans. There existed in the empire a group of 
artisans, artists and craftsmen who were not attached to any parti- 
cular calýulli or quarter of the city and who, unlike the general pea- 
santry, performed no communal labour and paid tribute only in their 
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specific products or services (Keen, 1971: 22). These craftsmen were 
most frequently involved in working raw materials secured through tri- 
bute, trade and conquest, into luxury items for the wealthy (Chapman, 
1957: 121). The Aztec commoner did not depend on the artisan. He made 
his own house, his own tools, and his own arms, and he was forbidden 
by law from wearing the rich clothing made by the artisans, or the 
gold and silver adornments. The feather workers, gold and silver- 
smiths, Sewelers, sculpturers, tailors, painters, potters, masons, 
and tanners provided goods primarily for the nobility and rich war- 
riors (Katz, 1966: 47-49). They depended, in order to make these goods, 
on the'-products brought in by the pochteca (Katz, 1966: 72). 
, 
Commonersv The majority of the population belonged to the com- 
mon class of direct producers called maceualli. The name of this 
class is taken from a word meaning "to work to acquire credit, " and 
even though it is often literally translated to mean nothing more than 
"the people" there was a derogatory connotation to the name (Soustelle, 
1961: 70). Most of these people lived a life very much like their an- 
cestors - working their plots Of land and serving as warriors when 
they were required to do so. The maceualtin were the backbone of the 
empire and it was their labour, that supported the rest of the social 
edifice. 
The maceualli who lived in one of the three confederated cities 
of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, or Tlalpan, received more benefits from be- 
ing part of the dominant political group'than did those living in the 
subject towns. Their allegiancewas essential to the continuation of 
the existing power structure. The commoner of the confederated cities 
worked the calpulli land to which he had a right for life, paid taxes 
to the state, aiýd; endered milita ry service-when-it was required. In 
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return he enjoyed the benefits of his position within the ruling 
state system, receiving food and clothing handed out by the authori- 
ties from the intake of tribute. The plebian of the provinces, however, 
enjoyed much less benefit from central authority. It was he who bore 
the brunt of supporting the social edifice. It was generally the com- 
moners of the provinces who were called upon to fulfill larger tribute 
demands, labouiý needs for public works and even sacrificial victims 
(Soustelle, 1961: 71). 
Below these free aommoners but above the slaves, was another 
group of people who were not formally citizens. They paid no taxes 
and were not called upon for communal labour services. These were 
the people who for one reason or another belonged to no calpulli 
and had no land. They were sometimes people displaced by wars, or 
those who had had to leave their tribes, or those whose land was given 
to someone else after a conquest. They agreed, in exchange for occupy- 
ing a parcel of land, to provide a noble with part of their harvest. 
or service of some sort. Even though these tenants were attached to 
the noble and not strictly speaking, citizens, they were subject to 
military duty and to the Aztec legal system. They were, therefore, 
not totally given up to the authority of the individual noble (Sous- 
telle, 1961: 70-73). 
The Slaves. On the lowest rung of the social hierarchy were the 
slaves, or tlacotli ýrho worked for others and received no pay. Male 
slaves worked as farm labourers, domestic servants, or porters; fe- 
male slaves spun, wove, sewed or served as concubines. Slaves were 
housed, clothed and fed in return for their services. Even though 
slavery as an institution existedýin Aztec Mexico, it was never 
chattel slavery in which the master owned the slave as a pieee of 
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property, as an object. Slaves were not citizens, but within the 
society they did have certain rightF and there were laws protecting 
them from abuse. No master in Aztec society had life and death pow- 
er over a-slave (Chevalier, 1963: 22). Slaves could marry, own goods, 
and even own slaves of their own. The children of slaves were born 
free. 
Social MoUility. Even though social classes became more defined 
and inequalities in wealth and power increased, in the beginning 
phases of the development of the Aztec state system, there was no- 
thing static about the social hierarchy. ' Military service provided 
the key to social advancement and all the men in the society either 
were or wanted to be warriors. Almost any man, no matter how lowly 
his birth could achieve renoun for himself and a comfortable life 
through military glory (Soustelle, 1961: 42-45). There are indications, 
however, that this situation was well on the way to changing by the 
early sixteenth century. With the assumption of power in 1502 of 
Moctezi-a II, an end came to the sort of military meritocracy that 
had existed previously and there was a move toward the establish- 
ment of an absolute monarchy and an exclusive nobility. Whereas pre- 
viously, any man no matter how humble his origins, if shown success- 
ful in war, could become wealthy andý . a: I, r_espected--', member of the ruling 
elite, under Moctezuma II entrance into the nobility was restrict- 
ed. Noble breeding instead of capability became the prerequisite to 
membership into the nobility (Davies, 1973: 215-216). 
Moctezuma II decreed that all those holding office in the capi- 
tal and in the provinces under his predecessor be replaced. because 
many of them were of low birth (Davies, 1973: 214). Moctezuma II be- 
lieved in an alcost devine right of the nobility to rule. He is said 
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to have remarked: 
... just as precious stones appear out of place 
among poor and wretched ones, so those of royal 
blood seem ill-assorted among people of low ex- 
traction (Davies, 1973: 215). 
Moctezuma II had his inherited palace staff replaced by the sons of 
the nobility, and decreed that only a very pure form of Nahuatl lan- 
guage be spoken in his presence (Davies, 1973: 215). 
1 
By the later empire social class distinctions were entrenched. 
The egalitarian days when every man performed essentially the same 
functions - warrior and farmer, were gone. Gone also were the days 
when leaders were elected or nominated from within the clan group. 
With the rise and development of the Aztec state, power began to flow 
from above, not below (Soustelle, 1955: 39). 
The Economic Bases of Aztec Society 
The Aztec economy of the later empire can best be described as 
a centrally administered storage economy, somewhat like those of ancient 
Egypt and Mesopotamia. Most individuals engaged in agric'ultural pro- 
duction on their own land and on land set aside to be worked for the 
state. The Aztec state organised appropriation of the agricultural 
surplus produced by this labour and distributed it to support the 
ruling class and to meet the expenses of ceremonial display, state 
administration and warfare. This economic arrangement was a logical 
extension of the organisation of the calpulli system. Formally, in- 
dividual-, family units worked their own plots of land for subsistence. 
They also worked communally a plot of land the produce from which 
was designated to support the needs of the calpulli over and beyond 
the needs of individual family units. Part of the produce, for 
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example, was used to support the calpullec who was then free to spend 
his time seeing after the general affairs of the calpulli. The econo- 
mic system of the later state society only extended this concept and 
added to it the element of force. Since people were already used to 
working communal lands for the support of a wider social need, it 
was a logical transition to extend this 'wider social need' to include 
the state along with its projects, wars, and functionaries. The 
awarding of surplus to this new 'wider society', however, came to be 
determined not by the people but by the ruling class, and force was 
one of the methods which ensured that the demands of the new stpLte 
system were met. 
Superimposed, therefore, on the structure of tribal agricultural 
organisation which had characterised the social order when production 
had been geared toward communal subsistence, was a state system de- 
signed to channel surplus to the top of the social hierarchy. Most 
of this surplus came in the form of obligatory tribute, but also some 
came through obligatory trade. Long-distance trade was just beginning 
to become an important feature of the Aztec economic system. In the 
later empire it was dominated by the state and largely directed to- 
wards providing goods not for the co n people but for the ruling 
class. There were, therefore, three bases of the Aztec economic sys- 
tem - agriculture, tribute and trade. 
Agriculture. The societies of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia grew 
up around rivers; the societies of the central Mexican valley centred 
around a lake system. Complex social organisation, however, develop- 
ed in each area for much the same reasons. Before the widespread use 
I 
of iron tools for cultivation, agriculture could best be practiced in 
loose, sandy sqil that could be irrigated. Access to water presented 
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a potential for the development of a highly productive agriculture, 
and the organisation of irrigation projects required collective, ef- 
forts and the establishment of an authority structure which transcend- 
ed the priest-centred organisation of the tribe. In addition, in- 
creased agricultural productivity brought about by irrigation made 
available a surplus which could be appropriated and used to support 
individuals whct did no manual labour and could devote their energies 
to administration. Hence, in all three areas the environment pre- 
sented a potential for the development of the. state and a differen- 
tiated social structure (Viljoen, 1974; 1-14). The ecological poten- 
tial of the particular region, however, had to be taken advantage of. 
Aztec ascendancy was due partly to the ecological characteristics of 
the central valley itself, and partly to the highly successful ex- 
ploitation by the Aztecs of natural advantages present. 
The agricultural techniques practised in the central valley were, 
for the most part, rudimentary. Almost all agricultural utensils were 
either wood or stone, and the digging stick and the stone axe were 
the most prevalent tools (Katz, 1966: 27). The wheel, though known of, 
was used only as a toy. There were no metal ploughs, and no draught 
animals (Peterson, 1961: 179). Given these conditions, the production 
of an agricultural surplus sufficient to support a state, an exten- 
sive ruling class and almost continual warfare testifies to the re- 
markable natural advantages of the area and the ingenuity of the peo- 
ple. 
The land of the central plateau was extremely fertile. Katz 
(1969: 29) has pointed out that a family of three in parts of MesoAmeri- 
ca such as the central plateau could, even without irrigation, produce 
in 120 days a year,. -twice the maize needed to survive. The lake system 
I 
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provided a source of protein, the possibility of easy irrigation, and 
a mode of transportation crucial in an area where there were no draught 
animals. The Aztecs, on an island in the centre of this lake system, 
were in a position-to make maximum use of these natural advantages. 
Agriculture, especially artificial agriculture, required water 
and water played a central role in Aztec urban development. The water- 
ways of the city provided a transportation network for goods, continu- 
ous irrigation, and a method of disposing of waste material. It was 
crucially important as a means of transportation in a civilisation 
that did not use the wheel or beasts or burden. The lake system fos- 
tered a certain degree of integration in the area, a facility which 
allowed the exchange of goods and therefore the possibility of econo- 
mic specialisation (Katz, 1969: 130). 
In addition to the natural ecological advantages of the central 
plateau, the Aztecs developed their own means of further exploiting 
the environment. Probably the most important agricultural develop- 
ment was their use of the productive floating garden, the chinampa, 
richly fertilised by the mud and vegetation of the lake bottom and 
constantly fed by the lake's water supply. The chinampas, combined 
with the-use of seed beds, shortened the growing season to such an 
extent it allowed a continuous succession of crops in one year (San- 
ders and Price, 1968: 148). And, as was noted, chinampa qgriculture 
required less land than the traditional slash and burn agriculture, 
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or two-field cultivation (Wolf, 1959: 74)., 
The chinampas, however, could only be fully utilised if they were 
protected from periodic flooding. The primary threat to agricultural 
production came when heavy rainfall brought about a rise in the level 
of the salt-water of Lake Texcoco which then overran the fresh water I 
64 
lakes. In order to counter this, the Aztecs constructed a sophisticat- 
ed system of dams and dykes which protected fresh water cultivation 
(Katz, 1969: 130). 
The additional productivity brought about by the chinampas and 
the intensive cultivation of the surrounding hills and mountains, 
permitted the very high population density in the central valley 
(Vaillant, 1`962: 102), and the surplus necessary to support a state and 
an urban ruling class (See Helms, 1975 and Sanders and Price, 1968 
for a discussion of the ecological bases of MesoAmerican civilisation). 
This partially explains the historical dominance of the central pla- 
teau over much of the rest of the country (Katz, 1966: 24). 
The organisation of agriculture was primarily centred around a 
communal land holding system which was. the characteristic social unit 
from the early days of tribal organisation. At the time of the found- 
ing of the Aztec capital, land was held by these clan groupings'. which 
distributed the land among its members according to need. Individuals, 
however, did not own land; it belonged to the calpulli and could not 
be disposed of by the individual. What the individual had were rights 
to the produce from the land, and nothing more (Katz, 1969: 138-141). 
At one time this calpulli land system was the primary form of 
land holding, klth the take over of Atzpotzalco and the attached Tep- 
anec kingdom, however, the individual holding of land by the nobility 
increased greatly and grew more prevalent with the development and 
expansion of the empire. That this individual use of land emerged 
and originated after the defeat of AtzcapotzAlco is attested to by 
numerous chroniclers (See Katz, 1966: 33,37). 
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The exact proportion of individually in relation to collectively 
held land at any point of development of the society is a matter of 
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controversy (See Katz, 1969: 29). However, by the time of the Spanish 
Conquest the Aztec ruler and the nobility held extensive lands 
their own which were worked either by people tied to the land as ten- 
ante, or by freemen who paid tribute by their labour. The ruler award- 
ed land to successful warriors which was held on a life tenure, but 
which was, at least in theory, still at the ruler's disposal. The 
state itself cdntrolled various other categories of land dedicated 
to such things as the upkeep of temples., and the expenses of war 
(Katz, 1966: 40-42). Even considering these other forms of land hold- 
ing, however, the communal. land system, organised around the calpulli, 
formed the basic productive foundation of the economy (Davies, 1973: 
79). 
By the. time of the later empire, the calpulli system had changed 
fundamentally from its original form in tribal society and had be- 
come more an administrative and geographical unit rather than a kin- 
ship unit (Thompson, 1933: 105). Calpulli land ceased being redis- 
tributed periodically as the needs of the calpulli family units chang- 
ed, and grants of land held by individuals. came to be passed onto 
their heiis. This change was another tinnocent extension' and was a 
significant step away from communal land distribution and towards the 
private holding of land (Katz, 1966: 183). The more permanent land 
allotments.. produce. d-: inequalitie_s over time because of-differential 
fertility of the soil, access to water, and other factors. It also 
brought about a situation in which increasingly families relied on 
themselves as a unit of production and support rather than the cal- 
pulli group (See Chavero, 1886: 612). 
Tribute. When the Aztecs first came_to the central valley most 
of the land surcounding the central lake system was already controlled 
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by several powerful Indian groups, each with their various tributary 
provinces. These societies were already organised along the lines of 
appropriating surplus through forced tribute extraction that the Az- 
tecs were to adopt and refine to a remarkable extent. In the begin- 
ning. the Aztecs took their place among the other tribute paying tribes, 
but by the time of the Spanish conquest some sixty semi-autonomous 
tributary states within the valley were paying tribute to one of the 
three major powers of the Aztec Triple Alliance - Texcoco, Tenochtit- 
lan, or Tlalpan (Helms, 1975: 101). Outside the valley, tribute flow- 
ed in from thirty-eight provinces (Soustell6,1961: xxi). By 1519, 
therefore, most of central Mexico was paying tribute to the Aztecs. 
An estimated 52,000 tons of food poured into the Aztec capital 
each year as tribute along with other items such as torquiose masks 
and two live eagles (Davies, 1973: 120). All this tribute had to be 
brought to'Tenochtitlan on-the backs of men or in canoes and was duly 
received and recorded by officials in picture writing (Gomara, 1964: 
155). Even though gold and precious metals existed they were main- 
ly used for decoration rather than as money. The cacao bean was 
used to balance out small inequalities in exchange, but cacao beans 
were quickly perishable and therefore not really a durable or satis- 
factory form of coinage. 
Tribute consisted mainly of foodstuffs, some manufactured, or 
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craft goods, luxury items, labour, slaves and war supplies. Duran 
(1964: 129-131) described the tribute flowing in from the provinces 
as including precious metals and stones, cacao, cotton, cloth, cloth- 
ing, live birds and animals, snakes, seafood and shells, dyes, gourds, 
mats, maize and beans, chilli, seeds, firewood, charcoal, building 
materials, rodents, deer and rabits, fruit, flowers, cotton armour, 
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bows and arrows, flints and honey. If a province lacked acceptable 
products, they often were required to pay in slaves. 
The tribute from all the empire served a number of purposes. It 
maintained the ruler and his extensive household; it met the costs of 
state administration and war; and also it provided the stuff of the 
elaborate displays of wealth and power designed to impress friend and 
foe alike (Davies, 1973: 112). The products secured through tribute 
were very rarely fed back into the economic process. They were by 
and large used for political purposes, elaborate displays which were 
intended to advance the political and social position of an individual 
in relation to other individuals. or the group in relation to other 
groups. For within this form of social organisation, the object of 
individuals was to accumulate not wealth for wealth's sake, but wealth 
for the sake of advancing political position (Wolf, 1982: 84). The 
goods secured through tribute which were used by the ruler to trade 
for desired products of other regions is an example of the reinvestment 
of products within the economy, but this practice was limited in scope. 
The goods secured through tribute were primarily intended for use rather 
than for exchange (Katz, 1966: 66). 
Within the three confederated cities this tribute system was an 
integral part of social life. The identification with the state and 
the benefits of being associated with the dominant polity were great- 
er for the producer within the city-state than for the producer in the 
outlying provinces. For the producer of the city-state there were 
various kin and religious ties which bound him within this group. The 
continuance of the far-flung empire depended on the solidarity of the 
peoples of the empire cities, and the ruling class was careful not to 
alienate its own labouring class. Tribute demands for those who were a 
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citizens of the empire were'evidently more or less reasonable. The 
Spanish lawyer, Alonso de Zorita, whose account of Indian life was 
written between 1566 and 1570, maintains that the tribute contributed 
by each man within the empirewas comparatively small, but taken to- 
gether, the contributions of so many individuals amounted to a great 
deal for the rulers. Certain inform or disadvantaged, such as widows 
or the disabled, were exempt from tribute entirely and in hard times, 
such as when crops failed, tribute was not demanded at all (Zorita, 
1965: 113,194). The ruler opened grain stor6s. -to the public when 
there was a danger of the cities being depopulated. In 1454, for ex- 
ample, when there was a great famine, Moctezuma 1, even hAd maize 
transported into the city from other parts of the empire. During this 
time, it was legally prohibited to transport maize to other regions. 
In the conquered territories, however, the situation was quite 
different. Tribute was imposed from outside and the benefits of be- 
ing a part of the empire were much less. There was always, therefore, 
among the people of the outlying provinces an element of resentment 
and the potential for revolt. By the time of the later empire only 
a small portion of the population of Tenochtitlan was engaged in agri- 
culture. Most of the people of the city performed administrative, 
commercial, ecclesiastical, military, or craft activýties (Kurtz, 
1978: 172). So it was usually the commoner of the outlying provinces 
that bore the greatest load in supplying tribute, slaves, and sacri- 
ficial victims. In some larger outlying dities, especially in the 
later empire, garrisons were established to prevent uprisings and to 
ensure tribute payments (Prescott, 1922: 29). ' Indian manuscripts show 
records of various uprisings where cities attempted to re. -restablish 
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their independence and shake off their tribute burdens (Soustelle, 1961: 
xxii). Continued tribute flow to the centre, however, was imperative 
to the survival of the city-state (Vaillant, 1962: 169). By the middle 
of the fifteenth century, Texcoco and Tenochtitlan had grown to-such 
an extent they were dependent on the additional supplies secured through 
conquest and subsequent tribute. 
Trade. A9 the empire developed, trade became an increasingly im-- 
portant aspect of the Aztec economic system. Local trade had long 
formed an important part of village life in Mexico. In almost every 
town and village the local market was the focus of social and econo- 
mic life. This was especially the case in the cities of the central 
valley. The importance of these'markets is well illustrated in the 
frequency of market encounters. In central Mexico, for example, there 
were daily markets, whereas in the cities of the Gulf Coast markets 
were held only every twenty days (Sanders and Price, 1968: 161; Gomara, 
1964: 160). The people of Tlatelolco (the sister city of Tenochtitlan) 
had long been known for their devotion to trade. After Tlatelolco 
was annexed under the rule of Tenochtitlan, it became the chief busi- 
ness centre of the empire (Soustelle, 1955: 26). The vast market of 
Tlatelolco was one of the most impressive sights the Spanish saw when 
they first arrived in the Aztec capital. Cortes (19.71: 103) described 
this market in a letter to Charles V: 
This city has many squares where trading is done 
and markets are held continuously. There is al- 
so one square twice as big as that of Salamanca 
v-.... where more than sixty thousand people come 
each day to buy and sell... 
The importance the Aztecs attached to this central market is il- 
l 
lustrated in its meticulous organisation. The market was divided 
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into sections reserved only for particular types of merchandise. 
Each vendor in the market paid a certain fee to the ruler for the 
right to sell. and for protection. Officials patrolled the market 
and kept strict order. They checked weights to make sure'they were 
fair and if any weights were found to be giving short measure they 
were broken and their owners fined. The commission of any offense in 
the marketplace'was considered very serious and often met with immedia- 
te punishment. There was even a court at the marketplace where judges 
sat daily to hear cases (Gomara, 1964: 163; Peterson, 1961: 178). 
The existence and centrality of a market such as the one in Tla- 
telolco reflects certain economic conditions such as a high degree 
of surplus. and specialisation of production. But the market also 
had the potential of perpetuating and accentuating these social condi- 
tions. Certain conditions had to exist in order for such a market to 
develop, but the very existence of the market held the potential to 
promote production for exchange, specialisation of production and com- 
modity relations. But the market was relatively undeveloped. Even 
though the market is the place where production, trade, and money 
come together, and a fairly complex set of interactions between these 
elements is possible even in social formations in which the market 
and the economic sphere of commodity production for exchange it re- 
presents are not dominant in the social formation (See Pearson, 1957: 
7-9). 
The significance of market trade lies in the changes. it starts 
to bring about in production. Even though a'. major part of the pro- 
duction in Aztec Mexico was still production for use of individual 
family groups, extensive market tr4de. is evidence of the beginnings 
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of a process of production specifically intended for exchange, is ano- 
ther of what Marx refers to as seemingly 'innocent extensions. ' Its 
real significance lies in its potential to feed back into the social 
system and bring about fundamental change, to accentuate commodity 
production to the extent that in combination with other factors. the 
fundamental mode of production of the society changes. Market trade 
and commodity felations had not developed in central Mexico to the 
extent that they were replacing or even seriously challenging pro- 
duction for use. However, extensive market activity, well developed 
in the central cities of the Triple Alliance, indicates the beginning 
of such a process of production. Both production for exchange and 
production for use, therefore existed simultaneously with the bulk of 
production still intended for use (See Collier, 1982: 4). 
The development of extensive long-distance trade, trade between 
the central plateau and the lowlands is also a further indication 
of the growing complexity of Aztec economic life. This long-distance 
trade, however, was a separate activity from the local market complex 
and its personnel composed a separate social group, the pochteca. 
Very seldom did the products procured through this trade reach the 
local markets or the common people. The goods secured through long- 
distance trade were, by and large, luxury items destined to fulfill 
the desires of the ruling elite (Chapman, 1957: 115). 
Long-distance trade. even in social formations characterised by 
other modes of production, for example the feudal mode of production, 
most commonly begins as a trade in precositie's for the very wealthy. 
Partly because of the difficulty and expense of transport, items se- 
cured through long-distance trade must be small and very valuable 
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(Davies, 1973: 137). It is only after other elements in the social 
formation have developed, for example efficient modes of transport 
and stable currency, that long-distance trade becomes a viable method 
of providing commodities for the mass of people and therefore inte- 
grates regions within an interdependent economic system. In central 
Mexico this process of economic integration had only just begun, for- 
ged largely by'the activity of the Aztec: -. state. But even at this 
early stage of development, the economic interrelationships of par- 
ticular regions within Mexico were being transformed through Aztec 
political domination. Markets, for example, were already beginning 
to develop some degree of specialisation. Some like Cholula were 
specialising in manufactured products such as feather work or precious 
stones. Texcoco was known for its textiles and fine earthenware (Keen, 
1971: 20). These city markets, therefore, had already begun producing 
explicitly for export (Katz, 1966: 62). The specialisation of regions 
in terms of production for exchange is the beginning of a process 
which can increasingly interlock regions into economic relations. 
The exchange of goods between the plateau and the lowlands was 
thousands of years old in MesoAmerica, but the nature of this trade 
and its socio-political implications- changed radically when the 
people of the central plateau had political control over the lowlands 
or of the trading routes leading to it. With this control, trade 
ceased to be an exchange of goods by mutual agreement and came to be 
trade conducted under coerced conditions'for the benefit of the con- 
trolling plateau group. With the rise to dom: inance of the Aztec 
state, this meant trade conducted for the benefit of the Aztec ruling 
class. 
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Aztec traders most frequently imported raw materials from the 
outlying regions - feathers, precious and semi-precious stones, cacao, 
gold and animal skins. The main exports were manufactured items, gar- 
ments and ornaments (Chapman,. 1957: 126-127). The plateau possessed 
virtually no raw materials unavailable to the peoples of the lowlands, ' 
and therefore, in order to secure desired raw materials the Aztecs 
forced outlyingnregions to provide raw materials in exchange for manu- 
factored goodF or largely worthless plateau 'delicacies. ' Katz (1969: 
213) maintains that the latter tactic was more often chosen than the 
former. The people of Soconusco, for example, grew so tired of trad- 
ing cacao, gold, feathers and precious stones for cakes made of worms, 
cheeses of lagoon weeds, or simple toys and devices of little value, 
they finally resisted through force (Davies, 1973: 137). 
Long-distance trade, therefore, was not simply an extesion of 
local market trading activity. Long-distance trade was not the ran- 
dom undertaking of individuals, but a highly coordinated, directed and 
structured activity (Chapman, 1957: 115). Chapman (1957: 119-120) il- 
lustrates well the separateness of the local market system from long- 
distance trade in a discussion about the effects of the conquest on 
trading patterns. The Spaniards had no use for the products secured 
through Aztec long-distance trade. They did, however, need the pro- 
ducts of the local markets - food and supplies to sustain them. The 
fact that long-distance trade virtually disintegrated shortly after 
the conquest without substantially affecting local market activity 
is testimony of the independence of the two.;. 
The state encouraged and protected commercial activity, but also 
controlled and curtailed it when it became too strong. As Wolf (1982: 
84) notes, there is an inherent conflict between free commerce of the a 
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merchant traders and the tribute based state. The drawing of products 
and services into commodity exchange can seriously weaken the command 
over these products and services into tribute. Given too much lati- 
tude it can render the tributary overlords dependent on the merchants. 
So, in tribute based societies, the state must ensure that merchants, 
in Wolf's words: 
... 'keep their proper place' by subjecting them 
to political supervision or to enforced partner- 
ships with overlords... 
The position of the merchants, therefore, is always defined poli- 
tically and made dependent on its relation to the state. The effect- 
iveness with which the Aztec state imposed restrictions on trade with 
opposing groups, the Tlaxcalans for example, illustrates the control 
the state maintained over trading. When the Spanish arrived in cen- 
tral Mexico, the Tlaxcalans had been effectively denied salt,, and 
#1 cotton for many years due to the enmity of the Aztecs (Gomara, 1964: 
115). 
The Aztec state conducted a sort of monopoligtic commerce and 
acted as the chief entrepreneurs in central Mexico. Davies (1973: 138) 
summarises the situation: 
... the Aztec rulers,. after imposing enormous tri- 
buteýby armed force, took advantage of their mi- 
litary superiority to procure special conditions 
for their own traders; they thus exchanged'these 
forced levies for even greater quantities of 
goods, for the ruler's own benefit. 
Long-distance trade was, however, limited in terms of its dev- 
elopment by other factors. Widespread long distance exchange of com-- 
modities was-severely limited, for example, by the lack of a form of 
non-perishable commodity money. There were certain items such as 
cacao beans, quills filled with gold and small copper axes which were 
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used as money, but these most frequently were only used to balance out 
small inequalities of exchange (D: Laz, 1963: 233). The cacao bean had 
the most widespread use. There was even a form of counterfeit cacao 
bean. The value of the cacao bean was that it would be ground to make 
a highly prized beverage. Counterfeit beans were made by drilling 
small holes in the bean, extracting the insides and then filling the 
bean with earth (Chapman, 1957: 127). Gold and silver formed part of 
I 
the tribute of certain regions, and the raw materials secured by 
trade as a means of trade. Most transactions, expecially those of 
the pochteca, were conducted through barter and money as a means of 
exchange was largely a local market phenomenon (Chapman, 1957: 128). 
Gomara (1964: 163) maintains that even in the main market in Tenochtit- 
lan, barter was the most frequent form of-exchange. 
The use of these items as a form of balancing out inequalities 
of exchange, indicates a certain level of development of Aztec econo- 
mic life, and there is no reason why a more viable form of commodity 
money should have not come into being. It is impossible to tell whet- 
her or not the disadvantages of the cacao bean would have, given fur- 
ther social development, been percieved and a coinage developed. But 
the Spanish intervention cut short indigenous development and makes 
the question impossible to answer on any level other than speculation. 
Long-distance trade, however, even given the limitations imposed 
on it by state control and the lack of commodity money, developed to 
an impressive extent. Rather than being a function of the nobility, 
as was the case in less stratified societies; such as the Maya, long- 
distance trade in Aztec society was the purview of a specialised class 
of traders (Sanders and Price, 1968: 161). The pochteca were not sed- 
entary merchants, but long-distance travelers who secured goods from 
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far beyond the rim of the valley. In addition to selling goods 
they acted'as bankers of a sort, making loans of food and articles in 
return for pledges of land and other possessions. They took advan- 
tage of famines to acquire land and slaves from their less fortunate 
neighbours (Keen, 1971: 24). The fact that long-distance trade both 
required and supported a separate class to deal with it, testifies to 
its importance'Within the social formation. 
Even within this specialised class, there were specialised func- 
tions. Top ranking traders, evidently appointed by the ruler and the 
older pochteca, acted as entrepreneurs. They commissioned expeditions 
of outgoing traders to sell their goods and shared in the returns. 
Another class of traders which enjoyed high status were the slave 
traders. The king's traders dealt specifically with the ruler's goods. 
The ruler sent merchants out with the manufactured tribute of one 
province to be traded for the raw materials of another. Davies (1973: 
136), for example, mentions an occasion shown in the Florentine Codex 
where a ruler had 1600 cotton capes, the produce of received tribute, 
traded for luxuries in another region. The trader spies dealt not 
in luxury items, but in common goods such as knives, combs, or flint. 
They joined traders in the local markets of targeted regions and re- 
layed the information they gathered back to the crown (See Chapman, 
1957: 123-124 for a more detailed description of types of traders). 
The importance of the pochteca to the state, therefore, was 
three-fold. First. they secured desired raw materials from the low- 
lands which were unavailable in the central plateau. Second, while 
traders dealt primarily in their own merchandise they also on some 
major expeditions carried-out transactions. on behalf-of the ruler.. 
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Third, merchants familiar with the languages of other peoples, and 
masters of disguise, served as a sort of intelligence service to the 
state, relating detailed information on geography and political cli- 
mate which formed the basis of further conquests (Vaillant, 1962: 181). 
Merchants also paid high taxes and made valuable gifts to the ruler 
(Katz, 1966: 71). The military function of the merchants became so im- 
portant that itý is suggested (See Davies, 1973: 132) that the primary 
reason for Tenochtitlan's take over of the sister city of Tlatelolco 
was to bring Tlatelolco's extensive network of long-distance merchants 
under central control and direction. The merchants formed an inte- 
gral cog in the state machine. 
Trade was, therefore, inextricably linked with warfare. Where 
the traders went, the soldiers followed. Like the Spaniards who 
came after them, the Aztecs maintained that trade with other regions 
on their terms, was a natural right. and any interference a logical 
pretext for war. The merchants were protectdd by Aztec force of arms 
and any attack on them was considered justification for warfare (See 
Davies, 1973: 100). In unconquered areas not paying tribute to the 
Aztecs there were neutral places called ports of trade, kept purpose- 
fully peaceful by the major Indian groups so trade could be conducted. 
Comara (1964: 156), for example, mentions that even in areas conquered 
by the Aztecs the trade conducted with them was still very important 
to Moctezuma II. 
Summary 
It is obvious from the 7preceding discussion that Aztec society 
had progressed well beyond the stage of tribal communalism which char- 
acterised the s9cial formation when the Aztecs first came into ýhe 
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central valley and well beyond the stage of military democracy des- 
cribed by Morgan. By the time of the later empire, distinct social 
classes had emerged -a non-labouring ruling class composed of the 
monarch, nobles, appointed officials, and priests, and a labouring 
class made up largely of peasant producers. A state had emerged to 
serve as a mechanism for containing the ant,; ýgonisms that the divi- 
sion of people'into classes engendered, and to institutionalise and 
enforce existing eoohomic arrangements1whereby the ruling class lived 
off the appropriatedý-surplus. -prodtiction. of the labouring class. The 
Aztec ruling class, through the state, organised the appropriation 
of surplus production and its distribution, and enforced a situation 
wherein the labouring class was held in subordination. ' 
The Aztec ruling class secured and maintained its existence lar- 
gely through the appropriation of the surplus production of indivi- 
dual peasant producers who still held the means of production,. the 
land. But as the economic and political power of the state increas- 
ed, the ruling-class was gradually able to appropriate not just the 
surplus production from the producers working on their tribal lands, 
but to an increasing extent, land itself. Within the city-state 
more and more land was taken out of the calpulli system and designat- 
ed as public, or state land. Citizens were required to work this 
land as part of their obligation to the state. The produce from this 
land went to support the state and its activities. Outside the city- 
state large tracts of land were appropriated after military conquests. 
Some of this land was designated as public land to be worked communal- 
ly by the people of the region for the support of the Aztec state. 
Other land was given to the nobility and production from this land 
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went toward the individual noble's support. In some instances the 
land of thehobility was worked by the people of the region, communal- 
ly. In other instances the people occupying the land before the 
Aztecs took it over, remained-and worked as tenants, paying a sort 
of rent to the noble for their occupancy. Those who could not meet 
their obligations to the state might be made slaves, and therefore, 
slavery expanded as a form of labour. The primary form of appropria- 
tion, therefore, was tribute in kind collected from independent pea- 
sant producerso Other labour forms and therefore means of appropria- 
tion emerged. They existed simultaneously with but suboHinate to 
the primary labour form which remained throughout the history of 
the empire the independent peasant producer. 
The foregoing discussion of the Aztec socio-economic system 
makes apparent the particular ways in which the ancient mode of pro- 
duction characterised this later stage of development of the Aztec 
social formation. A ruling class as possessors of the dominant state 
organised the appropriation of surplus production largely from inde- 
- pendent peasant producers and distributed 
it in politically determin- 
ed ways. The state determined the set of tribute requirements, de- 
signated land as public, awarded land to individual nobles, distri- 
buted the spoils of conquest, and determined access to important state 
positions such as those of governor or tax collector. Rights and ob- 
ligations of producers and non-producers were politically negotiated. 
Struggles about access to the means of p roduction and distribution 
of surplus were conducted within the political level. 
The centrality of the political level at this stage of the dev- 
I 
elopment of the Aztec social formation informs. the following discussion 
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of organised violence within that society. In order for the Aztec 
ruling class to maintain its position of dominance, its position as the 
receivers of surplus, production, it had to ensure that that state con- 
tinued in a dominant position in relation to its own producing class 
and the producers of the surrounding conquered Indian groups. In the 
following sections -the ways in which four forms of organised state 
violence - warfare, forced labour, legal sanctions and human sacrifice 
functioned within Aztec society to maintain the particular set of 




WARFARE IN AZTEC MEXICO 
There are, as Marx notes, various pathways out of the stage of 
tribal communism. The particular pathway followed by any one social 
formation depends on a number of factors - "various external, clima- 
tic, geographical, physical, etc., conditions as well as on their 
special natural make-up - their tribal character" (Marx, 1964: 68). 
The path Aztec society was to follow was shaped by many factors, but 
the competitive environment in the central valley and the subsequent 
centrality of warfare in the region was one of the most important. 
The Aztecs had been forced to assume a military role since their 
entrance into the central valley, serving as mercenaries to the conr- 
peting Indian groups which had already established themselves in the 
region. Once the Aztecs had taken up sedentary agriculture, the de- 
fense of their land from these competing groups became essential. In 
such circumstances, as Marx points out, warfare becomes production- 
the great communal labour which consumes the energies and the minds 
of the people.. Warfare becomes: 
... the great all-embracing task, the great com-. 
munal labour, and it is required either for the 
occupation of the objective conditions for liv- 
ing existence or for the protection and perpetua- 
tion of such occupation. The community, consist- 
ing of kinship groups, is therefore in the first 
instance organised on military lines, as. a war- 
like, military force, and this is one of the con- 
ditions of its existence as a proprietor (Marx, 
1964: 71-72). 
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But what began in Aztec society as a communal endeavour, gra- 
dually became the function of a specialised warrior group. Whereas 
at one time men had all worked the land and contributed their ener- 
gies as warriors when required, as Aztec society developed, the sup- 
port of a group of men who spent more and more of their time occupied 
in warfare became central to the continued existence of the community. 
Over time this-warrior group gained in importance for in the competi- 
tive environment of the central valley, Aztec survival and prosperi- 
ty came to depend on'the competence of Aztec warriors (See Payne, 1892: 
1-4). The rise of a specialist warrior group represented a signifi- 
cant departure from traditional tribal organisation -a beginning of 
a division of labour within Aztec society and a beginning of the 
breakdown of what Durkheim described as 'mechanical solidarity. ' The 
rise of the warrior elite was an 'innocent extension, ' a preshadowing 
of a social system in which the specialisation or division of labour 
was to be characteristic. It was to be one of the beginnings of an 
interdependence among members of the society based on specialised 
function, or what Durkheim calls 'organic solidarity! (See Durkheim, 
1933). 
The various external factors existing in the central valley 
which set up the competitive militaristic climate, led to the im-- 
portance of the warrior group, but the warriors themselves took ad- 
vantage of the position they found themselves in. The external con- 
ditions, therefore, made possible a struggle for power on the part 
of the warrior elite. The events preceding:. and following the Tep- 
anec war. demonstrate just how powerful this warrior group had become 
and just how prepared they were to use their position to further 
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their interests. Not only were the warriors able to persuade the rest 
of the Aztec people to go to war with the Tepanecs, they were also able 
in the aftermath to keep most of the conquered lands for themselves. 
In doing so they set in motion what was to be a fundamental change in 
the structure of Aztec society. 
The distribution of the conquered Tepanec lands to the warrior 
elite instead Qf to the kinship groups, was a crucial move in estab- 
lishing the warrior elite as a ruling class, economically as well as 
politically set apart from the rest of the people. The newly conquer- 
ed Tepanec lands composed the economic foundation on which the new 
warrior ruling class was to base its position of dominance. From this 
point onward. the warrior elite was no longer totally dependent for 
its support on the surplus product awarded to it by the members of 
the Aztec community. The warrior elite, after the Tepanec war, had 
land and a labour force outside the Aztec calpulli structure and 
the produce from these conquered lands came to the warrior elite in- 
dependently of the decisions of the Aztec populace (Padden, 1967: 17). 
This change gave the warrior elite a certain degree of economic 
and therefore political independence from the Aztec populace. So, 
using their previously established power as a warrior elite and 
their new and expanding positioA of economic power gýiined through 
possession of the Tepanec lands, the warrior elite won the struggle 
for control of Aztec society. They took more and more control over 
decision making. Popular democracy declined and the elite establish- 
ed a state designed to organise its affairs to enforce the changed 
set of economic relations, to manage the antagonisms brought about 
by these changed relations, and to present the new relations as in 
the interests of the society as a whole. I 
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The taking of the Tepanec lands by the warrior elite represented 
a fundamental change in the method of distribution of the means of pr07 
duction, the land. Traditionally land had been held communally, di- 
vided among the calpulli, and then distributed to family units with- 
in the calpulli. After the Tepanec war, however, the community as a 
whole did not participate in the decision about land distribution. 
The decisions about the distribution of newly conquered land were made 
by the warrior elite. A special group, therefore, made the decisions 
about land distribution and this group acted in its own interests to 
distribute land among the members of the warrior group. This crucial 
event set the pattern for an increasing take over by the ruling class 
of decision making about the distribution of the means of production 
outside the city-state. Land came to be appropriated through warfare 
by a political entity, the state, and distributed in politically de- 
termined ways according to the position an individual held in rela- 
tion to the state (ruler, judge, priest, valued warrior). 
Even within the city-state, as the empire developed, more and 
more land was taken out of calpulli control and designated as state 
land. The produce from these lands went to support the state, its 
functionaries, and its. activities. Increasingly, the new warrior 
elite, the possessors of the state, made the decisions about the 
distribution of surplus product within the without the city-state. 
Over time the decision about the amount of surplus awarded to sup- 
port the elite was taken out of the hands of the people. No longer 
did the Aztec people freely give part of their produce to the warriors, 
but instead a-new ruling class through the state demanded this pro- 
duce. and the apparatuses of the state the legal system and the 
army, for examAle - enforced these demands. 
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Decisions about war and peace, as well, came to be made not by 
the people through the popular assembly but by the ruling class. 
And warfare came to be conducted not solely for the defense of ter- 
ritory or for the common good, but to maintain and advance the in- 
terests of the ruling class and its domination of surrounding areas. 
Warfare became organised violence primarily controlled and conducted 
for the benefit of the ruling class. 
That warfare was conducted primarily to benefit the Aztec ruling 
class is evident. The tribute from conquered provinces, the land 
taken over, and the products secured through subsequent trade agree- 
ments went primarily to the ruling class. The rewards were enormous. 
Conquests meant increased tribute sent back to Tenochtitlan, land and 
labour awarded to the state and the Aztec nobility and, as trade be- 
came more and more important, conquests also meant lucrative trade 
agreements. The tribute in goods from conquered provinces included 
foodstuffs such as maize and chilli peppers, manufactured products 
such as mantles and blankets, and certain raw materials such as stone, 
cotton, and cacao beans. Labourers and slaves and sacrificial vic- 
tims were also at times part of tribute payments. The vast amount of 
foodstuffs that poured into the-state in Tenochtitlan went primýrily 
to feed the monarch and his extensive household, and, for the monarch's 
elaborate entertaining. Manufactured products were distributed with- 
in the royal household and also given to the nobility. 
Many of these articles received in tribute functioned directly 
to delineate class distinctions. Cotton, for example, which was not 
grown in the central valley was secured from the lowlands and only 
the nobility were allowed to wear cotton clothing. The commoners were 
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required to wear coarse clothing made of maguey fibres (Duran, 1964: 
131-132). Other items such as rare foods functioned indirectly to 
mark the distinction between noble and commoner. Rare feathers, masks, 
and elaborate costumes received by the state as tribute, were award- 
ed to warriors as a sign of military rank and distinctions, and there- 
by, as well, went to support a system of power and differentiation. 
The goods-and labour secured through tribute, therefore, pro- 
vided the economic basis for the support of the state. Every conquest 
of an outlying-province increased the flow of goods and labourers to 
Tenochtitlan and therefore the economic and political power of the 
state. The land awarded to the nobility in conquered provinces. pro- 
vided the ruling class with further economic power. Warfare, then, 
was essential in order to secure the economic basis of support for 
the nobility and the state. 
The acquisition of empire was not only interlinked with the 
economic interests of the ruling class through tribute, but through 
trade and commerce as well (Davies, 1973: 107). Any refusal to trade 
with the Aztecs. or any interference in trade was considered tanta- 
mount to a declaration of war. As the empire developed trade agree- 
ments increasingly became a part of settlements with conquered pro- 
vinces. The people of Tepeaca, for example, during the reign of 
Moctezuma 1 (1440-1468) refused to trade with the Aztecs and killed 
the traders sent out to them. The Aztecs responded by sending an army 
to conquer the region. When the war was iqon Tepeaca became a vassal 
territory. The Indians of Tepeaca were assigned a tribute of maize, 
chilli, salt, pumpkin seeds, cloth, sandals, palm leaf mats and deer- 
skins. They were also required to provide labourers to act as carriers 
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on the roads, workmen to assist with building, and promises to have 
their men set up huts and tents in the event that the Aztecs wanted 
to fight a war in the region at some future date. But also part of 
the Tepeaca war settlement was that they were to take special care of 
travellers and traders. It was ordered that a great market be built 
in Tepeaca so merchants could trade there on a particular day (Duran, 
1964: 99-105). 'The Tepeaca Indians were instructed by the Aztecs to 
receive well all traders and merchants: 
... since these are the ones who enrich and ennoble 
the earth. They feed the poor, they maintain 
villages, and should anyone mistreat them or harm 
them you will notify us so that they may be puni- 
shed (Durtn, 1964: 102). 
Trade, therefore, as well as tribute were intimately linked to 
conquests, and where the traders went the army soon followed. The 
traders were an integral cog in the state machine. Some traders car- 
ried on transactions exclusively for the ruler, others traded semi- 
independently although even they at times secured raw materials or 
manufactured goods by trading in the resources the crown received in 
tribute. Dealing in common goods rather than luxury items, these 
traders were able to blend easily into local markets. They were able 
to travel without attracting great notice and frequently spoke the 
language of other Indian groups. They gleened much useful informa- 
tion about the political climate and the geography of outlying re- 
gions. Trade was extremely important to the state, politically and 
economically, and warfare secured trading interests for the ruling 
state. 
A number of scholars (See for example Helms, 1975: 104; Sanders 
and Price, 1968: 210; White, 1971: 138) have acknowledged the inherent 
88 
economic nature of Aztec expansion 
into surrounding areas. Few, 
however, have included an emphasis on the class nature of this expan- 
sion. Helms (1975: 104), for example, maintains that expansion was 
largely motivated by a desire to secure resources which were either 
not available in the central valley or not available in sufficient 
quantities. This rationale for Aztec expansion, as far as it goes, 
is true - but extremely misleading by itself. Sufficiency of re- 
sources was not a problem for the common people to sustain life, but 
for the ruling class to sustain its position of economic, social and 
political dominance. 
Moctezuma I, for example, in 1503 sent a great army to the Oax- 
aca region after a small tree reported to bear very delicate and beau- 
tiful flowers. His reason for doing so was said to be that he was 
enraged that another ruler possessed something he did not (Davies, 
1973: 223). This war was indeed conducted to secure a resource un- 
available in the central valley but the resource was needed not to 
sustain or enrich the lives of the people. as a whole, but to mark 
the status of7. -the monarch. When the Aztecs demanded of a conquered 
region, labourers to build houses for the nobility or workers to 
build a causeway the primary function of which was military it be- 
comes difficult to argue that wars were a matter of ýecuring essential 
or resources (Duran, 1964: 187; Davies, 1973: 84; Bandelier, 1877: 151). 
The resources secured through tribute and trade were not destined to 
meet the needs of the common people. but'ýto meet the desires of the 
ruling class and the requirements of the state, the continued exis- 
tence of which became dependent on military success (Davies, 1973: 
203). 
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The class nature of Aztec warfare can be seen in the interests 
it served within the city-state, but even in the relations of the Az- 
tec state with outside groups the class nature of the society and 
therefore its warfare is apparent. Padden (1967: 38), for example, 
comments that the Aztec ruling class had more in common with the no- 
bility of other regions than the labourers of their own city-state. 
The populated land appropriated after wars of conquest most frequent- 
ly belonged to the common people and not to the nobles. When an. out- 
lying province was conquered by warfare its basic political and so- 
cial structure was usually left in tact. Very seldom, and only with 
especially rebellious groups were indigenous rulers replaced or gar- 
risons established. Defeated rulers were usually given back their 
lands and their titles after a war to ensure that they would collect 
the tribute imposed on their subjects (Davies, 1973: 77,84,113-114). 
In a war against Huaxtec, for example, 'the Aztecs s; ýCked the 
city, burned the temple to the ground and killed many people. 
ýhey 
spared, however, certain great rulers who promised them large tributes 
(Duran, 1964: 108). The nobility and rulers of conquered provinces 
were an essential part of the Aztec strategy of domination. The 
Aztecs used the traditional rulers to collect tribute rather than 
attempting to install a military governorship to do ýo. As long as 
tribute and trading demands were met the internal affairs of the 
conquered-province were of little interest or concern to the Aztecs 
(Vaillant, 1962: 82; Zorita, 1965: 11,134). Most often, the only Az- 
tec official left in a conquered province was a civil servant to col- 
lect taxes (Soustelle, 1961: xxi).. 
Sometimes, even in the case of a rebellion when the rulers 
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themselves had been the ones to decide to withhold tribute from the 
Aztecs, the rulers were left in power after the Aztecs had quelled 
the rebellion. Durafn (1964: 126-127) tells of the reaction of the 
people of Coaixtlahuaca in just such an instance. The people were 
said to have told the Aztecs: 
0 Aztec lords, why do you kill us? 
What fault is it of ours, we who are ignorant, 
simple people. 
Who are free of malice and have nothing to gain? 
Why do you take revenge on--us? 
We have not angered you nor offended you nor 
troubled you! 
And yet you have spared those cursed thieves, 
Our chiefs and lords, who have brought nothing 
but death to us? 
Have we not been the ones to pay the tribute? 
By any chance do they pay it? 
Is it not all the result of our sweat and labour? 
When we have cloth, did they weave it for you? 
No, it was woven by ourselves and out wives. 
If you received cacao, gold and precious stones, 
Rich plumage and fish, 
Were we not1he ones who offered it to our lord 
MotecZoma 
And to our masters the Aztecs? 
Spare our lives, 0 Aztecs. 
This was one of the few occasions when the Aztecs did actually kill 
the nobles of a captured province. - Moctezuma had their throats slit 
and set up an Aztec governor in their stead (Duran, 1964: 127). 
Aztec warfare, then, had a distinct class nature. The benefits 
of warfare went primarily to the ruling class, and settlements after 
a war reflect the concern of the Aztecs to maintain hierarchical re- 
lations within those groups they conquered by leaving in most cases 
the ruling nobility in the group in tact. (See Davies, 1973: 104). Ob- 
viously there were some benefits to the common people of the confed- 
erated three cities of being part of the dominant political group in 
the central valley. At times, for example, goods received in tribute 
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were distributed as gifts to the common people. The commoners to some 
extent shared the benefits of conquests and wars. They did not, how- 
ever, share in the benefits equitably (Vaillant, 1962: 104). Most fre- 
quently, distribution of state goods only occurred in times of famine 
when, for example, grain stores were opened for the public to prevent 
depopulation of the cities (Davies, 1973: 93). 
Wars of cdnquest, at least in the early years of the later em- 
pire, did provide a means through which warriors of common status 
could achieve renoun for themselves and become a part of the ruling 
elite. In a war against Xochimilco, for example, which occurred 
shortly after the Tepanec campaign, the best lands along with the 
labour of the people who occupied them were awarded to the ruler and 
the participating lords. Then. land in Xochimilco was also set aside 
to support the Aztec officials of the state and the clergy. Other 
less desirable land was distributed to plebians who had distinguish- 
ed themselves in combat (Padden, 1967: 19-20). Distribution of these 
lands, however, was always in the control of the state and as the 
socialýhierarchy became more rigid and entrance to the ranks of the 
nobility restricted. 
Perpetual wars of conquest held immense rewards for the nobility 
and the state. Because the Aztec ruling class supported itself part- 
ly through the products and labour secured from conquered provinces, 
warfare became essential to the continued maintenance and expansion 
of their economic and political power. The Aztec nobility constantly 
pressured for new wars of conquest and Aztec rulers who did not pur- 
sue a course of continual warfare were replaced. There is some in- 
dication, for example, that Tizoc, who reigned from 1481 to 1486, 
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was poisoned because he was generally thought to be cowardly and in- 
effectual and did not do enough warring (Duran, 1964: 180). The pri- 
mary overriding concern, therefore, of the state came to be protecting 
its own land, conquering new land, and the maintenance of dominance 
over previously conquered lands. 
As has been noted, the Aztecs did not integrate conquered terri- 
tories into thd empire in more than a superficial way. They general- 
ly left indigenous rulers in power, and with only minimal military 
presence attempted to hold together an empire which was in actuality 
only a loose federation of various ethnic and political groups (Helms, 
1975: 104). Because of their loose hold on these conquered regions, 
however, the history of the empire was characterised by successive 
waves of expansion and then periods of consolidation. When expansion 
began to stretch the resources of. the empire, a period of consolida- 
tion followed. Some rulers adopted specific policies along these lines 
as did Moctezuma 11 (1502-1520), who wanted to use the outlines of 
the existing empire as a skeleton to be fleshed out by more fully 
consolidating the hold of the empire over these areas (Davies, 1973: 
213-218). There was always at least the potential of rebellion all 
over the empire, and in fact, rebellions were frequent. Indian. pic- 
ture writings provide clear records of the continualýseries of upri- 
sings in which people in conquered cities attempted to reestablish 
their independence. (Soustelle, 1961: xxii)o 
The Aztecs were usually able to contain these rebellions, but 
they were both costly and dangerous. A rebellion meant diverting re- 
sources to support an unplanned war effort and more importantly a 
challenge to the position of dominance of. the state on which the 
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whole system depended. The Aztecs were only too aware of the danger- 
ous political implications of rebellions in an empire so scantily do- 
minated. Having once been dominated themselves, and having grown 
strong enough to successfully test their subjugation, they well under- 
stood the importance of meeting with force every assertion of strength 
from those they dominated. one successful rebellion could lead to 
many more, and'spell the eventual disintegration of the empire. 
Sometimes, therefore, a 'rebellion' was merely a refusal by 
the leader of one of these groups of an invitation to Tenochtitlan. 
Rulers of neighbouring provinces were regularly required to attend 
feasts which were great displays of wealth designed to impress on 
the-rulers the power of the. Aztecs. These invitations were demýnstra- 
tions of Aztec dominance and ability to command obedience. Just as 
the Aztecs had at one time tested the strength and resolve of their 
dominators, they constantly tested the submissiveness of those they 
dominated. 
Very soon after the defeat of the Tepanecs, for example, the 
Aztecs sent a demand to the ruler of Cuitlahuac for maidens of noble 
families to dance at a religious ceremony. The rulers of Cuitlahuac, 
sent an indignant refusal in response: 
Are my daughters, sisters and relations, and C2 
those of the lords of Cuitlahuac mere toys or 
bufoons of your god, that they must sing and 
dance before him (Davies, 1973: 84). 
This refusal was, to the Aztecs, a declaration of war. A refused de- 
mand was considered a sure indication of an erosion of power that must 
quickly be reinstated - for Aztec domination depended on political 
power to command resources. If demands were not complied with Az- 
tec armies responded with force. The demands on the surrounding 
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peoples served many purposes. Sometimes they were a matter of sheer 
greedi sometimes a pretext for war, but always the demands were design- 
ed to assert dominance. The belief only grew stronger as the empire 
expanded that it was the Aztecs function to make war and the func- 
tion of other peoples to work for them (Soustelle, 1961: xxiii). 
With the rise of classes in Aztec society and the state, warfare 
came to be geared increasingly toward advancing the interests of the 
ruling class. As the state gained more and more power it develop- 
ed and sophisticated its control over warfare, as indeed it would do 
over other forms of violence. Warfare was not a chance occurrence or 
an expression of the desires of the society as a whole, but an acti- 
vity directed and controlled by the state. As the empire developed 
the state attempted to increase its control over the conduct of war- 
fare so that violence was directed to accomplishing state goals (Davies, 
1973: 183-184). 
The Aztec ruling class was not interested in land as such, but 
populated land. A labour'force was needed to work the land appropriat- 
ed and therefore provide tribute and products which could be traded. 
The Aztecs, therefore, did not often devastate another region in war- 
fare. When they did so, it was as a punishment for peoples thought 
to be especially dangerous. Widespread looting, killing and destruc- 
tion, while effective politically as a demonstration of the might of 
the Aztecs, was economically unsound and usually avoided. When the 
Aztecs deemed it necessary to make a political statement and destroy 
a region. they usually attempted to repopulate it with citizens from 
the main empire cities. People were encouraged to volunteer for re- 
settlement in these areas through state promises of high offices and 
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freedom from tribute. They were also told that such resettlement was 
the will of the gods (Duran, 1964: 200). Such resettlement programs, 'r 
however, were not usually highly effective. And. a state which de- 
pended primarily on appropriated agricultural surplus could ill af- 
ford to often disrupt radically the basis on which its continued exis- 
tence depended. It was in the interests of the state, therefore, to 
avoid widespread destruction in war, and even war itself if the de- 
signs of the state could be accomplished otherwise. 
This point is clearly illustrated in the set of negotiations that 
went on prior to the conquest of a new province. Emissaries, in 
some cases three different sets of emissaries, one from each of the 
cities of the Triple Alliance, were sent out to offer targeted In- 
dian groups a choice - tribute or war. This ultimatum allowed the 
people time to consider the risks of warfare. The reputation of the 
Aztecs as fearsome warriors, a reputation they were careful to culti- 
vate, made this choice an ominous one. The emissaries attempted to 
impress, especially on the old, the miseries a war would bring and the 
higher tribute demands which could be necessary if a war was actually 
fought. If the rulers of the province agreed, tribute and trade ar- 
rangements were set, rulers and nobles maintained their positions of 
power, and there was no warfare (Zorita, 1965: 111,134). When negotia- 
tions were unsatisfactory, however, a war ensued and the Aztecs con- 
tinued fighting until their demands were met. 
The state also attempted to control'the behavior and limit the 
actions of its warriors after a war. In 1496, for example, the Az-, 
tec ruler Ahuitzotl dispatched an army to Tehuantepec to put down 
a trade rebellion. Tehuantepec was more distant than any area 
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previously conquered- and much of the motivation of the individual 
warriors to make such a long and arduous journey on foot and without 
pack animals lay in the anticipated rewards of plunder. The wider 
politics of the empire, however, were against such actions. The hold- 
ing of such a distant province and the maintenance of a continued flow 
of tribute depended to a certain extent on the good will, or at least 
the compliance-, of the conquered peoples. A bloody massacre and wides- 
pread looting was likely to accomplish little as far as the state was 
concerned except depopulation, consequent lessened tribute and a 
great deal of. -resentment which would threaten to breed further re- 
bellion and further expensive campaigns. 
It was usually in the state's interest to adopt a conciliatory 
attitude to conquered peoples, especially those who were far away and 
likely to be difficult to control. After the Tehuantepec campaign 
Ahuitzotl decreed that warriors were to be forbidden from. looting and 
all the booty was to be collected by the state. The subsequent. dis- 
content of the warriors over this decree prompted a distribution of 
almost all of the war booty to the warriors. The state relinquished 
its claim to all the booty, but booty was distributed to the warriors 
by the state. The warriors were not allowed to take it themselves. 
This event is an important indication of the statels, increasing at- 
tempts to establish an army solely under its control. Warriors were 
even told that they were no longer to buy precious goods in the mar- 
ketplace, but were to wait for a distribution of these goods by the 
sovereign (Duran , 1964: 142). Decrees such as this one illustrate the 
degree to which the state understood the importance of securing the 
I 
dependence of members of the army on the state thereby facilitating 
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state control of warfare itself. 
it is quite apparent that the Aztec ruling class was the primary 
initiator and beneficiary of warfare, and that the continued existence 
of ruling class power, both economically and politically was depen- 
dent on perpetual warfare. But, it was in the ruling class' inter- 
est to represent its actions as being in the interests of the group 
as a whole. And here as well the state played a crucial role. By 
objectifying interests, representing the interests of the ruling class 
as the interests of society as a whole, the state attempted to obfus- 
cate the real reasons for warfare. A great deal of 'ideological work' 
was directdd toward convincing the masses of people that they were 
fighting for some reason other than the enrichment of the ruling class. 
Nezahualcoyotl, for example, the Texcocan ruler from 1418 to 1472, is 
said to have lectured his people: 
It is the co n people who cause warwith their 
ignorance and their recklessness (Duran, 1964: 
88). 
But. negotiations for, warfare frequently went on in secret when ru- 
lers of other Indian groups were invited to Tenochtitlan and enter- 
tained privately. Duran (1964: 193) comments: 
The reasons for all this secrecy was that they 
did not wish the common people... to suspect that 
kings and rulers made alliances, came to agree- 
ments and formed friendships at the cost of the 
life of the common man, and the hsedding of his 
blood. 
The legitimation of warfare, however, required more than just 
pronouncements by rulers blaming the commoners. A complex array of 
ideas and beliefs evolved and were constructed to generate a warfare 
mentality and a belief that warfare was in the interests of all. 
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The Ideology of Warfare 
One of the most interesting aspects of the transformation of a 
social formation from one stage of development to another is the 
ideological transformation which occurs along with it. The transfor- 
mation of Aztec society from a tribal democracy to a warring imperial- 
ist state did not occur without profound changes in the ways in which 
men and women thought about themselves, the social organisation with- 
in which they were living, and their own existence. These changes 
did not occur all at once, some changes in thought predetermined 
political and economic transformation, others accompanied it and 
still further changes were a consequence of it. The changes in 
thought were partly a response to given conditions of existence in 
the central valley and partly the result of purposeful and deliberate 
manipulation by those in power who stood to gain by such changes. 
Obviously, the very entrance of the Aztecs into the central val- 
ley had brought about profound changes in thought. No longer able to 
hunt and gather and move about as they pleased, the Aztecs found them- 
selves in an area dominated by a number of settled agricultural 
groups all competing among each other for control of resources in 
the central valley. The Aztecs could either become competitors them- 
selves, leave the valley, or starve - the options were clear. Con- 
fronted with this different conception of territoriality, they were 
forced to modify their own conceptions just to continue as a group. 
The material conditions of existence in the central valley, therefore, 
forced the Aztecs to develop a political, economic and ideological 
structure which would ensure their survival in such a context. 
Religion served as a primary ideological tool in the process of 
transforming ideas to ones more appropriate to a military expansionist I 
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state. Religion came to be as much an apparatus of the state as did 
the legal system which will be discussed later (Kurtz, 1978: 174). 
Church and state were one in Aztec thought and warfare was represent- 
ed as a religious endeavour (Peterson, 1961: iii; Prescott, 1922: 
30). Aztec theology was revised and modified so that it supported 
this warring social order. Benevolent agricultural gods were replac- 
ed by fierce war gods, and a special heaven was reserved for warriors. 
The popular conception came to be fostered by the state that the Az- 
tecs were destined to rule the world. Military prowess was made the 
key to social advancement in the increasingly hierarchical society. 
The Rearrangement of the Gods. One of the most revealing legends 
from the early years of Aztec societal transition from tribal commun- 
'al-ism to an ancient state system is the legend concerning the rebel- 
lion against and eventual ousting of Malinalxochtl. Malinalxochtl 
was the 'witch' who, according to legend recorded in the Codex Ra- 
8 
mirez , had been the chief of the tribe at one time. She is said to 
have ruled through magic powers known only to her. She knew, for 
example, how to tame wild beasts and used them to fight against men. 
Once the Aztecs had established themselves within the fiercely conr- 
petitive environment of the central valley Malinalxochitl's brother, 
Huitzilopochtli, is said to have advised leading priests to do away 
with her. He told them that sorcery and magic were old fashioned and 
that they would never bring the Aztecs power and glory. Only "strength 
and valour of heart and arm... " he told them could do so '(Sejourne, 
1976: 18-19). 
1. j Sejourne (1976: 19) argues that this legend represented a revo- 
lution in Aztec thought, an, ýattempt to replace out of date concepts 
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with those more in keeping with a militarist society. Huitzilopoch- 
tli, the war god, replaced the sorceress thus making a statement about 
the need to emphasise will power, rationality, strength of will and 
force of arms. According to legend, Huitzilopochtli is said to have 
stated, after his victory over his sister: 
My chief mission and my task is war ... I have to 
watch and join issue wýth all manner of nations 
and that not kindly. 
The four corners of the world shall ye comquer, 
win, and subject to yourselves... it shall cost 
you sweat, work and pure blood (Quoted in Se- 
purne ,. 1976: 20). 
The elevation of Huitzilopochtli was symbolic of the creation within 
Aztec thov664. of a sphere in which the will of men could function. 
Men were not to be thought of as totally at the mercy of nature and 
its magic, through their will and force of arms they could, to some 
extent, direct'their fate. This was indeed a revolutionary change 
in basic philosophy. 
After the defeat of Atzcapotzalco a further series of signifi- 
cant changes in thought and religion occurred. Duran (1964: 110) and 
other more contemporary scholars (Ste for example Miguel Leon-Portilla, 
1971: 158-166) attribute many of these innovations directly to one man, 
Tlacaelel, who was a general in the campaign to secure the Tepanec 
lands as well as powerful advisor to a number of Aztec rulers after 
the defeat. But, however instrumental Tlacaelel was in formalising 
these changes, he did not impose them as an individual outside a so- 
cial context. Tlacaelel may indeed have perceived changes that were 
necessary and articulated them in the form of decrees and laws, but 
the changes attributed to him could only have been made within the 
wider social context. Tlacaelel's genius*was his ability to understand 
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and manipulate concepts which were imbedded in Aztec culture and mo- 
dify them so that they served the interests of a militarist state. 
Religious concepts were a very important part of the transforma- 
tion of the Aztec social formation into a warring imperialist state. 
The Aztecs inherited from their predecessors a milder version of the 
religious beliefs which came to dominate the central valley. Only 
later was a rather darker mythology grafted onto existing belief (Pres- 
1. j 
cott, 1922: 37). SeJourne (1976: 45) notes that this process was*one 
of bringing religion into the service of a "cruel state philosophy. " 
Tlacaelel played an important part in the reconstruction of religious 
myths which aided the goals of this new so cial order. 
The rearranging of the importance of the gods in the Aztec pan- 
theon was representative of this shifting in required values. Reli- 
gion became an ideological tool of the state, used to bring about 
changes and maintain them, instilled in the minds of the people. Tla- 
caelel was instrumental in the'elevation in status of Huitzilopochtli 
to a position of equality with, if not supremacy over, other gods 
traditionally worshipped in the valley. Huitzilopochtli was to be- 
come, as the empire expanded, increasingly important and he assumed 
more and more the functions and-attributes of other gods. Keen (1971: 
33) suggests that given time, this process might have. brought the 
Aztecs to monotheism, for Tlacaelel and his theologians were develop- 
ing Huitzilopochtli into a symbol of imperial sovereignty (Kurtz, 
1978: 178). The transition in status of Huitzilopochtli was a reflec- 
tion of changed social conditions, the earlyi, transition of the Aztecs 
from plural leadership to one chosen leader, and also the societyts 
transition from a pacific agricultural grouping to a warring imperi- 
alist state (Dayies, 1973: 27). But Huitzilopochtli's elevation also 
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in part made this warring imperialist state possible, for belief in 
him was a motivation gor war. 
Huitzilopochtli was, above all else, a war god. According to 
legend he emerged from his mother's womb with a shield in one hand 
and-a--spear., 'in'. the other, and promptly killed all his brothers and 
sisters who were jealous. 6-f-his somewhat dubious conception. It is 
possible that4one pime Huitzilopochtli had been a leader and at 
his death was elevated to the status of a god. , 
Ofter his eleva- 
tion within the Aztec pantheon to a position of dominance, the Aztecs 
never set to war without consulting in the temple decicated to this 
god (See-. Spence, 1923: 65-91 for a further discussion of the signifi- 
cance of Huitzilopochtli). 
The ancient god Quetzalcoatl who had ýeen extremely important 
in the civilisations-of central. Mexico such as Tula and Teotihuacan, 
was very different from the fierce warring Huitzilopochtli. Quet- 
zalcoatl was the central god of civilisations based on agricultural 
efficiency and plenty. Ile was a god of culture and benevolence - 
a god who was loved more than feared, and who asked only for offer- 
ings of flowers and butterflies. As Sejourne (1976: 27) notes, a god 
with a character such as that of Quetzalcoatl would have been "trouble- 
some at the head of so cruel an empire" as was to be developed by 
the Aztecs. Huitzilopochtli, however, was a reflection of a social 
order in which warfare had been elevated to pre-eminent importance. 
He was to be feared, not loved, and his ferocity was reflected in 
his demand not for offerings-of flowers or butterflies. but the blood 
of human beings. He reflected the concerns and values of the new 
social formation and advanced their-development. 
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The replacing of the gods and the re-evaluating of their posi- 
tion within the pantheon were important modifications in religious 
thought which were consistent with the needs of a militarist state. 
The construction of ideologies is a complex process, however, ideo- 
logies are seldom merely the conscious cynical constructions of self- 
interested individuals. No one can say, for example, the degree to 
which Tlacaelel consciously manipulated beliefs in the interests of 
his own class and the state which represented it, and the degree to 
which he actually believed them. Tlacaelel and his theologians pour- 
ed over the ancient legends seeking new interpretations which were 
consistent with the needs of the new military expansionist state. 
Whether they did so in a conscious effort to manipulate ideas or only 
saw themselves as reinterpreting and shedding new light on these pre- 
viously undeveloped legends is impossible to say, and in the final 
analysis it is irrelevant. The important point is that whether Tla- 
caelel and his minions believed their constructions or not, other 
people did believe them enough to motivate them to fight wars which 
were in the interests of the state. In the construction and propa- 
gation of ideologies. there is usually a complex process going on, 
combining cynical manipulation of ideas with a partial belief in 
those ideas. It is virtually impossible to distingulish betweenýthe 
two. The fact remains, however, that the Aztecs orchestrated a 
quite practical management of ideology which served state ends. 
In addition to being willing to rea rrange the importance of their 
own gods, the Aztecs were quite practical in-their view of the reli- 
gions and gods of other peoples. They used the religious symbols of 
conquered peoples as a binding force to the empire. They set aside 
a special place, in Tenochtitlan where the gods of conquered peoples 
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resided. They took these gods prisoner and brought them back to the 
temple reserved for them. The Aztecs, therefore, surrounded their 
own gods with gods from every part of the empire (Soustelle, 1961: 21). 
The Aztec pantheon was, like the Aztecs themselves, extremely adaptable. 
It had room for many gods. At the time of the Spanish conquest, it 
was said that the gods of Mexico numbered two thousand (Gomara, 1964: 
166). 1 
The Warrior Heaven. The Aztecs believed history to be divided 
into a series of ages, or suns, each one ending in catastrophy and 
partial destruction of the. earth. The sun of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries was to end in earthquakes (Spence, 1923: 39). 
The age of the fifth sun, under which the Aztecs were living in. the 
later empire, was also distined to end in catastrophy. Aztec society, 
then, was greatly imbued with a sense of impending doom. Aztec 
theologians, however, decided that the eventual cataclysm, althouth 
unavoidable, could be put off by the sacrifice of captives taken in 
war. Every day when the sun waged its struggle with the forces of 
darkness, the moon and the stars, to rise again, the sun was to be 
made stronger in this battle by the blood of sacrificial captives. 
The Aztecs, the People of the Sun, through this revised cosmology 
symbolically took some small measure of control over, the otherwise 
uncontrollable forces of nature. 
There were numerous heavens in the Aztec belief system, thirteen 
by some accounts. Some of these heavens' were reserved for people, 
some were populated with planets, and others-. occupied by birds, or 
fire snakes. But, the most desirable heaven wa's reserved for war- 
riors, and women who had died in childbirth - presumed to be sacri- 
ficing their limes in an effort to bring new warriors into the world. 
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Warriors who were killed in battle or who were sacrificed after their 
capture were presumed to accompany the morning sun, Huitzilopochtli, 
on his daily journey across the sky. On arrival in the west these 
warriors were greeted by the women who had died in childbirth. 'To- 
gether they all accompanied the sun on its nightly journey (Davies, 
1973: 172). 
People wh6 were sacrificed to Tlaloc, the Rain God, or who died 
of dropsy, leprosy, or venereal diseases went to the heaven belonging 
to Tlaloc - not a bad "terrestial paradise, " as Fray Bernardino de 
.9- Sahagun"%: 'described'it. "where they feign that there is surfeit of 
pleasure and refreshment" (Quoted in Spence, 1923: 62). The rest of 
humanity, however, rich or poor were destined to a grim underworld 
(Davies, 1973: 173). An initial journey to this underworld was fill- 
ed with terrors which could- to some extent be mitigated by the of- 
ferings of the living. But after this journey, souls reached the 
place of the dead where they were thought to find some measure of 
rest. Mictlampa was not a place of punishment but merely a place 
for the dead, and it played host to the souls of both the good and 
the evil (Spence, 1923: 63-64). The Aztec individual's destiny, there- 
fore, after death depended on the way in which he died instead of 
the way in which he lived, and there was great reward for dying in 
battle. Then at least he was assured a place in the most desirable 
and glqv-ious of heavens. An Aztec song reflects the desire for such 
a death: 
There is nothing like death in war, 
nothing like flowery death 
so precious to the Giver of Life 
Far off I see it: my heart yearns for it! 
(Quoted in keen,. 1971: 41)_.. 
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Religious belief, therefore, provided a much desired reward for dying 
in an attempt to serve state interests. 
Manifest Destiny. The Aztecs justified their domination of the 
country in terms of a sort of-natural right or manifest destiny. It 
was official state ideology that the Aztec polity was destined to rule 
the world as they knew it (Zorita, 1965: 4). The Aztec ruling class 
asserted that they were the heirs and successors of the Toltecs of 
Tula who had at one time ruled in central Mexico and that they had, 
therefore, domination over the entire region. From this point of view 
any city which refused to accept their overlordship was considered to 
be in rebellion. Causes for beginning warfare, therefore, were not 
difficult to find. Since the targeted cities belonged to them by 
right, warfare was merely a matter of forcing other groups to accept 
their natural position. If these groups succumbed without a struggle, 
tribute requirements were framed in terms of'. a 'voluntary gift' (Sous- 
telle, 1961: 206). -The powerful Aztec religion, therefore, and this 
concept of manifest destiny fed Aztec imperialism (Caso, 1958: 72-94). 
Social Mobility. The social system was structured to reward and 
promote warfare. Warring was considered the highest endeavour of man. 
At birth male children were presented with weapons and instructed in 
the glories of warfare. The umbilical cord of the male infant was 
taken and secretly buried in enemy territory so that he would be 
drawn into warfare (Peterson, 1961: 155). Special schools for the 
sons of the nobility were geared toward producing great warriors, and 
to achieve warrior rank was the ambition of most. Young men wore a 
lock of hair which was cut, only when they had achieved the rank of 
warrior. When a young man had taken his first prisoner he was 
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admitted into society with full rank and privileges and was then free 
to marry (Peterson, 1961: 156). If a young man failed to take captives 
singlehandedly in several battles, he was returned disgraced to civil 
life, his long lock of hair a mark of his worthlessness to the society 
(Thompson, 1933: 43). 
The Florentine Codex^ records the* Aztec image of a good and a 
bad warrior: 
The good valiant man (is) one who excels others 
-a victor, a conqueror, a taker of captives. 
He is reckless, he destroys, he charges the foe; 
he takes captives, he besieges, he sweeps away 
(the foe). 
The bad valiant warrior (is) unreliable... is 
afraid of war, timid; he is cowardly in his 
retreat (Sahagun, 1961: 23-24). 
To be a great warrior, therefore, in Aztec society was to be a 
respected and yalued man. And until the later stages of the empire, 
under Moctezuma II, when the existing nobility began to solidify its 
hold on social position, military distinction was the key to social 
mobility (White, 1971: 108). Important government positions and grants 
of land were reserved for successful warriors (Peterson, 1961: 156). 
Tlacaelel, for example, issued a directive: 
We also order... that if sons 
Be born of slave girls and maids, even tho6gh 
they be 
bastards, they be considered our blood. If 
any of these 
Bevaliant and courageous in war, more than our 
legitimate :' 
Sons who might be cowards, let them inherit our 
wealth (Duridn, 1964: 142). 1 
This open policy of social mobility according to military dis- 
tinction encouraged even commoners to distinguish themselves through 
warfare. But as the nobility and their families grew, pressure to 
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limit entry into the nobility and assure the spoils of war to the sons 
of the nobility increased (Katz, 1966: 137). When Moctezuma II was 
crowned in 1502, he had all those of common birth removed from his 
service and decreed that the sons of lowly women or slaves were not 
to become members of the nobility (Kurtz, 1978: 168,189). Agair. it 
is not possible to do more than speculate what the effect of this 
policy would have been had society in Mexico continued undisturbed 
by the Spanish conquest. It is possible that this policy and the 
changes in land ownership and labour 
: forms-might have led to a aevel- 
opment of a social formation characterised by the feudal rather than 
the ancient mode of production. But it is also possible that the 
stagnation of social mobility, the end of the military meritocracy 
could have led to the owerthrow of the Aztec state by another group. 
These developments - the restriction of entry into the nobility, the 
increasing hold over the land by the nobility who worked peasants as 
serfs - were preshadowings which could indicate the possibility of 
the rise of a feudal mode of production in central Mexico. They 
were, however, not invariant determinants of a rise of feudalism out 
of the ancient mode of production. 
Silmm, qry 
Warfare in Aztec society was a fundamental and integral part of 
the way in which the economic structure was organised. The spoils 
of warfare, the tribute secured, and the'land and labour appropriat- 
ed provided a means of support for the Aztec': . state and the 
Aztec ru- 
ling class. Warfare, therefore, was the primary method through which 
the Aztec ruling class secured the. economic conditions of its 
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existence. A great deal of ideological work was done by the state to 
instill in the minds of the people values consistent with those need- 
ed by a warring imperialist society. A war god was elevated to a 
position of dominance within the Aztec pantheon- and turned into a 
symbol of Aztec imperial sovereignty. A special heaven was reserv- 
ed as a reward for those who gave their lives fighting wars in the in- 
terests of the state. The ruling class asserted a mandate to rule 
based on their inherited domination of the region through the Toltecs. 
For a time at least, success in warfare was made the key to social 
advancement thus offering a reward for serving state interests which 
could be redeemed before entrance into the afterlife. 
The Aztec state used warfare and the threat of warfare to irjr- 
pose a particular set of relations of production on groups in surround- 
ing regions. The maintenance of this set of relations of production, 
the maintenance of the position of the Aztec ruling class as the re- 
ceivers of appropriated surplus depended to a large extent on poli- 
tical domination. The Aztec ruling class appropriated surplus as the 
possessors of the dominant political entity in the central valley. 
They had to be, therefore, constantly aware of any erosion of their 
position at the apex of political power and continually ready to 
reinstate the position with force if necessary. An important part 
of understanding the organised violence of the Aztec state is acknow- 
ledging the centrality of the political level in the social forma- 
tion. The Aztec ruling class enforced and maintiined a particular 
set of relations of production which'served their interests primarily 
through political means. Violence, therefore, was used as a tool to 
support political domination. This-use of violence as a political 
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too] can be seen clearly in the state's appropriation and subsequent 
development of the practice of human sacrifice to serve its ends. 
11]. 
CHAPTER IV 
AZTEC HUMAN SACRIFICE AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 
The Aztec 
ft 
practice of ceremonially sacrificing human beings has 
been one of the continuing. fascinations of those who have written 
about pre-conquest Mexico. From the sixteenth century to the twen- 
tieth various chroniclers and scholars have speculated about the 
reasons for its existence. - J'hese speculations have ranged from 
devil possession to lack of protein in the diet. To most of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century chroniclers and scholars (For examý- 
ple Diaz, Cortes, Francisco de Aguilar, Oviedo, Sepulveda, Thevet, 
Zapulli, and Chaveton) the explanation for human sacrifice was 
str? Lightforward. It was the influence of the devil. The-Jesuit, 
losephus Acosta (1625: 1037) is characteristic in his lament that the 
sacrifices were the "great misery wherein the Devil holds this blind 
nation. " 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. a few scholar's (for 
example, Clavigero and Marzuez) took a more detached view and point- 
ed out that human sacrifice had been practised in a number of cul- 
tures and no particular explanation for its existence in Aztec so- 
ciety was necessary. In 1845, the Mexican scholar Jose Fernando 
Ramfrez, maintained sacrifice was simply one aspect of a particular 
stage of development of Aztec sociity-. -. Orozco y Berra, in his 
Historia Antigua y de la Conquista de Mexico, published in 1880, 
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followed closely Rami 'r rez' ideas. He maintained that human sacrifice 
corresponded to a certain universal stage of social development. 
Most twentieth century scholars (See for example Peterson, 1961: 
145-150; Soustelle, 1961: 98-99) have only described human sacrifice, 
shunning any attempt to offer explanations for it except those which 
the Aztecs themselves promulgated (See SeJourne, 1976: 14). Aztec 
human sacrifice, therefore, is generally treated by contemporary his- 
tirians as one interesting phenomenon among the complex mix of cus- 
toms which characterised Aztec society. A few contemporary scholars 
(See for example Wolf, 1959: 145) take a psychological approach and 
hint that the explanation for Aztec human sacrifice lies somewhere 
in an analysis of the Aztec personality (See Keen, 1971 for an expand- 
ed discussion of the various perspectives expressed by the writers 
mentioned). 
None of these speculative assertions, however, really forms an 
adequate explanation. None actually presents an expanded argument 
which accounts for the existence of human sacrifice, nor explains the 
particular form it took in Aztec society. Devil possession holds no 
currency as a social scientific explanation, and indeed raises more 
questions than it answers. And to merely assert that sacrifice oc- 
curred elsewhere and corresponded to a certiin stage, of development, 
hardly explains why it occurred at all, why it corresponded to this 
particular stage of development, nor why it took the particular form 
it did in Aztec Mexico. To refer back to the "Aztec personality" 
as an explanatior also raises more question's than it answers. and 
as Wolf (1959: 145) himself notes, no analysis of the Aztec person- 
ality has as yet been undertaken which explains human sacrifice. 
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Only a handful of scholars have attempted to consider the phen- 
omenon of Aztec human sacrifice in materialist or class terms. The 
English writer, Edward Payne, in his History of the NeV': World Called 
America, was one of the first to do so. Payne (1892, Vol 1: 500) po- 
sited that Aztec ritual human sacrifice was a method of providing 
animal food for the ruling class, and that the religious mythology 
surrounding it was merely a facade for organised cannibalism. Where- 
as Payne linked the practice of human sacrifice with the desires and 
interests of the ruling class and noted the functional nature of 
the ideology constructed to support it, his assertion that the desire 
to consume human flesh was the underlying motivation for these ri- 
tuals is not backed up by substantiated argument, nor does it hold 
up well as an explanation when other information about the material 
conditions of existence in the central valley are considered. There 
were, for example, many sources of protein available in Mexico - vege- 
table protein, seafoods, domesticated turkeys and ducks, and even 
small dogs which the Aztecs ate (Duran, 1964: 32; Peterson, 1961: 28). 
And even if one accepted the notion that securing adequate protein 
was a problem, Payne's assertion still leaves many questions unan- 
swered. Why, for example, was this particular solution adopted? The 
Aztecs could have mobilised themselves in the large-scale production 
of turkeys or dogs. Why human beings? And why was human sacrifice 
adopted only by the Aztecs on a mass scale? Most of the other Indian 
groups in Mexico existed without using human beings as a protein 
source. 
Payne's hypothesis about the motivations behind Aztec human sa- 
crifice, while intriguing, is not'adequately backed up by argument. 
nor is it located within an elaborated theory of the nature of Aztec 
I 
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society as a whole. But_ while Payne failed to provide adequate evi- 
dence that human sacrifice was conducted for the reasons he proposed, 
he did link the practice with the desires and interests of the ruling 
class and noted the contrived nature of the ideology surrounding it. 
Other more contemporary scholars (See SeJourne, 1976; Padden, 1967; 
,fI Vaillant, 1962) have also noted these connections. Laurette Sejourne9 
for example, mdintains that it was the economy "which ruled human 
sacrificeill and that human sacrifice was a fundamental part of the 
Aztec expansionist military state. She terms the ideology surround- 
It 0.1 ing human sacrifice as state propaganda" (SeJourne, 1976: 35,156). 
R. C. Padden (1967: 112) calls human sacrifice an "imperial hoax, " 
and George Vaillant (1962: 81-82) notes the functional nature of human 
sacrifice to ruling class economic concerns. Neither SeJourne, Vai- 
llant, nor Padden, however, go much further than merely asserting 
the connection-between the practice of human sacrifice and the inter- 
ests of the ruling class and the state. None of them goes on to de- 
monstrate just how human sacrifice fit into the political and econo- 
mic structure of Aztec society. Indeed, the comments made by these 
contemporary scholars about possible explanations of Aztec human sa- 
crifice are, by and large, digressions - speculations mentioned with- 
in larger works concerned with other issues. 6 
Given the particular social, political and economic situation 
in central Mexico at the time, however, and the history of the dev- 
elopment of Aztec society, SeJourne seems to have the most insight 
into accurately assessing the role of human ýacrifice when she asserts 
that human sacrifice was primarily a form of statecraft which assist- 
ed the expansionist strategy of Aztec imperialism. The Aztecs did 
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not invent human sacrifice, nor was sacrifice a feature solely of the 
empire phase of their development. What the Aztecs did, however, was 
to appropriate the practice and then elaborate on it in such a way 
that it became an act which served the interests of the empire both 
materially and ideologically. By appropriating the act, the state 
fcaptured' for itself the religious significance attached to it. 
This 'capture'. or redeployment of human sacrifice to serve state ends 
was only part of a wider appropriation of religion itself to support 
the Aztec state. SeJourne (1976: 16), for example, notes that Aztec 
religious concepts were a ". political weapon. " Religion became an 
ideological apparatus of the state used to justify state actions and 
legitimate state interests in the same way that the army became a 
coercive apparatus of the state, fighting its wars and enforcing its 
will. Religion was brought into service to the state. It was, as 
1.1 SeJourne (1976: 156) notes, "spirituality at the service of an Em- 
pire. " But what were the interests of the state*served by human sa- 
crifice? Why was this particular practice adopted and built into a 
prominent feature of Aztec society? 
Human sacrifice became an important-feature of Aztec society for 
a number of Veasons all of which were associated with maintaining 
the conditions of existence of the dominant polity in the central 
valley - the Aztec state. First, the elaborate and public displays 
of human sacrifice served as an effective form of state terror which 
assisted in the intimidation of surrounding Indian groups into accept- 
ing a position of political and economic subordination. Second, the 
act of sacrifice itself was an important symbolic representation of 
the centrality and power of the Aztec state, an act which graphically 
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stated the importance of the Aztec empire as a political entity. 
Third, the ideology surrounding human sacrifice, the 'cosmic mission 
theory' which asserted that by sacrificing human beings the Aztecs 
were fulfilling a divinely appointed task of keeping the sun moving, 
and therefore existence continuing, reinforced the notion of the Az- 
tecs as a 'chosen', almost supernatural people. 
The Development of Human Sacrifice as a Form of State Terror 
The ritual sacrifice of human beings was not alien to other In- 
than groups in Mexico and there is good evidence that it was prac- 
tised in the central valley long before the arrival of the Aztecs. 
The Mayan Indians of Yucatan and Guatemala, for example, performed 
human sacrifice as did the Mixtec Indians of Oaxaca. There is no 
indication, however, that human sacrifice ever reached the propor- 
tions in these other groups that it did in the Aztec empire (See 
Bosch Garcia, 1944: 47; Helms, 1975: 105; Wolf, 1959: 80,145). The 
Aztecs in the later empire took human sacrifice to an extent never 
before reAlised both in terms of the number of people sacrificed and 
the amount of ceremony surrounding it. They adopted what had been 
primarily a religious practice, infrequent and involving only a few 
individuals, and made of it an elaborate display- glorifying the po- 
wer of the Aztec. --state (Davies, 1973: 98). 
It is impossible to determine exactly how many people the Az- 
tecs sacrificed, but there are enough estimates from the chroniclers 
to indicate that the numbers must have been great indeed. Prescott 
(1922: 49), for example, cites sixteenth century estimates. that Aztec 
human sacrifice consumed from 20,000. to 50,000. lives annually at the 
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height of the empire. Duran (1964: 194,199) who used Aztec picture 
writings and Indian informants as sources, maintained that at the 
dedication of the temple of Mexico alone, 80,000 people were sacri- 
ficed in a ceremony which lasted from dawn to dusk for several days. 
Torquemada, a seventeenth century chronicler, and Ixtlilxochitl, a 
descendant of the last king of Texcoco, both of whom also relied on 
native sources,. estimated that a file of prisoners two miles long was 
killed at the dedication of the temple to Huitzilopochtli in 1486 
(Prescott, 1922: 49). Duran (1964: 225) also wrote that at the enth- 
I roncr, cnl of Moctezuma IIj 8,000 people were sacrificed and eaten at 
banquets during a single day. In addition to these accounts, we 
k 
also have the statements of the Spanish conquestadors. Cortes (See 
I 
Gomara, 1964: 167) and Bernal D(az (1963: 138) both maintained that 
when the Spanish arrived in Mexico-Tenochtitlan in 1519, they found 
a skull rack situated in the main square on which they counted no 
less than 136,000 skulls. They noted that many more skulls, diffi- 
cult to see, were left uncounted. 
By the later Aztec empire there were elaborate ceremonies sur- 
I 
rounding these sacrifices. Duran (1964: 111-112) desc 
. 
ribes a form 
of sacrifice devised by Tlacaelel, the military leader, 
Once they had tied him (the victim) they hýLnd- 
ed him a wooden sword and a shield; the sword 
was not equipped with blades but was feathered 
from top to bottom ... an old man disguised as an 
ocelot appeared then and gave four wooden balls 
to the victim, telling him to try to defend him- 
self with them. He wrapped a piece of cloth 
around the prisoner's body and gave him a lit- 
tle Divine Wine to drink. After this he with- 
drew, leaving the victim alone. 
One of the men disguised as a god then ap- 
proached the stone dancing, with his shield and 
sword in his hand; well protected ... The poor 
wretch upon the'stone threw the*wo0den balls at 
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him. These. wpre. evaded by. the:: sacrificer if he y 
was skillful'*, '- whereupo4', the. icked up 
, 
prisoner. p 
hig_: 4eathered-, sword And-defendedhimself the best 
-he could. - 
Some of the victims_'posSesse*dl"such-ability 
that -attackers before they ý, 4ore out two, orthrde. 
-painied Adýbe 'o our: ''. c'ou ý is,; ý they :. '. w unded, '-f " -, pii. es 
black, ý, _withý-: to , ng- braided hair , dressed, In 
. gar- 
mentS. . similar'to'chasuble : s, 'a. cýnýed the stone 
and .1a 
"wounde d. man on his baý: A'-_, -h6lding 
him dow-_ nb eet ., 'and ': hand s,.:, - h y. the' e. _ 
i. g 
priest, then -rose f rom -his: seat, ' weht: ý to. -'the 
stone'an 'opened: his.,, cheit Viw-. the knife. He d. 
out the, fieart ýand . off ered. the. 
vapor. that 
cqme-. out of'it. ýto:.. ,, 
A, s, soon as"Ithe 
he art was c ol d ýhe: deli-4er ,. ed 
i, t : 'i 6,.,. cer. tain min- 
isters. os 
These ceremonies were performed in the case 
of all tho prisoners, each one in his turn. 
However, there we re some who, on being given 
the shield and sword, felt the sword with their 
fingers. When they realized that the sword was 
not edged with stone but with feathers they cast 
it away and threw themselves willingly upon 
their backs on the stone. The pri , ests 
then 
took hold of them and the high priest opened 
their chests and extracted their hearts. Some 
of the victims, such as those mentioned above, 
were unwilling to go through so much ceremonial, 
and they cast themselves upon the stone immedia- 
tely, seeking a quick death. Whether one de- 
fended himself well or whether one fought badly, 
death was inevitable. That is why all those 
priests were required; when one was tired of 
sacrificing another would take his place. At 
the most it meant another half-hour of life. 
Within Aztec society these human sacrifices consisting of ela- 
borate ceremonies and involving large numbers of victims were a dev- 
elopment of the later empire. Prescott (1922: 46), f8r example, main- 
tains that human sacrifice was adopted by the Aztecs early in the 
fourteenth century, some two hundred years before the Conquest. Rare 
at first, as the empire expanded. sacrifice became more and more fre- 
quent until almost every war and every festival concluded with this 
practice. The increase in the freguency, the'scale, and the cere- 
mony surrounding human sacrifice occurred in conjunction with the 
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growth of the Aztec state into a position of dominance in relation 
to surrounding Indian groups and its own labouring class. Vaillant 
(1962: 88), for example, maintains that it was during the period from 
1455 to 1507, when the state was greatly expanding the size of the 
empire that Aztec sacrifice increased. The frequency and scale of 
these sacrifices grew as the society matured and they became public 
specta: cles involving masses of victims (Davies, 1973: 169). 
There were numerous different types of sacrificial ceremonies. 
II Sejourne (1976: 12-13), for example, notes sacrifices of children in 
honour of the rain god, Tlaloc; the sacrifice of an unblemished 
youth to honour the god Tezcatlipoca; and the sacrifice of a woman in 
honour of the goddess of salt, among others. But. the extravagant 
displays which involved masses of lives seem to have involved pri- 
marily war captives. The two-mile long file of prisoners sacrificed 
at the dedication of the temple of Huitzilopochtli, for example, was 
largely composed of the accumulated prisoners from recent large- 
scale battles (Peterson, 1961: 101). 
It is difficult to establish the exact chronology of the develop- 
ment of particular forms of sacrifice. We do, however, know that the 
mass sacrifice of war captives began somewhere around 1450 (Peterson, 
1961: 145). Duran (1964: 110) attributes the invention of these cere- 
monial sacrifices to Tlacaelel, the military leader who rose to po- 
wer after the Tepanec war and served for almost forty years as an 
influential advisor to several Aztec rulers. Tlacaelel ordered in- 
creases in human sacrifice and devised new me4thods of sacrifice which 
I 
were made into law (Duran, 1964: 141). Tlacaelel did not invent the 
I 
practice of human sacrifice. He was, however,. extremely instrumental 
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in transforming what had previously been solely a religious rite into 
a public display of state power (See Padden, 1967: 23). Tlacaelel was 
a prime mover in initiating the process through which the state appro- 
priated the practice of human sacrifice and transformed it to serve 
state ends. 
Mass ceremonial sacrifices, therefore, were a development of 
the later empife phase of development of Aztec society. They ori- 
ginated at a time when the Aztec ruling class needed to maintain its 
dominance over surrounding Indian groups and its own labouring class. 
Mass human sacrifices were devised by those in power and correspond- 
ed to an era in which the Aztec ruling class was attempting to main- 
tain and expand its position as the sole recipients of surplus pro- 
duction. 
The Aztec state maintained itself in this position of political 
and economic dominance partly through military expertise, through con- 
quering new provinces and putting down rebellions in those already 
conquered. But, as has been noted, the ruling state could not ensure 
the tribute of conquered provinces. or their 'Compliance with trading 
agreements by maintaining a military presence in the area, and the 
state held no-monopoly on land. The Aztec state, therefore, relied 
as much on the fear of warfare as on warfare itself to intimidate 
surrounding Indian groups into compliance with this system of etono- 
mic and political relations. Davis (1973: 110) notes that: "It was 
a case of remote control by threat of harsh reprisal, rather than 
direct government... " The public display ofl: gruesome death to those 
who had opposed the Aztecs acted as a powerful deterrent to opposi- 
tion. As was noted in the chapter on warfare, when emissaries went 
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out to demand submission from a targeted group, they tried to impress 
on the people the miseries a war would bring. Death on the sacrificial 
stone was a poignant misery that could be anticipated by those who did 
not accept their subordination. 
It is not difficult to see, if one looks at the history of dev- 
elopment of the Aztec society, why this particular form of terror was 
adopted. The cultivation of an image of indestructibility and the 
expert use of intimidation were nothing new to the Aztecs. Eve n dur- 
ihg the period when they were serving as mercenaries to more power- 
ful Indian groups in central Mexico, they were already using the po- 
litics of fear to make themselves as threatening to the groups they 
were serving as well as to their enemies. Even at this early stage 
their overlords considered them dangerous. A number of ificidents be- 
tween the Culhuacan Indians and the Aztecs illustrate well the Vqay in 
which the Aztecs had long used display to unsettle their neighbours. 
The Aztecs had at one point in their history. served as mercen- 
aries to the Indians of Culhuacan. After well serving them in a war, 
the Aztecs were rewarded by being given a piece of land of their own 
within the Culhuacan territory. However, the area they were given, 
Tizapan, was notoriously snake infested; and the ruler of Culhuacan 
was said to have given it to the Aztecs in the hope that they would 
be overcome by the reptiles. Characteristically, however, the Aztecs 
not only adapted but turned the unfavourable situation to their ad- 
vantage. Snake hunting became their favourite sport and snake dishes 
a great delicacy (Katz, 1969: 136). Mhen the;, ruler of Culhuacan sent 
his emissaries to see how the Aztecs were faring, they found, accord- 
ing to Durain (1964: 25): 
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Their fields... cultivated and in order, a temple 
... built to their god, and the people-living in their houses. The spits and pots were replete 
with snakes some roasted and others boiled. 
Duran wrote that the Aztecs, rather than being overcome by the snakes. 
as the ruler of Culhuaca had intended, had almost totally-consumed 
the snakes in the area. The ruler on hearing the news told his 
court: 
I 
See what rascals-they are; have no dealings and e do not speak to them (Duran, 1964: 31). 
The Aztecs were asked by the Culhuacas on another occasion to 
provide an account of the number of enemy they had slain in a battle. 
Aztec warriors promptly removed the ears of all those they had kill- 
ed and presented them in a bloody mass to the ruler. The ruler called 
them. even at this early stage "military maniacs" and he released 
them from all obligation to the Culhuas (Duran, 1964: 26; Peterson, 
*0 1961: 88). Duran (1964: 26) writes that the ruler then told his peo- 
ple: 
Give them everything they request. I have told 
you that they are people favoured by their god, 
but they are evil people. Do not anger them 
for while you do them no harm they will be ap- 
peased. 
The final breaking point between the Aztecs and the Culhuas is 
said to have come when the Aztecs, filled with confidence from a mi- 
litary victory, asked for the daughter of the ruler of Culhuacan to 
be their princess. The ruler agreed and the daughter was taken with 
much fanfare to Tizapan. The ruler and his dignitaries were then in- 
vited to a feast to celebrate the festival in which this daughter was 
to become a goddess of the Aztecs. Duran (1964: 27) described what 
happened at the end of this feast: 
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The king, with great confidence, arose and went 
to the temple. He ... began to perform many cere- 
monies .... As the room was dark he distinguished 
no one. Taking with his hand a brazier with 
fire, he threw insense into it fervently. This 
began to burn and the room lighted up with the 
fire. Thus the king suddenly perceived the 
priest who was seated next to the idol, dress- 
ed in his daughter's skin. This was such a 
frightful sight that the king was filled with 
terror. He dropped the brazier and rushed out 
of the temple... 
After this incident the Culhuas drove the Aztecs from Tizapan. 
The use of gruesome display therefore, was nothing new to the 
Aztecs. And as the empire was established and expanded, they be- 
came masters at the practice of inspiring fear. The elaborate cere- 
monies of human sacrifice, especially the sacrifice of captives td- 
ken in war, was only an escalation of an already well-established 
practice of gruesome display. Public and gruesome human sacrifice of 
those who had shown contempt for its authority, reconstituted in the 
eyes of all who beheld and heard about it the power and intrinsic 
superiority of the Aztec-state. Through this ceremony an affront- 
ed sovereign, or state, re-established its position. And. it was the 
very gruesomeness and excess of the punishments that underscored the 
superiority of the power of the state. The goal of these displays 
was not to re-establish justice, but to reactivate power (See Foucault, 
1979: 48-50). The ceremonial execution of war captives had to be ela- 
borate and severe. For, as Foucault (1979: 50) notes, public physical 
punishment such as this: 
... has to manifest the disproportion of power 
of the sovereign over those he had; ý, reduced to 
impotence. The dissymmetry, -the irreversible 
imbalance of forces were an essential element 
in the public execution*! 
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The public sacrifice, therefore, was a manifestation of force. 
The body of the sacrificed an opportunity of dýmonstrating the "un- 
restrained presence of the soverLign, " It demonstrated the reality 
of the state as the superordinate power. It was also a demonstration 
of the falseness of the gods of those conquered, gods which had aban- 
doned these victims. The killing of victims after or in a war had 
an effect, but, taking victims, holding them in captivity, forcing 
them to walk to their own deaths, and tearing apart their bodies had 
a much more intense effect. -- The eating of these bodies as well held 
a particular significance regarding the power of the Aztecs. They 
not only killed their enemies but quite literally consumed them (See 
Foucault, 1979: 45-57, for a discussion of the symbolic use of public 
physical punishments). 
In the later empire the rulers of other provinces were forced 
to watch sacrificial ceremonies. Provincial lords as well as the 
lords of independent areas were invited to attend these great displays 
(Padden, 1967: 36-37). And to decline such an invitation was to in- 
vite war. The displays were designed to impress upon these rulers 
that they would be wise to submit to Aztec demands or meet a like 
fate. Duran 'notes the shock and horror with which the lords of other 
provinces beheld these ceremonies of human sacrifice, and the Aztecs' 
calculated intent to intimidate with them. At times rulers were 
I 
even required to bring their own sacrificial victims (Duran, 1964: 115, 
191). "The entire land, " wrote Duran (1964: 108) "trembled with fear 
of them. " The Aztecs of Tenochtitlan even came to be feared by their 
allies in the confederated Triple Alliance cities. Nezahualcoytl, 
ruler of Texcoco from 1418 to 1472, is said to have remarked to his 
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people, warning them to be friendly with the A2tecs: "The fury of the 
I 
Aztecs is measureless, limitlessit (Duran, 1964: 88). 
The ferocity of the Aztecs in war and these horrifying displays 
had the predictable effect of generating great fear among the Aztecs' 
I 
neighbours (Vaillant, 1962: 78). Motolinia, another Spanish frair who 
came to New Spain in 1524, recorded a chilling description of the sa- 
crifice of captives taken in war: 
To the top of those six poles which they had 
erected ... they bound and crucified six male war 
captives. Below were more than two thousand 
boys and men with bows and arrows. After the 
ones who had gone up to fasten the captives had 
come down, the boys and men discharged the ar- 
rows, like rain, at the six crucified captives. 
Presently, they went up, unfastened the half- 
dead victims, and let them fall from that height. 
Such was the crash with which they ýit the 
ground that every bone in their bodies was bro"- 
ken or bruised. Thereupon the Indians subject- 
ed them to a third death, sacrificing them and 
tearing out their hearts. Finally they dragged 
them away, slashed their throat, cut off their 
head, and gave the heads to the minister of the 
idols, while the bodies they carried, like mut- 
ton, to the lords and chiefs for food (See 
Steck, 1951: 118). 
Even when the Aztecs were not engaging in the act of sacrificing vic- 
tims there were reminders of human sacrifice all over the city. Go 
I 
mara (1964: 165), for example, described the temple to Quetzalcoatl in 
Tenochtitlan. Its entrance, he wrote, was a door carved like a ser- 
pent's mouth: 
... diabolically painted, with fangs and teeth 
exposed, which frightened those who entered... 
Gomara wrote that to the Christians. this temple looked like 
"the mouth of hell. " The appearance and effect of this temple re- 
flects the extent to which the Aztecs had appropriated and perverted 
even the cult of QuetZalcOatl. The gentle*agricultural god who, 
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according to legend had brought civilisation and ethics to his peo- 
ple, and who only wanted butterflies and snakes as sacrifice, was in 
the Aztec city-state housed in an intimidating temple and brought in- 
to service promoting the fearsome image of the Aztecs. 
Gomara described rooms within other temples in Tenochtitlan the 
walls of which were covered in blood and which "stank horribly. " The 
skull rack which the Spaniards saw in the main square itself must 
have been an'. intimidating sight. It was composed of seventy or more 
tall poles, each with pegs from top to bottom. On each of these 
pegs, Gomara (1964: 167) notes, were five skulls "impaled on it 
through the temples ... teeth outward. " 
. It is not difficult to understand the impact such displays must 
have had on the minds of those who saw them, or those who heard about 
them later. The Aztecs went to great effort to make these ceremonies 
as public as possible, so that news of them spread all over the area 
(Padden, 1967: 89). When targeted Indian groups were confronted with. 
Aztec emissaries offering a choice of tribute or war, therefore, 
these images of sacrifice must have been alive in their minds. The 
payment of tribute, as the Aztecs intended, often seemed to be the 
preferable alternative to a war*vith the Aztecs and a possible even- 
tual end on the sacrificial stone. The Aztec ruling-class, therefore, 
at times gained access to new sources of surplus production without 
having to fight a costly war. And the horrors of these ceremonies 
worked to some extent to deter rebellions. Even the Texcocans, the 
Triple Alliance allies of the Aztecs, were afraid of opposing them. 
Nezahualcoytl, their ruler from 1418 to 1472, is said to have told 
his people: 
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I beg you, lords, brothers, to treat the Aztecs 
well .... you know them: I do not have to say more 
regarding their ways. If you meet them on the 
roads and they ask for something you carry, 
share it with them... Should we oppose them we 
would only gain wars, trouble, death, robbery, 
the shedding of our blood, and desolation to 
our kingdom (Dura**n, 1964: 87). 
The more successful wars the Aztecs fought and the more captives 
they sacrificed, the greater was the fear of them. And the greater 
the fear of them the more easily they intimidated and defeated their 
enemies. Bernal Diaz (1963: 408), for example, one of the tonquistadors 
I 
who arrived with Cortes, wrote that after seeing some of the Spaniards 
dragged up to the altar and sacrificed, he began to fear death more 
than ever when he went into battle with the Aztecs. lie wrote: 
... I remember their hideous deaths ... Before I 
went into battle, a-sort of horror and gloom 
would seize my heart, and I would make water 
once or twice and commend myself to God. 
To provoke horror and gloom in the minds of the enemy even before the 
battle began was of definite strategic value. The sacrifices had 
this effect on a hardened Spanish conquistador. - 
Their impact must 
also been great on the superstitious Indians for whom the capture of 
a chief or an evil portent was enough to demoralise-a whole army 
(Vaillant, 1962: 181). 
The crucial role of intimidation in holding together the Aztec 
empire is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the way in which 
the Spanish were to conquer Mexico. Even though the weapons of the 
Spaniards were technologically superior, ' the conquistadors were ridi- 
culously outnumbered. They conquered Mexico'not by sheer force of 
arms. but by demonstrating to other Indian groups that the Aztecs 
themselves were capable of being intimidated, and therefore able to* 
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be overthrown. The Spaniards, for example, talked the Indians of 
Cempoala into taking prisoner some of Moctezuma's tax collectors. 
The Indians were terrified. They were astonished when the Aztecs 
failed to respond. Diaz (1963: 112) wrote of their reaction: 
The act they had witnessed was so astonishing 
and of such importance to them that they said 
no human beings dared to do such a thing, and 
it must be the work of teules, which means gods 
or demons. 
Once the spell of fear through which the Aztecs dominated the empire 
was broken. the Spaniards were able to forment rebellion all over the 
empire and thus bring about its eventual collapse. 
The Ideology of Human Sacrifice 
Ritual ceremonies of human sacrifice not only served to intimi- 
date surrounding Indian populations into exploitative relations ad- 
vantageous to the Aztec ruling class; they were also a powerful sym- 
bolic statement of the centrality of the Aztecs as a people, as a 
polity, and graphically represented their position as a chosen people. 
Wolf (1982: 83) maintains that a hallmark of tribute based societies 
is their tendency to claim supernatural origins as a means of vali- 
dation. Domination. in such societies. is, in Wolf's words: "inscrib- 
ed into the structure of the universe. " The ideological model is 
characterised by "a hierarchical representation of the cosmos in 
which the dominant supernatural order, working through the major 
holders of power, encompasses and subjects humanity. " The Chinese 
emperor, for e xample, was thought to hold a mandate from-heaven to 
ensure the balance of heaven and earth. Similarly, the Aztec ideolo- 
gists, led by Tlacaelel. proclaimed that the gods worked through the 
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Aztecs to ensure the continual movement of the Sun, by the sacrifice 
of human beings. 
By constructing such an ideological model the ruling class, or 
the surplus takers, provided a rationale for their own exploitation 
as well as a rationale for the exploited, and the ideological system, 
thus created, served to obfuscate the real relations between the sur- 
plus takers and' the dominated producers. Exploitation was thus trans- 
formed into a matter of divine will. rather than public power. Through 
this ideological system the ruling class invited the exploited pro- 
ducers into relations with an effective polity which held a divine 
mission. The subject producers were invited to win merit with the 
gods by controlling their own behaviour in concert with the rules 
laid down by the dominators. In Mexico the Indians in surrounding 
groups, an d indeed the direct producers within the city-state, were 
asked to enter into exploitive economic relations as part of a divine 
plan. The Aztec ruling class, therefore, constructed a complex reli- 
gious justification for their own exploitation of direct producers 
and human sacrifice was the act which symbolised their right to ex- 
ploit- their chosen position at the centre of the cosmos. After the 
fall of Atzcatpotzalco, Aztec ideologists revised and modified ancient 
legends so they justified and promoted the idea of the cosmic mission 
of the Aztecs. They proclaimed that the eventual cataclysmic end of 
the present sun, or age in which the Aztecs were living, could be 
rarCstalled through the sacrifice of human beings. This way of con- 
ceiving of the natural order placed the Aztecs in a strategic posi- 
tion as guardians of the cosmos involved in a divine mission. 
I 
The elevation of Huitzilopochtli, who at one time was only a 
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minor god, one among many, to a position of pre-eminence within the 
Aztec pantheon was part and parcel of this process. Huitzilopochtli 
was proclaimed omnipresent and indispensible, the Lord of Creation, 
to whom sacrifices must be made to keep the sun moving. Through sa- 
crifices the sun was to be made stronger in its journey during the 
night. The new sacrifice dogma was not a crude construction but in- 
terwoven into the complex traditional system of Aztec belief. Cen- 
tral to Aztec thought was the concept of dichotomy between matter and 
spirit and this concept was used to construct the legend that con- 
tinued existence was dependent on the sacrifice of human beings. It 
was asserted that the sun, dead unmoving matter, was originally set 
in motion when a small god threw himself into the flames as a sacri- 
fice. In order to keep the sun in motion, therefore, spirit and mat- 
ter had to be continually reunited. The sacrifice of humans was to 
be this symbolic reuniting of opposites which kept the sun moving. 
According to this new interpretation it was the duty of the Aztecs 
to sacrifice, and the duty of their victims to be sacrificed. This 
"cosmic mission theory: " as Padden (1967: 35) terms it, provided a 
religious imperative for continual warfare, expansion and sacrifice. 
According to the new religious precepts, the Aztecs had been or- 
dained to keep the sun, the giver of life, in motioni They had, 
therefore, to fight wars in order to secure victims or the world 
would come to an end. The cosmic mission legend, therefore, provided 
a religious justification and motivation for warfare which economical- 
ly and politically benefited the ruling class and the state which re- 
presented its interests. The leaders and priests, the ideologiAts 
of the state, provided a religious rationale for state actlon. 
1 131 
1.1 1 SeJourne (1976: 35) maintains that Aztec nobles . 
", ought of hu- 
man sacrifice as merely-a "political necessity. " And the Aztec state 
did display a certain practicality in the way in which they conducted 
wars and sacrifices. On. one occasion, for example, when the Aztecs 
had taken captives in a very distant province they decided it was 
too much trouble to bring them back to Tenochtitlan to be sacrificed, 
so - sun or no sun - they were slaughtered on the spot (Duran, 1964: 
202-203). And. even though the Aztec nobility fought in numerous 
wars, the members of the Aztec ruling class were not lining up to be 
sacrificed in order to become 'feathered birds' accompanying the sun 
across the sky. SeJourne (1976: 35) comments: 
The Aztec nobles were never themselves impati- 
ent to achieve the solar glory in whose name 
they were slaughtering humanity. Their lust 
for life equalled their desire for power. 
In fact, as has been noted, human sacrifice, by and large, con- 
sumed the lives of those in subordinate groups - prisoners of war, 
slaves, women and children. SeJourne (1976: 35) notes, sacrifice was 
not the privilege of the elite, but the fate of "inferior beingý. " 
The cosmic mission theory, therefore, was effective to some extent 
in justifying state action but was not wholeheartedly accepted by 
I 
all members of the society. SeJourne (1976: 44) maintains that it 
has been taken much more seriously by contemporary historians than 
by the people of MesoAmerica at the time. This is to some extent 
an overstatement since this complex ideological presentation had de- 
finite effect on the lives of the peoples of MesoAmerica, but there 
were also evidently segments of the population which did not totally 
accept the validity of the presentation. Sahagun, for example, wrote 
that: 
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... the parents of the victims submitted to these 
practices (4hed) many tears and (responded) with 
great sorrow in their hearts (Quoted in Sejourne, 
1976: 15). 
There were also precautionary measures taken to deal with those sa- 
crificial victims who did not happily accept their fates and, seized 
I 
with panic, attempted to escape (Sejourne*, 1976: 15). 
There is some indication that by the time of the Spanish conquest, 
L 
the practice had reached such proportions it was becomming dysfunction- 
al (Padden, 1967: 37; Vaillant, 1962: 78). During the reign of Mocte- 
zuma 1, Tlacaelel, according to legend had told the people: 
... we will never lack victims... Our god will not be made to wait until new wars 
arrive. 
He will find a way, a market place where he will 
go 
To buy victims, men for him to eat. They will 
be in his sight 
Like maize cakes hot from the griddle ready for 
him who wishes to eat (Duran, 1964: 140). 
But, by the time of the reign of Moctezuma II, the ritual had reached 
a sort of frenzy level. Padden (19*67: 99), for example, estimates that 
at the height of the empire, one hundred to three hundred plebians were 
sacrificed at the death of every noble. When one great Texcocan ru- 
ler Jied, two hundred male and one hundred female slaves were sacri- 
ficed (Bosch Garcia,. 1944: 44). And sacrifice became over time not 
i 
just a state activity, but 'the activity of private individuals (Se? - 
.0 journe, 1976: 11). Merchants, for example, brought slaves to be sa- 
crificed in the marketplace and went through elaborate ceremonies in 
which the victims were dressed in fine clothing and forced to dance 
with the purchaser so that the merging of the two identities could 
be established and the merchant cduld, be. assured of the heavenly 
credit for the transaction (Bosch Garcia, 1944: 41-42,83-84). 
a 
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Francisco de Aguilar (1964: 163), a conquistador who came to Mexico 
with Cortes and later became a Dominican frair in Mexico, noted the 
immense amount of power the priests and religion came to have on the 
minds of the Indians in the later empire. He describes Indians squat- 
ting on their heels in the courtyard before going to worship their 
gods, sobbing and weeping and asking forgiveness of their sins. The 
priests, as des-cribed by Aguilar, were fearsome to behold. lie wrote: 
They went about very dirty and blackened, and 
wasted and haggard of face. They wore their 
hair hanging down very long and matted, so that 
it covered them, and went about infested with 
lice (Aguilar, 1964: 164). 
These priests walked about the city in long black robes, blood clot- 
ted in their hair, and frequently deformed themselves by perforating 
their tongues with knives (Steck, 1951: 30). Not only priests but 
other members of society began to perform auto-sacrifices, peneten- 
tial self-infliction of wounds. Bones were often used to pierce the 
ears, or tongue, or penis, and then twisted cord, thread, or wood 
slivers passed through the holes (Peterson, 1961: 149). 
Aside from the rise of this sort of self abuse there were much 
more practical reasons why the extent to which sacrifice was taking 
hold of society might have been a concern to the state. The demands 
for sacrificial victims from the tributary provinces.. were becorro-1 
a source of discontent. And, subject peoples were beginning to cour- 
plain about the elaborate and prolonged nature of the sacrificial 
deaths (Padden, 1967: 91). SeJourne (1976: 39) describes Moctezuma II, 
the ruler in power at the time, as "... the representative of a system 
grounded upon beliefs which were ... being thrown into doubt. " 
It is probable that an act wLch had originally been intended to 
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symbolise the state's might and involuability to justify empire expan- 
sion, and to function as an effective form of terror, generalised in 
unexpected ways. Among some segments of the population the elaborate 
state ceremonies prompted an increase in violence which took on a 
fanatical tone, while other segments of the population looked askance 
at these practices and complained bitterly, such as those Indian groups 
in surrounding-territories who were being called upon to provide most 
of the victims. As Foucault (1979: 9) notes, the public ritual of tor- 
ture and punishment, while demonstrating the power of the state or 
sovereign, can at times turn the victim into an object of pity and 
provoke violence itself. "The very excess of the violence employed. " 
Foucault (1979., 34)*; wrltes "is one of the elements of its glory. " But, 
it is this excess of violence that can, as well, provoke profound 
and sometimes violent response in those who watch. 
It is conceivable that the state itself would have taken some 
action to tone down the frenzy of human sacrifice. and thereby avoid 
risking an open conflict with surrounding groups,. But it is also 
conceivable that they would or could not. The empire, though strong, 
was still in the early part of the'sixteenth century. under threat 
of rebellion from its own tributary provinces and take over by other 
unconquered tribes (See Peterson-, 1961: 103). Whether or not the res- 
ponse to these threats would have been a further increase in human 
sacrifice in an effort to ward off potential challenges, or a de- 
crease is impossible to guess. The Aztecs had previously allowed 
their posturing and fear mongering to reach dysfunctional levels. 
Their display of the flayed skin of the ruler of Culhuacan resulted 
in their being driven from Tizapan. -The path of 
development of this 
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particular practice is unclear and the Spanish conquest cut short any 
answers. 
Summary 
Human sacrifice did not have a direct economic benefit in the way 
in which warfare did. A war of conquest yielded a tributary province, 
and therefore Vooty, tribute and trading agreements, and on some oc- 
casions labourers to work for the ruling class and the state. Human 
sacrifice, however, as a form of state terror had the effect of 
helping to maintain these economic relations. The key to understand- 
ing the role of Aztec human sacrifice within its social context is 
understanding the importance of politics within the social formation 
and the centrality of political mechanisms in maintaining-the parti- 
cular set of economic relations which characterised the empire.. The 
position of the Aztec state at the apex of political power in Mexico. 
and therefore its ability to enforce a particular distribution of the 
means of production and the social product, was maintained primarily 
through political means. The Aztec ruling class forged an empire 
and a particular set of economic relations which were to their advan- 
tage partly through military force, but partly as well through the 
expert use of intimidation. Aztec ceremonies of human sacrifice were 
made into public displays, which were designed to strike fear in the 
minds of their enemies and their allies alike - to intimidate other 
groups either into assuming a position of political and therefore 
economic subordination or remaining in such'a position. 
The ideology constructed to support human sacrifice was part of 
a wider reinterpretation of religious beliefs which gave the Aztecs 
1 
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the status of chosen people -a special group singled out by divine 
will to carry out a mission. The ideology, therefore, served to make 
political domination a matter of spiritual destiny and obfuscate the 
real power relations at work in the central valley. The ideological 
system served its purpose at least in motivating the Aztecs themselves 
if not their neighbours. Whether or not it would have eventually been 
their downfall,. is not possible to determine. 
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CHAPTER V 
FORCED LABOUR IN AZTEC MEXICO 
By the time of the third phase of development of Aztec society, 
that of the later empire, the Aztec warrior elite had successfully 
separated itself from the masses of the people and become establish- 
ed as a ruling class. The fruits of the production of the labouring 
class, then, were a necessary condition of the existence of this non- 
labouring class. The warrior elite had transf6rmed itself into a 
class of surplus takers which depended for its economic support on 
the appropriation of the production of both the Aztec direct producers 
and the direct producers of surrounding Indian groups. Accompanying 
and necessary to this transformation was the rise of the Aztec state 
and its coercive apparatuses (the law and the army in particular) to 
enforce the economic arrangement in which the ruling class lived off 
the appropriated surplus of the direct producers. For. in the later 
empire, surplus appropriation was enforced by means of extra-economic 
coercion, i. e., through political domination, physical force and in- 
timidation. 
The crucial event in the transition of the warrior elite into a 
ruling class came with the distribution of land after the war with 
Atzcatpotzalco. Before the Tepanec war the warrior elite was al- 
ready to some extent supported by Aztec direct producers. The war- 
riors, however, at this time had to depend on the compliance of the 
Aztec producers with this economic arrangement. There were no ýoercive 
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mechanisms to enforce the distribution of surplus in this particular 
way. The wider populace at this time- still participated in the de- 
cision making about how much of their produce was to be designated as 
'surplus' and how much of it was to be used to support the warrior 
elite. The wider population, at this time, therefore, still retained 
some means of controlling what the warrior elite did. 
After theTepanec war, however, the Aztec warrior elite took 
over the former Tepanec lands, distributed them among themselves, 
and forced the then subject Tepanec. population to work these lands 
for them. The warrior elite, therefore, at this crucial juncture, 
established for itself a source-of. economid support which was indep- 
endent of the producers within the Aztec city. Ane since the war- 
rior elite no longer had to secure its economic support wholly from 
the Aztec producers, it gained a certain degree of independence from 
these producers. and did not have to depend so completely on the com- 
pliance of the Aztec populace with its decisions. Over time, the 
warrior elite was to use this position of independence to take more 
and more control away from the masses in their own group.. Consequent- 
ly the influence of the direct producers in decision making was ero- 
ded and the warrior elite developed the coercive apparatuses of the 
army and the legal system to solidify their position. The Aztec war- 
rior class began to conduct wars, make laws, and distribute land with- 
out the agreement of all the people. And. this expansion of power 
not only occurred outside the city-state, but within. 
Fundamental to understanding the crucial nature of this pattern 
of land distribution after the Tepanec war this concrete historical 
struggle on the part of the warrior elite is the recognition of its 
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importance in setting in motion a change in the relations of product- 
ion which were to come to characterise the society. The change began 
as a change in the nature of the political and economic relationship 
between the Aztec warrior elite and the conquered Tepanec peoples. 
But over time these changed relations were to extend to affect the 
relationship between the Aztec warrior elite and the Aztec direct 
producers. 
The warrior elite in the Tepanec war had conquered by force an 
outside group. They then claimed for themselves land, labour, and 
tribute from the subject Tepanec peoples by right of their position 
within the dominant polity. Land, labour, and tribute were extiact- 
ed from the Tepanecs through force and distributed by the Aztec rul- 
er as the representative of the dominant polity. The warriors did 
not receive or claim the appropriated land and labour and surplus 
product for themselves as individuals, but by right of their rela- 
tionship to the Aztec state. Theoretically all the land taken af- 
ter the Tepanec war -belonged to the ruler, who embodied the new state 
system. And it was the state which awarded land to individual war- 
riors as a reward for their services. The ruler, then, as the em- 
bodiment of the state, became the primary proprietor in the society. 
Some of the Tepanec land was set aside as 'public land' and the pro- 
duce from this land was designated to support the ruler, the state, 
and its functions. The state distributed other lands to particular 
warriors who had fought in its interests. Individual warriors held 
their rights to the land and the labour of the peoples who occupied 
it through their position in relation to the state. - 
At this point, therefore,. the. state was established as the 
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location of power in the appropriation and distribution of productive 
property. The Aztec state, representing the new ruling class, expand- 
ed its power over other Indian groups and used the army to force these 
groups to render up tribute and labour services to the state. Over 
time the state established legal mechanisms to enforce the extraction 
of surplus from its own labouring class. By the time of the later 
empire, therefore, the support of the warrior elite was no longer a 
voluntary act on the part of the Aztec labourers. The appropriation 
of land and the fruits of production of the labouring class inside 
Tenochtitlan was now enforced by the legal apparatus, as it was en- 
forced by the army on outside groups. 
Warfare, the inequitable distribution of land in conquests, and 
the rise of the state and its coercive apparatuses, therefore, radi- 
cally changed the society. Whereas formerly. surplus had been free- 
ly awarded by members of Aztec society for various purposes they con- 
sidered important, such as the support of a warrior group-,, - noW sur- 
plus was extracted from these labourers who had little, if any, con- 
trol over that extractior and who were forced by the coercive appa- 
ratuses of the state (the law and the army, for example) to comply 
with this arrangement. In the later empire within the city-state. 
individuals were required by law to give up part-of their produce 
as tax or tribute to the state. Additionally more and more of what 
had formerly been calpulli land was taken over by the state and la- 
bourers were required to spend some of their time working this as 
well as their calpulli land to support politically designated cate- 
gories of people such as the ruler, judges and priests, or state 
functions such as warfare. The rendering up of this tribute and 
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labour were mandatory and the legal system provided severe penalties 
for noncompliance. 
Outside the city-state, individuals were also required to pay 
specified tribute) and often as well to spend some of their time 
working on lands designated by the Aztecs as 'public land. ' Addition- 
ally in some conquered provinces large tracts of land were awarded 
to nobles and fhe peasants who had formerly held these lands were 
required to work as renters or serfs (Vaillant, 1962: 103). Other 
individuals were made slaves and awarded to nobles, or required to 
work state lands. While the Aztec legal system had authority primari- 
ly within the city-state, tax collectors assigned to conquered pro- 
vinces could punish, for example by making slaves, those who failed 
to meet their tribute requirements (Prescott, 1922: 29). If a conquer- 
ed group as a whole *refused to supply tribute or Perform their la- 
bour on lands set aside for the nobility or the crown, the army was 
sent out to put down what was considered a rebellion. There was, 
therefore, after the rise of the Aztec state nothing voluntary about 
the rendering up of surplus production to the state or the performing 
of labour services required by the state. Agricultural produce and 
labour both inside the city-state and without were appropriated 
through force and distributed to politically designated categories 
of people and politically designated functions. 
The ancient mode of production is often based on a mUltipI1614 
of economic forms - slavery, tax-farming, tribute, debt bondage-, 
helotry, clientage, booty, etc. -(Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 81). In 
Aztec Mexico this was also the case. Peasant producers who still 
held land through their calpulli, worked the land and paid tribute 
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to the state by giving up part of their produce. Other peasant pro- 
ducers laboured on land set aside specifically for the state, its 
functionaries, and its activities. Still other peasant producers 
worked lands set aside for the support of nobles. Labourers who had 
lost their land entirely through warfare and subsequent land appro- 
priation remained on the land as serfs, paying for their right to 
occupy the lancr-by means of a rent in either produce or labour. Other 
individuals we*re legally designated as slaves and required to work 
for masters. At times people were drafted as labourers and used 
by the state in the construction of causeways or ceremonial buildings. 
Artisans, craftsmen and merchants were separated entirely from direct 
production and made their living by trading in merchandise of their 
crafts. 
The application of the terms 'free' and 'forced' to these dif- 
ferent forms of labour is not unproblematical, and as Nichols (1980: 
78) notes, and the very application of these terms to different, forms 
of labour is a powerful polemical device. Forced labour is general- 
ly thought of as unremunerated labour performed under direct coer- 
cive supervision. Supervised slave labour in mines, for example, 
is illustrative of this conventionally understood sense of the term. 
But Marx used the term 'forced labour' in a much wider sense. He 
maintained, for example, in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
(Sections translated in Bottomore and Rubel, 1979: 176) that any labour 
which was not voluntary but imposed was forced labour. In Capital, 
Marx called the labour a serf performed on his master's land, forced 
labour (Marx, 1978: 462), and maintained that even the surplus labour 
obtained by the capitalist from the wage labourer. "... in essence... 
3 143 
always remains forced labour... " (Quoted in Nichols, 1980: 74). The 
force, therefore, used to extract labour does not necessarily have to 
be direct physical coercion in order for the labour to be considered 
forced. 
Forced labour, narrowly defined as unremunerated labour perform- 
ed under direct coercive supervision, played a minor role in Aztec 
economic organisation. The drafts of labourers used to construct 
works projects such as temples, palaces, and causeways were the-only 
category of labourers which fits this definition. There was, however, 
force or coercion present in the wider sense in other labour forms. 
Indeed to some extent, all labour the produce from which went to 
support the Aztec ruling class and the Aztec state can be seen as 
forced labour since it was not voluntary. Inside the city-state. the 
peasant producer was required by law to render up part of his pro- 
duction to the state, or to spend some of his time working state 
lands. The legal system required this labour to be performed and 
severely punished noncompliance. Outside the city-state, the threat 
of warfare or the army directly ensured that peasants performed 
these labours. Slaves were designated as such by the state and there 
were legally proscribed penalties for those who did not labour for 
their masters. When the Aztecs conquered other territories and took 
over lands inside these territories, the people who occupied these 
lands had little choice but to then work for the Aztecs as serfs if 
they were to reamin on the land. So even the labour forms which did 
not involve direct coercive supervision can be thought of as forced 
labour since the people performing this labour did not do so volun- 
tarily. 
The focus of concern in this thesis, however, is organised state 
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violence, institutionalised state action which brought about direct 
physical harm. Labour may be forced or coerced without neces- 
sarily involving direct physical harm to those who perform it. In 
fact, although much of the labour in Aztec Mexico performed to sup- 
port the state and the ruling class was involuntary, it was not par- 
ticularly violent in a narrowly defined sense especially as contrast- 
ed with the vi6lence of labour in Conquest Mexico which will be dis- 
cussed in later chapters. But the central argument of this thesis 
is that organised state violence is conditioned by the structure of 
the social formation and the structure of the social formation is 
conditioned, in the last instance, by the economy. So just as the 
rampant violence of labour forms in Conquest Mexico will be inter- 
preted in terms of the structure of the economy. mediated by the 
other levels of the social formation, the rather milder forms of vio- 
lence involved in the labour process in Aztec Mexico is interpreted 
in the same way. For, the violence involved in labour forms in Az- 
tec Mexico was conditioned by the structure of the social formation 
which for various reasons placed limitations on the violence with 
which labour forms could be pursued. So in the following sections, 
the primary types of forced labour performed for the state in Aztec 
Mexico and the structural limitations placed on the; violence with 
which the labour could be pursued, will be discussed. 
The Independent Peasant Producer 
Although, as has been noted, the ancient mode of production is 
frequently characterised by a mul OPUAI of labour forms, the 
predominant form of the labour process is the individual peasant 
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producer who works the land under a variety of "... more or less op- 
pressive external conditions" (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 83). The con- 
tinued existence of the ancient mode of production does not depend 
on a separation of the producer from the means of production, the 
land, or on labour forms based on more complex forms of cooperation. 
It depends primarily on the appropriation of surplus from direct pro- 
ducers who stilml possess the means of production, the land. Where 
other forms of the labour process emerge, involving complex coopera- 
tion and division of labour, they do so only in certain specialised 
sectors w1iich are primarily maintained through the intervention of 
the state (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 83-84). The development and 
maintenance of these complex labour forms depends on the production 
of the peasant producer. 
Continued appropriation of surplus production and labour from 
direct producers in the ancient mode of production depends first on 
the production of the conditions of citizenship and second on the 
legal and political mechanisms of subordination. In Aztec Mexico 
the Aztec ruling class in order to maintain itself as a non-labouring 
class of surplus takers, had to ensure that the Aztec city-state it- 
self remained a polity, and to ensure the dominance of this polity 
over an exploited labouring group. It is not an invariant feature 
of the ancient mode of production that the ruling class exploit the 
direct producers who are citizens of their own polity. They may or 
may not do so (See Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 83-85). In Aztec Meýicol 
however, the organised body of citizens who were the possessors of 
the ruling state did exploit their own labouring class. They, there- 
fore, depended for their economic support on reproducing conditions 
of dominance over the labouring class outside and inside the 
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city-state. The mechanisms through which the ruling state enforced 
these relations of dominance were primarily political. As Hindess 
and Hirst (1975: 82) note: 
... the extraction of surplus-labour by citizens 
and the distribution of productive property (es- 
pecially land) take place by means of mechanisms 
articulated on the-political and legal appara- 
tuses of the state. 
So the political and legal apparatuses of the state worked'to 
reproduce conditions under which direct producers continued producing 
and the state continued to appropriate their production. It was the 
necessity of reproducing these conditions of existence of the mode of 
production that placed limits on how violent labour exploitation could 
be. The violence with which labour forms could be pursued, therefore, 
was inscribed in the structure of the social formation. 
The physical harm brought about by tribute and labour require- 
ments on peasant producers was indirect, in that at times the level 
of these requirements left the peasants in a state of virtual poverty. 
The Indians in the subject provinces, for example, complained bitter- 
It ly to the Spanish of Aztec tribute and labour requirements. Diaz 
(1963: 210) wrote. that when the Spaniards arrived in Mexico., the In- 
dians in vassal states said that-the Aztecs made them work like 
slaves. Within the city-state., the labour requirements were, as 
Gomara (1964: 166) wrote, a "heavy burden ." Gomara noted that the 
great temple of Tenochtitlan alone housed some five thousand people 
who all ate and slept within it, and that the labourers of many towns 
as well as those of Tenochtitlan were obliged to support this priestly 
population. Sahagun maintained that the oppressive weight of religi- 
ous tribute requirements provoked some of the Indian peasants to 
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court their own deaths. The demands, he wrote: 
... gave rise to much distress; it caused anguish-; it affected them. And some therefore fled; they 
went elsewhere. And many flung themselves in 
the midst of war, they cast themselves to their 
deaths (See Keen, 1971: 21). 
Tribute demands, therefore, were burdensome and brought about 
indirect violence to the Indian labourers both within and without 
the city-state. ý But the structure of the social formation'placed 
limits on just how violent,, these demands could be. The extent to 
which tribute and labour demands were pursued was a matter of con- 
tinual assessment and reassessment on the part of the Aztec state. 
The intent was always to extract as much tribute and labour as pos- 
sible while still continuing to reproduce the conditions'of existence 
of the economic system as a whole. At the most basic level, if tri- 
bute and labour demands reached the point where the peasants were 
left without a means of reproducing themselves, the conditions of 
existence of the economic system could not be reproduced. Without 
the peasants there would be no production to support the state and 
the ruling class; there would be no surplus to appropriate. It was 
simply not feasible, therefore, for the Aztecs to place such heavy 
tribute and labour demands on the peasants that they worked them to 
death. 
The argument here is not that the Aztecs could not have attempt- 
ed to extract so much tribute and labour that they worked the peasants 
to death. They could have made such an attempt. What is being ar- 
gued is that such an attempt was not politically practical, i. e., 
they could not have done so without destroying the conditions of 
I 
existence supporting themselves as a ruling class. The Aztec state 
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remained a ruling class through the long term appropriation of sur- 
plus production and therefore the long term production of the peasant. 
Evidence for this concern to maintain continuing production has 
been noted primarily in the discussion of warfare. The Aztecs, for 
example, attempted to avoid war if they could secure tribute through 
intimidation. And even when they warred, they attempted to minimise 
the devastatiori that warfare reaked so production could resume short- 
ly afterwards. When regions were devastated in warfare as a punitive 
measure the Aztecs attempted to repopulate the areas with their own 
citizens to take advantage of the productive capacity of the area. 
The same concerns for tempering the. violence of the state can be seen 
in the lessening of tribute demands on regions where, for example, 
there had been a famine or on individuals when they had been ill. A 
tribute collector could release an individual of tribute requirements 
due to illness, but not due to laziness. The necessity of maintain- 
ing the production on which the economic system depended therefore, 
placed a brake on the extent to which tribute and labour demands 
could be pursued. 
Over and above this most basic level, the fact that the peasant 
producers still, by and large, controlled the means of production 
the land-in their own hands. also placed a limitat-ion on the extent 
to which tribute and labour demands could be pursued. The peasants 
did not own land in the sense that it was private property which could 
be disposed of at will; they held the land through membership in the 
tribe. But the peasants still occupied the' land. The Aztecs did 
not hold a monopoly on land. And. although they controlled. certain 
parts of it, they were far from being able to control generally the 
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access to the means of production by denying the majority of the la- 
bourers a means of supporting themselves. The Aztecs, therefore, 
maintained the system of tribute and labour payments not by control- 
ling the means of production,. but through extra-economic forms of 
coercion -through political domination, force and intimidation. And, 
there were limits to how effectively such extra-economic forms of 
coercion, -couldftmaintain relations of subordination. The Aztec state 
had to continually balance off increased tribute and labour demands 
against the possibility of the rebellion of those they exploited. 
Within the city-state the severity of tribute demands was held 
in check partly by the nec; --ssity of maintaining the loyalty of the 
people. The Aztec state could not afford to gamble too freely on 
the support of their own citizens. These citizens had to be relied 
upon to fight the wars that kept other groups in submission. The 
tribute demands were therefore, less severe on the citizens of the 
Aztec polity than on those in outlying territories. The main burden 
for supporting the social edifice, then, fell on outside groups. But 
even with these outside groups there were limits as to how far demands 
could be pursued. The Aztecs did not generally leave a military pre- 
sence in conquered territories to organise labour or enforce tribute 
requirements. If labour and tribute demands became intolerable, 
therefore, they were likely to provoke rebellion and an attempt by 
the people in the tributary provinces to oust the Aztecs. Such re- 
bellions did occur but the Aztecs were g enerally able to contain them. 
The continued existence of the domination of the Aztec ruling 
class, and therefore their position as surplus takers, depended on 
their maintaining an effective polity, a city7-state, and maintaining 
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the position of dominance of this city-state over surrounding Indian 
groups and over its own direct producers. This placed limits on the 
violence with which exploitation of the independent peasant proaucers 
could be pursued, and these limits were inscribed in the conditions 
of existence of the mode of production. 
The Renters 
The conquests of foreign territories gave rise to another labour 
form-that of the renters- or serfs. When the Aztecs conquered other 
provinces, land was set aside the produce from which was designated 
for the support of the state, its officials, and its acEivities. The 
state also awarded land to the great warriors who became thu Aztec 
nobility, In some cases these lands were worked communally, but in 
other cases. the segment of the, population made landless by these 
conquests remained on the land as serfs, paying a rent to the state 
or a noble for their occupancy of the land. These people were tied 
to the soil but not considered slaves. They tould not leave the 
land, but were like bondsmen (Peterson, 1961: 115). 
The development of this form of labour was due to a number of 
circumstances. First, when the Aztec state conquered a province it 
seized the best lands available (Peterson, 1961: 172). The people 
who had previously worked the land had to be either reabsorbed with- 
in the remaining calpulli land of their triber or remain landless. 
Since the rerýAning land was less productivc, this reabsorption 
might not always have been possible and the ! displaced thereby had 
little choice but to remain on the land as renters. Wolf (1982: 95), 
for example, notes the pressures brought-to bear on outside groups 
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by tribute based societies since it is often difficult for displac- 
ed groups to escape to unoccupied areas where they can avoid competi- 
tors. 
Katz (1966: 37-38) points out that the practice of awarding land 
to individuals which was then rented, occurred most frequently in 
regions which persistently rebelled against the Aztecs. It was, he 
argues, the exdeption rather than the rule and was a punitive action. 
The awarding of these plots of land to the nobility which was then 
rented ensured a greater Aztec presence in the area (Thompson, 1933: 
61), an important consideration in a highly suspect tributary provin- 
ce. Additionally the awarding of these lands provided a flexible 
system for rewarding the nobility (Vaillant, 1962: 103), and could be 
used as a promise to deter widespread looting and destruction. Du- 
ran (19b4: 79), for example, notes that warriors were prevented from 
sacking the city of Xochimilco. but appeased by being awarded plots 
of land after the state had extracted what it wanted. 
Padden (1967: 93-94) estimates that by the time of the assumption 
of power of Moctezuma IT one third of the population, exclusive of 
slaves., Oelrf- serfs. Gomara (1964: 154) wrote that tribute demands on 
this renter class were severe, *often leaving them with nothing more C. 
than a pot for cooking, a stone for grinding maize and a mat to sleep 
on. He noted that the owners of land paid a third of their yearly 
produce to the empire, while the renters paid "whatever they must. " 
The ex? loitation of the renter class, th"erefore, seems to have been 
somewhat more severe than that of the peasant producers who still 
held their qwn land. But, even with the renters there were the same 
two levels of limitation on how violent this exploitation could be. 
a 15 2. ': - 
On the one hand, the appropriation of surplus by the nobility depend- 
ed on the continued reproduction of the renters themselves, and second 
rebellion or the abandonment of the land itself could result from over- 
burdensome demands. It was perhaps easier to exploit the renters since 
they had been somewhat separated from the calpulli structure. But 
they still remained on land which was within a conquered province 
and could joinwith their tribesmen in'a rebellion. 
Slavery 
The constant warfare, conquests, and take over of lands worked 
to produce another landless segment of the population, which wereý 
made slaves. These slaves performed essentially three tasks within 
the empire; they were used to transport materials (since there were 
no draught animals this was a considerable function), they worked in 
the fields, and some provided personal services in the houses of 
their masters. It is difficult to talk about slavery as a unithry 
labour form, since there were a variety of types of slaves and treat- 
ment of slaves varied considerably. (See Gonzalez Torres, 1976: 78-87 
for a discussion of the various types of slaves and the methodological 
problems associated with defining the different statuses of slaves). 
Certain characteristics, however were common to. most. forms-of 
slavery. There was, for example, never chattel slavery in Aztec Mexi- 
co. No slave was* the property of his master, an object to be disposed 
of at will (Chevalier, 1963: 22). The class of people discussed as 
slaves were not juridically non-persons or objects without rights. 
The owner of a slave did not have total control over the slave's 
production or his life. The slave was protected juridically from 
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mistreatment and ensured certain basic rights (Katz, 1966: 142-143). 
Slaves, were, for example, allowed to have families, possessions, and 
even slaves of their own. Some slaves lived in their own houses. 
Slaves had legal status before the courts and they could as indivi- 
duals appear before the courts to make a claim that they had been 
made slaves unjustly. 
Within the. city-state, there seems to have been a rather mild 
form of slavery, entered into lightly by individuals. This slavery 
was more a sort of mutual agreement for exchanged privileges. One 
person might, for example, agreeto become a slave of another for a 
short period of time in exchange for the use of a possession. This 
form of slavery was not a harsh affair- and one which occurred quite 
frequently. The most numerous class of slaves, however, in the later 
empire had sold themselves into slavery due to some sort of economic 
pressure (Lopez Gallo, 1976: 96). This was especially common in times 
t 
of famine (Leon-Portilla, et. al., 1964: 64). In the famine of 1454, 
I 
for example, Duran (1964: 147) wrote that many families sold their 
sons and daughters to the wealthy. Some individuals sold themselves 
into slavery after being financially ruined from gambling on ball 
games. Women who had given themselves freely and were then devalued 
by the society might also sell themselves as slaves. Men who had 
not worked their calpulli land alotment for two years and had had 
their land taken from them, might. sell themselves to another person 
to ensure their upkeep (See Gomara, 1964: 145). Both inside and out- 
side the city-state, individuals sometimes sold themselves or members 
of their families into slavery to meet tribute demands (Bosch Garcla, 
1944: 3&-37). Those who sold themselves could receive a price and 
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and remain at liberty until they had exhausted this price and they 
could regain their freedom by paying back the price paid for them. 
These slaves were in a somewhat different category from people 
made slaves as a punishment by the state. The slavery of criminals 
or prisoners of war was not a mutual'agreement but a harsher and 
more permanent status (Lopez Gallo, 1976: 96-98). Those who did not 
meet their trilmte demands could be enslaved by the tax collectors. 
The state also could sell an individua I to recover a tribute that 
was unpaid. Gomara (1964: 155), for example, maintains that the tri- 
bute collector could defer payment if failure was due to illness, 
but if it was due to laziness the offender-could be taken as a slave 
and sold or even sacrificed. The sacrifice of slaves, however, af- 
fected only a very small percentage (Borah, 1982: 271). Not only 
debts to the state were settled by slavery. but even personal debts 
could be so settled. Bosch Garcia (1944: 58), for example, notes that 
those who took. goods and did not pay for them could be enilaved, and 
also those who owed for a medical cure. If an indebted person died, 
his creditors could enslave a member of his family to recover the 
loss. 
. The violation of a number of laws resulted 
in slavery. If, for 
example, one man killed another, the wife of the vicpim could pardon 
the offender and make him her slave. If a man murdered a slave, he 
might, depending on the inclination of the master, be made a slave 
to replace the dead one. Theft sometimes resulted in slavery, and 
also rape. Slavery was also the punishment for selling into slavery 
those who were legally free. Both the buyer and seller of free child- 
ren, for example, such as the children of slaves, were made slaves 
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and given to those harmed by such an act (Bosch Garcia, 1944: 50,62-67). 
Captives in war were very seldom made slaves (Katz, 1966: 147) and 
usually ended their days on the sacrificial stone. When they were 
used as slaves, it was usually for a temporary period of time. They 
formed a completely different legal category and had none of the rights 
and privileges awarded to slaves. They could not, for instance, be 
brought and sold in the market place (Bosch Garcia, 1944: 40). 
The ever increasing tribute demands of the Aztec state were an 
important factor in the growth of slavery. Outside the Aztec city- 
state, slaves were often a part of a tribute settlement. A conquer- 
ed region might agree to provide a certain number of slaves periodical- 
ly to satisfy their tribute commitments to the empire. Duran (1964: 
129-131), for example, mentions that when regions lacked products de- 
sired by the Aztec ruling elite, they sometimes paid their tribute in 
slaves. 
There were strict rules regarding the treatment, rights of slaves, 
and conditions for becomming a slave. Numerous writers (See Bosch 
Garcia, 1944: 74; Soustelle, 1961: 73-78; Borah, 1982: 271; Moreno, 1931: 
84) maintain that Aztec slavery was a tolerable condition.. Mendieta 
y Nunez (1921: 185), for example, maintains that Aztec slavery was 
generally less severe than that of the old Romans. And there were a 
number of ways in which some categories of slave might regain their 
freedom. A slave who had sold himself, for example, might pay his 
master the price paid for him and therefore gain his freedom (Lopez 
Gallo, 1976: 96). One member of a family, serving as a slave might 
be freed on the death of his master, or freed by the ruler. 
If a slave was about to be sold, ýe might escape from the 
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market place. If he did so, he could be stopped by no one except his 
master and the master-'s son, -f he reached the palace, he had 
earned. his freedom (Bosch Garcia, 1944: 74). There were no proscrip- 
tions about marrying slaves, for men or for women. Wealthy widows, 
for example, sometimes married one of their slaves (Lopez Gallo, 1976: 
97), and a slave once married to a free person became free (Bosch 
Garcia, 1944: 7&). 
As was noted, slaves were never in Aztec society considered as 
non-persons to be disposed of at will, and numerous writers maintain 
that relations between masters and slaves were not harsh (Borah, 1982: 
271; Vaillant, 1962: 97). There were festivals at specific times of 
the year to celebrate the relationship between masters and slav&s. 
Masters gave gifts to their slaves and master and slave sat down to- 
gether and ate a meal (Lopez Gallo, 1976: 97). Torquemada, however, 
maintains that these feasts were designed to make the slaves forget 
their burdens and the bad will that had grown up between them and 
their masters during the year in order that they serve their masters 
better (See Bosch Garcia, 1944: 80-81). And the laws about the mis-' 
treatment of slaves indicates that there were abuses.. Bosch Garcia 
(1944: 61) in his study of Aztec slavery, mentions that at times it 
was pretended that an Indian had not paid his tribute requirements 
on time and was sold into slavery. Lopez de Gomara (1625: 1120) main- 
tains that tribute collectors sometimes took the daughters of people 
for pleasure and that the fear of these tax collectors was so great 
that no objection was made. The laws against selling free children 
I into slavery also indicate that this practice went on. Gomara (1964: 
115) maintains that the Tlaxcalans sometimes sold themselves into 
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slavery to acquire the salt and cotton denied them due to Aztec trade 
restrictions. Diaz (1963: 154), however, wrote that what actually 
happened was that emissaries went out to trade for salt and cotton, 
and they were either killed or made slaves by the Aztecs and their 
allies. So the voluntary nature of slavery even when people 'sold' 
themselves is subject to question. Slaves were also sometimes a 
likely category, for sacrifice. Duran (1964: 17ý) notes that in the 
later empire, slaves were burned with the body of a dead noble. 
And Motolinfa (See Steck, 1951: 119) noted that slave children were 
sacrificed in a ritual to Tlaloc in which they were placed in a cave 
which was then sealed up. 
It is difficult to determine just how many slaves there were by 
the time of the Spanish conquest or in what category of slave status 
I 
most slaves were. Bosch Garcia (1944: 29) maintains that there were 
very many slaves by the time of the later empire and that the work 
this class performed was one of the main supports of the economy. 
Diaz (1963: 232) noted that when the Spaniards came to Tenochtitlan 
there were many slaves on sale in the great market. Katz (1966: 232), 
however, maintains in an analysis which takes into consideration the 
structure of the Aztec economic system as a whole, that slavery did 
.0 
not play a decisive role in the economy. As Gonzalez Torres (1976: 
78-87) points out, much of the confusion about this issue arises 
from the translations made by the chroniclers of Nahatl terms into 
Spanish. Unfamiliar with the intricacies of Indian usage, several 
categories of labour status in the society were often all translated 
into the Spanish word 'slave. ' The level of production and organisa- 
tional capacity of the society limited how many slaves could be 
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supported within the economic system and this limit was rather small. 
As Katz (1966: 146-147) notes, the destruction of so many captives in 
ceremonies of human sacrifice is evidence that the social formation 
could more easily sacrifice these captives than support and organise 
them as slaves or forced labourers. 
The Labourers 
, 
Narrowly defined forced labour- unremunerated involuntary labour 
performed under direct coercive supervision- was used to a limited 
extent within Aztec society. The mobilisation and supervision of 
large numbers of labourers takes a great deal of organisation. Such 
organisation was not beyond the capacity of the Aztecs, as has been 
noted. They did use such a labour force to construct the mammoth 
ceremonial buildings in Tenochtitlan. There were limits, however, 
given the productive and organisational capabilities of the society, 
to how widespread this form of labour could become. Groups of forced 
labourers have to be brought together, organised to work, supervised, 
controlled, fed And house& The society using such a labour form as 
a primary support of the economy has to be able to organise and support 
large numbers of labourers. Therefore, the productive and organisa- 
tional capacity of the social formation structures the degree to which 
such a labour form can be used. 
Forced labour. even though it existed in Aztec society, existed 
only in a rudimentary way. It was almost exclusively used to con- 
struct ceremonial buildings within the city-state where it would be 
easier both to support and control such large groups of labourers. 
I The use of forced labour in the production process itself seems to 
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have been confined to the use to limited extent of slaves to work 
some parcels of land. As Hindess and Hirst (1975: 79) comment: 
The specific articulation of politics and econo- 
mics in this mode of production governs the pos- 
sible forms of development and effectivity of 
subordinate economic forms and relations, trade 
and commodity production, slavery, relations of 
personal dependence. '** 
When, therefore, these more complex labour forms developed such 
as renters.. and slaves and forced labourers, they did so only in 
limited form and were dependent for their existence on the production 
of the independent peasant producers (See Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 83). 
These labour forms developed: 
..: only in certain specialised sectors which are 
maintained through the more or less direct inter- 
vention of the state (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 
78). 
By and large, the revenues of the members of the ruling class 
were "... devoted to the reproduction of the political and. legal con- 
ditions of their continued appropriation of surplus-labour" (Hilidess 
and Hirst, 1975: 102). The revenues, therefore, were channelled into 
unproductive expenditures - large banquets, public displays, etc., 
which improved an individual's political and social position within 
the society or the society's social and political position in rela- 
tion to other groups. Because these revenues were spldom fed back 
into the production process, productive forces have limited develop- 
ment. As Hindess and Hirst (1975: 108) note: 
More complex forms of labour process develop 
mostly in sectors of production which depend on 
the level of exploitation of the mass of direct 
producers . Thus the scope for the development 
of productive forces is extremely limited with- 
in the ancient world and the highest developments 
in slave-worked latifundia and manufactories, 
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hardly affect the productivity or conditions of 
labour of the mass of direct producers. 
It is unclear whether the labourers used in building large scale 
public works such as roads, dykes, temples and fortifications were 
permanent slaves or temporary labourers who were allowed to return 
to their provinces. They were most probably a mixture of both. Pres- 
cott (1922: 446), for example, notes that the Aztecs, as a. punishment 
of the Chalcas for a rebellion, required the entire population in- 
cluding women to labour on the construction of royal edifices for 
four years. Additionally, within the city-state the individual 
peasant producer came to be required to contribute labour to the 
construction and maintenance of these public works (Comara, 1964: 
154; Keen, 1971: 21). Each conquered province was required to pro- 
vide labourers for diverse types of work. Katz (1966: 95) maintains 
that careful accounts were kept in detail concerning these require- 
ments, which lends some support to the idea that these were not per- 
petual slaves, but temporary labourers. 
Bosch Garcia (1944: 80) contrasts the harsh treatment Of these 
labourers with the generally mild treatment of the slaves. lie notes 
that the labourers used to build the great pyramids were required to 
carry extremely heavy materials and worked excessively. Gomara (1964: 
155) maintains that all of Moctezilma II's houses were built and main- 
tained by the labour mustered in neighboring towns. The people of 
these towns, he wrote: 
... gave their labour, paid the workmen, and car- 
ried on their backs or dragged, the stone, lime 
lumber, water and everything necessary for their 
consýruction. 
The drafts of labourers used to construct the temples and other 
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ceremonial buildings were the group of labourers most subject to vio- 
lent exploitation. Separated from their tribes and from the land, 
they were less likely to rise up in rebellion. And, since their use 
was temporary, their long-term well being of less concern than the 
long term viability of other groups of labourers. 
Summary % 
The degree to which direct physiCal violence was used in rela- 
tion to Aztec labour forms was tempered by the structure of the 
economic system. The ruling class depended on the appropriation of 
agricultural surplus from independent peasant producers. Given the 
level of political control the Aztec state had over these producers, 
there was a limit to how violently tribute and labour demands could 
be pursued. Within the city-state, demands were limited by the nec- 
essity of maintaining the loyalty and therefore the support of the 
labouring class. Outside the city-state, the possibility of rebel- 
lion limited these demands. The widespread use of serf labour was 
limited by the lack of Aztec monopoly on the land, and slavery limit- 
ed by the level of-production of the society as a whole. The harsh- 
est form of forced labour seems to have been that of the drafts of 
forced labourers used to construct ceremonial edifices, but the use 
of this form of labour was limited itself by the productive and or- 
ganisational capacity of the society. 
This particular form of organised state violence was, therefore, 
relatively mild when compared with other forms of organised violence 
such as warfare and human sacrifice. And the mildness of labour 
forms was determined by the characteristics. of the social formation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LEGAL SANCTIONS IN AZTEC MEXICO 
The primary concern of this thesis is to locate the organised 
state violence which occurred in two social formations in two his- 
torical periods within its economic context - to demonstrate the con- 
nections between the institutionalised violence of the state during 
these two particular historical conjunctures, and the economic foun- 
dations of the social formation. In this chapter, the ways in which 
the violence of legal sanctions in Aztec Mexico functioned to help 
secure the necessary conditions of existence of the economic system 
will be discussed. Although the focus of concern is with the violence 
of legal sanctions and not with the legal system itself, it is nec- 
essary to make a few preliminary comments about the way in which law 
is to be considered. 
Within this analysis, the law is conceived of as one institution 
among many through which the ruling class attempted to secure the 
social, political, and economic conditions necessary for its continu- 
ed existence as a ruling class. This is not to imply that this is 
the only function of the law, just that it is the one which is of 
concern in this thesis. 
10 In order for the Aztec ruling class to 
maintain itself as a class of non-labourers, a class of surplus 
takers, it had to organise and enforce surplus apprcpriation from 
direct producers. As has been no4ed previously, within the ancient 
mode of production the continued appropriation of surplus production 
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by the non-labouring ruling class depends primarily on reproducing 
the conditions of citizenship on the one hand, and the mechanisms of 
subordination on the other. The law was one mechanism through which 
the ruling--class sought to reproduce these conditions. 
The law functioned as an instrument of subordination in that it 
was an organised system of coercion, of force. The-law required the 
performance ofýcertain acts by those under its authority and prohi- 
bited others. This system of requirements and prohibitions were en- 
forced through the exercise and threat of punitive measures. The 
legal system, therefore, was first a means of controlling behavior. 
However, the law also served a function beyond its instrumentality 
in channelling behavior. It also maintained the conditions of ý_iti- 
zenship-by institutionalising the authority of the state - locating 
authority in the society with the state as an entity separate from 
and above individuals. The law, therefore, not only directly served 
ruling class interests by subordination - by coercing people into 
performing or not performing certain acts - but also by institution- 
alising the conditions of citizenship, by imposing the power of the 
state over the lives of its subjects. 
Law in Aztec Mexico was clearly the law of the ruling class. 
Nezahualcoyotl and his son Nezahualpilli, who rulediTexcoco from 1418 
to 1515, were considered the great lawmakers. They compiled both the 
civil and criminal codes, determined the system of ranks and func- 
tions of judges and the number and importance of the courts (Ceballos 
Novelo, 1937: 27). Judges were chosen primarily from among the nobility 
(Peterson, 1961: 120). They were supported by the state and they serv- 
ed for life (Prescott, 1922: 24). The law, therefore, was made and 
a 
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primarily administered by the ruling class, and this ruling class did 
not act merely-as an intermediary, codifying and implementing laws 
which reflected the will of the collective. 
The interests served by the law were primarily ruling class in- 
terests. The law required, for example, peasant producers to surren- 
der part of their production to the state and to perform labour on 
state lands. The law designated certain land as 'public land. ' The 
law forbid the commoner from wearing the clothing and decorations of 
the ruling class. Such laws clearly benefited not the collective, but 
the ruling class since the ruling class received the goods surrender- 
ed up in the form of tribute and the goods produced through labour on 
'public lands ' and they marked their position of pr ivilege through 
the use of distinctive clothing and decorations. 
In a more complex way the law served the interests of the ruling 
class by defining terrains of behavior in terms of its own interests. 
As Wolf (1982: 288) notes: 
Meanings are not imprinted into things by nature; 
they are developed and imposed by human beings. 
The ability to bestow meanings, to 'name' things and acts in a par- 
ticular way, is a source of power. Through the law the ruling class 
was able to name acts - to create the categories through which reality 
was perceived. Through legal sanctions the ruling class enforced 
their categories and protected their viability from other competing 
conceptions (Wolf, 1982: 388). 
The law, for example, Inamed' killing in one context as 'murder. ' 
Killing, however, in a different context, warfare or sacrifice for 
example, was not so named. The oVject of laws against killing was 
not to eliminate a particular behaviour held in revulsion by the 
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collective, but to delineate the difference between the contexts with- 
in which this behaviour would and would not be officially tolerated. 
And these distinctions primarily reflected when the behaviour was 
and was not in the interests of the state. 
Acts of violence committed at random by individuals were a poten- 
tial threat to the state since they were uncontrolled and could easily 
be turned against the state and its representatives. The state, there- 
fore, sought through the law. to establish a mon. ppoly on the use of 
violence by 'naming' some violence as criminal and punishing them and 
rewarding other violence, such as the violence of warfare. And as 
was noted in the chapter on warfare, the Aztec state even attempted 
to control the violence of warfare so that it more closely served the 
interests of the state. Warriors were prevented from unorganised 
looting and plundering of conquered provinces and required to await 
their award of booty through the state. The state attempted to con- 
trol all expressions of violence. 
Aztec citizens, for example, were not allowed to go about the 
city armed, except in times of warfare. 'Personal vengence was 
strictly prohibited. If a spouse, for example, was found committing 
an act of adultery, private action was not allowed. A murder in such 
circumstances was considered like any other (Floris Margadant S., 
1978: 24). The murder of a slave was considered a capital offense 
(Prescott, 1922: 26), and even abortion was punishable by death (lien- 
dieta y Nunez, 1921: 186). Anyone who challenged a person to a fight 
except in wartime was sentenced to death (Lopez de Gomara, 1625: 1140), 
and public quarrelling was punishable by placing the offender in a 
I 
cage (Peterson, 1961: 123). Violence inwarfare, however, was not 
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only encouraged but demanded. Deserters from the army were killed 
and soldiers were ordered to watch each other for indications of 
I 
cowardice (Duran, 1964: 186). The state was careful, therefore, to 
control and channel violence to serve its own ends. 
The contextual delineations made by the law, the naming of acts, 
not only applied to violence. The taking of property belonging to 
someone else, -Dn an individual basis, not controlled by the state, 
was labelled 'stealing' -a criminal act. The organised taking of 
property belonging to others, however, by the state during and after 
" war., was not considered stealing, not considered criminal. It was 
" crime for an individual to alter the boundary lines of another's 
land (Prescott, 1922: 26). The state, however, regularly encroached 
on calpulli land, "apPropriating more and more of it for the support 
of its officials and systematically took over the land of other In- 
dian groups (See Padden, 1967: 93). An individual who sold stolen 
goods was punished by death (Alba, 1949: 9-10), but the Aztec state 
regularly sold goods it secured from the tribute that was extracted 
by force from subject provinces. The law, therefore, was not design- 
ed to eliminate violence or the taking of property by force, but to 
secure control of their expression for the state. 
The law functioned, then, as a system of coercion, a system of 
control over bodies. It. specified certain behaviours that were re- 
quired such as the payment of tribute, and prohibited other behaviours 
such as violence in particular contexts. ' But the law served state 
interests also in a second way. The law coneinually reestablished 
the conditions of citizenship by making the state the centre of auth- 
ority, the controlling force in the society. The state, through the 
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law, attempted to secure its own power by subverting other sources of 
authority and allegience, such as the calpulli, and inserting itself 
as the primary focus of power (Kurtz, 1978: 170). Through the legal 
system the state sought to establish itself as the primary adjudicator 
of important disputes within society. The state attempted to monopo- 
lise the power to judge and therefore the power to determine the terms 
of dispute. As, SeJourne (1976: 14) notes: 
Laws, penalties, and innumerable prohibitions, 
indicated to each person in detail the behavior 
he must follow in all circumstances of his life, 
in such a system personal decision did not exist, 
dependence and instability were absolute, fear 
reigned. Death lurked ceaselessly everywhere, 
and constituted the cement of the building in 
which the individual Aztec was prisoner. 
Individuals, after the rise of the Aztec state, were no longer 
left to resolve their own disputes, at least not those disputes con- 
sidered important by the state. It was to the state, then, and its 
representatives that people had to refer to settle grievances. This 
situation helped to ensure that important disputes would be settled, 
directly or indirectly, in the interests of the ruling class since 
the representatives of the ruling class controlled the legal system. 
The fact that the ruling class made and administered the laws in its 
own interests does not mean that. all cases were adjudged in the in- 
terests of an individual-, member of the ruling class. The interests 
of the ruling class as a class, as an aggregate were reflected in the 
law and the administration of the legal system. The law functioned 
to ensure the average interests of the ruling class and this average 
interest was at times contrary to the particular interests of an in- 
dividual member of the ruling clas's. 
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It was, for example, in the average or general interest of'the 
ruling class that the legal system appear to be objective. and fair 
and separated to some extent from the individual will of the monarch. 
Part of the very instrumentality of the law as a system of control was 
that it did not overtly appear to function as an institution of ruling 
class domination. The degree to which Aztec law was (and still is by 
some historians-, see Peterson, 1961: 118-124 for example) popularly con- 
ceived of as representing collective interests is an indication of 
the sophistication of its ideological presentation. Law in Aztec 
society was conceived to originate in the will of the monarch whose 
authority to rule came both from his political and religious position 
within society. The power to make law and to punish, then, proceeded 
from the sovereign and was not to be shared with his subjects. Even 
though he delegated to the courts and judges the task of exercising 
this power to dispense justice, the ruler did not transfer the power 
(See Foucault, 1979: 53). 
It was in the interest of the monarch, however, and the ruling 
class whose interests he represented, to be seen as legislating and 
indeed ruling for the good of the collective. Even though Aztec 
rulers did not by and large make laws in the interests of the collect- 
ive but primarily in the interests of themselves andýthe ruling class 
to which they were members, consistent with the demands of the exist- 
ing economic arrangements, the appearance of representing the collect- 
ive was highly functional in that it worked to decrease the extent to 
which force had to be resorted to to implement decisions. The naked 
use of will and force, in most circum tances, is not the most effi- 
cient means of controlling human behaviour% Foucault (1979: 102), for 
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example, notes: 
A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with 
iron chains; but a true politician binds them 
even more strongly by the chains of their own 
ideas... 
The law, therefore, carried part of its effectiveness in the 
fact that it was given the appearance of representativeness and objec- 
tivity rather than the appearance of a controlling mechanism of the 
ruling class. Because this appearance of representativeness was so 
important, at times the interests of individual members of the ruling 
class were sacrificed in the interests of the class as a whole. Theo- 
retically, for example, no one not even the ruler in Aztec society, 
was ex mpt from the law (Alba, 1949: 9). Zorita (1965: 130) mentions 
several occasions wherein rulers had members of their own families 
executed for some crime such as adultery or improper behaviour. Neza- 
hualpilli, for example, had four of his sons, along with their lovers, 
put to death. He is said to have explained publicki: 
My child has violated the law; if I pardon him 
it will be said that the laws are not for all. 
You may know then, my subjects, that nothing 
you shall be excuses a transgression, since I 
punish it in the child I love the most (Lopez 
Gallo, 1976: 93). 
But. the nobility regularly were permitted numerous wives. Moc- 
tezuma II, for example, was one of his father's 150 children, and him- 
self is said to have had four thousand concubines (Padden, 1967-: 98). 
in order, to maintain the image of fairness and objectivity in law, 
however, it was at times necessary that certain members of the pri- 
vileged class actually be seen to come underýits authority. The pro- 
paganda effect of one such case of-severe penalty for a member of 
the ruling class, told and retold, is high. It created the impression 
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that no one was indeed above the law (See Hay, et. al., 1977: 33 who 
make a similar point about law in eighteenth century England). 
Even though the law was represented as being objective and to 
some extent separated from the will of the sovereign, nobles and 
other privileged members of society, such as merchants and warriors, 
had special courts in which their cases were heard. And the penal- 
ties proscribed for some crimes were more severe for nobles than those 
proscribed for commoners. If, for example, the son of a nobleman 
gambled and sold what belonged to his father in order to meet his 
debts, he was killed. If, on the other hand, the son of a commoner 
committed the same crime, he was enslaved (Peterson, 1961: 119,123, 
161). The nobility were supposed to serve as examples to the rest of 
the people and frequently a noble who was found guilty was taken 
out secretly and punished. The noble's son, for example, who gambled 
was secretly drowned (Trimborn, 1936: 58; Peterson, 1961: 123). 
Even though the proscribed penalties for nobles were more severe 
than those for commoners in some cases, the fact that they had separa- 
te courts and were not punished publiclý-. indicates that they may 
have not in fact been subject to the laws in the same way as were 
commoners. Foucault (1979: 58), for example, notes that in the eight- 
eenth century the hidden execution was considered a privileged exe- 
cution and it was often suspected that executions carried on in se- 
cret had not been carried out with customary severity. The laws, 
therefore, specifying more severe ptnaltles for the nobility were in 
all probability designed more for appearance; than enforcement. There 
were, for example, strict laws against adultery and drinking in Aztec 
society, but Aztec nobles had many wives and concubines and were 
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allowed to drink freely if this was done in private (Padden, 1967: 89- 
98). 
The Violence of Legal Sanctions 
That the law functioned to maintain the conditions of citizen- 
ship and the conditions of subordination does not necessarily iM7- 
ply that it did so primarily through physical violence, or indicate 
the levpl of violence that was required to maintain these conditions. 
The threat of violence is always present behind the legal system. 
But there are varying degrees to which this force is actually put 
into practice as physical violence. Foucault (1979), for example, 
discusses how the law functioned as a system of control in the eigh- 
teenth century while shifting from punishments of the body (physical 
violence, public executions) to a punishment of the 'soul' (carceral 
institutions, punishments removed from the public eye). 
Punishments for infractions of the law in Aztec society were, 
however, by and large explicitly violent - explicitly punishments 
of the body. Most criminal behaviour resulted in death by one of 
a number of means. Wrongdoers were hanged, drowned, stones, whip- 
ped, beheaded, impaled, strangled, or had their bodies torn to pieces. 
Less severe sanctions included slavery, mutilation, loss of employ- 
ment, destruction of one's house, or the cropping of hair - consider- 
ed by the Aztecs to be a great humiliation (Toscano, 1937: 53; Floris 
Margadant S., 1978: 23). The offences for which one might be so 
punished included among others, murder, treason, rebellion, high- 
way robbery, adultery, sodomy, lying, trickery in a trial, assault, 
rape, bestiali'ty, destruction of crops, homosexuality, the intentional 
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moving boundary markers, and refusal to pay debts (Peterson, . 961: 
120-124). Some offences might be punished less severely on first 
occurrance, the penalty becomin 3 more severe if repeated. Drinl,,, 
for example, was thought to cause all sorts of social ills. and the 
use of alcohol was severely proscribed for the common people. Only 
the old were allowed to drink freely (Toscano, 1937: 55). Drinking 
or becomming drunk, was considered a great offence and shame. On 
the first occasion the offender's hair might be cropped, on the se- 
cond his house demolished and his employment lost; on the third in- 
cident he could be put to death as an incorrigible offender (Peter- 
son, 1961: 123-124). The punishments for certain crimes extended be- 
yond the, offender to his relatives, and at times there was no distinc- 
tion made in terms of punishment between the person committing the 
crime and his accompli es. All were given the same penalty (Floris 
Margadant S., 1978: 24). Penal sanctions, therefore, in Aztec society 
were generally severe and were punishments of the body. 
Most of the punishments were performed in public. These public 
punishments were designed to be powerful statements of both the price 
to be paid for noncompliance with the law, and the force and auth- 
ority of the state. The punishment of crimes was designed both to 
punish the offender and prevent him from repeating hýs offence, and 
to make a statement to the other members of the society. They were a 
demonstration of the power of the state to enforce its will. On some 
occasions citizens were called upon to participate in the punishments 
and so join with the state in condemning the-offender. Aztec records 
show adulterers, for example, being stoned to death by citizens (Pur- 
chas, 1625: 1117). Male adulterers were sometimes delivered to the 
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husbands of their lovers, who could either give a pardon or beat the 
offender's head in with a large stone (Leon-Portilla, et. al., 1964: 
64). Mendieta, in his Historia [cclesiastica, described these punish- 
ments for adultery in which citizens participated: 
They were taken to the town square where many 
people united in throwing stones like rain upon 
them, but they did not feel much pain because 
they were soon dead and covered with stones 
(Quoted in Peterson, 1961: 122). 
Severe and public punishment for challenging the authority of 
the state was a powerful political tool. _ 
The punishment of 
crime was not an uncontrolled expression of anger, but a calculated 
expression of state power - not merely an exercise of the legal mach- 
inery, but a political tactic, a "technique for the exercise of pow- 
er" (See Sheridan, 1980: 138-131). Every act of punishment marked the 
body of the offender with a visible demonstration-of the-state's auth- 
ority. Those who took part in the punishments as either active par- 
ticipants(who for example threw stones) or spectators, were an in- 
tegral part of the process, not incidentals They witnessed and sup- 
ported the control and power of the state. 
It is within the political sphere that the domination of the 
ruling class was established and maintained, and the politics of pun- 
ishment were important. In the chapter on warfare it was noted that 
the importance of the political level necessitated a constant vigi- 
lance. with regard to challenges to the authority of the state. Any 
perceived erosion of that authority, a refusal to attend a sacrificial 
ceremony or a refusal to pay tribute, had to'be quickly dealt. with, 
for the position of the Aztec state at the apex of the hierarchy of 
I 
power in Mexico was maintained not primarily by economic coercion 
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but through politics. Within the city-state. the same imperatives were 
in force. Just as the Aztec city-state maintained its dominance over 
the surrounding territories largely through political mechanisms, by 
maintaining its position of political domination over other Indian 
groups, so the Aztec ruling class maintained its position of dominance 
over its own citizens primarily through political means. The state, 
therefore, had-to be as vi3ilent about maintaining its autnority among 
its own citizens as among those groups ofi.. non-citizens from which it 
extracted tribute. To commit a crime was to question the state's 
authority and the state maintained its dominance through maintaining 
its political authority. 
The continued existence of the ruling state, therefore, depended 
partly on harsh response to any challenges. If at any point public 
power was seen to fail, it called into question the entire hierarchi- 
cal relationship on which the economic system depended (See Wolf, 1982: 
83). The establishment of the state as the adjudicator gave to the 
state the power to 'name' to dictate the terms of dispute. This po- 
wer was reinforced every time an appeal to the legal system was made. 
Once the state had established itself in the position to make and en- 
force a set of laws, refusal to comply with these laws became an at- 
tack on the state. Crime, then, essentially became treason. 
11 
The state intervened in instances of law-breaking not as a medi- 
ator of conflicting interests but as an injured party itself, for a 
refusal to comply with the law was a refusal to accept the authority 
of the state. And as with rebellion and the'punishment of war cap- 
tives, the punishments employed to counter an affront to the state's 
authority were designed not so much to.; e-7establish a balance, but 
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to demonstrate the dissymmetry between the subject who had dared 
to violate the law and the all-powerful state or sover6ign who dis- 
played his strength. Public punishment was an emphatic statement of 
the intrinsic superiority of the authority of the sovereign and the 
state he represented. The populace was made aware through the punish- 
ment of the body of the condemned, of the "unrestrained presence of 
the sovereign", (Foucault, 1979: 48-49). The Aztec ruling class claim- 
ed its right to the appropriation of surplus production and labour 
by right of membership in the politically dominant group. Within 
the city-state, they claimed this right through their relation to 
the dominant state. This superiority in terms of the power of the 
state was the means through which the ruling class maintained its 
position of dominance and therefore its control over surplus produc- 
tion. This superiority had to be stated, restated and protected 
from any challenges. The authority of the state, however, over its 
own citizens rested not only on its ability to enforce its will, but 
with its central power to regulate and integrate social life. 
Outside the city-state, conquered tributary provinces had no in- 
vestment in the Aztec state. They received little benefit from be- 
ing a part of the empire and we're not integrated within it. Within 
the city-state, however, the relations between the ruling state and 
the populace were quite different. The Aztec populace was not held 
in subjection through military force but drawn into a relationship 
of interdependence with the state. The legal system was one insti- 
tution through which this relationship of interdependence was estab- 
lished and maintained. For the law functioned not only as a system 
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of coercion but as an integrative force. It regulated the lives of 
individuals and established the state as the location of reference and 
appeal. This important function of integration in part explains the 
care and concern the Aztec state displayed over its legal system. On 
the level of sheer formal organisation, the Aztec legal system was 
impressive. In each Aztec town a magistrate was elected by each clan 
or calpulli fo-f a period of one year. This magistrate settled the 
more straightforward civil and criminal cases which could be kept out 
of the higher courts. Under his supervision and also appointed by 
the people were men who served warrants and made arrests. These in- 
spectors watched over the conduct of a certain number of families in 
each of the towns. and were charged to report any disorder or law- 
breaking to higher authorities. The rulings in the town courts were 
generally made within a day or two and if the decision was not satis- 
factory to the parties involved, could be appealed to the provincial 
or tecalli court (Prescott, 1922: 23-24; Peterson, 1961: 118). 
The tecalli courts, one in each province, consisted of three ma- 
gistrates each of whom had various assistants to execute orders and 
sentences. The tecalli judges were inferior to a supreme judge, 
appointed by the crown, who had jurisdiction over both civil and cri- 
minal cases and handled appeals from the two lower courts. A deci- 
sion in the superior court could not be appealed, even to the monarch, 
although difficult cases were sometimes referred to the emperor for 
consideration (Prescott, 1922: 23; Peterson, 1961: 118-119). 
Cases were judged after the presentation of evidence, confessions, 
documents and cross-examination. Scribes took down in picture writing 
the details of every case - the claims, the witnesses, and the 
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findings (Zorita, 1965: 128). There were no lawyers in Aztec courts. 
The officials present were there only to preserve order and to summon 
others. The individuals involved stated their own cases, supported 
by the testimony of witnesses (Prescott, 1922: 25-26). Excessive rhe- 
toric was considered an attempt to evade the truth (Peterson, 1961: 
120). 
The witnesýses called in a case, took an oath to tell the truth, 
and lying was punished by death (Peterson, 1961: 120). When people 
took an oath, they touched their forefinger to the ground and then to 
their lips. Some said that this was because they swore an oath to 
the earth which maintained them. Others said that it was because if 
they lied, it was to the earth that they would, in short order, be 
returned (Lopez de Gomara, 1625: 1139). At times. the ruler would 
audit a trial, or a supreme court justice would appear in a lower 
court to supervise the proceedings and ensure regularity (Peterson, 
1961: 120). 
Judges were not allowed to hear cases involving friends or rela- 
tives, and they sat from early morning to late afternoon with only a 
short break midday (Peterson, 1961: 120; Zorita, 1965: 126). No law- 
suit in the Aztec system was to last longer than eighty days. Punish- 
ments proscribed for magistrates found guilty of col-lusion with a 
suitor were severe, and judges were put to death for accepting bribes 
and pronouncing suits in their own houses (Iýrescott, 1922: 24). Jud- 
ges were subject to penalties ranging from removal from office to 
death for partial sentences, bribery, negligience, or misconduct (Pet- 
erson, 1961: 120). Zorita (1965: 128) maintains that if a judge was 
discovered to have accepted a ýift, or drank to excess, or was 
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negligent in some way, he-was, if it was a small matter, severely re- 
primanded by his fellow judges. If, however, the judge did not mend 
his ways, on the third offence, his hair was cropped and he was re- 
moved from office in disgrace. If the offence was a serious one the 
ruler stripped the judge of his office. Prescott (1922: 24) mentions 
an instance in which Nezahualpilli had a judge put to death for accept- 
ing bribes andýanother for hearing cases in his house. Zorita (1965: 
128). bdintAins that in the reign of the same ruler, a judge favoured 
a principle in. a case and then gave an untruthful account of it to 
King Nezahualpilli. Nezahualpilli, according to Zoritajordered the 
judge hanged and the judgement reversed in favour of a commoner. 
Evidence indicates that the law did function at least with the 
appearance of objectivity and fairness and that there was great res- 
I 
pect for the law in Aztec society. Lopez de Gomara (1625: 1139) com-- 
ments on the learned nature of the judges and praises the fact that 
they did not accept fees. Zorita-... (1965: 128) on the same subject conr- 
ments: 
The judges received no fees, large or small and 
accepted no gift from any person great or hum, - 
ble, rich or poor. They showed great rectitude 
in their judgements; the same was true of all 
the other ministers of justice. 
Sahagun maintains that the magistrates: 
*** examined with great diligence all cases that 
came into their hands ... 
The desCriptions in the Florentine Codex (Dibble and Anderson, 
1961: 16) recorded by Sahagun, however, of the good and the bad magis- 
trate, reveal that there must have been abuses. 
The good magistrate (is) just: a hearer of both 
sides .... a passer of just sentences ... a shower 
of no favor. He fears no one-he shows no bias. 
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The. bad magistrate '(is)ýa_sho'Fer of-favor, a ha- 
ter of people', an establisher: of unjust ordinances, 
. an accepterof 
bribes ... a. doer. of. favors. 
. 
The proscribed penalty f6r, pubUc'officiali found guilty of hot 
perfokmiiig their jobs properly was: death. '. ,. Aztec law for example, 
stipulated the penalty of death for tax collectors who stole from the 
people (Gomara, 1964: 155). Diaz (1963: 210), however, maintains that 
the Indians encountered by the Spanish complained bitterly that Aztec 
tax collectors robbed them and took their lands. A Cempoalan chief 
told Cortes that the tax gathers of Moctezuma II took away handsome 
women and raped them in all the thirty Totonac villages which were 
under Moctezuma II (Diaz, 1963: 110). The Indians were evidently so 
afraid of the Aztec officials they didn't even dare to complain 
*0 (Lopez de Go*mara, 1625: 1130). Diaz wrote that while the Cempoalan 
chief was talking to Cortes, messengers arrived to tell him that 
five of Moctezuma's tax collectors had arrived in the city. When he 
heard the news, the Cempoalan chief, according to Diaz (1963: 111), 
"turned pale at the news. " 
Prescott (1922: 24-25) maintains that the provision of appeal of 
cases was a reflection of the concern the Aztecs felt over the sev- 
erity of their proscribed punishments. This would, Prescott notes 
it ... naturally have made them more cautious of a wrong conviction. " 
But there is also evidence to indicate that the right to appeal 
cases to--. ýthe highest tribunal, applied only to criminal cases (Men- 
dieta y Nu"Vez, 1920: 185). And, the right to appeal was not always 
available. Those who committed crimes in the market place, for ex- 
ample, or highway robbery, were tried and punished on the spot (Pet- 
erson, 1961: 124; Vaillant, 1962: 99)... 
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Prescott (1922: 23-24) maintained that the character of the judi- 
cial tribunals mitigated to some extent the potential despotism of 
the concentration of monarchical power, and he maintained that the 
provision of land to support the judges made them "wholly independent" 
of the crown. He then remarks, however: 
It is not, indeed to be supposed that, in a gov- 
ernment other wise so despotic, means could not 
be fdund for influencing the magistrate. But it 
was a great step to fence round his authority 
with the sanction of the law; and no one of the 
Aztec monarchs, as far as I know, is accused of 
an attempt to violate it (Prescott, 1922: 24). 
Judges consulted with the ruler regularly, however, and their 
lands and incomes were awarded by the ruler (Zorita, 1965: 126-128). 
Even though the monarch's authority was 'fenced round' no law prevent- 
ed Moctezuma II, for example, from slaughtering all the palace of- 
ficials of the previous monarch when he assumed power (Padden, 1967: 
86). The monarch also had the power to condemn judges to death for 
wrongdoing (Davies, 1973: 110). The fencing round, therefore, would 
seem to have served primarily-to create the appearance rather than 
the fact of judicial independence. 
Summary 
The Aztec state was keenly aware of the political importance of 
law as a means of power and social control, and in many respects, 
the Aztec legal system was very advanced. There was an organised 
body of law, a concept of precedent through the decisions of courts, 
and territorial jurisdiction (Yturbide, 1959: 729). Offences were 
specified in writing along with their punishments, as were court 
procedure and organisation. There were strict-rules concerning the 
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administration of justice and severe penalties proscribed for malfea- 
sance in office. The Aztecs also well understood the importance of 
the appearance of the law as an-objective force independent of the 
state. Judges were appointed. for life and lands were awarded for 
their upkeep. There were rules regarding judicial partiality and 
a concept of equality before the law (Mendieta y Nunez, 1920: 184). 
Most chroniclers have nothing but the highest praise for Aztec 
legal institutions. Zorita (1965: 123-125), for example, maintains 
that better order and justice prevailed within the Aztec empire than 
within all the other Indian groups. Ceballos Novelo (1937: 27), in 
his book on Aztec political institutions, described the legal system 
as "an eloquent manifestation of a high grade of civilisation. ", Even 
the Spanish conquistadors, when they arrived in Tenochtitlan marvelled 
at the fairness and efficiency of the Aztec legal system. They also 
commented on the extent to which respect for the law and authority 
were engrained in the minds of the people (Cortes, 1971: 105,108,464). 
It is very difficult to assess the actual workings of the Aztec 
legal system (See Prescott, 1922: 23). Much of the information avail- 
able is based on the law as written and such information actually 
tells very little about how the law functioned in practice. In later 
sections it will become apparent what little correspondence there 
was between the Spanish law as written and its actual implementation 
in Mexico. But in ancient Mexico. there was no dissenting group 
such as the Spanish missionaries who possessed the facilities:. to re- 
cord disparities between the law and its implementation. From the 
evidence available, however, it does appear that the Aztec state in- 
vested considerable importance in the swift sure and harsh punishment 
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of offences and in the creation of the appearance, at least, of fair- 
ness and objectivity in the legal system. The importance of the 
legal system is an indication of the primacy of the political level 
within the social formation. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SPAIN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 
The focus of this second section is the violence of the first 
thirty years of Spanish presence in Mexico - from 1520 to 1550 - 
what Parry (1949: 60) calls "the Age of the Conquistador. " The vio- 
lence of these first thirty years can be most adequately understood 
as a predictable by-product of the wider economic demands of emerging 
western European capitalism in the latter part of the fifteenth and 
the first part of the sixteenth centuries. To understand-just how 
this was the case, it is necessary to explore not only economic and 
political conditions in Mexico and in Spain during this period, but 
to give some indication of the pressures that existed within the 
ý. -, European world economy and the position of Spain and Mexico in rela- 
tion to this European world economy. 
In this chapter, the scaffolding of economic pressures that form- 
ed the context within which organised violence in Mexico took place, 
will be described, It is important to stress again that such an an- 
alysis does not imply a strictly deterministic model . The economic 
structural configurations of the time were the context within which 
the struggles and events of history in Mexico were played out. Ra- 
ther than determining these struggles and events, the economic. struc- 
ture underlaYed, oriented and constrained the ways in which these 
events and struggles took place. 'Given the particular set of econo- 
mic contingencies, a range of responses was possible. The range, 
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however, was not infinite, and certain responses had a higher proba- 
bility of occurring than did others. While the organised violence 
which took place in colonial Mexico, or New Spain, was not strictly 
determined, it was an almost inevitable outcome of the particular 
set of social and economic demands of the time (See Wright, 1978 for 
a discussion of models of determination). 
Spanish violence in Mexico was not a response solely to the i=- 
mediate exigencies of the world situation. Even though the primary 
concern of this thesis is with the events in Mexico during thirty 
years of the sixteenth century, it is necessary to go back prior to 
that time to explain the economic pressures which set the context for 
those events. But at what point is it necessary to begin? Several 
writers (See Wallerstein, 1974: 68 for a discussion of the positions 
of the various scholars on this point) have divided the sixteenth 
century into two parts, the first from about 1450 to 1550, and ano- 
ther beginning in 1550 and ending around 1620. "1 am skeptical, " 
writes Fernand Braudel (1953. -73) "of a sixteenth'century about which 
one doesn't specify if it is one or several... " It is the first of 
these sixteenth centuries that will be discussed, for it is during 
this period that there began developing in Europe a capitalist world 
economy and Mexico was to be dragged forcibly to play its part in 
this economy. 
The point at which one begins reconstructing the socio-economic 
situation is, of necessity, somewhat arbitrary. Capitalist relations 
did not appear simultaneously in all of western Europe. In Italy 
and Flanders, for example, a fairly well developed capitalism exist- 
ed as early as the thirteenth cenýury (Darby, 1957: 97). It is in 
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the middle of the fifteenth century, however, that western Europe began 
as a whole to change rapidly from a group of somewhat insular socie- 
ties dominated by feudal social relations into an increasingly inter- 
related system drawn together by co n economic concerns and char- 
acterised by the emergence and struggle for dominance of capitalist 
relations (See'Wallerstein, 1974: 68). 
The Emergence of a Capitalist World System 
Sweezy (1950: 136) maintains that the crucial features ofýwestern 
European feudalism in the latter middle ages were production for use, 
locality of markets, and the externality of long-distance trade to 
the dominant mode of production. Handicrafts and food production were 
the primary economic activities, and these were geared to local con- 
sumption rather than production for a wider market. Most individuals 
engaged in a sort of partial self-sufficiency whereby they produced 
to satisfy their own needs, and after providing feudal dues, used 
what surplus was left to barter for goods with the non-agricultural 
population. The bulk of the surplus of any increased production un- 
der such a system, however, was assured to landlords who had noble 
status and who controlled the legal machinery (See Wallerstein, 1974: 
18-21). 
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Western European feudal society of the time can be conceived of 
as being a series of "tiny economic nodules. " While these nodules 
were not totally isolated from one another, nor totally self-suffi- 
cient, the interaction between them and the dependence of one on the 
other. was minimal. While not anthetical to trade, such a system 
could only support a certain a uht of long-distance as opposed to 
local trade and the long-distance trade that did exist tended to be 
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a trade in luxuries, not in bulk goods. This trade, therefore, depend- 
ed for its existence on the support and interests of the very wealthy. 
This is the externality of trade which Sweezy referred, i. e., the 
trade in precosities did very little to feed back into the economy 
and provide expanded production (Wallerstein, 1974: 20-21). 
From about the twelth to the fourteenth centuries the scale of 
economic activity under this system was slowly expanding. Some- 
time around the fourteenth century, expansion reached its limit and 
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what had expanded, began to contract. Population,, at the time. be- 
gan to reach a saturation point given the state of technology, and 
food shortages and epidemics were the result. The situation was ex- 
acerbated by the beginnings of the Hundred Years War in 1335, since 
the war economies of the western European states required increased 
taxes. The taxes on top of already heavy feudal dues led to a re- 
duction in consumption and a consequent further reduction in produc- 
tion. The ruling class responded with an intensified exploitation 
of the peasantry and the counterproductive squeeze resulted in wides- 
pread peasant revolts and peasant flight from the land. In addition, 
climatological changes lowered soil productivity and increased epi- 
demics (Wallerstein, 1974: 37).. This contraction, which Wallerstein 
(1974: 21-22) terms the "culmination of 1000 years of development, " 
was'to have the effect of moving western Europe into a new age. A 
new structural, arrangement for the extraction of surplus became nec- 
essary when the old arrangement proved inadequate, and the profound 
changes of the sixteenth century represent the be-ginning of develoý- 
ment of this altered structural arrangement (See Wright, 1978: 171). 
The only way out of the stagýiation was to expand the economic 
pie to be shared. What was needed and what capitalism offered was 
I 
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a new and more lucrative form of surplus appropriation, and political 
energy was to be invested in securing the conditions necessary for 
developing and maintaining this form of appropriation (Wallerstein, 
1974: 16). As Wallerstein (1974: 38) summarises: 
... what Europe was to develop and sustain now 
was a new form of surplus appropriation ... based 
not on direct appropriation of agricultural sur- 
plus in the form either of tribute ... or of feu- 
dal rents... Instead what would develop now (was) 
the appropriation of a surplus which was based 
on more efficient and expanded productivity... 
by means of a world market mechanism with the 
'artificial' (that is, nonmarket) assistance of 
state machineries, none of which controlled the 
world market in its entirety... 
Europe began undergoing changes which were unlike any that had 
been experienced before and international commerce was the foundation 
of these changes (Thompson, 1965: 415). Trade was, as Glamann (1978: 
427) has written "... the great wheel driving the whole engine of so- 
ciety... " Long-distance trade operated increasingly as a creative 
force. More commodities were brought within reach and the trading 
centres for these commodities provided an impetus to commodity pro- 
duction and an exchange economy. Trade increased demand and demand 
in turn increased trade. Production for exchange and production for 
use came to exist side by side,. each affecting the other in this new 
economic arrangement. The demand for goods increased and the desire 
to buy brought with it a pressure to sell (Sweezy, 1950: 140-143). 
Cities like Antwerp and Amsterdam grew into international ex- 
changes and new forms of transacting business and arranging credit 
were established to accommodate the widespread and complex trading. 
International fairs grew out of formýr provincial markets, displacing 
the old periodic fairs by year-round commodity markets where credit 
facilitated comrqerce in the greatest centres of trade (Thompson, 1965: 
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495). As Thompson (1965: 492) notes: 
* the rate of interest, stockjobbing, the 
im- 
; 
ortance of the mining industries, the formation 
and dissolution of monopolies and trusts, the 
origin of newspapers ... the financial policies 
of the different countries, the rise of the 
great fairs... the evolution of national debts 
each and all of these are evidences of the chang- 
ed condition of Europe. 
Commerce in the fifteenth century came to be carried on less by 
individual merchants than by giant trading corporations which poss- 
essed a degree of capital and political influence previously unknown. 
European states began to recognise the importance of trade and imple- 
mented protective laws and navigation acts which were designed to mi- 
nimise competition (Thompson, 1965: 494). The nobility, weakened by 
declining profits, began to turn capital investment away from land 
and to seek profits elsewhere. The nobility therefore welcomed to 
some extent the strengthening of the centralised absolutist states 
which began to rise in western Europe since these states were in a 
position to secure the conditions necessary for profits in commerce 
and trade (Wallerstein, 1974: 36). During the great expansion in com- 
merce and finance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the 
Italians led the way to European recovery. In fact, Ferguson (1962: 
97) has written that: 
The history of early capitalism is to a very 
large"extent the history of Italian commerce. 
As early as the eleventh century, Italy had been the entrepot 
of the luxury trade between the eastern kediterranean and western 
Europe and had therefore accumulated sizable profits which were then 
fed back into an expanding economy (Ferguson, 1962: 113). The most 
sophisticated techniques of credit, banking, and international ex- 
change were pre, sent in late medieval Italy (Braudel and Spooner, 1967: 
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490). Italian merchant-bankers dominated European money markets and 
Italian prosperity, based on international trade and the commercial 
and financial techniques developed in the large mercantile cities, 
provided much of the capital for expansion in the rest of western 
Europe (Ferguson, 1962: 113). 
What grew out of this general crisis, as Wallerstein (1974: 15) 
has pointed out, was a world economy -a world system not because it 
encompassed the whole world (there were other world systems at the 
time) but because it grafted together diverse political entities in- 
to one interdependent sy8tem. It was a world economy because the pri- 
mary link between political units was economic. Decisions had to be 
made within the context of this new world market, and there came to 
be a distribution of productive tasks within this new world system 
in that: 
,.. those who breed manpower sustain those who 
row food who sustain those who grow other raw 
materials who sustain those involved in indus- 
trial production (Wallerstein, 1974: 86). 
Increasingly, economic decisions were oriented toward the fled- 
gling world economy, while political decisions remained within the 
sphere of smaller governmental entities (Wallerstein, 1974: 67). By 
the sixteenth century, the needs of the market gained overriding im- 
portance (Rowdon, 1974: 16). Indeed the most crucial development of 
the capitalist economy was that of a world market and the capitalist 
nature of international commerce and finance became clearly apparent 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (See Hobsbawm, 1964: 30; 
Bernard, 1971: 37). 
Obviously there were regions isolated from these general trends, 
regions relatively unaffected by the sorts of'ýhanges that came about 
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as a result of the growth of a world market (Vilar, 1976: 33). And 
even within regions, sectors of the economy were affected differen- 
tially. Industry, for example, remained far behind commerce in dev- 
elopment during this period (Braudel and Spooner, 1967: 492). This 
was not an age in which capitalist relations pervaded every level of 
social and economic life. Instead it was an era in which capitalist 
relations wereýjust beginning to take hold - an era in which various 
forms of production existed simultaneously under the waining dominance 
of one of them: feudalism (Anderson, 1974b: 39-40). 
It is impossible to establish as imple causal relationship be- 
tween the expansion of western Europe and changes in commerce. Both 
were cause and effect in the same process (Knight, 1930: 298). The 
general rise in commercial activity produced capital to finance over- 
seas expansion, and a certain political stabilisation in the great 
nation states provided an environment which freed capital to be in- 
vested. lmproVýments in navigation and geographical knowledge were 
part of and stimulus to pressure to get better contacts with the 
sources of Eastern commodities. 
What this period initiated was a condition in which all of west- 
ern Europe came increasingly to be part of the same economic system. 
The laws of the market drew into connection nations and regions re- 
, gardless of their 
differences, and began to penetrate other layers 
of political and social life. Since commodities assumed a value on 
a world market, and coins of international circulation were subject 
to fluctuations of the world gold market, inýcreasingly all of west- 
ern Europe was drawn into a role in the world system (Frank, 1978b: 
52,! 753). 
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Precious Metals and Primitive Accumulation 
One of the primary features of the transition from feudal to 
capitalist relations was a change in the relative predominance of 
money transactions. Whereas under a feudal system money played a 
secondary and subordinate role, with the increasing importance of 
capitalist relations, money came to play a major role in social and 
economic life (See Vilar, 1976: 25). And the importance of money 
meant the importance of precioua metals.. Any object, theoretically, 
can be used as money, as pepper was from time to time. However, the 
precious metals, especially gold, fulfill the role probably better 
than any other substance. Gold has always been the easiest commodity 
money to handle and transport in limited quantities and has, there- 
fore, been a universal medium of international payment and means of 
balancing one country's trade deficit with another. Also gold is 
less difficult to extract and shape than silver or copper, even 
though the latter are more abundant (Vilar, 1976: 22,26,33). - 
The degree to which the search for gold took hold at this time 
is an indication of the extent to which feudalism was already under- 
mined in western Europe. Engels (1956: 213), for exampliý, wrote that 
the quest for gold "... however much it materialised at first in feu- 
dal and semi-feudal for was at root already incompýtible with feu- 
dalism, whose groundwork rested upon agriculture, and whose conquests 
were essentially directed at acquiring land. " In the early sixteenth 
century, the accumulation of capital wag an overriding economic and 
consequently social concern. As Frank (1978b: 52) has written: 
... the sixteenth century witnessed the first 
long, sustained, and widespread quantitative 
and qualifative development of capitalism in 
its mercantile stage and the first period of 
concentrated capital accumulation in Europe. a 
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There were two primary ways of accumulating large amounts of capital. 
k7" 
One was through scarcely-veiled plunder. The other was by establish- 
ing monopolistic control over the disposal of some commodity, and 
thereby dictating the terms of exchange to the advantage of the sup- 
plier. By far the quickest and easiest form of accumulation was 
through the discovery and plunder of sources of precious metals (Dobb, 
1972: 88). 
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Precious metals therefore, especially gold, were to play 4n im- 
portant role in the expanding world market. Obviously trading ar- 
rangements in such a system were far too complex to be based on bar- 
ter, and given the instability of the new economic and political ar- 
rangements, money of account might always collapse (Del Mar, 1969: 137). 
Precious metals, therefore, were a primary prerequisite to the estab- 
lishment and maintenance of such a market not only as the base of a 
monetary system but as the foundation of a European "collective con- 
fidence, " a confidence necessary to develop and sustain a mode of sur- 
plus appropriation wherein profit was based on the deferring of realis- 
ed value. Wallerstein (1974: 46) writes: 
Given this phenomenon of collective psychology, 
an integral element of the social structure of 
the time, bullion mus. t be seen as an essential 
crop for a prospering world-economy. 
The latter middle ages were marked by the economic theory that 
precious metals were wealth itself. The country that could sell ab- 
road and thereby get gold in return grew richer, while the country 
which bought with gold, got poorer (Thompson, 1965: 497). The econo- 
mic revolution that took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen- 
turies was essentially mercantile and did not involve substantial 
changes in industrial techniques, There was, therefore, a lag in the 
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development of industrial techniques in general which meant a lag in 
industrial techniques for the extraction of precious metals in parti- 
cular. Because of this, and because of the increased demand for capi- 
tal, the supply of precious metals from the mines of western Europe 
did not keep pace with the expanding economy (Vicens Vives, 1969: 197). 
In fact, from the end of the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteen- 
th-centuries, Zuropean silver production all but ceased for technolo- 
gical reasons. Even though nearly all European nations began to limit 
and restrict the export of precious metals, precious metals still 
continued to flow to the east and drain Europe (Nussbaum, 1937: 92). 
There seemed to be no way of alleviating the shortage of precious 
metals either by replenishing the stock through increased mining, or 
i-ncreasing its velocity of exchange from hand to hand (Del Mar, 1969: 
136; Jacob, 1968: 369). Long-distance trade required increased amounts 
of capital and Europe was desperately short of precious metals (Heck- 
scher, 1955: 344). Commerce, therefore, was inhibited by the subse- 
quent inadequacies of the'monetary and credit systems which were de- 
pendent on the flow of bullion and on large bullion reserves (Thomp- 
son, 1965: 494; Glainann, 1978: 430-431). 
The shortage of precious metals became endemic. Even consider- 
ing the gold imported from north-western Europe, a moderate amount 
coming from the mines of central Europe, and more substantial amounts 
from Senegal, the supply was barely adequate (Wallerstein, 1974: 31, 
46; Cook, 1970). Trade was growing faster than the stocks of silver, 
and public disorder encouraged the hoarding of bullion. Gold and 
silver had to meet the demands of decoration, currency, hoarding and 
payment of foreign debt (Heaton, 
i948: 176). Any perceived shortage,, 
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in precious metals caused alarm. All over Europe, one country after 
another imposed strict regulations on the export of precious metals 
and limitations on the use of precious metals to pay for foreign cour- 
modities. England, for example, forbade export of gold and silver at 
least seven times during the fifteenth century. In addition, foreign 
merchants were ordered to buy English goods with part of the receipts 
of their sales-in England. While such measures were, as Heaton (1948: 
176) points out: 
... emergency policies to meet critical conditions, 
they indicate a general attitude. Only mature 
economic centers which imported at least as much 
as they exported could regard precious metals 
with indifference... 
After 1450, an increase in population, production and cultivation 
brought about a fall in all prices relative to gold, and those who had 
gold were able to buy increasing amounts of commodities. The search, 
therefore, between 1450 and 1500 for precious metals became especial- 
ly profitable. Because the supply of gold in Europe was so limited 
at the time, even small discoveries had a great impact on the Euro- 
pean gold markets (Vilar, 1976: 19,137,45). Vicens Vives (1969: 322) 
maintains that the lust for precious metals was as much due to the 
stories of the early explorers'as to a shortage of precious metals in 
Europe, but it was the shortage, the demand, and the-subsequent rise 
in the price of gold relative to other commodities which created the 
context within which these stories were heard by individuals. Had 
the value of gold not been so high, stories of its discovery would 
not have generated so much interest. 
Fluctuations, for example, in the value of gold affected Genoese 
exploration in the Atlantic. When the. price of gold was high - as in 
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the late thirteenth century when gold was thirteen or fourteen times 
more expensive than silver - there was increased activity and a capi- 
tal financed expedition was*tried by the Genoese to circumnavigate 
Africa. After 1350, however, when the ratio between gold and silver 
reached more normal levels there was a lull in Genoese exploration 
(See Vilar, 1976: 47-48). In 1450, these explorations began again 
and the Genoesek moved down the west coast of Africa trying to secure 
better and better access to gold markets. The Portugese and then the 
Spaniards, located near the gold route to-Africa, were soon to join 
the search. 
Portugal, Spain and the Atlantic Expansion 
The expansion occurring in western Europe was a general one and 
was the result of a long evolutionary process in agriculture, tech- 
nology, industry, communications, commercial and financial techniques 
and politics (Vilar, 1976: 69). The expansion, therefore, first of 
Portugal and then of Spain into the Atlantic cannot be considered as 
a break or discontinuity with contemporary trends. It was a part of 
the more widespread expansion in the whole of western Europe. The 
Balaeric Islands, Sardinia and Corsica were recaptured for Christian 
Europe, the Normans conquered southern-Italy and Sicily, Cyprus, Pal- 
estine and Syria, Crete and the Aegean Islands fell in the Crusades. 
The English expanded into Wales, Scotland and Ireland, and the Ger- 
mens and Scandinavians moved into the lands of the Balts and Slavs 
(Wallerstein, 1974: 38). 
The Iberian states would respond to the pressures of expansion 
with overseas conquests largely because there was no other place to 
expand. Productive land in both countries was scarce and the 
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particular geographic location of Spain and Portugal between the Medi- 
terranean and the Atlantic, and African and the North European trade, 
made Atlantic expansion the most logical alternative (Vilar, 1976: 49). 
The Italians held a monopoly on trade from the east and were simply 
passing on to their customers in the rest of Europe the increasingly 
high costs of acquiring eastern goods. These high prices provided 
an additional iftimulus to other countries like Spain and Portugal to 
seek their own trade routes with the east (Parry, 1963: 46). 
It is instructive to look at some of the reasons why Portugal 
was able to launch an undertaking so ambitious as overseas expansion 
as well as her motivations for doing so, since both are closely relat- 
ed to Spani. ýh ability and motivation to expand into the Atlantic later. 
Portugal established the necessary structural prerequisites which al- 
lowed an overseas expansion earlier than any other western European 
country and was, during the later part of the fourteenth century, a 
vigorous trading nation (Diffie, 1977: 37-41). Portugal had achieved 
a political stability at least a century before Spain, France, or 
England (Wallerstein, 1974: 51). While France was involved in the Hun- 
dred Years War and in her rivalry with Burgundy, England was embroiled 
in a struggle with France and the War of the Roses, and Spain and 
Italy were involved in divisive dynastic disputes, Portugal was free 
to invest her energies in expanded commerce. 
The planning, organising and financing of overseas expansion de- 
pended a great deal on a state which wad free to provide competent 
governmental initiative and support (Boxer', 1963: 6-8). Political 
stability was crucial because it created a climate in which entre- 
0 
preneurs could flourish, and encouarged the nobility to find outlets 
for their energies other than internal or inter-European warfare. 
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The state in Europe would come to be one of the chief entrepreneurs 
(Wallerstein, 1974: 51). 
Along with a stable political situation, Portugal had behind. her 
a long history of trading experience in the Atlantic, and the Medi- 
terranean. Portugese governments had for centuries strongly promoted 
commercial activity and encouraged the presence of foreign merchants, 
especially the'Italians. The Italians had long been financially in- 
volved with Iberian commercial enterprise (Wallerstein, 1974: 49)... 
The-Italians contributed both capital and experience of the sea and 
shipbuilding. Because of these trading contacts, Portugal had a his- 
tory of experience with the advanced money economies of the Christian 
Mediterranean. In the latter part of the fourteenth century Porgu- 
gese merchants were already growing wealthy from trade abroad and 
carried on an active commerce with the Muslims of Granada, Africa 
and the north (Diffie, 1977: 26,37-40). 
But. if political stýtbility and a trading and monetary tie to 
the Mediterranean were reasons for Portugal's ability to initiate such 
an expansion, what was the motivation? What did Portugal hope to 
gain? The Portugese nobility was suffering from the same decline in 
seignorial incomes as the nobles in the rest of Europe and needed 
some way of bringing incomes back up to an acceptable level. Sources 
of profit had to be secured and exploitable land was just not avail- 
able. Even though the overseas expansion of Portugal is traditional- 
ly associated with the interests of merchants who would profit by 
extended trade and monarchs who sought to increase both their Atatus 
and their revenues, there is also evidence to indicate that the young- 
or sons of the nobility who had no land, provided the initial motiva- 
tion. The 'discovery business' as Wallerstein calls it, held potential 
198 
for many groups of people. It was the most likely route to increased 
revenue for the state - always in financial need - for the nobility 
squeezed by declining revenues, and the bourgeoise which sought lar- 
ger markets (Wallerstein, 1974: 47). 
There were a number of co dities that Europe needed in the 
fourteenth and. fifteenth centuries and that Portugal hoped to provide. 
Food was important, and wheat and sugar became primary products of 
overseas expansion. Fish, meat, and spices were also important, and 
wood both to be used as fuel and for shipbuilding (Wallerstein, 1974: 
40-44),, Many writers, however (See Boxer, 1963; Smith, 1950, Vol 11; 
Del Mar, 1969) maintain that the central motivating force behind At- 
lantic expansion for Portugal and later for Spain was to be precious 
metals. 
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It is almost impossible to overestimate.: the effect that the lure 
of quick and easy wealth through the discovery of gold in distant 
places had on the minds of the people of the time. The desire for 
gold dominated the literature of the age (Lynch, 1964: 141). Benjamin 
Keen (1965: 15) calls it "... the sixteenth century dream of limitless 
wealth. " There were few areas which held out the potential for quick 
wealth, but the metal market was one of these (Hale, 1971: 145). As 
Braudel and Spooner (1967: 498) remark, there was an almost 1supersti- 
tious reverence' for gold and silver. 
Portugal, even more than other European countries, was suffering 
from a precious metal shortage and was one of the few European king- 
doms without gold coinage. The drain of precious metals to the east 
and the fall in production from the central European mines affected 
Portugal greatly and her exploration into Africa largely involved an 
attempt to divert the gold routes in the western Sudan (See Boxer, 
a 
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1969: 7-19). Gold, in the fifteenth century came predominately from 
Africa brought from the interior to markets where European merchants 
competed for it. Obviously merchants wanted to get to the source of 
this gold themselves (Vilar, 1976: 47). Through their expansion the 
Portugese succeeded in shifting gold routes to some extent from North 
Africa and the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, thereby shifting the 
main axis of commerce (Vilar, 1976: 58; Frank, 1978b: 39). 
The Castilian Domestic Economy 
While the Portugese were exploring the west African gold coast 
and developing increasingly lucrative trade routes, Spain was occu- 
pied with domestic struggles. It was not until 1497, when Isabella 
and Ferdinand assumed the joint throne of Castile and Aragon, that 
the work of forging a modern nation state, in a position to compete 
on the international market, really began. During the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries there had been not one Spain, but two. 
There was an Aragonese Spain. tied to the customs and economies of 
Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, and carrying on an active trade in Tunis, 
Tlemcen and Morocco, and a Castilian Spain. heavily involved in in- 
ternal disputes and the crusades against the Moors and lacking a 
trading tradition (Vilar, 1976: 58). The marriage and assumption of 
the Spanish throne of Ferdinand and Isabella united in theory, if 
not in practice, the two kingdoms under one monarchy. Even though 
superficially Aragon appeared to be the stronger and more economical- 
ly advanced region, the great plagues had had a much more severe and 
long lasting effect in Aragon than in Castile and much of the Ara- 
gonese economy had fallen into the hands of the Italians. Castile, 
on the other hand, was in a very advantageous position. close to the 
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Atlantic centre of trade (Vilar, 1976: 58). The marriage of the two 
monarchs merged the Mediterranean trading experience of the Aragonese 
with the Altantic advantage and crusading spirit of Castile. This, 
combined with political stability, put Spain in a position to begin 
competing with Portugal for the lucrative African gold trade (Vilar, 
1976: 58). 
Castile, after centuries of struggle, had finally defeated the 
Moors who had occupied the peninsula for centuries and driven them 
out of Spain. The defeat of the Moors brought to an end the era of 
easy wealth which could be acquired through conquest and plunder (Vi- 
lar, 1976: 58). But the Castilians had, even by the thirteenth cen- 
tury, developed fairly set ideas about wealth and ways of securing 
it. Riches were the reward of conquest, not work. In Castilian so- 
ciety, riches were: 
... considered not as something that one created. 
or built, that is, worked for, but as something 
one conquered or enjoyed because of one's sta- 
tus as a warrior conqueror, a nobleman (Payne, 
1973: 77). 
The defeat of the Moors ended the availability of this ready 
source of exploitable conquest. There were always possibilities of 
extending raids to the North African cities, but these were already 
becoming less and less lucrative since the Portugese. were diverting 
the gold trade in Vestern Africa (Vilar, 1976: 60). In Spain as else- 
where a nobility faced with declining profits was on the look-out 
for alternative sources of wealth denied-them in Spain (Castillo, 
1930: 25). As had been the case in, Portugal,; a number of groups - 
nobility, merchant, and the state found their interests served by 
turning to the 'discovery business. ' 
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That the Spanish, as had the Portugese, chose this 
business' as an alternative is not solely attributable to factors 
internal to the Spanish state, but heavily Affected by Italian influ- 
ence. The importance of foreign interests in Spain at this time, es- 
pecially the Italians, is difficult to sort out and not clearly under- 
stood but it bears stressing nevertheless. In the middle ages, Italy 
was the only real colonising nation and the Italian merchants were 
active in the ports of Spain and Portugal as early as the twelth cen- 
tury. They drew the coastal towns of the Iberian peninsula into in- 
ternational trade by using them as stopover points for their ships 
on route to England and Flanders. While in the beginning these towns 
were merely passive participants in Italian economic arrangements, 
they grew increasingly into commercial centres. 
Italian interests further and further entrenched themselves in 
Spain. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Genoese bar- 
rio in Seville was the hub of commercial activity. As Italian influ- 
ence increased, the fortunes of the Spanish state and the Italian 
merchants began to merge and Spain gradually began to depend on It- 
alian backed commerce. Even as early as the thirteenth century the 
Genoese were acting as money lenders to the Spanish monarchs, and 
this financial dependence was only to increase. 
As the colonies of Genoa wained, the Italians more and mor& turn- 
ed their interests westward to the economic involvement with Spain 
and Portugal. The Genoese embarked, at this juncture, on a different 
type of colonialism. They did not actually take over or occupy other 
regions, instead they exerted economic rather than political control. 
I 
They would colonise now under the aegis of foreign states, reaping 
the benefits while avoiding the actual risks of conquests and colonial 
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occupation (See Verlinden, 1940,1953; Cox 1959 for a discussion of 
the Italian involvement in Spanish expansion). 
The Italians with their money and their interest in 'booty capi- 
talism' helped to make possible the Spanish expansion into the Atlan- 
tic (MacKay, 1977: 171-173). The Portugese and the Castilians, even 
though they had the motives and the abilities of launch Atlantic ex- 
ploration lacked, as Parry (1963: 48-49) notes: 
* the capital, the commercial experience and ýhe 
financial organisation to exploit commercial- 
ly the discoveries which they made ... Only in 
northern Italy and sourthern Germany were there 
commerdial and financial houses big enough and 
well enough organised to supply the facilities 
which the Porgugese and. Spaniards lacked. On- 
ly by drawing upon the experience and borrow- 
ing the capital accumulated in Italy and south 
Germany, could the Spaniards and the Portugese 
exploit the wealth of the Indies, East or West. 
In the beginning of the sixteenth century Spain, compared to 
other productive areas in western Europe, had a very small urban 
middle class. Most spending and wealth was that of the great Castil- 
ian lords or grandees, and not Spanish capitalists (Payne, 1973: 269). 
Over eighty percent of the population were peasants who attempted to 
scrounge an existence out of the difficult Castilian soil (Vicens 
Vives, 1969: 293). In 1481, landed serfs had been granted the right 
to abandon their lords, but this insurance of theoretical freedom 
did not ensure economic viability. Since ninety-seven percent of 
land was held by the aristocracy, it meant often, as Vicens Vives 
(1969: 299) has written: "the freedom to 'die of hunger. " Even though 
serfdom was abolished, only about one percent of the peasantry owned 
land or had any chance of acquiring capital (Payne, 1973: 271). Pea- 
sants, faced with their inability to survive from the soil, increas- 
ingly left farming and the aristocracy turned it over to the grazing 
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of sheep. Castilian agriculture, consequently, was all but stagnant 
from the fourteenth century (Vicens Vives, 1969: 250). 
Essentially, the structure of the medieval Castilian economy rest- 
ed on one product, wool, and the trade in wool was controýled by the 
great Castilian lords (Vicens Vives, 1969: 250). In fact, the debili- 
tation of agriculture was largely. the result of sheep grazing. Far- 
mers were unable to protect their land and crops from the destruc- 
tion of the migratory flocks, backed as the wool trade was by power- 
ful economic interests, and agricultural production suffered. Pro- 
duction only barely managed to meet local needs and even then, famine 
was a regular part of existence (Vicens Vives, 1969: 250,302; Payne, 
1973: 155). In the beginning years of the sixteenth century, harvests 
were so bad that the government had to import massive quantities of 
foreign grain (Elliott, 1978: 118). But even then, the Spanish crown 
lent their support to the growing sheep industry over agriculture. 
From around 1273, when Alfonso X the Wise began org . anising 
the sheep industry into an administrative unit, the Spanish crown re- 
lied on the taxes from the wool trade for a substantial part of its 
income. Because of the financial overextension of the Spanish state, 
the monarchy needed to cultivate a sector of the economy which insur- 
ed a high financial return and over which it could exert a strong 
measure of royal control (Fernandez-Armesto, 1975: 70). It was the 
clash between the agricultural and pastoral economy which Thompson 
(1965: 247) places at the root of Castilian economic history. Sheep 
could more easily be taxed than farming and the taxes paid by sheep 
farmers to the royal treasury took on such an importance that the in- 
dustry was paternally protected. The long-term effects of such a 
policy were easily ignored when the wool trade and the economy 
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generally appeared prosperous (Elliott, 1978: 119). 
Continual financial crisis marked by chronic monetary instabil- 
ity and debasements of coin frequent after the 1450's hindered capi- 
tal and credit formation. Castile itself fell into a somewhat colo- 
nial economic position with the rest of Europe - exporting raw mater- 
ials such as wool and iron, but having to import finished products 
such as cloth from England, France, and Flanders. Castile was and 
remained, distinctly under-commercialised and without the powerful 
mercantile class which distinguished other European countries. The 
basic weakness of the Castilian economy was an open invitation to 
the Italians and by the time of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, 
the Genoese controlled high financial circles in Castile.. An economy 
such as the one in Castile attracted the more sophisticated merchants 
and banking interests of the Italians who stepped into the breech and 
provided capital and business techniques (MacKay, 1977: 170-173; Vicens 
Vives, 1969: 312). 
Contact with the gold of the western African countries had al- 
ready led to an accumulation of considerable wealth in Spain. When, 
for example, in 1480 Isabella decided to collect unpaid taxes and 
debts from wealthy aristocrats, these nobles handed over vast sums 
without ruining themselves. The Duke of Alburquerque, for example, 
6 
handed over 1,400,000 marvedis in one lump sum to the crown (Vilar, 
1976: 60). But even this aristocratic wealth was not sufficient to 
finance real competition with the Portugese in the Atlantic. 
The Italians during this period dominated European monetary mar- 
kets '(Potter, 1957: 113). As Parry (1963: 45) notes: 
... banks in Florence aný in other northern and 
central Italian cities had-huge capital and 
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widespread business interests, maintained by agents 
in all major centres. The size and efficiency of 
Italian commercial and financial organisation; 'the 
superiority of Italian manufactured products, the 
Italian monopoly of trade in eastern goods; all 
combined to tie the whole of Europe, in greater 
or less degree, commercially to northern Italy. 
The Italians had led the way in the fifteenth century commercial re- 
covery, but wars and the unfavourable balance of trade with the east 
constantly increased even Italy's need for precious metals (Parry, 
1963: 45). The German banking families such as the Fuggerr also were 
important in generating the search for precious metals'and in provid- 
ing the capital to pay for trade (Vilar, 1976: 52; Frank, 1978a: 52). 
By the end of the fifteenth century the Fuggers controlled silver 
mines in Spain as well as elsewhere (Darby, 1957: 39). 
Wolf (1959: 156-165) presents a picture of two Spains in 1492 
headed for collision when the Moors were finally defeated. The one 
Spain, the aristocratic warring nobility - whose "... traditional eco- 
nomic interest lay in the extension of grazing range for its herds 
of cattle and sheep, coupled with a flourishing export trade in wool 
to northern Europe, " and the warlike peasantry drawn into conflict 
with them through promises of freedom and land. The other Spain, a 
town based bourgeoisie, mostly centred in eastern Spain pressing for 
industrialisation and the trade with the Orient. The discoveries in 
America, Wolf maintains, allowed the evasion of this collision. With 
the discovery of the Americas - those who might have allied themselves 
with this rising bourgeoisie against the aristocracy now joined their 
fortunes with those of the knight adventurersý Spanish industrial 
development would never recover. 
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The Domestic Reforms of Ferdinand and Isabella 
The rise of strong monarchical government was part of the chang- 
ing condition in Europe and Spain evolved what was to become for a 
time the most powerful and centralised of all the western European 
national monarchies (Thompson, 1965: 492-293). When Ferdinand and Isa- 
bella finally defeated the rival claimants to the Castilian throne in 
1479, they united at least formally all of Spain under their domina- 
tion. It was at this time that the work of forging the first modern 
state in Europe began (Lynch, 1964: 148). 
Ahderson (1974b: 39-41) describes the period of absolutism in west- 
ern Europe as being "... profoundly over-determined by the growth of 
capitalism. " It was a perioa in which elements of different modes of 
production existed under the waning dominance of the old feudalism. 
A new economy was at work within the old. It was a time of premoni- 
tions - foreshadowings of things to come. The absolutist-Spanish 
state, profoundly infused with capitalist social relations, evidenced 
this growing capitalist influence imbedded within a feudal state. 
Anderson (1974b: 40) notes: 
All the structures of the Absolutist state thus 
reveal the action from a distance of the new 
economy at work with the framework of an older 
system: hybrid "capitalizations" of feudal forms 
abounded. 
It is in the domestic reforms of Ferdinand and Isabella that the 
emerging outline of a capitalist state in Spain can be seen most clear- 
ly. The centralisation of authority, growing bureaucracy, rationali- 
sation of government and of law, reformed taxation, a hugh mercenary 
standing army, and the stabilisation of property relations were hall- 
marks of the reign of the Catholiý Monarchs. During the sixteenth 
century the Spanish state was developing the necessary apparatuses 
a 
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to advance capitalist forms of appropriation. The outcroppings of 
capitalism which appeared in the sixteenth century paved the way for 
economic transformation, and the absolutist state secured certain con- 
ditions which made the eventual triumph of the capitalist mode of pro- 
duction possible (Anderson, 1974b: 40). 
Castile and Aragon, even though joined by one monarchy, did not 
achieve a unityýof i&-41,41in the sixteenth century and maintained se- 
parate governmental structures, laws, traditions and customs. In fact, 
the marriage contract between Ferdinand and Isabella assured that this 
jealously guarded separation would, to some extent, be protected. Even 
though both regions were involved in the development of the Spanish 
state, it is events in Castile which are of pt-imary concern, for it 
is in Castile that the reforming energies of the Catholic monarchs 
were concentrated, and it is Castile which launched the Atlantic ex- 
pansion and controlled the subsequent events in the colonies. Fer- 
dinand and Isabella, once they had joined the thrones, began almost 
immediately consolidating power at all levels in Castile. They creat- 
ed a complex governmental bureaucracy staffed not by the aristocracy, 
but by trained jurists, eroded the power of the localities by filling 
their institutions with royal officers, and centralised monetary con- 
trol. They even wrested power away from the church., 
The thriving government bureaucracy created by Ferdinand and Isa- 
bella was filled not with Spanish aristocracy, but with jurists (Lynch, 
1964: 48). The growing bureaucracy and a plethora of law seemed to go 
hand and hand. As Gibson (1966: 111) wrote: ! 'Bureaucracy bred law, and 
law bred bureaucracy. " The law took on an ever increasing importance 
to the running of the state. The administration of law became an im- 
portant tool in, the central isation of authority (Elliott, 1963: 96-97). 
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The Spanish Monarchs attracted self-made legalists who rose in rank 
in opposition to the nobility (Beneyto Perez, 1972: 288). The lawyer 
seemed particularly well suited for this centralised authoritarian 
government, for he had, as Parry (1966: 194) describes him: 
... no excessive family pride, and as a rule no 
great ambition for military glory. His training 
gave him a deep respect for authority and for 
legal forms, and a habit of careful attention to 
detaýl, while it discouraged tendencies toward 
rash or unauthorized action. A judge, represent- 
ing the jurisdiction of the monarch, could com- 
mand the respect of swordsmen who would resent 
authority in the hands of one of their own class. 
The Catholic Monarchs reformed and strengthened royal tribunals 
at the expense of the local tribunals and carried out the codifica- 
tion and standardisation of law (Kagan, 1981: 25). It was important 
that law emanate from the state and not from the church (Haring, 1947: 
5). The reorganisation of the important Council of Castile involved 
a heavy emphasis on judicial matters and Ferdinand and Isabella per- 
sonally lent their weight to the judicial structure by sitting on 
the Council on days in which it was devoted to judicial affairs (Mer- 
riman, 1918: 121). A permanent Audiencia, or supreme court, was es- 
tablished along with a lesser regional audiencia. This was part of 
a general expansion of the rule of law in the sixteenth century (Pay- 
ne, 1973: 174). 
One of the ways Ferdinand and Isabella diluted the power of the 
localities and therefore the aristocracy was by assuming control of 
what had been previously locally controlled institutions. The assump- 
tion of the control of the hermandades, or provincial police forces 
was central to this move. Not only did the monarchy reorganise and 
assume control of this important body, but forced even the nobility 
to contribute to its expenses (Lynch, 1964: 5). 
I 
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The decline in the authority of municipal self-government had be- 
gun really more than a century before the Catholic Kings assumed the 
throne, but they quickly moved into the breech created by this decline 
to consolidate power. So disorderly had life in the towns become that 
royal intervention was not seen a's the further centralising of power, 
but as the welcome establishment of order in what had previously been 
disorderly exiiktence (Merriman, 1918: 145-146). Ferdinand and Isabella 
relied heavily on legal rather than military institutions to govern 
Castile (Kagan, 1981: 123). Increasingly, municipal life in Spain 
came to be controlled by royal officials. The corregimiento was an 
administrative division presided over by a royal officer, the corre- 
gidor. At first. primarily a judicial officer sent out to settle 
disputed cases or to check up on other royal officials, týe corregi- 
dor very quickly became what Merriman (1918: 149) has described as an 
11omnicompetent servant of an absolute king. " He was endowed with 
extensive political, administrative and judicial power (Ortiz, 1971: 
4), and from about 1480, there was a corregidor in every Spanish town 
(Ortiz, 1971: 4; Fernandez-Armesto, 1975: 88). 
When Ferdinand and Isabella ascended the throne, the monetary 
system was a shambles and they were not able to initiate any sub- 
stantial reforms, such as the standardisation of the value of coin- 
age until around 1497 (Merriman, 1918: 15). These reforms, however, 
provided Castile with a sound money system during the sixteenth cen- 
tury indeed, the most stable monetary system of its time (Hamilton, 
1934: 53; Ortiz, 1971: 192). The Catholic Monarchs struggled to estab- 
lish the orderly collection of taxes and to eliminate the monetary 
abuses of the nobility (Smith, 1995: 123). But. even though reform 
of the treasury began in 1480, and brought about a thirty-fold 
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increase in royal revenue from 1474 to 1504,, there was no essential 
tax reform. Nobles and the clergy enjoyed tax immunities while the 
poor were increasingly burdened (Payne, 1973: 178; Vicens Vives, 1969: 
312). 
Not even the Church was exempt from the reforming and centralis- 
ing zeal of Ferdinand and Isabella. The primacy of the crown could 
not be established without bringing under royal control this immensely 
wealthy and powerful institution (Elliott, 1963: 99). The clergy re- 
presented the richest social group in Castilian society and therefore 
its interests coincided with those of the nobility (Vicens Vives, 
1969: 340). Nowhere in Catholic Europe did the Pope have less auth- 
ority than in Spain. In 1514, for example, the publication of any 
papal bulls not previously examined and approved by the crown were 
forbidden (Davies, 1973: 10). 
Ferdinand and Isabella were more than willing to promise unfail- 
ing loyalty to the aims of the Catholic church, and to Rome, but in 
return, they wanted almost complete control of the church in Spain 
(Merriman, 1918: 152). Ferdinand campaigned determinedly for control 
over church matters and gained, for example, through these efforts, 
power to nominate the officials of the Spanish Inquisition. The 
papal bulls of 1501 and 1508 were to give him an almost unparalleled 
power over the church in New Spain - to decide which clerics were to 
be appointed, what jurisdiction they would have, and even what they 
would be paid (Gibson, 1966: 76). 
The Catholic Monarchs were keenly aware of the importance of the 
control of ideas. Printing with movable type was introduced into 
Spain in 1470. At first books and pamplets were welcomed, but 
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Ferdinand and Isabella quickly realised their dangerous potential. In 
1502, they put into effect a law which stipulated that books could 
neither be printed nor imported into Spain without a royal licence 
which could only be acquired after royal examiners had approved the 
text. There were severe penalties stipulated for dealing in unlicen- 
ced material. The circulation of banned books or the owning of an 
unlicenced manu_script on a religious subject was punishable by death. 
This control of the press was to become more centralised later under 
Charles V (Schulte, 1968: 12,68-71). 
With characteristic conservatism and political finesse, the Cath- 
olic Monarchs streamlined and improved existing institutions in Cas- 
tile. They tightened and made more efficient existing institutions 
of revenue collection rather than create new ones (Merriman, 1918: 131). 
They encouraged capital accumulation, large-scale estate management . 
and commerce. They also encouraged a free and mobile peasantry (Fer- 
nandez-Armesto, 1975: 69). They established an internal peace indis- 
pensible for a development of commercial life. They favoured commer- 
ce and foreign trade, carried through some negotiations on the behalf 
of merchants with sovereigns of other kingdoms. Commerce benefited 
under Ferdinand and Isabella due to protective maritime legislatlon 
and support of wool exports (Payne, 1973: 273). The Catholic Monarchs 
were not always successful, but under their rule Castile experienced 
a continuous development of industry and commerce (Sanchez-Albornoz, 
1975: 876-877). 
The changed nature of the state at this. time can be seen not on- 
ly in the domestic reforms of Ferdinand and Isabella, but*in their es- 
tablishment of a #Uge standing army. The army was supported not by 
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feudal lords, but by royal taxation and immense private capital (Thomp- 
song 1965: 492-293). Ferdinand and Isabella established one of the 
greatest armies 
in Europe and showed an early recognition of the im- 
portance of keeping the nobility out of it (Smith, 1965: 137; Merri- 
man, 1918: 165). In fact, the central part that Spain played in six- 
teenth century Europe was partly due to their military greatness. But 
the payment of-mercenary armies necessarily involved precious metals. 
The Spanish Monarchs could ill afford to risk the loyalty of troops 
who might, given a better offer, change sides. The large Italian 
and German banking families were the only ones who.; could be depend- 
ed on to ensure gold at the right place at the right time. But the 
dependence on these banking families involved high interest rates 
(Davies, 1973: 24). 
There was an unquestionable shifting of political power away 
from the feudal aristocracy toward the centralised authority of the 
crown during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella (Merriman, 1918: 110- 
111). The domestic reforms of the Catholic Monarchs, however, also 
enriched the aristocracy (Vicens Vives, 1972: 255). Anderson haq writ- 
ten-ýthat the paradox of the absolutist state of this time was that 
while fundamentally protecting'the property and privileges of the old 
aristocracy, it still managed to secure some conditions for the pro- 
motion of budding mercantile interests and the manufacturing class. 
The absolutist state, Anderson (1974b: 40) maintains: 
... accomplished certain partial functions in the 
primitive accumulation necessary for the even- 
tual triumph of the capitalist mode of produc- 
tion itself. 
But at the same time, the absolutist state also secured some of the 
conditions necessary for the feudal aristocracy to maintain its power. 
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Ferdinand and Isabella were consequently keenly jealous of the 
power of the aristocracy. They forbade the building of new castles 
and private wars between the feudal estates were dddlared illegal 
(Payne, 1973: 174; Lynch, 1964: 5). They did not, however, want to so 
exclude the nobility from the government that the nobles retired to 
their estates to hatch plots. The Crown adopted an intermediate 
course, allowing the nobility to retain some insignificant titles and 
a few significant ones in order to maintain their ties with the mon- 
archy. The nobility was encouraged to spend a great deal*of time at 
court, more so they could be supervised than for any other purpbse. 
As Merriman (1918: 10) notes: 
Flattery and cajolery were thus judicisouly mix- 
ed with vigorous measures of suppression, in the 
sovereign's treatment of their unruly magnates. 
Ferdinand and Isabella, however, consistently implemented policy 
favourable to the aristocracy. They affirmed and extended the right 
to hereditary -transmission of entailed property, they approved a po- 
licy of matrimonial connections which only served to concentrate pro- 
perty in the hands of those who already had it. They pursued a policy 
in the Reconquest of Granada in which most of the recovered lands were 
granted to nobles, and, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
faced with an agrarian crisis, they put up for sale the lands of free 
farmers (Vicens Vives, 1969: 296). 
As Vicens Vives (1969: 296-297) sums it up, during this time a 
third of the country's revenue belonged to the king, a third to the 
nobility and a third to the Church. Even though Ferdinand and Isa- 
bella attempted to subvert the aristocracy's political power by fill- 
ing the ranks of the bureaucracy with an educated middle class, 
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subordinate executive power was still turned over to the royal gran- 
dees, in viceroyships as well as in high military posts, and royal 
governors of the cities were drawn from the ranks of the lower nobility. 
Even with the determined measures to centralise authority and 
sap the power of the aristocracy, the Catholic Kings never really dis- 
placed the economic power of the nobility. In 1500, the nobility 
comprised approximately 1.5% of the population and held approximately 
97% of the land (Vicens Vives, 1972: 253). The aristocracy was as en- 
trenched economically at the death of Isabella as it had ever been be- 
fore and was still the power behind the monarchy (Lynch, 1964: 12-13). 
As Vicens Vives (1969: 338) has characterised the situation, the Span- 
ish nobility, as powerful as ever, seemed to be simply waiting for 
the opportunity to reassert its political control. 
The reforms of the Catholic monarchs and their efforts to bring 
into being a modern state were crucially important to the discovery 
of America. At the time of the discoveries, the Spanish state was 
strong both militarily and administratively (Ortiz, 1971: 279). And 
the pro. sperity created by the paternalistically protected wool trade 
contributed to Spain's willingness to look outward (Elliott, 1963: 
3). It is doubtful that without such rationalisation of the state, 
the voyages of exploration would ever have been supported by the Span- 
ish crown or if they had, if Spain could have held onto such a dis- 
persed empire (Ortiz, 1971: 279). 
Columbus and the Search for Gold 
The Spanish monarchs were, for the various reasons discussed, 
rece? tive to the proposals for expiorations which might guarantee the 
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capital the economy needed to further expand. After first ignoring 
Columbus and his plan to reach the Oirent by sailing west, and crown 
finally agreed to help outfit a voyage primarily financed by the pri- 
vate capital of bankers and the nobility of Andalusia. Columbus was 
in fact introduced into the Spanish court by a Florentine banker and 
the endeavour was inspired by the prospect of profit (Vilar, 1976: 
61-63). The Mediterranean trade was monopolised by the Italians and 
the Portugese were jealously guarding their gold and trading inter- 
ests in West Africa from Spanish and other European interlopers (Par- 
ry, 1963: 20; Boxer, 1969: 32). The Spanish, if they were to expand at 
all, had to outflank one or the other and the water routes to the 
east were the most promising option. Gold above all, was the primary 
motivator both for the state and for individuals. Gold was both the 
most lucrative and most symbolic of all commodities (Vilar, 1976: 
66). 
It was, however, not only gold, but the promise of gold that un- 
leashed Atlantic expansion and ensured that the conquests would be 
haphazard and vicious (See Vilar, 1976: 65). Part of the psychology 
of gold discovery as a means of accumulation was its immediacy. For 
the state, it. meant short-term accumulation of capital. And, as has 
been illustrated the Spanish state was quite willing to sacrifice long- 
term stability for short-term gain. The devastation of Spanish agri- 
culture was brought about to a large extent by the more immediate 
gain to be secured from the taxes on sheep farming. For individuals, 
the 'discovery business' promised wealth beyond anything that could 
be gained through other endeavours, and wealth without the investment 
of a lifetime of toil. No other commodity promised so much. And, 
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even small discoveries, due to the scarcity of gold, its demand, and 
its consequent high value relative to other commodities, generated 
the dreams of El Dorado (Vilar, 1976: 109). 
The wiercantilist theories of the age assumed that an abundance of 
precious metals meant prosperity, and ecoýiomic wellbeing was assumed 
to be assured through the acquiring of precious metals (Larraz, 1963: 
18). Columbus', expedition was not a mere chance 'extra economic' oc- 
currence, but--the culmination of an internal development in the west- 
ern European economy- which for very specific conjunctural reasons 
reached out in search of gold and other precious metals. The pre-oc - 
cupation with precious metals can be seen in all of the subsequent 
Atlantic exploration and colonisation. Columbus himself, as evidenc- 
ed by his diaries, was obsessed with gold and it was the first thing 
he enquired about on reaching the Caribbean isJdnds (Coornaert, 1967: 
267; Vilar, 1976: 63). 
On Columbus' first voyage, he landed on the northeast coast of 
Cuba and the northern shores of Hispaniola (Haiti). The voyage was 
considered a success by the Spaniards, but an expensive success. The 
few gold trinkets bartered from the natives in Hispaniola convinced 
Columbus that the islands were rich in gold, and he left a group of 
his men on the island with orders to build houses and search for 
gold mines (Parry, 1963: 151). Back in Spain, Columbus' presentation 
of the gold to the crown excited the crown's interest and aroused ex- 
pectations of great treasures of gold to. be had in the New World 
(Smith, 1950: 69). Anxious for a return on their investment, the 
crown ordered immediately that Columbus prepare for another voyage. 
Columbus set sail in September of'1493. The main cargo of this voy- 
age was men with the purpose of establishing a mining and farming 
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colony which would pay for the voyage by remitting gold to Spain (Par- 
ry, 1963: 152). But when Columbus arrived, he found the previous set- 
tlement wiped out. Left behind to search for gold, the Spaniards had 
roamed the island at will abusing the Indians (Sauer, 1966: 72). The 
men of the second voyage as well were dispatched with liýtle select- 
ion and had been motivated to join the expedition through the stories 
of gold brought back by Columbus. There was almost no thought given 
to what so many men would do in Hispaniola, whether they had any com- 
mitment to the endeavour or to Columbus, supposedly their leader (Sau- 
er, 1966: 70-71). So the new settlers as well spent most of their 
energies hunting for gold and slaves ignoring the more mundane chores 
of settlement. The difficulty of getting gold-hungry Spaniards to 
establish an organised settlement was to plague the crown in all its 
Atlantic explorations. The lure of gold, however, prompted the Spanish 
state to allow private exploration of the New World by these unregulat- 
ed men (Parry, 1966: 48,153). 
In the account of his second voyage, Columbus sought to explain 
to the Catholic sovereigns why he had not sent any gold and proposed 
founding a colony near where gold could be found (Del Mar, 1969: 141). 
He imposed a tribute of gold. on the whole population of Hispaniola, 
but the natives complained that they didn't know where to find such 
quantities of gold. One Indian leader, or cacique, offered to supply 
enough food to keep the Spaniards fed, but he was turned down. Gold 
was the concern (Helpg, 1900: 103). There were, however, simply no 
mines of any consequence in Hispaniola. By 1520, what gold there had 
been was depleted'and the native population all but extinct (Helms, 
1975: 136). El Dorado had not yet 
ýaterialised, but the Spanish crown 
and it's subjects were still intent on pursuing the 'discovery business. ' 
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Summary 
In order to make sense of the organised violence of the Age of 
the Conquistador - the first thirty years of Spanish presence in Mexi- 
co - it is necessary to understand something of the economic context 
within which that violence took place. The latter part of the fif- 
teenth and the first part of the sixteenth centuries were characteri- 
sed by the emergence of an interlocking capitalist world economic 
system in western Europe. This nascent capitalist world economic 
system formed the context of organised violence in Mexico. For, the 
Atlantic explorations were undertaken primarily because of the impor- 
tance of precious metals within this capitalist world economic system, 
and after the Spanish conquesr Mexico was assigned a position within 
this western European economic system, a part in the division of la- 
bour and specialisation within the system partly determined by the 
discovery of precious metals. 
The first part of the sixteenth century was characterised by 
developments which would pave the way for capitalism - primitive ac- 
cumulation, the rise of the modern state, the freeing of the state 
from dependence on a feudal aristocracy and ground-rents. In the do- 
mestic reforms of Ferdinand and Isabella it is possible to see the 
emergence of the modern state. And the growing dependence of the 
economies of western Europe on monetary transactions and therefore 
a supply of precious metals signallý4 the erosion of feudalism and 
the early emergence of a capitalist world system. 
Given the particular set of economic contingencies - the emergence 
of commodity relations, widespread trading and commerce, a need for 
precious metals, for example -a range of responses in Mexico was 
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possible. But as was noted, this range was not infinite and certain 
responses had a higher probability of occurring than did others. The 
nature of the organised violence which took place in Mexico, its harsh- 
ness and its focus on economic concerns, was all but an inevitable 
outcome of the economic conditions of the time. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF THE CONQUISTADOR 
From the foregoing chapter, it is evident that the western Euro- 
pean economic world system of the sixteenth century was radically dif- 
ferent from the MesoAmerican world system of the same time. When the 
Spaniards arrived in Mexico, the men from two social formýitions at 
two very different levels of development came into contact. Meh con- 
ditioned in two very different sccioeconomic contexts, confronted 
each other. Their motivations, their ambitions and their world views 
were different. The differing economic systems of these two social 
formations structured, in large part, the function and therefore the 
conduct of the warfare engaged in by the two groups of men. 
The Aztecs conducted or threatened warfare for two primary rea- 
sons: to maintain the Aztec state as a polity in a position of dom- 
inance with regard to surrounding Indian groups, or to secure and 
maintain rights to the agricultural surplus of targeted Indian groups. 
The Aztec state was not intent on changing the nature of economic 
production in these conquered territories, or in most cases, forcing 
people of a particular territory to provide a specific commodity 
they did not ordinarily produce. The intent of Aztec warfare was 
primarily to establish tribute agreements with other groups in which 
surplus production was channelled to the Aztec ruling class. The 
Aztec state was only peripherally, interested in the immediate booty 
from conquests. And indeed, as was noted, the state initiated 
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measures to control widespread looting which interfered with its 
long-term aims - those of maintaining continued appropriation of agri- 
cultural surplus. The Aztec state also engaged in complex negotia- 
tions with other groups in order to avoid warfare if tribute agree- 
ments could be reached without it. Because the Aztec state depended 
for its support on the production of the peoples of conquered terri- 
tories, it had, little investment in devastating a region in warfare 
or depopulating it. State interests were served by maintaining pro- 
duction so that surplus production could be channelled to the Aztec 
ruling class. Additionally, Aztec society was not infused with com- 
modity relations. The goods secured through tribute were not val- 
ued as commodities in and of themselves, but for the social standing 
they bestowed on the receiver within the society. Their value was in 
their use, their display, and in their redistribution, not in their 
possession. 
In the money economies of western Europe, however, the character- 
istics of a nascent capitalism had already started to permeate the 
levels of the social formation. Money transactions had come to play 
a pre-eminent role in economic life, and the shortage of precious 
metals with which to conduct those money transactions led to the in- 
creasing value of and therefore the increasing search for gold. The 
Spanish in their explorations and conquests were not interested in 
merely siphoning-off. agricultural surplus from the Mexican Indians, 
in other words replacing the Aztecs as receivers of tribute in the 
form of agricultural products. They were primarily interested in a 
commodity, gold. Since booty in the form of gold was the primary 
consideration of the Spanish Conquistadors, they had no vested in- 
terest, as did the Aztecs, in maintaining the productive capacity of 
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the Indian groups they fought. There were no restraining forces, 
therefore, on the devastation of the Indian population. The warfare 
of the Spaniards against the Mexican Indians had a different function 
than did the warfare of the Aztecs against their neighbours, and this 
difference was largely determined by the differences in the economic 
contexts underlying the two social formations. 
it must be7 remembered, however, that even though the powerful 
Spanish state and the wealthy European merchants and banking houses 
primarily financed and promoted Atlantic exploration, the explorations 
themselves were not carried out by state officials or bankers. They 
were carried out by what were essentially warring medieval bands, by 
Conquistadors (Gongora, 1975: 12). Because of the economic situation 
in western Europe, the Spanish state was interested in precious metals, 
as were the Conquistadors. In these early years the state and the 
Conquistadors shared a similar goal, both were interested in conquests 
and a quick return on the investments they had made in exploration. 
The Spanish state forfeited a considerable amount of control over the 
men who conducted the explorations in order to achieve conquests with 
the least possible investment. This policy would cause the Spanish 
state considerable problems in the later years of colonisation. The 
Spanish state in whose name these men explored and conquered would, 
after the Conquest, exert power to control the activities of the Con- 
quistadors and secure a great part of the discovered wealth for itself. 
The warring groups of men who undertook explorations were useful to 
the state in conquering new territories, but the establishment of 
feudal estates and yet another aristocracy in Mexico was 6omething 
the Spanish Crown was determined to prevent. The Crown would move 
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quickly after the Conqudst, as will be discussed in more detail in 
a later chapter, to impose its will over economic organisation in Mexi- 
co. But in the preliminary contacts between the Spaniards and the 
Indians, the Spanish state had little control. The economic structure 
of the western European world system moulded the designs of the Span- 
ish state and its ambitions in Mexico and influenced the way in which 
the conquests Wlere carried out. The quest for gold and personal en- 
richment conditioned the temperament of the Spanish Conquistadors and 
their initial contacts with the Indians. 
The Conquistadors 
Because the Spanish state exerted little control over the mili- 
tary conquest of Mexico, it is instructive in understanding the vio- 
lence of the Conquest to look at the temperament of the men who car- 
ried it out. It has been written that a man resembles his age more 
closely than he resembles his own father, and the Conquistadors de- 
finitely were a product of their age. The men who boarded the ships 
setting sail for the New World came from a crusading society -a 
society which had for centuries been campaigning to drive the Moors 
from Spain. They brought with them the "ambitions, the prejudices, 
and the habits and the values" that had developed within that conquest 
society (Elliott, 1963: 62-65). The men of no other European society 
so di'sdiin6ýd manual labour. They each aspired to being the perfect 
hidalgo - the man whose primary interests were war and booty, who re- 
presented himself as being able to accomplish any feat through strength 
of will. The literature of the age was filled with stories of hidal- 
I 
go heroes and their chivalry (Schulte, 1968: 69). Elliott (1978: 32 ), 
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in his book Imperial Spain, describes the way these men conceived of 
themselves: 
... the Castilian noble confirmed to his own en- 
tire satisfaction that true wealth consisted es- 
sentially of booty and land ... his highest admira- 
tion came to be reserved for the military vir- 
tues of courage and honour. In this way was es- 
tablished the concept of the perfect hidalgo as 
a man who lived for war, who would do the im- 
possible through sheer physical courage and a 
constant effort of the will... 
The Reconquista, the reconquest of Spain from the Moorsl had given 
Castilian society .4 distinctive flavour. It had a profound effect 
on the kind of men who came to the New World and the kind of society 
they played a part in transferring to Mexico. Although these men 
conquered in the name of the Spanish state, an important part of their 
motivation for doing so was a desire for adventure and personal wealth. 
It was long-established practice from the time of the Reconquis- 
ta that fighting men were granted a large share of the spoils of con- 
quest, especially land. The men who sailed to the New World expected 
to gain their share of the spoils of conquest as had been customary 
during the Reconquista. In the Atlantic explorations, gold was an- 
ticipated to be the likely reward. As Adam Smith (1950; Vol 1: 66) 
noted: "Every Spaniard who sailed to America expected to find an 
Eldorado. " This search for El Dorado, for gold and wealth beyond 
anything imagined, acted as a driving force which motivated many to 
risk the hazards of exploration. 
Hernan Cortes exemplified well the concerns and ambitions of the 
Conquistador mentality so characteristic-of the age. Cortes first 
sailed on an expedition to the Indies in 1504, when he was only nine- 
teen. Francisco Lopez de Comara (1964: 10), who years later served 
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Cortes as a personal secretary, wrote at the time, Cortels thought: 
... he had only to arrive (in the Indies) in order 
to be weighed down with gold... 
But Cortes found, as did others, that there was no gold of any 
significance in Hispaniola. cortes was advised to register as a ci- 
tizen and acquire land and the rights of cultivation. But Cortels, 
according to Comara (1964: 10), regarded the advice with scorn - saying 
he preferred mining. Five or six years later, dissatisfied with life 
in Hispaniola, Cortes went to Cuba. He settled in Cuba for a time, 
and using the labour of the Indians allotted to him, raised cattle 
and horses and did some mining. But the settled agrarian life did 
not suit a Spanish temperament forged on tales of Moorish conquest 
and the discovery of gold. Cortes, like other Spaniards, was in search 
of El Dorado and he found it neither in Hispaniola nor in Cuba. El 
Dorado remained a dream, but a dream the Spaniards were still in search 
of. 
When Diego Velazquez, governor of Cuba, dispatched an expedition 
in 1517 to explore and trade on the coast of Mexico, the captain of 
the expedition returned bearing tales of a land rich in gold (Cortels, 
1972: 5). Velazquez was anxiously awaiting official permission from 
Spain to conquer and colonise the new lands. He had, at the time, 
only permission to barter for goods with the natives .. Velazquez, 
however, dispatched another expedition thinking he might at least 
acquire some gold and silver through trading while he awaited the 
royal response (Gomara, 1964: 14). 
When the expedition took longer to return than Velazquez had 
expected, he decided to dispatch another expedition to be led by 
I Cortes. Ostensibly, this expedition was sent to search for the 
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previous one which had disappeared, but it is possible that Velazquez 
was more interested in keeping his claim to the Mexican lands alive 
I 
than in finding the second expedition. But Cortes had plans of his 
own. Even though neither he nor Velazquez had permission to do any- 
thing but trade, Cortes was determined to carry out the conquest of 
this new territory. He left Cuba secretly with more than three hun- 
dred spaniardsýin order. to avoid the possibility that Velazquez would 
be granted jurisdiction over the new lands which he, Cortes, wanted 
I for himself. Velazquez was not pleased with this turn of events and 
I 
all the time Cortes was carrying on his campaign to conquer Mexico, a 
furious bureaucratic battle was going on in Cuba and in Spain for re- 
cognition of rights in the new lands (See Gomara, 1964: 21; Elliott, 1972: 
10). 
The political battle for recognition by the Crown of rights to 
conquer and colonise Mexico formed a backdrop to events there, and 
put considerable pressure on Cortes and his men to accomplish the 
conquest as quickly as possible. Cortes knew that if he was to see 
his claim to the new lands upheld he had to present the Crown with 
results, in other words with a conquered territory and gold. This 
pressure-as well as the search'for gold contributed to the ruthless- 
ness of the Conquest. 
The Initial Contacts with the Indians 
The Spaniards' almost single-minded'concern with finding gold 
is well illustrated in the confrontations between them and the Indians. 
Each time the Spaniards came in contact with a new Indian group, they 
were mainly interested in finding put whether or not these Indians 
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possessed gold (Smith, 1950, Vol 1: 396-397). When Cortes and his 
men first landed on the island of Cozumel, they found that the inhabi- 
tants had abandoned the island in fear. So.. the Spaniards explored 
the villages and brought back the few bits of gold mixed with copper 
that were found. Cozumel was certainly not the El Dorado the Span- 
iards were seeking. So Cortes coaxed the Indians back to the island 
and returned tlLe objects (Diaz, 1963: 58). Since there was no plunder 
of value, Cortes used the opportunity to garner the good will of the 
Indians with the intent of getting any information he could about 
where more gold could be found. The Spaniards had not risked their 
lives and charges of treason for Buch a small amount of gold. 
The conviction of the Spaniards that there was much gold to be 
found is illustrated well in a story related by Bernal Diaz (1963: 
67). When Cortes and his men set sail for Yucatan after leaving Co- 
zumel, a Spaniard who had lived as an Indian for many years and who 
was serving as an interpretor for the Spaniards, tried to encourage 
Cortes to take some towns he knew of where there was a small amount 
II it of gold. Cortes, according to Diaz answered with a laugh that he 
was not after such small game. " 
The Spaniards were not always so peaceable, however, and they 
were quite prepared to fight when they felt it was to their advantage. 
When, for example, the Spaniards landed on the coast of Yucatan they 
found not deserted villages, but Indians prepared to defend themselves. 
The Indians assembled on the shore and told the Spaniards to go back 
to sea. When this failed to deter the Spaniards the Indians drew up 
their archers and threatened the Spaniards, shouting at them to leave. 
The Spaniards, however, took no hýed. The following day Indians ap- 
peared with food and again tried to convince the Spaniards to eat and 
a 
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be off- Cortes, however, according to a letter sent to Charles V* , told 
the Indians that the Spaniards would on no account leave until they 
had "learnt the secrets" of the land. The Spaniards then proceeded 
to inform the Indians that they were vassals of the Spanish King and 
therefore should not prevent that king's representatives from entering 
their towns. The Indians were not impressed. Cortes (1972: 19). wrote: 
... they replied forbidding us to enter their town 
and ordering us to-, be gone... 
If Gomara (1964: 40) wrote that the Indians then said nothing more 
11 ... except to tell the 
Spaniards again to leave and not play the bully 
in someone else's land... " The Spaniards, however, were intent on 
#0 playing the bully, as Gomara put it, since they had not found the gold 
they were seeking. They proceeded to the Indian town and Cortes and 
his men. took it by force. "A great deal of Indian blood (was) spil- 
l 
led, " Gomara wrote. And in the aftermath, little had been gained. 
Gomara (1964: 42) continues: 
The Spaniards searched the houses and found lit- 
tle, only some maize, turkeys, and a few cotton 
things, but no sigh of gold. 
Militarily defeated, the Indians brought some gold and trinkets 
for the Spaniards and pleaded with them to leave. Cortes told them 
he would be pleased to do them no more harm, but henceforth they must 
consider themselves vassals of the greatest monarchs on earth and 
must serve the Spaniards. Once they had done so, Cortes told them, 
the Spanish monarchy would grant them many favours and protect them 
I from their enemies. The Indians replied, wrote Cortes to Charles V: 
... that they were content to do so but still re- 
quired us to leave their land; and so we became 
friends (Cortes, 1972: 20). 
The Indians were confronted with yef another set of warriors demanding 
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allegiance to yet another state. The Spaniards, as had the Aztecs be- 
fore them, assumed sovereignty over these tribes of Indians and any 
resistance was deemed rebellion. The Spaniards were to be dissuaded 
by nothing but the fulfillment of their dreams of wealth and power in 
the new lands, and the gold trinkets possessed by these coastal In- 
dians were few. Because the gold was so thin but so highly valued 
by the Indians ,7 the Spaniards concluded that the pieces had come to 
them through trade (Cortes, 1972: 23). 
When the Spaniards reached the town of Tabasco they asked the 
Indians they encountered where their gold came from. "They answered, " 
I 
wrote Diaz (1963: 81) "from the direction of the sunset, saying 'Culua' 
and 'Mexico'. " The Tabascans told the Spaniards that they had little 
interest in living as rich men, only in being contented and happy. 
They could not even tell the Spaniards what a gold mine was and did 
not seek gold except the little they found in the streams which they 
picked up. They added, however, that further inland was a group of 
people who valued gold. much more than they and possessed much of it 
(Comara, 1964: 49). 
It became evident to. the Spaniards that the defeat of the Aztecs 
and their ruler Moctezuma II was the key to power and wealth in the 
new territory. Cortes and his men established that even the coastal 
Indian groups were part of the tribute domain of the Aztecs, and 
Cortes (1972: 128) wrote to Charles V: 11-it was the capital city of 
the land which all others obeyed. " The Spaniards soon realised that 
it was with the conquest of this capital city and its empire that 
real domination of Mexico rested. The capture of this city-state 
would give the Spaniards control. of-most of theregion (See Helms, 1975: 
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147). If Cortes was to convince the Spanish court to give authority 
r 
in Mexico to him rather than to VelAquez, he had to show that he 
had secured a vast and wealthy empire for the sovereign of Castile, 
before his enemies at court convinced the Crown that he was a traitor 
for exceeding his authority in Mexico. He did so with surprising 
speed and considerable tactical acumen (See Elliott, 1972: 11). The 
Spaniards set 6ut on their journey toward the sunset, toward the apex 
of the pyramid of power in Mexico, and toward gold. Gold was the 
ever present obsession and there was none to speak of in Yucatan and 
the coastal cities (Chapman, 1957: 130). 
Cortes and his men, having convinced themselves that the coastal 
towns were poor "... there being no gold or silver or other treasure 
(Go'm'ara, 1964: 50) set out to central Mexico. They found on the jour- 
ney a country full of Indian groups in widely disparate stages of de- 
velopment. Some of these groups were very primitive, while others 
such as the Aztecs had evolved a highly advanced civilisation (Toro, 
1§34: 13ý-lý). Cortes, in his contact with these groups, discovered 
that he could easily mobilise the resentment of the people in some 
of Moctezuma's vassal states, and the -resentment within other states 
where people had fought bitterly with the Aztecs to retain their in- 
dependence from the empire. These people were quick'to see the Span- 
iards and their power as a means of freeing themselves from the yoke 
of Aztec domination, and Cortes seized the opportunity by represent- 
ing himself and the Spanish as great liberators and protectors (Diaz, 
1963: 108). 
The ruler of Cempoala, for example, told Cortes that his people 
f 
had lived in peace and happiness until Moctezuma's empire had placed 
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them in servitude. He told Cortes that the Aztecs had come into his 
countryl"with religious pretexts" and then seized all the arms and 
made themselves masters. The Cempoalans said they had soon realised 
their mistake, but any attempts to free themselves from Aztec domina- 
tion only worsened their lot. Moctezuma took all their possessions, 
and sent constables and tax collectors to their houses (Gomara, 1964: 
7Z-74). The C6mpoalans, therefore, bore the Aztecs a considerable 
grudge and were eager to ally themselves with the Spaniards. Cortes 
told them he had only come: 
... to right wrongs and succor the oppressed, 
fa-r- 
vor the weak, and destroy tyrannies... (Gomara, 
1964: 74). 
Using a combination of military and political expertise the 
Spaniards, as they moved across Mexico, cajoled, manipulated and di- 
I 
vided the various Indian groups they came in contact with. Cortes 
capitalised on the resentment felt by conquered Indian groups against 
the Aztecs and provoked rebellion all over the empire. At the same 
time, he sent messages of friendship to Moctezuma. Cortes wrote in 
a letter to Charles V: 
... I maneuvered one against the other and thank- 
ed each side for their warnings and told each 
that I held his friendship to be of more worth 
than the others (Cortefs, 1972: 70). 
I One example of the maneuvering of Cortes involved the Cempoalans. 
I Cortes talked the Cempoalans into taking prisoner some Of Moctezuma's 
tax collectors -a grave offence. He had the Cempoalans send word to 
the surrounding Indian groups that no more were they to pay tribute 
to Moctezuma. Cortes then took charge of the prisoners. Privately 
he maintained to the tax collectois that the Cempoalans had been the 
ones who wanted to take them prisoner and that he, Corteshad saved 
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them. Cortes released the prisoners with instructions to return to 
Moctezuma bearing the message of Cortes' good will. Aftet the tax . 
collectors had gone, he feigned anger to the Cempoalans that they had 
escaped (See Diaz, 1963: 112-113). 
The Cempoalans were terrified that the Aztecs would descend on 
I- 
them and make war, but Cortes assured them "with a most cheerful 
smile " (D3. az, 1963: 113) that he would protect them. Cortes, through 
these actions, assured that the Cempoalans could not back out of 
their alliance with the Spanish, since their only hope of assistance 
was the Spanish should the Aztecs decide to attack. Always careful 
J# of the legal formalities, Cortes duly had a Spanish notary take down 
the Ceupoalaniý oath of obedience (Diaz, 1963: 113). 
I 
Moctezuma sent messengers in response to tell Cortes that he 
was displeased about the rebellion and that his subjects would not 
have had the courage to rebel without Spanish protection. Cortes 
made his intentions in Mexico quite clear when he had the represen- 
tatives return with a message to Moctezuma saying that the Cempoalans 
could not serve two masters, and that they had sworn allegiance to 
I 
the Spaniards and their king (Diaz, 1963: 115). 
If fine words and gifts Aid not win for Cortes and his men the 
supplies and alliances they needed, they used trickeiy or force. 
By defeating one Indian group after another, they gained the support 
of additional allies who were then inclined to switch to what seemed 
the winning side in the shifting cauldron of alliances in Mexico. The 
defeated and those who became allies sent out appeals to other lords 
J# 
and towns to join the_rebellion against the Aztecs. As Gomara (1964: 
80) writes: "... open war was declared against Moctezuma. " From the 
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coast to Tenochtitlan, Cortes manipulated and 
fought his way through 
this maze of Mexican tribal politics. 
The Tlaxcalan Indians proved to be both the fiercest foes of the 
Aztecs and the most difficult group for the Spaniards to subdue. Hav- 
ing fought for many years - nearly a hundred according to Gomara (1964: 
122) - to maintain their independence from Tenochtitlan, they were 
bitter enemies-of the Aztecs. Surrounded by Aztec vassal states, 
they were subject to. trade restrictions of the Aztecs and consequent- 
ly were allowed no salt or cotton (Diaz, 1963: 154). They would not 
I have suffered such deprivations, they later told Cortes had they been 
prepared to accept Aztec domination and become one of the empire's 
*1 
vassals (Gomara, 1964: 115-116). Having fought diligently, however, 
to maintain their independence, they were ill inclined to either trust 
or be intimidated'by the Spaniards. who were by that time marching 
across Mexico with peoples who had been vassals and friends of Moc- 
I 
tezilma (D2. az, 1963: 140). In the first encounter between the Span- 
iards and the Tlaxcalans, the Tlaxcalans mustered more then 80,000 
men. After an extremely difficult campaign, during the course of 
I 
which Cortes had the hands of fifty Tlaxcalan 'spies' removed, the 
Tlaxcalans allied themselves with the Spanish and this Tlaxcalan al- 
liance greatly upset the Aztecs. The Tlaxcalans, who had good reason 
for despising the Aztecs, were formidiLble fighters (Colmara, 1964: 100- 
115). 
The fame of the Spaniards spread all over the country after 
their defeat of the Tlaxcalans. "Terror" writes Diaz k1963: 166) 
spread through the whole land. " Cortefs was pleased to have gained 
the Tlaxcalans as allies but he continued to play the friend of both 
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the Tlaxcalans and Moctezuma (Gomara, 1964: 122). 
The Technology of Warfare 
The different levels of development of these two social formations 
is nowhere more evident than in their technologies of warfare. The 
Aztecs maintained their dominant position as surplus takers in the re- 
gion through a complex system of political, ideological and military 
maneuvering. From the moment Cortes and his men landed on the eastern 
shore, however, an entirely new element entered the system of power 
relations in Mexico. The result for the Aztecs was catastrophic. 
With the arrival of the Spanish, there was a source of power in Mexi- 
co which could compete with the power of the Aztecs - an alternative 
to what had often seemed like an invincible force. As intimidating 
as the Aztecs were with their ferocious armies, their great city, 
their gruesome ceremonial displays and their majestic ruler, not even 
they could compete with the sight of these bearded, fair-skinned 
Spaniards with their horses and cannons and steel swords. The Aztecs, 
fearful as they might be were at least recognisable, familiar, They 
fought in predictable ways. The Spaniards, however, were alien beings 
with alien ways of fighting wars. They engaged in none of the ela- 
borate ceremonies of negotiation before warfare nor fought ceremonial- 
ly. 
After one battle Cortes and his men, for example, asked the In- 
dians of Tabasco why such a great number of them had fled from so few 
Spaniards. The Indians replied that they had been terrified by the 
flashing of the Spaniard's steel swords and by the wounds which they 
inflicted since they were deep and incurable. The guns, they said, 
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roared and flamed like thunder and lightening. And the horses astonish- 
ed them. Even though they were swift runnersp the Spanish horses easi- 
I if ly overtook them (Gomara, 1964: 50). And, as Diaz (1963: 76) records, 
the Indians having never seen. a horse, thought "horse and rider were 
one creature. "- 
of Cortes was extremely adept at using any perceived advantage the 
Spaniards had over the Indians, One of the main advantages they 
had was their strangeness, and the Indian's consequent tendency to 
I 
regard them as possessing supernatural power. Diaz (1963: 79-80) re- 
I lates a story of how Cortes used the horses to intimidate the Indians. 
Cortes had a mare which had just foaled tethered to a certain spot, 
and then gave a stallion her scent. When an Indian group came to 
the Spanish camp, he talked with them on the same sp9t where the 
mare had been. The stallion began to paw the ground furiously and 
neigh, all the time looking at the spot where the Indians stood. The 
actions of the stallion, which made him appear to be trying to attack 
the Indians, terrified them. When Cortes calmly had the stallion led 
away, he showed himself master of even these terrible beasts. 
After the defeat of another Indian group, the Tabascans, lords 
and nobles came to the Spaniards to plead for forgiveness, offering 
presents and slaves. When the horses, tied in the courtyard began 
to neigh, the Indians asked what the fearful creatures were saying. 
I 
Cortes replied that the horses were scolding him for not punishing 
the Indians. The Indians then dutifully offered the horses roses and 
I 
turkeys and begged their pardon (Gomara, 1964: 49). In San Juan de 
#0 Ulua, Cortes had his armed men parade in front of the people and their 
leader, and staged a mock combat complete with horse charge and 
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cannon fire. Gomara (1964: 58) describes the reaction of the Indians: 
The Indians stared at the dress, fierce counten- 
ances, and beards of the Spaniards; they were 
astonished to see the horses eat and run; they 
were frightened by the flashiug of the swords; 
and they fell to the ground at the roar of the 
cannon, for it seemed to them the sky was fal- 
ling upon them with its thunder and lightening. 
J* The Florentine Codex (See Leon-Portilla, 1962: 30) records that mess- 
engers from thqoutlying regions went to Tenochtitlan and related 
fearsome descriptions of the Spaniards. They told Moctezuma: 
Their trappings and arms are all made of iron 
.... Their deer carry them on their backs where- 
ever they wish to go. These deer, or Lord, are 
as tall as the roof of a house. 
The Spaniards used to the maximum the effects of their intimi- 
dating military presentation and their strange swords and horses. 
Soon after reaching Mexico, the Spaniards gained a fearful reputation 
by defeating many Indians with a few men. As had the Aztecs before 
them, they cultivated their image of invincibility. They were well 
aware of the fact that one lost battle might destroy the Indian's 
fear of them and bring on an onslaught (Diaz, 1963: 131). They attempt- 
ed to hide their dead,: especially the horses, so the Indians would con- 
tinue to regard them as supernatural and incapable of being killed. 
An additional factor which entered into the fear and awe with 
which the Indians regarded the Spaniards was their disregard for the 
Indian gods. When the Spaniards smashed with impunity the idols the 
Indians had worshipped the feared for generations, the Indians were 
even more firmly convinced of the Spaniardts supernatural status. 
The way in which the Spaniards played these factors to their advan- 
tage, was of considerable importance to the eventual conquest. 
The Indians, in addition, were technologically no match for the 
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Spaniards. The main Indian weapons were the bow and arrow, the sling, 
and the dart and spear. Some Indian groups wore quilted cotton ar- 
mourp but others were more easily killed since they fought almost na- 
ked. Tactically, the Indians relied primarily on intimidation and 
sheer numbers. The Spaniards did not have to be especially good shots 
to hit an Indian in a battle since there were so many of them and with 
the cannons they could hit a great many Indians with one shot since 
the Indians fought concentrated in a mass. The Indians, however, were 
quick to learn from the Spaniards and adapt, at least in some ways, 
to the new technology of warfare. When, for example, the Spaniards 
were fighting in central Mexico, they encountered lances made from 
their own captured swords. But such adaptations were not sufficient 
to allow the Indians to overcome the Spaniards (See Comara, 1964: 42; 
Diaz, 1963: 73,341). 
The Indians remained extremely superstitious and ceremonial conr- 
batants. The Tlaxcalans, for example, at the beginning of every bat- 
tle, shot the ancient arrows of their forefathers at the enemy. If 
one of the arrows wounded or killed, it was considered a sign of Vic- 
tory, if it missed, a sign of defeat (Gomara, 1964: 119). Such a prac- 
tice was an advantage if it predicted victory but a great disadvantage 
when it predicted defeat. The Indians, in addition, 
'spent 
time while 
in battle shouting insults at one another. Gomara (1964: 252) comment- 
ed that in the thick of the battle for Tenochtitlan, when the Tlax- 
calans were fighting alongside the Spaniards, the Tlaxcalans and the 
Aztecs both took time out from the fighting to make long speeches. 
Gomara notes: 
... those who understood them died of laughter. 
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This sort of ceremonial display played a major role in Indian warfare. 
For the Spaniards, however, warfare was reýgarded in a much more prac- 
tical way. Warfare, for the Spaniards, was not a matter of signs or 
omens or long speeches, but a test of strength and will and cunning. 
The Indians were, therefore, at a definite disadvantage. 
The Entrance irrto Tenochtitlan 
Moctezuma. had known almost immediately and in great detail of the 
Spanish presence in Mexico. Messengers had come to him with vivid de- 
tails of the Spaniards and their might. Artists made paintings of the 
Spaniards, their ships, sails and horses and brought them*to Moctezuma 
(D: 'Laz, 1963: 91). The Codex Florentino (See Leon-Portilla, 1962: 30) 
records that Moctezuma was terrified by these reports. The messengers 
told him of the cannon possessed by the Spaniards: 
A thing like a ball of stone comes out of its en- 
trails: it comes out shooting ýparks and raining 
fire.... If the cannon is aimed against a mountain, 
the mountain splits and cracks open ... This is a 
most unnatural sight... 
Moctezuma had also known very soon after the Spaniards arrived 
that they wanted gold. He had instructed his governors to barter with 
the Spaniards - gold for the glass beads offered, and to supply the 
Spaniards with food. Moctezuma sent many rich and beautiful presents 
to Cortes and commanded that his subjects provide for the Spaniards, 
but he also sent messages that he considered a meeting with them irr- 
possible. Moctezuma, according to Diaz (1963: 94) put up many object- 
e ions to the proposed meeting between himself and Cortes (Diaz, 1963: 
35,94). 
From the first communications telling Moctezuma of the arrival 
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of the Spaniards to his death, Moctezuma's attitude towards the Span- 
iards was ambivalent. He fluctuated between receiving them into Teno- 
chtitlan as gods, and sending his armies to kill them as invaders (Diaz, 
1963: 195). It is, of course, impossible to know the state of Mocte- 
zuma's mind with regard to the Spaniards, but there were a number of 
factors which make his wavering attitude explicable. First, Aztec 
religious mythology did tell of the return of the God, Quetzalcoatl, 
from the east +o rule his land. Moctezinna is said to have believed, 
at least in the beginning, that Cortes was this returning god. Se- 
I journe (1976: 45), however, maintains that he did not long hold this 
view. Moctezuma had found out that during the battles with other In- 
dian groups, Spaniards had been killed and even their horses were 
known to be mortal. It is probable that Moctezuma's wavering atti- 
tude was partly the result of the rising and falling probabilities 
of success of the Spaniards. SeJourne (1976: 45), for example, pro- 
poses that Moctezuma was simply following the path of least resistance. 
Pressured on the one hand by fear of confronting the Spaniards and on 
the other by the rage of his people, Moctezinna may have just responded 
to whatever sentiment was more forceful at the time. And in addi- 
J* I tion Cortes strategies contributed to the general confusion. Diaz 
(1963: 114), for example, writes that Moctezuma had prepared an army 
to move against the Spaniards after he heard of the taking of the tax 
collectors in Cempoala. When, however, these tax collectors were re- 
leased by Cortes and reached Moctezuma with the news that Cortes was 
his friend, he haulted the plans. Moctezuma was evidently never an- 
xious to confront the Spaniards. He had seen not only the ease with 
which they subverted the coastal provinces, but the Spaniard's defeat 
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of the Tlaxcalans who the Aztecs had been trying to defeat for many 
years. All this filled him with awe and fear. The Florentine Codex 
(See Leon-Portilla, 1962: 31), for example, records that even when Moc- 
tezuma, was told by his messengers about the Spanish arrival on the 
coast: 
... he was filled with terror. It was as if his 
heart had fainted, as if it had shriveled. It 
m was as if he were conquered by despair. 
When the Spaniards were fighting with the Tlaxcalans and it seem- 
ed likely that the Spaniards would end the victors, Moctezuma sent a 
message to Cortes asking that Cortes acertain from his emperor the 
yearly tribute required of the Aztecs. Moctezuma assumed that the 
Spaniards wanted to replace the Aztecs as the dominant surplus appro- 
priators in Mexico and he was, faced with the evidence of the Spafi- 
iards' military prowess, willing to submit to the payment of tribute 
and therefore recognise the dominant position of the Spaniards in 
order to avoid the destruction of his city. Moctezuma promised to 
deliver tribute without fail provided that Cortes and his men stay 
i? out of Tenochtitlan (Diaz, 1963: 166). Moctezuma attempted to avoid a 
battle with the Spaniards in the way ý7hich was customary in the re- 
gion, i. e., by accepting subordination and making a tribute agreement. 
Time and time again, as the Spaniards got closer to Tenochtitlan, 
Moctezuma attempted to make peace by giving gifts and making tribute 
proposals in order to avoid having the Spaniards enter the city. As 
the Spaniards advanced on Tenochtitlan, Moctezuma sent a message 
telling them entrance into the city was forbidden. He promised to 
send gold and silver and precious stones to the port if the Spaniards 
would return to where they came from (Diaz, 1963: 211). 
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But, the gifts of gold and precious jewels, intended by Moctezuma 
to pacify the Spaniards, nnly whetted their appetites and hardened 
their resolve to conquer Tenochtitlan. Cortes, at one point had sent 
Moctezuma's messengers back to Tenochtitlan with a helmet and request- 
ed that Moctezuma fill it with gold. Moctezuma complied and returned 
the helmet with gold estimated by Bernal D&z at the value of three 
le thousand pesos. ' Diaz remarked in his history of the conquest that 
the gold was worth much more than its actual value for it proved to 
the Spaniards that there was a great deal of gold in Tenochtitlan 
(Diaz, 1963: 93). 
The Spaniards were not interested merely in replacing the Aztecs 
as the surplus takers in a tribute based system. They were interested 
in conquest and gold. Cortes, for example, addressed his men and at- 
tempted to rally their resolve for the final approach into Tenochtitlan. 
He said to them: 
... not only shall we win for our Emperor and 
king a country naturally rich, but a vast do- 
main and iftfinite vassals, and for ourselves 
great wealth in gold, silver, precious stones, 
pearls, and other goods (Go*mara, 1964: 113). 
Moctezuma's offerings to the Spaniards made the situation worse 
rather than better. Not only were the Spaniards more convinced than 
ever that they must conquer Tenochtitlan, but when other Indian groups 
saw that Moctezuma was sending presents to the Spaniards and declaring 
the Aztecs servants of the Spaniards, they became even more convinced 
of the power of the Spaniards and even more willing. to ally themselves 
with the Spaniards against the Aztecs (Diaz, 1963: 116). 
4F When it became evident that Cortes and his men intended to enter 
I 
Tenochtitlan, Moctezuma rilented and the Spanish conquistadors 
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finally were received in Tenochtitlan in 1521. They were clearly 
amazed at what they found. The Aztec empire was barely a hundred 
years old but the Spaniards marvelled at its size and beauty. Diaz 
(1963: 214-216) recorded the reaction of the Spaniards when they enter- 
ed the city: 
... we were astounded. The great towns and cues 
and buildings rising from the water, all made of 
ston&-, seemed like an enchanted vision .... some 
of our soldiers asked whether it was not all a 
dream .... It was all so wonderful that I do not 
know how to describe this first glimpse of things 
never heard of, seen or dreamed of before. 
With such wonderful sights to gaze on we did not 
know what to say, or if this was real that we 
saw before our eyes. On the land side there 
were great cities, and on the lake many more... 
Cortes estimated that the city of Tenochtitlan alone was as large as 
Seville or Cordova, and he wrote to Charles V that the main market, -. 
was composed of not less than 60,000 people who traded there every 
I day (Cortes, 1972: 102). 
The Spaniards were not only impressed with the size and splendour 
of th e city, but with its order and organisation. Corte's (1971: 108, 
120) wrote: 
... these people live almost like those in Spain, 
and in as much harmony and order as there... it 
is truly remarkable to see what they have achiev- 
ed in all things. 
I will say no more than that the manners of the 
people, as shown in their intercourse with one 
another are marked by as great an attention to 
the proprieties of life as in Spain, and good 
order is equally well observed; and considering 
that they are a barbarous people, without know- 
ledge of God, having no intercourse with civi- 
lised nations, these traits of character are 
worthy of admiration. 
4 
The amazement and respect with which the Spanish beheld the Aztec 
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civilisation, however, did not long prevent them from destroying the 
city and the empire. First the Spaniards used the pretext that some 
soldiers had been killed in another part of Mexico to seize Moctezuma 
I 
and make him a prisoner. Moctezuma was. forced to dispatch messengers 
to all his towns ordering them to send gold to the capital. He then 
was forced to take the Spaniards to his storehovie- - The Spaniards 
seized everything. The Florentine Codex (See Leon-Portilla, 1962: 66-70) 
describes the Spaniards' reaction to Moctezuma's riches. The Spaniards 
seized the treasures: 
... as if they were their own, as if plunder were 
merely a stroke of good luck. 
They gathered all the gold into a great mound 
and set fire to everything else, regardless of 
its value. Then they melted down the gold into 
ingots. As for the precious green stones, they 
took only the best .... The Spaniards searched 
through the whole treasure house, questioning 
and quarreling, and seized every object they 
thought was beautiful. 
They ... coveted everything; they were slaves to 
their own greed. 
The seizure of Moctezuma caused unrest in Tenochtitlan, but Moctezuma 
himself reassured his people and maintained that he was housed with 
the Spaniards of his own free will. 
Meanwhile, Diego Velazquez, still intent on securing his rights 
in Mexico, sent an expedition to Mexico which landed'on the eastern 
coýst with orders to arrest Cortes. Cortes, realising that such an 
expedition could threaten his hard won hold over the territory, de- 
parted from Tenochtitlan to defeat the new conquerors. He left one 
of his men, Pedro de Alvarado, in charge of the forces left behind 
in Moctezuma's palace. While Corte's was gone a massacre resulted in 
Tenochtitlan while the Indians were celebrating a feast, in which 
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hundreds of Indians were murdered. The Florentine Codex (Leon Portil- 
la, 1962: 105) gives the Indian description of the events: 
They attacked all the celebrants ... They attack- 
ed some of them from behind, and these fell in- 
stantly to the ground with their entrails hang- 
ing out. Others they beheaded: they cut off 
their heads, or split their heads to pieces. 
They struck others... and their arms were torn 
from their bodies .... They slashed others in the 
abdomen, and their entrails all spilled to the 
ground. Some attempted to run away, but their 
intestines dragged as they ran. 
The blood of the warriors flowed like water and 
gathered into pools. The pools widened, and 
the stench of blood and entrails filled the air. 
The Spaniards ran into the communal houses to 
kill those who were hiding. They ran every- 
where and searched everywhere; they invaded 
every room, hunting and killing. 
It is not clear exactly what caused this massacre. Alvarado 
maintained that the Aztecs were planning a revolt and that he had 
only moved quickly to put a stop to it (Diaz, 1963: 285). Others 
maintained that Alvarado and his men simply saw a chance to gain the 
displayed wealth of the assembled Indians, for after slaughtering 
them, the Spaniards took all the gold and jewels they were wearing 
(Gomara, 1964: 208). Whatever the reasons, this event was the begin- 
ning of a series of armed struggles, rebellions and counter rebellions 
in Tenochtitlan and the surrounding area which ended with the vir- 
tual destruction of the city. Moctezuma again pleaded with his peo- 
ple for peace. He sent a messenger who spoke to the people: 
... these are his (Moctezuma's) words to you: 
We must not fight them. We are not their equals 
in battle. 
He tells you this because it is the aged who 
will suffer most. The humblest classes will al- 
so suffer, and so will the innocent children... 
(Florentine Codex, LeAr-Portilla, 1962: 78). 
The message destroyed whatever credibility as a leader Moctezuma had 
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left. The people were enraged at what they saw as an unprovoked 
slaughter by those who Moctezuma was sheltering. They screamed 
in- 
sults at Moctezuma: 
Who is Moctecuhzoma to give us orders? We are 
no longer his slaves (Florentine Codex, Leon- 
Portilla, 1962: 78). 14 
And so, even the subjects in Moctezuma's own city now questioned 
and challengedýhis authority to rule. The Spaniards, as the rebel- 
lion grew, forced Moctezuma into making another speech pleading 
with his people to cease hostilities. According to Diaz (1963: 294) 
the people refused to listen and in the consequent shower of stones, 
Moctezuma was fatally wounded. Others maintain that this story was 
untrue and that Moctezuma was killed by the Spaniards when he was 
no longer of use to them. 
It is impossible to say just how many died in the final seige 
of Tenochtitlan. Ixtlilxochitl, the Texcocan Indian historian, es- 
I- timated that 240,000 Mexica warriors died (See Leon Portilla, 1962: 
124), a figure that was repeated in 1551 by natives of Coyoacan, 
15 
and this figure included almost the entire Indian nobility. Ix- 
tlilxochitl also maintained that more than 30,200 Texcocan Indians 
died out of the some 200,000 fighting with the Spaniards (Cortes, 
1972: 491f). These figures do not include the many non-warriors who 
died in the plague, probably smallpox, which swept through the city 
during the seige (Leon-Portilla, 1962: 92). The Florentine Codex re- 
cords the misery of the time: 
The sick were so utterly helpless that they 
could only lie on their beds like corpses ... 
If they did move their bodies, they screamed 
with pain. I 
A great many died from this plague, and many 
others died of hunger ... everyone else was too 
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sick to care for them, so they starved to death 
in their beds (LeSn-Portilla, 1962: 93). 
Many Spaniards as well died on the Noche Tristi, when forced to 
fight their way out of the city, they were impeded in baftle by the 
41 1 
gold and riches they attempted to carry out. Both Gomara and Diaz 
wrote: 
... those who were most encumbered with clothing J, gol&, and jewels were the first to die... (Gom- 
ara, 1964: 222). 
... they were so weighed down by the stuff that 
they could neither run nor swim (Dfaz, 1963: 
306). 
At the final'seige of Tenochtitlan, GOMara (1964: 277) estimates 
that 200,000 Indians assisted the Spaniards and with their help, the 
I 
city was raized. Cortes (1972: 258) told in a letter to Charles V 
of the aftermath of the final seventy-five day seige: 
The people of the city had to walk upon their 
dead while others swam or drowned in the waters 
of that wide lake where they had their canoes; 
indeed, so great was their suffering that it 
was beyond our understanding how they could en- 
dure it. Countless numbers of men, women and 
children came out toward us, and in their eager- 
ness to escape many were pushed into the water 
where they drowned amid that multitude of corp- 
ses... 
J* Cortes and his men sacked what was left of the city, taking 
the gold, silver and featherwork. They left for their Indian allies 
It the clothing and other spoils. After burying the dead, Cortes brand- 
I 
ed with the King's iron many men and women as slaves (Gomara, 1964: 
293). The Spaniards set up guards on the roads leading out of Teno- 
chtitlan to search the fleeing inhabitants for gold (Florentine Codex, 
Leon-Portilla, 1962: 118). Ixtlilxochitl (See Leon-Portilla, 1962: 
1 
122) maintained that the Spaniards committed some of their most 
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brutal acts in the days immediately following the surrender of Teno- 
chtitlan. The Tlaxcalan Indians, as well, evidently avenging them- 
selves on the Aztecs for old offences, robbed the Aztecs of every- 
thing they could find. An Aztec poet recorded the demoralised state 
of mind of the Indians after the fall of Tenochtitlan. 
And all this happened to us. 
We saw it, 
we marveled at it. 
With this sad and mournful destiny 
we saw ourselves aflicted. 
On the roads lie broken arrows, 
our hair is in disarray. 
Without roofs are the houses, 
and red are their walls with blood. 
Worms multiply in the streets and squares, 
and on the walls brains are spattered. 
Red are the waters, as if they were dyed, 
and when wedrink, 
it seems water of saltpeter. 
We have struggled against the walls of adobe, 
but our heritage was a net made of holes. 
Our shields were our protection 
but not even with shields could we defend ourselves. 
We have eaten branches of binnet, 
we have chewed upon salty witch grass, 
bits of adobe and ground earth, 
small lizards, rats, worms... 
We ate meat 
when it was scarcely on the fire. 
When the meat was cooked, 
we snatched it out of 
the very coals and ate it. 
They put a price on us. 
The price for a young person, for a priest, 
a child or a young girl. 
And it was enough: for a common man 
the price was only two handfuls of corn 
or ten portions of caked mosquitoes, 
our price was only 
twenty portions of salty witch grass. 
Gold, jade, rich mantles, 
plumage of quetzal, 
all that has value, 
was then counted as nothing 
(Leo"n-Portilla, 1969: 150-151). 
The number of Indians who dibd during the Sapnish campaign is 
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I 
incalculable. The group of men who landed on the eastern shore, 
fought their way into the heart of the Aztec empire and destroyed it, 
were motivated primarily by the desire for a dingle commodity - gold. 
The state in whose name they fought was also primarily concerned with 
the plunder of these territories and a yield in the form of precious 
metals. The search for gold, the pressure for results in order to 
legally justify these exploits to the Spanish state, and the resent- 
ment of Aztec domination by the surrounding Indian population, all 
contributed to the violence with which the conquest was conducted. 
The Ideology of Warfare 
The changes in the Aztec ideological system which occurred with 
the transformation of the society to a warring imperial state system, 
have been discussed in previous chapters. As part of this transfor- 
mation, Aztec theologians elevated a war god from among the panthe- 
on to be a symbol of empire. The Spanish Conquistadors bad no need 
to begin at such an elementary level. Their warfare was alreaqy 
well backed up and legitimated by a complex and well established re- 
J* ligious and legal ideological system. Cortes, for example, had been 
well aware that he would have'to present his claim to Mexico in terms 
of that religious and legal complex for it to be well received at 
the Spanish court. He understood the importance the Crown attached 
to legal formalism and he was conscientious to set out in writing 
the legal and moral justification of his actions in the New World 
(Valero Silva, 1965: 41). Wars and conquests, such as the Reconquis- 
ta which drove the Moors out of Spain, were conducted as holy wars - 
I 
as "divinely appointed" missions. -at once military and religious 
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endeavours (Elliott, 1963: 32). The Castilian nobility and the Cas- 
tilian crown were therefore long accustomed to acquiring riches 
through conquest conducted in the name of religious zeal. It was 
Cortes' astute presentation of his claims in Mexico in terms of 
this set of moral, religious and legal ideas, as much as his actions 
there that eventually won for him the name of Conqueror of Mexico. 
As soon a§ the Spaniards found a suitable site in Mexico, for 
example, Cortes established a settlement. This act, firmly based on 
precedent established during the Reconquista, was intended to ligni- 
fy legal possession of the territory (Helms, 1975: 140). Cortes then 
had himself appointed governor of this new municipality and appeal- 
ed directly to the Spanish Crown for authority to conquer and colo- 
nise the rest of Mexico, over-riding Velazquez' claims. In his ap- 
peal, he represented Velazquez as a self serving and greedy man in- 
terested only in securing personal wealth. He represented himself, 
however, as a pious servant to God and the Crown, interested only in 
the further glorification of the Spanish monarchy (Elliott, 1972: 
The five letters dispatched by Cortes to Charles V in the months of 
his occupation and conquest of Mexico were intended almost exclu- 
sively to win the Grown's favour and to discredit Velazquez by ar- 
guing the legality and moral rightness of Cortes' actions. 
By the time of Cortes'conquest of Mexico, the Spanish monarchy 
was already sensitised to the need to justify its actions in the 
New World. As early as 1511, a Dominican fxidr, Antonio de Monte- 
sinos, had created a furor by speaking before a congregation of the 
most prominent citizens of Hispaniola and denouncing Spanish policy 
in the New World. "On what authority, '. '. Montes. inos asked"have you 
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waged a destable war against these people? " Montesinos continýed in 
words which were to haunt the Spanish monarchy during this period: 
Are these not men? Have they not rational souls? 
Are you not bound to love them as you love your- 
selves? (Quoted in Hanke, 1949: 17). 
The members of the Mendicant orders - the Dominicans, the Fran- 
ciscans and the Augustinians - were the product of a reform movement 
in Spain. The-y were intent on applying the concepts of Erasmian 
humanism to their missionery task in the New World (Gibson, 1964: 99). 
They were, during the initial years of colonisation, outspoken cri- 
tics of Spanish policy. The Crown's response, however, was forceful. 
In the case of Montesinos, Ferdinand ordered in 1512 that this line 
of preaching woUld cease or the Dominicans would be put aboard a 
ship and returned to Spain (Hanke, 1949: 18). But the questioning of 
royal policy did not 'cease. 
The then Pope, Paul III, issued a papal bull in 1537 stating 
that the Indians were rational beings and therefore should under no 
circumstances be enslaved. Those who did so enslave the Indians were 
to be denied the sacraments of the church. The Spanish Monarchs, 
however, embarassed by this papal announcement and resentful of its 
apparent encroachment on the privileges previously granted by the 
papacy with regard to the New World, prevailed upon-the Pope to re- 
volk if not the bulls themselves, at least their penalties (Haring, 
1947: 55). 
In a series of lectures given in 1539, Dominican jurist Francis- 
co de Vitoria rejected the claims that either the Pope or the Emperor 
had a right to exercise jurisdiction over foreign princes. Ile main- 
tained that the Americas were formed into independent states with 
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recognised princes and could no more be subject to the Spanish than 
were other European states. The Spanish Monarch reprimanded the Do- 
minicans and hinted that such public discussions would be frowned upon 
by the Crown (Parry, 1966: 138-142). 
Nowhere in Catholic Europe did the Pope have less authority than 
in Spain. Ferdinand had diligently campaigned for and eventually won 
the authority -to almost total control of the church in New Spain. 
No cleric could go to the Indies without royal permission. No dir- 
ect contact between Rome and America was allowed, and no document 
could be circulated without royal approval. As Parry (1966: 156-157) 
comments: 
the promulgation of papal bulls and briefs 
in the Indies was frequently suspended, and 
sometimes stopped altogether, if the contents 
appeared likely to infringe the authority of 
the Crown. 
But the Crown could not afford to totally disregard the objec- 
tions of the Catholic church which was still, despite royal competi- 
tion, one of the strongest forces in Europe, and the cornerstone of 
the Spanish ideological complex. The Spanish Monarchs desperately 
attempted to make their policies in the New World conform to the 
letter if not the spirit of Christian Catholic doctrine. Ferdinand, 
for example, had written a document called the Requerimiýnto which 
was given to all conquistadors. Before any warfare in the New'14orld, 
the Spaniards were to read to the Indians this document which was 
to inform them of the Pope's authority, the place of the Catholic 
Kings as his substitute, and the necessity of their accepting the 
Christian faith. This document was to be read before any hostilities 
against Indians in the New World could ensue. After it was read, 
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however, warring could then legally commence (Hanke, 1949: 33). The 
whole purpose of the Requerimiento was to lay the blame for the en- 
suing battle on the Indians and not the Spaniards and therefore le- 
gitimate Spanish actions (Gibson, 1968: 58). 
In the Requerimiento, the Spanish Crown set out its justifica- 
tions for the conquest of the New World and the Indians who occupied 
it. The Spani7sh, as had the Aztecs before them, asserted their 
rights over another people in terms of divine will. God had chosen 
the Pope "that he should be lord and superior to all the men in the 
world. " The Pope donated to the Spanish Monarchs the New World ter- 
ritories and the conquistadors were the representatives of the Span- 
ish Monarchs, The Spanish, as had the Aztecs, considered the Indians 
of Mexico to be already subjects and vassals to their state. If the 
Indians "received and served" these self-appointed masters, they 
would be received "in all love and charity. " If, however, the In- 
dians did not obey and refused to receive these new lords, they would 
be considered in rebellion, be warred against and subjected to "the 
yoke and obedience of the Church and of their highnesses. " Once 
again, therefore, there was in Mexico a group of dominators claiur- 
ing for themselves the right to rule in the name of a state and a 
divinity that supported that state. 
For the Spaniards, once the Requerimiento had been read, notaris- 
ed and witnessed, the ensuing hostilities were entirely legal and 
moral. The Indians had been warned and had only themselves to blame 
for the consequences of refusing to obey. The Requerimiento was, 
however, read to Indians who shared neither the Spaniards language 
I 
nor culture. It was read on board ships before the Spanish landed, 
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to eraPtY villages, to fleeing Indians, and as often as not without 
an interpretor. A Spanish notary, 
Gonzalo Fernandez de Oveido, re- 
ported that he saw it read to Indians already tied by the neck with 
ropes as prisoners (Hanke, 1949: 34). Bartolome 
/ de Las Casas, a Do- 
minican frij. r who was to become one of the most prolific of the In- 
dians' defenders, commented that he did not know whether or laugh or 
weep over thie 'ridiculous document' (Hanke, 1959: 41). The Requer- 
imiento is quoted here in full for it is only by reading the entire 
document and imagining a Spanish notary-reading it to uncomprehend- 
ing Indians that one can grasp the gap between Spanish legal formal- 
ism and the realities of New Spain. 
on the part of the king, Don Ferdinand, and of 
Dona Juana, his daughter, queen of Castile and 
Leon, subduers of the barbarous nations, we 
their servants notify and make known to you, as 
best we can, that the Lord our God, living and 
eternal, created the heaven and earth, and one 
man and one women, of whom you and we, and all 
the men of the world, were and are descendants, 
as well as all those who come after us. But on 
account of the multitude which has sprung from 
this man and woman in five thousand years since 
the world was created, it was necessary that 
some men should go one way and some another, 
and that they should be divided into many king- 
doms and provinces, for in one alone they could 
not be sustained. 
Of all these'nations God our Lord gave charge 
to one man called St. Peter, that he should be 
lord and superior to all the men in the world, 
that all should obey him, and that he should be 
the head of the whole human race, wherever men 
should live, and under whatever law, sect, or 
belief they should be; and he gave him the wor- 
ld for his kingdom and jurisdiction. 
And he comanded him to place his seat in 
Rome, as the spot most fitting to rule the 
world from; but also he permitted him to have. 
his seat in any other part of the world, and 
to judge and govern all Christians, Moors, Jews, 
Gentiles, and all othek sects. This man was 
called Pope, as if to say Admirable Great 
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Father and Governor of men. The men who lived 
in that time obeyed that St. Peter and took him 
for lord, king, and superior of the universe. 
So also they have regarded the others who after 
him have been elected to the pontificate, and 
so has it been continued even till now, and 
will continue till the end of the world. 
One of these pontiffs, who succeeded that St. 
Peter as lord of the world, in the dignity and 
seat which I have before mentioned, made dona- 
tion of these islands and mainland to the afore- 
said king and queen and to their successors, our 
lordb, with. all that there are in these terri- 
tories, as is contained in certain writings 
which passed upon the subject as aforesaid, 
which you can see if you wish. 
So their highnesses are kings and lords of 
these islands and mainland by virtue of this 
donation; and some islands, and indeed almost 
received and served their highnesses, as lords 
and kings, in the way that subjects ought to do, 
with good will, without any resistance, immedia- 
tely, without delay, when they were informed of 
the aforesaid facts. And also they received and 
obeyed the priests whom their highnesses sent to 
preach to them and to teach them our holy faith; 
and all these, of their own free will, without 
any reward or condition have. become Christians, 
and are so, and the highnesses have joyfully 
and graciously received them, and they have also 
commanded them to be treated as their subjects 
and vassals; and you too are held and obliged 
to do the same. Wherefore, as best we can, we 
ask and require that you consider what we have 
said to you, and that you take the time that 
shall be necessary to understand and deliberate 
upon it, and that you acknowledge the Church as 
the ruler and superior of the whole world, and 
the high priest called Pope, and in his name 
the king and queen Dona Juana our lords ' in his 
place, as superiors and lords and kings of these 
islands and this mainland by virtue of the said 
donation, and that you consent and permit that 
these religious fathers declare and preach to 
you the aforesaid. 
If you do so you will do well, and that which 
you. are obliged to do to their highnesses, and 
we in their name shall receive you in all love 
and charity, and shall leave you your wives and 
your children and your lands free without servi- 
tude, that you may do with them and with your- 
selves freely what you'like and think best, and 
they shall not compel you to turn Christians 
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unless you yourselves, when informed of the tru- 
th, should wish to be converted to our holy Cath- 
olic faith, as almost all the inhabitants of the 
rest of the islands have done. And besides this, 
their highnesses award you many privileges and 
exemptions and will grant you many benefits. 
But if you do not do this or if you malicious- 
ly delay in doing it, I certify to you that with 
the help of God we shall forcefully enter into 
your country and shall make war against you in 
all ways and manners that we can, and shall sub- 
ject you to the yoke and obedience of the Chur- 
ch and of their highnesses; we shall take you 
and your wives and your children and shall make 
slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dis- 
pose of them as their highnesses, may command; 
and we shall take away your goods and shall do 
to you all the harm and damage that we can, as 
to vassals who do not obey and refuse to re- 
ceive their lord and resist and contradict him; 
and we protest that the deaths and losses which 
shall accrue from this are your fault, and not 
that of their highnesses, ours, or of these 
soldiers who come with us. And that we have 
said this to you and made this Requerimiento 
we request the notary here present to give us 
his testimony in writing, and we ask the rest 
who are present that they should be witnesses 
of this Requerimiento (Gibson, 1968: 58-60). 
Objections to Crown policy, however, persisted and there were 
those like Las Casas who seriously questioned the sincerity behind 
the formal presentation in this 'ridiculous document', the Requeri- 
miento. The most coherent articulation of the ideological justifi- 
cation for royal conquest in the New World occurred thirty years af- 
ter the conquest of Mexico in 1550 in a debate between Las Casas and 
the Spanish scholar, Juan Gines de Sepulveda. The debate was the 
culmination of some fifty years of questioning of the Spanish Indian 
policy and the arguments summarised two conflicting points of view. 
The arguments at Valladolid largely revolved around the Aristotelian 
concept of natural slavery. Las Casas had argued previously before 
Charles V in 1519, against this concept and complained of its 
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implications when applied to the Indians. He wrote: 
... just as 
if rational men were pieces of wood 
that could be cut off trees and transported for 
building purposes or like flocks of sheep or any 
other kind of animals that could be moved around 
indiscriminately, and if some of them should die 
on the road little would be lost (Quoted in Hanke, 
1959: 17). 
But the influence of the Aristotelian scholars and the appeal 
of their arguiffents was strong and Las Casas, by the time of the 
Valladolid disputation in 1550, was arguing not against the concept 
of natural slavery itself, but that the Indians of the New World 
did not fit the criteria of natural slaves that Aristotle had set 
up. Sepulveda, arguing for the concept of natural slavery and its 
applicability to the New World Indians, had never been to the New 
World and his interest in it was largely academic. He had been ask- 
ed to write his treatise by the members of the Council of the Indies, 
the main administrative body for ruling the Indies. In 1542, when 
Charles V had ordered an inspection of the Council, it was discover- 
ed that one of the oldest members had been accepting money from, 
among others, Cortes (Hanke, 1949: 94). 
The question the King officially put to the participants to the 
Valladolid dispute is significant: "How can conquests, discoveries, 
and settlements be made to accord with justice and reason? " (Hanke, 
1959: 41). The question was not whether or not conquests, discoveries 
and settlements would be pursued. The question, indeed the problem, 
was how to justify them. Sepulveda maintained that the Spaniards 
"o-were sent by the King for the purpose of dominating" the Indians 
and that this domination was just and natural. He argued: 
... in accordance with the authority of the most 
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eminent thinkers... the domination of prudent, 
good, and humane men over those of contrary 
disposition is just and natural (Sepulveda, 
1968: 115). 
Sepulveda argued that domination of the Indians was both lawful and 
necessary for four primary reasons. First, before the Spanish domina- 
tion the Indians were "... totally uncivilized in their customs" and 
were "... by nature without learning or judgement and contaminated 
with many vicious habits. " By natural law they ought to obey peo- 
ple "more provident, and more excellent, so that they may be governed 
by better customs and institutions... " Second, the Indians were in 
"grave sin against the natural law" for their human sacrifice, and 
their ignorance of such sins was no excuse. Third, the Spaniards 
were obliged to stop the human sacrifices and to prevent innocent 
men from being destroyed. Fourth, the Spaniards were morally ob- 
ligated to save the Indians from hell, and spread the faith (Sepul- 
veda, 1975: 61-64). 
Sepulveda's main arguments at Valladolid, based on Aristotle 
and Thomas Aquinas were that wars could be justly waged if their 
cause was just, if the authority carrying on the war was legitimate, 
and if that authority carried on the war in a right spirit and cor- 
rect manner (Sepulveda, 1975: 61). Sepulveda and other theologians 
of the time generally held the view that since the Pope held poli- 
tical as well as spiritual authority over the entire world, it there- 
by followed that those who refused Christianity should be justly war- 
red against and enslaved (Hanke, 1949: 28-29). 
Sepulveda maintained that he personally abhorred war for booty, 
waged for greed and conducted with cruelty. But the actions of in- 
dividuals, he reasoned, did not negate the whole endeavour and the 
I 
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personal motives of soldiers could not detract from the holy mission 
(Hanke, 1959: 62-63). Besides, Sepulveda argued. the Spaniards were 
full of gentleness and humanitarianism. He argued: 
Their only and greatest solicitude and care in 
the battles, after the winning... is to save the 
greatest possible number ... and free them from 
the cruelty of their allies (Sepulveda, 1968: 
118). 
Sepulvedaýmaintained that the Indians had been told through the 
reading of the Requerimiento that hostilities had been declared and 
were even given the chance to accept the Christian religion. He 
argued that they could not be given too long. If the Indians were 
allowed time to consider and compare the alternate systems, their 
laws and government, "the time allowed would extend into infinity. " 
Besides, wrote Sepulveda "... these matters cannot be known until af- 
ter our rule has been accepted... " (Sepulveda, 1968: 114). This last 
sentiment was a co nly held position. Comara (1964: 33), for ex- 
ample, echoes the point in his history of the conquest. 
Truth to tell, it is war and warriors that really 
persuade the Indians to give up their idols, 
their bestial rites, and their abominable blo- 
ody sacrifices ... and it is thus that of their 
own free will and consent they more quickly re- 
ceive, listen to, and believe our preachers, 
and accept the Gospel and baptism... 
Legalised warfare, however, according to this series of justifi- 
cations, could only be waged by the Spanish. The Indians, Sepulveda 
maintained, could because of their sins no more wage a just war ag- 
ainst the Spanish than could Jews against Christians (Hanke, 1959: 
1 69). Sepulveda wrote: 
How can we doubt that these people, so uncivilis- 
ed, so barbaric, so contaminated with so many 
sins and obscenities ... have been justly conquer- 
ed by such an excellent, pious, and most just 
a 
259 
king as was Ferdinand the Catholic and is now 
Emperor Charles, and by such a humane nation 
which is excellent in every kind of virtue? 
These inferior people require, by their own 
nature and in their own interests, to be plac- 
ed under the authority of civilized and vir- 
tuous princes or nations, so that they may learn, 
from the might, wisdom, and law of their conquer- 
ors, to practice better morals, worthier customs 
and a more civilized way of life. 
Compare then those blessings enjoyed by Span- 
iards of prudence, genius, magnamity, temperance, 
humahity, and religion with those of the homun- 
culi in whom you will scarcely find even ves- 
tiges of humanity who not only possess no science 
but who also lack letters and preserve no monu- 
ment of their history except certain vague and 
obscure reminiscences of somethings ... Neither do 
they have written laws, but barbaric institutions 
and customs. They do not even have private pro- 
perty (Quoted in Hanke, 1959: 47). 
I 
Sepulveda argued that were it not for the "abominable perver- 
sions" of which the Indians were guilty, it would be wrong to en- 
slave them and despoil their property (11anke, 1959: 69). Ile even 
went to the trouble to work out a mathmatical rationale for SpAnish 
I 
conquest. Sepulveda calculated that the Aztecs had sacrificed 
20,000 people per year, therefore, 600,000 lives had been saved in 
the thirty years since the conquest. Since, he concluded, the Span- 
ish had not killed that many, there had been a net gain (See Keen, 
1971: 82). 
Las Casas defended the Indians against the arguments of Sepul- 
veda. The disputation in Valladolid was, for Las Casas, the culmina- 
tion of some forty years of campaigning on the Indians' behalf and 
arguing the contradictions of Spanish Indian policy. Las Casas wrote: 
The Indians are our brothers, and Christ has 
given his life for them. Why, then, do we per- 
secute them with such inhuman savagery when . - they do not deserve such treatment (Las Casas, 
1975: 362). 
260 
Las Casas argued before the Council that the Indians were indeed not 
barbarians and did not fit into the definition of natural slaves out- 
lined by Aristotle. To Sepulveda's second argument,. that ýt was-. 
just punishment for wrongdoers for their idolatries and sacrifices 
against other Indians, Law Casas replied that the actions concerned 
only the people involved, and the Spaniards had no right to apply 
punishments ofýany sort (Losada, 1975: 16-22). Las Casas (1975: 42-43) 
wrote: 
... long before they had heard the word Spaniard, 
they had properly organized states, wisely order- 
ed by excellent laws, religion, and customs. 
They cultivated friendship and, bound together 
in common fellowship, lived in populous cities 
in which they wisely administered the affairs 
of both peace and war justly and equitably, 
truly governed by laws which at very many points 
surpass ours, and could have won the admiration 
of the sages of Athens ... 
The Spaniards, Las Casas maintained, "... (had) surpassed all other 
barbarians... " (Las Casas, 197ý: 28). 
Las Casas argued that the Spanish themselves had at one time 
practised human sacrifice and that such ancient customs were diffi- 
cult to eradicate. It was unreasonable, he maintained, to expect 
the Indians to immediately change and desert their customs. Sa- 
crifices had long been a recognised form of worship. For the In- 
dian, it was natural because they were giving their most precious 
possession, their lives, for a god they believed to be the true god 
(Hanke, 1959: 93-94). Las Casas argued that it would be better to 
tolerate some such deaths than to "move against an immense multi- 
tude of persons, including the innocent, and destroy whole kingdoms, 
and implant a hatred for the Christian religion in their souls... " 
(Las Casas, 1975: 190). "What" LasCasas (1975: 173)-askeA "does the 
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herald of the gospel have to do with armed thieves? " 
The result of the great Debate at Valladolid was inconclusive. 
The council which heard the arguments never rendered a collective 
opinion of the issues and no tangible royal policy resulted (Hanke, 
1974: 113-115). The inconclusiveness of the Great Debate, far from 
being an indication of royal ineptness, is evidence of the Crown's 
ability to orchestrate the justification of its own interests. The 
whole history of royal action from the departure of the expedition 
to the Great Debate illustrates the Crown's growing sophistication 
in legitimating its own economic interests in the realm of ideology. 
Ferdinand and Isabella had developed to a fine art the manipulation 
of ideological consensus and passed on that legacy to Charles V. 
Indeed, it is a tribute to the ideological mastery of the Catholic 
Kings that Isabella is remembered as a champion of Indian rights 
even though she sanctioned and directly profited from the labour of 
the Indians in the New World. Under Charles V, the Spanish Crown 
by allowing Las Casas to publish his opinions and debate his side of 
the arguments regarding Indian treatment, effectively made itself ap- 
pear as an impartial adjudicator of affairs, sincerely concerned 
with the welfare of the Indians. But Spanish policy with regard to 
the conquest and subsequent exploitation of the Indians in Mexico 
was guided in large part by economic concerns that could not be 
changed and made conquest and exploitation necessary. 
Summary 
The warfare conducted by the Spanish in the conquest of Mexico 
was designed essentially to accomplish two aims. The fitst was to 
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seize booty, especially booty in the form of precious metals. The 
second aim was to take possession of the new territory for the Con- 
quistadors and for the Spanish Crown. The men who carried out the 
conquest were adventurer knights who sought their own personal en- 
richment through war in the medieval tradition. The warring of 
these Spanish Conquistadors against the Mexican Indians had short- 
term aims and týas not integrated into a long-term policy of empire 
as Aztec warfare had been. The violence of Spanish warfare, there- 
fore was subject to none of the constraints which influenced the po- 
licy of the warfare of the Aztecs. Whereas the Aztec state attempt- 
ed to control and manage the violence of warfare with the intent 
of effectively maintaining tribute relations with conquered groups 
afterward, the Spaniards were little concerned with such long-term 
affairs. 
The relative ease with which a few hundred Spaniards conquered 
the Aztec empire was due to both the superior technology of Spanish 
arms, and to the technology of Spanish warfare. The ceremonial na- 
ture of Indian warfare put them at considerable disadvantage when 
they faced a group of combatants who did not fight cerem6nially nor 
recognise tribute offers as an'end to warfare. In addition, the 
Aztecs maintained the control of their empire largely through politi- 
cal means and through force and intimidation. Once the Spaniards 
had entered into the system of power relations in Mexico, this tenuous 
political hold of the Aztecs on surrounding groups broke down. The 
Spaniards exploited with considerable acumen the resentment the peo- 
ples of tributary provinces felt for the Aztecs and promoted rebellion 
all over the empire. 
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Within the ideological frameworks of each social formation, war- 
fare was both a religious and a military endeavour -a devinely appoint- 
ed mission. Whereas the Aztecs had had a mere hundred years, however, 
to engrain an ideological system which supported their empire, the 
Spaniards had had centuries to establish a complex ideological matrix 
of religious and legal ideals to underwrite their exploits. The 
Great Debate dost clearly illustrates the ideological bases on which 
Spanish conquest was justified, and the importance to the state of 
maintaining this legitimation on ideological grounds in the face of 
the questioning of its policy by the reformed clergy. 
The military conquest of Mexico, however, was only the beginning 
of a more systematic exploitation of the Indian population. And, the 
Aztecs seemed to understand what was in store better than the other 
Indian groups who had allied themselves with the Spaniards. Gomara 
(1964: 288) notes that at one point in the final stages of the battle 
for Tenochtitlan, the Aztecs taunted the Tlaxcalans saying: 
Hurry! Burn and destroy these houses, for you 
will build them again, whether you like it or 
not, at your own cost and by your own hands. 
If we win, you shall do it for us; if we lose, 
for the Spaniards. 
It is better that we should all die fighting... 
than see ourselves in the power of those who 
would enslave us and torture us for gold (Diaz, 
1963: 394). 
The Spanish Conquistadors had believed they could take from the 
Aztecs enough in spoils and treasure to live comfortably for the rest 
of their lives. They were, however, to be disappointed. Most of the 
treasure went to Cortes and to Charles V. The remaining spoils, di- 
vided up between the men, came t6 little, so little that some of the 
Conquistadors, disgusted, refused even to accept their shares (Diaz, 
a 
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1963: 411). Diaz (1963: 410) writes in the concluding pages of his 
account Of the conquest: 
We ... were all somewhat sad when we saw how lit- 
tle gold there was and how poor and mean our 
shares would be. 
The Indians and their labour, then, became the real wealth of 
Mexico, and this labour was to be exploited to produce the commodi- 
ties required by European markets. Mexico was to take its place 
after the Conquest as part of a world economy, a world economy just 
beginning to be pervaded by capitalist relations of production. It 
was necessary for the Spaniards to destroy the basis of the former 
mode of production in order to replace it by a social organisation 
based on commodity production and trade (See Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 
260). As has been noted, the ancient mode of production depended 
on maintaining the conditions of citizenship on the one hand and 
relations of subordination on the other. The Spanish defeat of the 
Aztec empire effectively destroyed its ability to maintain either 
of these conditions, and paved the way for enforcing an altered eco- 
nomic arrangement in Mexico. The first two decades of Spanish rule 




FORCED LABOUR IN CONQUEST MEXICO 
Once the military conquest of Mexico had been achieved by Cortes 
and his men, the economic conquest of Mexico began. The Conquista- 
dors had come to Mexico primarily in search of personal wealth 
seeking to-make their fortunes in the 'discovery business. ' the eco- 
nomic conditions in western Europe which made precious metals so val- 
uable a commodity, underlay the motivations of these men. And just 
as the value of precious metals on the world market had all but en- 
sured that the Conquest would be a rapacious search for gold, it al- 
so helped to ensure that the years immediately after the Conquest 
would be characterised by a search for gold in even greater earnest. 
The amount of readily available gold seized from the Aztecs was 
hardly the El Dorado dreamed of by the Conquistadors, but the possi- 
bility of securing gold through mining remained. The Spaniards were 
to find in subsequent years that Mexico had more silver than gold, 
but silver was also highly valued on the world metal market and its 
discovery and shipment back to Spain offered the possibilities of 
accumulating vast personal wealth. The Spaniards wasted no time. 
They established producing mines within two years of the Conquest 
and important silver mines were established in Michoacan, Tasco and 
Zimpango as early as 1534. The first half-century after the Conquest 
- the Age of the Conquistador - x4as to be one of vigorous mining 
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activity (Sauer, 1948: 89; Palmer, 1976: 76). 
Once the Conquest had proved successful, however, the Spanish 
Monarchy was quick to assert its rights as the state on whose theo- 
retical authority and behalf the Conquest had been undertaken. Even 
expeditions which were entirely organised and financed through pri- 
vate initiative were dependent on the Crown for legal authority. 
And the monar-chs of Spain were determined to maintain control of ex- 
ploration so that the wealth of the New World would not enrich. just 
the small group of conquerors. Mercantilist theories of fifteenth 
and sixteenth century Europe clearly defined the relationship b e- 
tween a colonial possession and the mother country as one geared al- 
most exclusively toward the enrichment of the latter. Colonies were 
to serve as sources of raw materials and tribute, and as markets for 
manufactured goods. The Spanish state was determined-that the lands 
conquered in the New World would be brought into such a relationship 
(Elliott, 1978: 59; Helms, 1975: 156). 
Spanish manufacturing, however, had long been crippled by the 
Crown's expenditures in European wars and the monopoly of sheep 
grazing. The manufactured output of Spain was minimal. Spain her- 
self, in fact, was becoming a sort of colony to the rest of Europe - 
exporting raw materials and importing manufactures (Lynch, 1964: 122). 
So the primary focus of Spanish interest in the New World came to 
be the securing of raw materials and tribute. And, as has been 
noted, the particular stage of development of European capitalism 
made precious metals the most important raw material to be extract- 
ed (Haring, 1947: 261). The Spani, sh Crown, then, along with the Con- 
quistadors invested their energies in securing the precious metals 
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of the New World. Predictably, the Crown and the Conquistadors 
would compete for the larger share of the profits. 
From the very beginning of colonial expansion, the Spanish Crown 
had shown itself to be increasingly concerned with the material as- 
pects of colonisation. The colonial policy of Ferdinand, for exam- 
ple, has been described by a contemporary historian as "simplicity 
itself: get money" (See Simpson, 1929: 34). Royal interest increas- 
ed as the potential wealth of the New World became more apparent. 
The increasing royal concern about the wealth of the New World-can 
ý_, or be seen clearly in the differences between the capitulacipn 
agreement, made with Columbus in 1492 and the same document made 
16 
with Pizarro less than forty years later. , The agreement with 
Columbus began: 
In the name of the Holy Trinity and Eternal Uni- 
ty, Father,. Son and Holy Ghost, three persons 
really distinct and one divine es 
' 
sence which 
lives and reigns forever without end, and of 
the blessed and glorious Virgin, Saint Mary, 
Our Lady, His Mother, whom we regard as our 
sovereign and advocate in all our actions, and 
to her honour and worship, and of the blessed 
Apostle Saint James, light and warrior of the 
Spains, patron and guide of the kings of Cas- 
tile and Leon, and likewise to the honour and 
worship of all the other saints of the celes- 
tial court (Gibson, 1968: 29). 
The document continues in this vein for some one thousand more words 
before even mentioning the practical material arrangements of colo- 
nisation. Contrast this with the crisp tone of Isabella's permis- 
sion to Pizarro which is almost totally concerned with business. 
Pizarro's capitulacion reads: 
Of the gold mined during the next six years, 
counting from the date of this document, by 
those who shall go to colonize the said land, 
we shall be paid one tenth; the seventh year 
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one ninth, and so on, increasing each year until 
our share is the one fifth part. But of the 
gold and other things received as ransoms or 
booty or in any other way, from this date we 
shall be paid one fifth all of it (Gibson, 1968: 
93-97). 
The price of gold, and therefore its importance, was to steadily 
increase during the period from 1450 to 1750 thus increasing the pro- 
fits to be made from its discovery. In the initial years of explora- 
tion it had been decreed that all precious metal mines were to be the 
property of the Crown. In 1501, however, Ferdinand and Isabella 
conceded that private exploration for precious metals would be allow- 
ed as long as all gold mines discovered were still reserved to the 
Crown. And. even after private exploration was conceded, the Crown 
reduced the share of the mined gold which was due to the Crown from 
2/3 to 1/5 in an effort to increase the exploration for precious 
metals. Charles V became so concerned with the revenues of precious 
metals from the New World that he initiated the practice of seizing 
shipments of gold and silver in Spain and issuing in exchange, in- 
terest bearing annuities. This practice had already reached consider- 
able proportions by 1523 (Haring, 1947: 277,278,297). 
Even though Spain remained throughout this period primarily ag- 
ricultural, the metals from the New World greatly stimulated the 
Spanish economy and produced a remarkable commercial expansion 
(Lynch, 1964: 140-141). The discoveries were also a boom to the 
Spanish monarchy. Precious metals from America financed Hapsburg 
I war and diplomacy (Sanchez-Albornoz, 1975: 10). The treasures from 
New Spain encouraged Hapsburg imperialism and contributed to an ag- 
gressive foreign policy, which in, turn created a greater demand for 
a steady supply of money. It was not only the quantity but the 
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dependability of this revenue which fueled Spanish ambitions (Hamil- 
ton, 1934: 44-45). The Monarchy could secure revenue from the New 
World without having to go through the difficult process of extract- 
ing it from its own nobility and the Crown was constantly, as will be 
discussed, taking measures to ensure that the Conquistadors did not 
become another powerful aristocracy in Mexico. On the strength of 
the revenues f-rom the New World, Charles V largely debt-financed 
his monarchy and so put Spain in the position of constantly search- 
ing for new ways of raising revenues. The illusion of great pros- 
perity created by the influx of American treasure encouraged extra- 
vagance (Gibson, 1966: 107). As Elliott (1978: 76) notes, by the end 
of thexeign of Charles V: 
... almost every conceivable source of revenue in Castile was pledged to one banker or another 
as security for a debt. 
Spain was eventually to act only as a funnel for these precious 
metals to the rest of Europe. Since most of Spain's manufactures 
came from northern Europe, from England, Italy, and Germany, to 
them went her precious metals in payment. The balance of trade be- 
tween Spain and the rest of Europe was always favourable to Europe 
(Haring, 1947: 267,268). But the 'bullionist theories' current in 
Spain advocated the accumulation of precious metals-almost to the 
exclusion of all else, and the power of the Spanish monarchy cýLme 
to rest precariously on American mining production. The precious 
metal flow from the New World became the most important single item 
in Spain's economy (Haring, 1947: 274; Lynch, 1964: 147). 
Mining, therefore, became the leading sector of the colonial 
economy and as Stein and Stein (1970: 31) have termed it: "a cutting 
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edge of west European capitalism. " The Spanish Crown set about es- 
tablishing a colonial mining-agricultural economy in Mexico tied to 
Spain. The essential elements of this economy were to be: 1) develop- 
ed mining cores, 2) agricultural and ranching areas peripheral to 
the mining regions which provided food supplies and raw materials, 
and 3) a commercial system which could channel the metals to Spain 
and distributenmanufactured products - not by and large from Spain 
herself, but from western Europe,, Ifunnelled through Spain. The major 
concern of the Spanish state came to be maximising production, and 
maximising its control over silver and gold production from the New 
World (Stein and Stein, 1970: 23,45). 
For the individual Spaniard, the mining economy in Mexico offer- 
ed the possibility of returning to Spain wealthy without. a lifetime 
of hard work. For the Spanish state it offered a means of financ- 
ing itself and its European wars. For the Indians, however, the 
restructuring of the economy around mining meant the exploitation of 
his labour to devastating effect. As Brandenburg (1964: 26) has 
written: "Gold fever became a disease more deadly than smallpox. " 
Economic Reorganisation 
In order to understand the devastating effects, on the Indian 
population of the Spanish economic restructuring of Mexico, it is 
necessary to grasp the profound changes in economic and social or- 
ganisation it necessitated. For the Conquest of Mexico was not 
merely the victory of one military group over another, nor simply 
the replacement of one dominant class by another. It was instead 
the forcible imposition of a mercantile capitalist economic system 
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onto civilisations and peoples who understood nothing of its values, 
priorities and demands. The peoples of the Indian communities in 
Mexico were dragged forcibly into a capitalist European world system 
and assigned a role within the division of labour of that alien 
world system. Their military defeat ensured that they would have no 
say in determining the role they were to play, and the presence of 
precious metals in the region largely determined that the role would 
be to provide the labour which would make it possible for the Span- 
iards to acquire precious metals. 
Since mining is a labour intensive activity, the main focus of 
Spanish endeavour in the years immediately following the Conquest was 
to be the more densely populated, successful sedentary agricultural 
regions of Mexico where labour was plentiful. In these early years 
other regions which were devoid of gold, silver or precious gems 
were virtually ignored. The Indians were needed as labourers in the 
mines and as carriers to and from the mining regions. Additionally, 
their agricultural production had to be geared towards the produc- 
tion of goods needed to support the mining regions (Helms, 1975: 143, 
147). Whatever the endeavour - mining or agriculture - however, 
labour had to be organised in such a way as to fit into the priori- 
ties of the new mining economy. 
The traditional system of labour organisation in Aztec Mexico, 
however, was based on the ancient mode of production. The primary 
labour form within this system was the independent peasant producer 
who still held the means of production, the land. Independent pea- 
sant producers practised agriculture primarily to support themselves 
and their families and rendered up demanded surplus to the body of 
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surplus takers who were the possessors of the dominant state. The 
Aztec system, as has been discussed, supported only a limited amount 
of forced labour in the conventionally understood sense of that term, 
i. e., involuntary, unremunerated, supervised labour. The main support 
of the state was the agricultural surplus appropriated from peasant 
producers. 
The Spanidrds, however, were not intent on establishing a donr- 
inant state based on the appropriation of agricultural surplus. They 
were primarily interested in the production of a single commodity - 
precious metals. Additionally, whereas the Aztec state had depended 
on appropriating, by and large, products already being produced by 
conquered peoples, the Spaniards were interested in appropriating a 
commodity the Indians did not ordinarily produce. Indian communit3. es 
were organised around agricultural production, not the production of 
precious metals. For the Spaniards to take advantage of the mining 
potential of the region they had to reorganise labour in the mining 
areas and to some extent in the areas peripheral to the mining areas. 
The reorganisation of this labour in Mexico constituted such a fun- 
damental change and was, because of economic pressures in western 
Europe, accomplished in such a short ; ipan of time, that force and 
violence played a large part in this reorganisationi The Indians 
had to be reorganised along lines which would make it possible for 
the Spaniards to respond to the economic demands of the European 
system. And- the consequent restructuring of the economy around 
mining and the profound change this represented in terms of labour, 
all but ensured that this labour would have to be forced. 
It was not the first time that the Spanish had relied on forced 
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labour. Forced labour had always been the material basis of Spanish 
colonialism, even in Africa. The foundations of forced labour in the 
New World had been laid in Hispnaiola (Santo Domingo and Haiti) and 
Cuba. Attempts to work out a satisfactory organisation of labour in 
Hispaniola prefigured the attempts in Mexico, and events and experi- 
ences there influenced subsequent decisions about labour organisation 
in Mexico. 
Forced Labour in Hispaniola 
Columbus wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella as early as 1494, out- 
lining a plan for establishing a regular slave trade in Hispaniola. 
The Crown was loathe to put any obstacles in the way of securing In- 
dian labour. Royal revenue even in these early years largely depend- 
ed on the discovery of precious metals which in turn depended on a 
labour supply. Although there were periodic objections from the 
Crown to the enslavement of particular groups of Indians, there was 
no sincere intent to block slave trading in general (Simpson, 1929: 
21-24). Nothing, for example, was done to stop slave trading in the 
Bahammas through which settlers in Hispaniola attempted to secure 
labourers (Parry, 1966: 61). When slavers threatened to stop cap- 
turing and enslaving the troublesome Carib Indians because of the 
expense, Isabella promptly decreased the Crown's share of the pro- 
fits from a third to a fifth. 
The initial conception of the Spanish Crown of the role of 
Hispaniola had been to establish it as a fortified trading entrepot 
and royal monopoly for, primarily, gold. The Indians were to work 
I 
for the Crown as part of their obligatory service. All the mines 
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were to belong to the Crown and be worked for the Crown's benefit. 
Private individuals were to contract for labourers on a voluntary 
basis and pay them wages. This idealised system, however, was in 
practice, unworkable. The Spanish Conquistadors who pacified the 
islands had come to regard the private use of the labour of captives 
as a right and they exploited the Indians and their labour rapacious- 
ly (Sauer, 196-6: 98). The Crown was forced into concessions about 
the ownership of mines and the use of Indian labour since the Span- 
iards, merely in order to live, had to be supported by Indian labour. 
Some form of organising a colony utilising Indian labour'had to be 
established and in the initial years of colonisation there seeted 
no way of doing this without allowing the Spaniards an almost free 
hand in the use of native labour (Gongora, 1975: 5-6,131-132). In 
the initial phases of Spanish presence in the Indies (and later in 
Mexico) then, the organisation of labour was left to the individual 
Conquistadors. Indians fed the Spaniards and provided personal ser- 
vices under a sort of 'squatter sovereignty. ' 
From the outset of the explorations of the New World, the In- 
dians had been declared theoretically and juridically free subjects 
by the Crown - in other words, free to dispose of their labour as 
they wished. But even so, it was still entirely legal to enslave 
'rebellious' natives taken in battle, cannibals such as the Caribs, 
those who committed criminal acts, and those who had already been 
enslaved under native social systems. These exceptions to the gen- 
eral principle of freedom for the Indians were sufficient, at least 
for a time, to provide the Spaniards with an adequate labour force 
(Helms, 1975: 150; Ots y CapdequJ., 1959: 64). 
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But slavery in particular and forced labour in general were 
never practices that the Crown was public[ comfortable with - for 
two main reasons. First, the blatant enslavement of an entire race, 
especially for economic gain, won for the Spanish Monarchs no favour 
with the Papacy in Rome. As Simpson (1929: 19) so aptly put it, the 
Crown found itself from the beginning of the Conquest of the New 
World "... between the devil of papal displeasure and the deep sea 
of economic necessity. " Second, the Crown was determined to prevent 
the establishment of a feudal aristocracy in the New World which 
forced labour, controlled by-the Conquistadors, encouraged. The dif- 
ficulty with regard to organising labour in the Indies and later in 
Mexico was always to be finding a way of supplying adequate labour 
to ensure that Spanish economic demands were met. while at the same 
time avoiding offending Rome, and preventIng the establishment of a 
new colonial feudal aristocracy which would compete with the Crown 
for revenues. 
Even as early as the Spanish presence in Hispaniola, the Crown 
was officially legislating that the Indians should be contracted as 
wage labourers and not as slaves. When Columbus, for example, peti- 
tioned the Spanish Crown in 1498 for the use of Indian labour, Isa- 
bella promptly sent to Hispaniola a royal governor with instructions 
regulating Indian affairs. His instructions read, in part: 
... since it will be necessary, in order to mine 
gold and carry out the other works we have or- 
dered done, to make use of the services of In- 
dians, you are to compel them to work in our 
service, paying them the wages you think it 
just they should have (Instructions of Ferdin- 
and and Isabella to Fray Nicolas de Ovando, 
1501, quoted in Simpson, 1929: 27). 
The idea that the Indians should work for wages was to be a 
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continuing theme in Spanish colonial legislation - in Hispaniola and 
later in Mexico. But, the imposition of a system of wage labour in 
the New World was never to overcome two fundamental obstacles. First, 
Spain had allowed the Conquest to be made through the private initia- 
tive of the Conquistadors and these men were ill disposed to give up 
the private exploitation of the Indians and the territory to which 
they felt entitled. Second, Indian ideas of life were shaped in the 
context of a pre-capitalist mode of production in which commodity re- 
lations in general and notions of wage labour in particular were un- 
developed. It was simply not possible to turn a population of farming 
peasants into wage labourers in a short span of time. The notion of 
working for wages was totally foreign to the Indians. 
The Indians had to be made to work, however, and it became in- 
creasingly apparent to the Crown that the only way to get them to do 
so was to allow the Conquistadors to force them. The Conquistador/ 
colonists played no small part in encouraging this view. In 1517, 
for example, the Crown appointed three Jeronymite friars to conduct 
an inquiry into the issue of Indian labour. To each of their wit- 
nesses (colonists) they put the following questions: 
Would they (the Indians) be able to live poli- 
ticamente as do the Spaniards? Would they 
know how to support themselves by their own ef- 
forts, each Indian mining gold or tilling the 
soil or maintaining himself by other daily 
labour? Do they know how to care for what 
they may acquire by this labour, spending only 
for necessities, as a Castilian labourer would? 
(Hanke, 1949: 42-43). 
The answer from the colonists is revealing. Not only did they 
explain clearly that the Indians had none of the motivations neces- 
I 
sary to prompt them to work for wages, they even went so far as to 
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maintain that the Indians could not even govern themselves without 
the help of the Spaniards. The Indians, said the colonists, were so 
simple they often gave their possessions away to those that asked 
for them. They lacked the greedyness and the desire for wealth to 
provide themselves with the basics to sustain life without the Span- 
iards. One colonist complained that even when the Spaniards beat 
the Indians or-cut off their ears for some impropriety, their fellows 
did not regard them any less well (Hanke, 1949: 43). The colonists 
all agreed - the Indians could not govern themselves and had to be 
enslaved. If they weren't, reported one resident of Hispaniola, they 
would "... revert to their former habits of idleness, nakedness, drunk- 
enness, improvidence, gluttony, dancing, and would patronize witch 
doctors and eat spiders and snakes" (Quoted in Hanke, 1949: 44). 
From these replies it is evident why both the Crown and the 
colonists found it necessary to enslave the Indians. They possess- 
ed none of the motives necessary to allow them to fill the economic 
niche they were destined for within the European division of labour. 
Since they could not be convinced to toil long hours for wages, but 
instead were content to provide themselves with the basic necessi- 
ties and use the rest of their time to dance and eat snakes, as the 
resident suggested, they would, in order to fit into their assigned 
niche within this new economic system, have to be forced to work. 
So the Spanish Crown found it necessary to rely on forced labour in 
Hispaniola whatever the drawbacks. 
Slavery as a labour form was used widely in Hispaniola and also 
another form of labour organisation, the encomienda. Strictly speak- 
ing, the encomienda was a grant n ot of land but of the services of 
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Indians living in a particular area. The individual Spaniard, or 
encomendero, was granted a certain area in encomienda. From the In- 
dians in this area, he was allowed to extract tribute and labour ser- 
vices. The encomienda was a compromise the Crown was forced to ac- 
cept, at least temporarily. It was one answer to the labour problem 
if not an answer the Crown was pleased to accept. The encomienda, 
then, became the primary institution through which Spaniards wqre 
to organise labour for two and a half centuries (Simpson, 1929: 24). 
But the use of slavery and encomienda resulted in miserable 
mistreatment of the Indians. The islands of the Caribbean were all 
but depopulated within a few years. Las Casas who first came to 
Hispaniola in 1502, noted that mining was the major cause of native 
deaths. He estimated that from a fourth to a third of the work gangs, 
sent to dig for gold in six to eight month stints, died. And the 
fewer Indians there were, the more harshly they were exploited. Las 
Casas estimated that between 1494 and 1508, more than three million 
people perished on the island (See Sauer, 1966: 145-150,155). In 1509, 
only seventeen years after the discovery of the island, the amount of 
gold obtained from Hispaniola was little more than five million dol- 
lars, bought for the price of several expensive expeditions and 
the lives of thousands of Spaniards and at least a million and a 
half Indians (Del Mar, 1969: 147). By 1510, black slaves were being 
imported into Hispaniola from Africa to alleviate the labour shor- 
tage (Palmer, 1976: 8). By 1512, bands of Spaniards were combing the 
'useless islands' to capture natives to be transported to Hispaniola 
as slaves (Gongora, 1975: 9). By 1520, the native population was 
virtually extinct (Helms, 1975: 130). 
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The Spanish Crown was anxious to prevent a similar decimation 
of the Indian population in Mexico. But in its attempts to insti- 
tute a system of wage labour in Mexico, the Crown was confronted 
with the same obstacles that had prevented its establishment in 
Hispaniola - the Conquistadors were just as stubborn about relinquish- 
ing their power to privately exploit the Indianýs labour and the In- 
dians were just as unprepared to adapt to a system of wage labour. 
Forced Labour in Conquest Mexico 
As had been the case in Hispaniola, in the initial years of 
Spanish presence in Mexico labour organisation was left largely to 
the individual Conquistadors. The Crown was to move consistently 
during the next thirty years under discussion to wrest control over 
labour organisation away from the Conquistadors and implement a sys- 
tem which would ensure greater profits for the Crown. But in these 
initial years, the struggle between the Crown and the conquerors 
was weighed toward the conquerors. The Conquistadors were physically 
in Mexico and the establishment of forced labour and encomienda, were 
a fact. The Crown's preferences in terms of labour organisation 
would be implemented over the objections and against the interests 
of the Conquistadors and only after a sustained effort. During this 
initial thirty year period there were three primary forms of labour 
organisation - slavery, encomienda and repartimiento. 
Slavery. As had been the case in Hispaniola, slavery was the 
I labour form adopted immediately in New Spain. Cortes and his men 
branded many Indians as slaves after the conquest of Tenochtitlan 
and decreed that any group of Indians who had declared allt5ls-cc- 
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to the king of Spain and then fought against the Spaniards, were also 
condemned to slavery. The initial wave of captives taken in the Con- 
quest and the subsequent capture of rebellious Indians provided an 
immediate labour supply. And as long as there were continual wars, 
there was a steady supply of slaves. A rebellion of the Opilcingo 
Indians, for example in 1531, yielded from one to two thousand slaves 
(Zavala, 1943: 51). 
During this first phase of colonial occupation of Mexico the 
Crown did not openly oppose slavery. It was merely stipulated that 
the circum tances of taking slaves be consistent with established 
law. Established law, however, always left open enough circumstan- 
ces to provide a labour force. Slaves could be made of those Indians 
deemed 'rebellious', or they could be obtained by barter with local 
Indian chiefs who held slaves. Those who had been slaves under the 
Indian system could be transferred legally to the Spaniards in ex- 
change for something of value (Zavala, 1943: 52-53). But the de- 
finition of 'rebellious' Indians and Indians who were already 'sla- 
ves' under the'Indian system, was open to interpretation. The Span- 
iards, for example, put pressure on the Indians to bring-in all their 
former slaves. Alonso Zorita, a Spanish jurist in Mexico at the 
time, 17 noted that the Indians 
. 
were so afraid of not satisfying the 
Spaniard's demands, they brought in their vassals and even their 
own children if they had no others to offer (Zorita, 1965: 208). 
Another entirely legal way in which the Indians might be en- 
slaved was as a punishment for failure to meet tribute demands im- 
Posed by the Spaniards on them. Cortes had divided the Indians 
I 
amon, 5 the Conquistadors and allowed each Spaniard to impose a tribute 
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on the Indians he held (Zorita, 1965: 201). If the Indians in a vil- 
lage could not meet their tribute requirements to the Spaniards, they 
might substitu+e slaves instead of goods. Additionally, Indians con- 
victed of certain crimes under Spanish law might'also be condemned to 
slavery. The practice of commuting a death sentence to a sentence of 
slavery was considered a humane form of judicial leniency (Zavala, 
1943: 52-53). In 1530, the Crown issued a cedula, or order, prohibit- 
ing the slave trade. But, Indian slavery was to continue uaabated 
for many years. Legal exceptions were made to orders against sla- 
very every time the supply of labour for the mines ran short (Simp- 
son, 1929: 117). 
In the haste to make slaves of the Indians inthe first ydars 
of colonisation, Zorita wrote that the Indians were "... taken in 
flocks like sheep to be branded. " Motolinia, a Franciscan fridr 
who arrived in New Spain in 1524,18 wro 
I te that every time a slave 
was sold to a new master he was branded, and many Indians had faces 
covered with marks (See Steck, 1951: 92). Under the Aztec system 
slaves had rights as well as obligations and status as persons be- 
fore the law. In Conquest Mexico, however, the slave became a com- 
modity, a human chattel, totally at the disposal of his master (Pal- 
mer, 1976: 37). 
Encomienda. The use of slave labour was accompanied as it had 
been in Hispaniola by the use of the encomienda as a labour form. 
The encomienda grant most frequently involved a densely populated 
city or town and its dependent villages. Cortesl for example, car- 
ved out for himself, an encomienda which included twenty-two towns 
and some 23,000 heads of families and comprised most of what is now 
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the states of Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Mexico and Vera Cruz (McBride, 
1971: 45). Encomienda. awarded to less important Conquistadors were 
much smaller, but all encomienda grants still provided encomenderos 
with vast Indian labour reserves (Helms, 1975: 148). 
The Spaniards usually left the organisation of labour and tri- 
bute collection to the former Indian elite, and lived themselves in 
the Spanish towýns off the produce of the Indians (Helms, 1975: 149). 
Tn the initial years the Spaniards, as had the Aztecs before them, 
used the traditional lines of obedience established through long 
years of participation in the indigenous hierarchical social struct- 
ure to organise labour (Wolf, 1959: 1-6). The tribute demands of the 
Spaniards were, however, so excessive and the Indian lords found it 
all but impossible to collect them. As Zorita (1965: 114) writes of 
the Spaniards: 
... their appetite and greed were their only mea- 
sure and rule, they demanded all. they could in 
tribute, personal services, and slaves..., 
The choice was to be either oppressor or oppressed and this 
situation eroded all respect the Indians had left for their natural 
rulers. The Spaniards moved among the Indians and convinced them 
to overthrow natural rulers who did not collaborate with the Span- 
iards. Then they set themselves up to receive all the tribute for- 
merly going to the lords in addition to, as Zorita (1965: 120) main- 
tains: "all they could steal. " The Spaniards demanded that the 
leaders still in power collect high levels of tribute set with lit- 
tle consideration to the ability of the people to pay. Fray Moto- 
linia who studied Indian civilisation in depth, maintains that the 
tribute demands of the Spaniards were so great that the Indians, in 
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order to meet them, would sell their children or their land to the 
merchants. Many, he writes, died as a consequence. As Zorita (1965: 
116) notes: 
Lords and commoners alike have been ruined spirit- 
ually and temporally, while the men who threw them 
into turmoil prosper on their misery. 
The general effect was a levelling out of former social positions so 
that all Indians moved toward a single level and condition (Palmer, 
19 76: 37) . 
Even though the Spaniards were theoretically supposed to pro- 
tect and civilise the Indians they held in encomienda, the Indians 
were abused and virtually enslaved, especially through heavy labour 
demands (Helms, 1975: 150). Gibson (1964: 58) describes the encomienda 
as "... the most openly exploitative of all modes of contact with In- 
dians and the most aggressively competitive in relation to other 
Spanish institutions. " In the forced reorganisation of the society 
f 
many Indians, writes Motolinia, died: 
... some from torture, and others from cruel im-- 
prisonment, since they were treated inhumanely 
and regarded as being lower than beasts (See 
Steck, 1951: 91). 
The Indians became, under Spanish rule, expendable commodities and 
were treated in these first thirty years of rapacious exploitation, 
viciously. Tribute demands were set at impossibly high levels and 
labour demands were excessive, In 1530, for example, over two hun- 
dred Indians died carrying the possessions of one of the. encomenderos 
to Vera Cruz (Gibson, 1964: 79). 
The Spaniards, however,. were always intensely "legalistically 
minded" about their labour organisation (Elliott, 1978: 64). They 
were always careful to justify their actions to the Crown. In an 
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attempt to avoid a confrontation over the encomienda, Cortefs for 
example, wrote to Charles V explaining that both for the support of 
the Spaniards and the conservation of the Indians, the division of 
the Indians into encomienda in Mexico was necessary (Simpson, 1929: 
82). Grants of encomienda labour were by this time considered a 
right of conquest to the individual Spaniard, many of whom had come 
on the expedition because they had been granted no Indians in Cuba 
and Hispaniola (Gongora, 1975: 9). Charles V, however, was incensed 
J# 
at the presumption of Cortes and his immediate division of the In- 
dians into encomienda. Charles V wrote back informing Corte's that 
he was to make no more encomiendas in the new land. On the contrary, 
he wrote, Cortes was to: 
... allow them to live in liberty, as our vassals 
of Castile live... (Instructions to Hernan Corte's 
of Charles V, 1523 quoted in Simpson, 1929: 82). 19 
It was two years, however, before this message reached Cortels 
and when it did, Cortes ignored it. He wrote back to Charles V ex- 
plaining why it could not be followed. The response of the Crown 
this time was a whole host of royal officials dispatched to New Spain 
to put the Conquistador in his place. Nothing was done, however, to 
attempt to enforce the cedula, or royal order, prohibiting the en- 
comienda. Cortes was granted his huge encomienda in the Oaxaca 
valley (Simpson, 1929: 84,88-90). Even though Cortes was in bad 
favour at court for exceeding his authority in New Spain, his argu- 
ments for the necessity of the encomienda were persuasive. The re- 
sult of the abolition of the encomienda as described by Cortels, ap- 
.0t peared to the court more threatening for the time being than Cortes 
I 
challenge to royal perogative. Since the Spaniards could not support 
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themselves without the Indian labourers, Cortes argued, abolition of 
encomienda would mean the abandonment of the new territory. The King 
would lose his empire and the Indians their souls. Besides, Corters 
explained, the Indians themselves much preferred their Spanish mas- 
ters to the cruelty of their own caciques, or rulers. Cortes assured 
Charles V that he was familiar with the abuses of the Indians that 
had occurred ih the islands and was being careful that such abuses 
did not occur in New Spain. The Indians held in encomienda, hd 
wrote, were not to be permitted to work in the mines or on the plan- 
tations - this work was to be reserved for slaves (Simpson, 1929: 85). 
But the distinction between encomienda Indians and slaves was all 
but irrelevant. Many encomienda. Indians were treated as slaves (Pal- 
mer, 1976: 66). 
The Crown's worst fears about the establishment of a New World 
aristocracy were being realised in Mexico. Spaniardsjwho considered 
themselves part of a conquering race, followed the traditions of 
medieval conquest and aspired to becomin 3a new Spanish aristocracy. 
The encomienda became a form of land tenure. The Spaniards in Mexi- 
co began to view the land as their own and the Indians as their serfs. 
A characteristic feature of Castilian agrarian life had been the 
overlordship of the land along with peasant cultivators (McBride, 
1971: 45). In Mexico, however, even though a feudal institution, the 
encomienda existed without any of the bonds between master and serf 
that had existed in Europe. Master and serf were of two different 
races, two different religions, and two different languages (Simp- 
son, 1929: 32). 
In the beginning years of colonisation the Crown was forced to 
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accept the granting of Indians in encomienda. The securing of pre- 
cious metals in Mexico was the priority and the organising of Indian 
labour a necessity for this end. Encomienda was the only way to or- 
ganise labour for the present. Encomienda played a very important 
economic role with regard to mining. The encomienda produced food 
for labourers in the mines and also materials used to build houses 
and mills (Zavýala, 1943: 84-85). Mexico was a long way from Spain 
and the Spanish Crown, in order to keep the flow of gold coming, 
risked the threat of the potential power of the encomenderos in 
order to use them to organise labour. Charles V backed off on the 
abolition of the encomienda. But- by the 1530's, official reports 
were beginning to comment on the declining Indian population (Parry, 
1966: 215).. The Crown responded by sending to Mexico a royal bureau- 
cracy which struggled to take control of labour and production away 
from the Conquistadors and to centralise control for Spain. The 
Crown had to put an end to the freewheeling wasteful exploitation 
of the Age of the Conquistador. The exploitation of the New World 
had to proceed for the advantage of Spain, -not to the advantage of 
individual Conquistadors. 
The Crown, therefore, sent to New Spain an administrative body, 
the Audiencia., which was designed to take control of the situation 
for the Crown. Within the Audiencia was vested formal political, 
administrative, and judicial control of New Spain (Elliott, 1978: 
174-176), but no amount of formal legislation could counter the 
realities of the conquest environment in New Spain and the econo- 
mic requirements of the age. The struggle for control of Indian 
labour between the Crown and the individual Spaniard had. begun and 
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was to cbntinue for years, but the Audiencia in these early years 
brought about little real change in the poýition of the Indian. The 
instructions given to the Audiencia which arrived in 1528 were to 
distribute the Indians fairly in encomienda and to prevent their 
misuse. But there were not enough encomienda for all the Spaniards 
and the adventurers who cam after them. Factions developed and 
disorder, viol&nce, and lawlessness were the rule. The Indians bore 
the brunt of the disorder (Israel, 1975: 5). Even the members of the 
Audiencia including its president, Nuno de Guzman, were concerned 
primarily with making a personal fortune. The subsequent two years 
after the arrival of the Audiencia. were characterised by'rampant ex- 
ploitation of the Indians. Guzman and his two oidores, or assistants, 
according to Simpson (1929: 98): 
::: seem to have had but one dominant idea, to 
grab everything in sight and convert it into 
cash. 
The first Viceroy of Mexico, Antonio de Mendoza, arrived in 
1535 with no shortage of instructions about the proper relations 
with the Indians. The Crown was primarily concerned with native 
idleness. Mendoza's instructions stated that the Indians were nat- 
urally lazy and shiftless and should be employed in the mines for 
their own benefit as well as the Crown's. Also it'was specified 
that if Indians were unable to pay their tribute, they were to be 
allowed to work out its value in the mines. The Indians were not 
to be allowed to pay tribute in kind (Simpson, 1929: 155-157). 
Repartimiento. Repartimiento was one of the instruments used 
by the Spanish Crown to centralis !e 
control of the wealth and labour 
in Mexico. Under repartimiento, a certain percentage of-Indians in 
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a village formed a labour pool from which groups of labourers were 
assigned to individual Spaniards who were required to apply for 
them through a-royal official, the. corregidor. Corregimiento was an 
established Spanish institution which had been used in the fourteen- 
th and-fifteenth centuries as both a judicial and an administrative 
post (Gibson, 1952: 68). The establishment of the office of the cor- 
regidor in theý. -Spanish municipalities was one of the most effective 
steps taken by Ferdinand and Isabella to centralise the Crown's po- 
wer. The corregidor was a royal official responsible directly to 
the Crown and. with no real link to the locale where he served 
(Elliott, 1963: 96). 
The encomienda system began to be undercut through the estab- 
lishment of corregidors and repartimiento in the latter half of the 
sixteenth century. This was partly due to the centralising tenden- 
cies of the Spanish state, and partly as a reaction to the catastro- 
phic decline of the Indian population (Helms, 1975: 150). Bureau- 
cracy, the main arm of the control of the Spanish Crown, flooded in- 
to Mexico. A new Audiencia, packed with lawyers, arrived in Mexico 
in 1530 with secret instructions to do away with the encomienda. The 
weapons in the battles over Indian labour were to be not the sword, 
but the system of legal formalism controlled by the-state (Israel, 
1975: 5). All the encomienda claims were to be reviewed and those 
false were to be declared so. These along with all that fell va- 
cant were to be divided into administrative districts called corre- 
gimientos, and were to be administered by corregidors who were to be 
salaried administrative officers of the Crown. Indians in the corre- 
gimiento were to have legal status of the vassals of the Crown of 
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Castile and were to pay an analagous feudal dues or tribute. The 
ousted encomen. deros were to be compensated if found worthy, by be- 
ing made corregidores. If not, they might be made constableF or 
aiguariles (Simpson, 1929: 113). 
The formal instructions to the members of the second Audiencia, 
however, stipulated that they were to assess the availability of un- 
conquered provinces that could be pacified and granted as encomienda. 
These instructions were obviously contrary to the secret order and 
Simpson (1929: 116) maintains that they were intended to lull the 
Conquistadors into thinking that they had won the encomienda issue. 
He writes: 
The confusing dualism in the treatment of the 
encomienda during this period goes beyond any 
rational policy. 
The policy, however, was most rational. The Spanish Crown proceeded 
to take advantage of formally legislating one thing and doing quite 
another. This use of formal legislation as an ideological tool ra- 
ther than a serious plan of action was a developed strategy of the 
Crown and used frequently, as will be discussed later in this chap- 
ter, with regard to Indian policy. 
For the Spanish Crown, control of Indian labour and tribute in- 
creasingly rested with royal officers dependent on royal pleasure 
and not encomenderos. The number of encomienda decreased steadily 
during the sixteenth century, and those that remained were subject 
to heavy taxes imposed by the Crown (Zavala, 1943: 89-91). For the 
Indians, however, corregimiento made little practical difference. 
The Indian had no money and in the last instance he had to work out 
his tribute in some way. And the corregidores proved to be as 
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corrupt as were the encomenderos. The Viceroy, Mendoza, wrote to 
Charles V: 
The persons appointed are incompetent and, more- 
over, they have no interest in what concerns the 
Indians except in taking their tributes and 
stealing from them everything they have left... 
(Quoted in Simpson, 1929: 163-164). 
In 1550, the Crown abolished (with exceptions) the encomienda 
system and replaced it with repartimiento (Palmer, 1976: 66). The 
discovery of new mines, such as those in Zacatacas and Guanajuato in 
1548, created heavy labour demands. The mining regions had to be 
supplied with labour. The repartimiento system, which required the 
Indian chiefs to supply Indian labourers for service to royal offi- 
cials, had the advantage of permitting a much more flexible division 
of labour and the Crown more control over both the labour force and 
mining. This, combined with Crown-controlled forced resettlement of 
Indians near mining centres, created a more efficient system (Frank, 
1978b: 44-46). The Crown would receive its tribute directly from its 
own salaried officials and not through the intermediary of an en- 
comendero. What was of real importance was preventing the establish- 
ment of powerful feudal estates in the New World and monopolising 
the tribute. It was the power of the Spanish encomenderos that 
Charles V was so determined to frustrate with corregimiento. 
The Effect of Yorced Labour on the Indians 
Mining, the central focus of Spanish presence in Mexico, reeked 
havoc on the Indian population. Slaves who worked in the mines suf- 
fered the highest death rate because of the rigorous nature of the 
work (Palmer, 1976: 49). Zorita (1965: 208), wrote that they were 
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being reduced by their thousands through their labour in the gold and 
silver mines. The provision that slaves rather than 'free' Indians 
were the only ones who could be worked in the mines was largely ir- 
relevant. Under encomienda, the Indians were treated as slaves (Pal- 
mer, 1976: 66). The charge of rebellion could always be brought ag- 
ainst a group of Indians if labour was in short supply. And in ad- 
dition the re§triction of mining to slaves was not carefully ob- 
served. The lot of the slave and the forced labourer were equally 
as hard (Sauer, 1948: 89). 
The Indians were used as carriers to transport provisions to 
the mines, and many overloaded, without adequate food, and forced to 
march eighty or a hundred leagues to the mines, died on the way. 
The Spaniards loaded them down with the heavy implements needed in 
the mines and required that they bring their own food. Many, if 
they survived the-journey and the labour in the mines, died on the 
return trip of hunger, having depleted their limited food supplies. 
Motolinia (See Steck, 1951: 92-93) described the situation around the 
gold mines in Oaxaca: 
From these dead carriers and from the slaves who 
secumbed in the mines there was so much decay 
that it caused a pestilence, notably in the mines 
of Oaxyecac (Oaxaca). Here for half a league 
round and for a great part of the way one-could 
scarcely walk, except over dead bodies or over 
bones ... 
Many Indians, in order to avoid being taken to the mines, fled - 
abandoning their homes and families. Many of the villages surrounding 
the mines were depopulated. The Spaniards, Zorita (1965: 208) wrote., 
would secure Indians under repartimiento with the pretext that they 
were being used to construct buildings and then send them to the 
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mines. The Indians, Zorita maintains, never went voluntarily - 
they were to go by order of the Audiencia. 
The Spanish official, Lebron de Quinones, reported on the situa- 
tion of the Indians on the west coast around mid-century. The depopu- 
lation of the Indians he attributed largely to the taking of large 
numbers of men, women and children as slaves who were forced to la- 
bour "... with las little charity or consolation as though there were 
no Christianity or fear of God. " The Indians were required to carry 
food to these mines and to break roads to the mines through mountains 
and woods, with no more food than the powdtrc-dcorn they brought along 
(Sauer, 1948: 94). 
Mining not only consumed lives directly through overwork and 
disease, it fundamentally upset traditional agricultural patterns. 
Indian land was taken over by the Spaniards to establish the large- 
scale agricultural production needed to support the mining economy. 
Stock raising was an integral part of mining (Keen, 1965: 14) and 
the encroachment of cattle on the land created grave hardships (Zori- 
ta, 1965: 109). Herds of. livestock grazed where the Indians had for- 
merly raised their crops, and free grazing herds constantly destroy- 
ed the crops of those Indians who still cultivated @arry, 1966: 219). 
The effect was more than physical. Fernando Ortiz wrote 
in the introduction to his book about slavery in the Indies: 
To subject the Indian to the mines, to their 
monotonous, insane and severe labor, without 
tribal sense, without religious ritual ... was 
like taking away from him the meaning of his 
life... It was to enslave not only his muscles 
but also his collective spirit. 
Lebron, the Spanish official noted that many Indians, seeing 
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the devastation brought about by the Spaniards refrained from conceiv- 
ing children or attempted to dispose of those that were conceived be- 
fore they were born rather than see them in captivity and servitude 
(Sauer, 1949: 94). The dogs of the Spaniards, Lebron notes, were 
treated better than the Indians. 
The toll in human lives and human misery brought about through 
the economic demands of the time was immense, but by the time of the 
great mining boom of 1545 to 1610 private entrepreneurship had es- 
tablished itself. Miners, merchants, and the state collaborated to 
exploit the Indian labour and reaped the benefits (Stein and Stein, 
1970: 31). 
The Ideology of Forced Labour 
As has been noted previously in this chapter, the use of forced 
native labour was never the preferred labour form of the Spanish 
Crown. Objections to forced labour in the Indies came mainly from 
the first wave of Mendicants sent to the Indies to fulfill the papal 
dispensation to save souls. The Mendicants were extremely vocal in 
their protestations and Las Casas was perhaps the most vocal in his 
opposition. Las Casas had received estates and Indians in Hispaniola 
himself, and worked Indians in the mines. He could-not, however, re- 
concile forced labour with the Erasmian humanism of his order. He 
therefore, not only freed his own slaves but vowed to work for the 
protection of all the Indians (Hanke, 1974: 7). Las Casas spent a 
major part of his life attempting to influence Spanish policy toward 
the Indians. 
Through his experience and. observation of the New World, Las 
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Casas deduced the fundamental materialist aspects of Indian oppres- 
sion. He consistently stressed the economic roots of colonial ideo- 
logy and maintained that the material welfare of the Indian took 
precedence over all other concerns, even those of conversion (Keen, 
1971: 94). Las Casas believed that basic justice for the Indian de- 
pended on the economic form taken by colonisation. He wrote that 
the only way W ensure justice was the deliberate colonisation of 
the New World with Spanish peasant farmers who would work side by 
side with the Indians, sharing the profits of their collective la- 
bour (Hanke, 1949: 54-56). 
Las Casas worked out and presented to the Crown a detailed plan 
of just how such a colonisation would be accomplished. His plan re- 
ceived tacit royal support to be tried on a limited basis, but Span- 
ish feudal lords were ill pleased by the recruiting of their labour- 
ers to go to the New World and they resisted him at every turn. So 
effective were these powerful lords in opposing Las Casas that he 
dropped this project in 1520. Perhaps a bit wiser after his first 
attempt, Las Casas worked out another plan which stressed the econo- 
mic interests of the Crown. He promised the King increasing reven- 
ues through hi s new experiment. He secured royal permission to try 
this plan, but it too was a dismal failure in large part'because of 
the interference of Spanish colonists in the New World (Hanke, *1949: 
61-67). The economic demands of the age required forced extraction 
of surplus labour from the colonies and Las Casas' experiments were 
not, because they took into consideration the welfare of the Indians, 
designed to maximise profit. The cheap labour of the Indians and 
the kind of labour they performed was connected to the demands of an 
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international market (Braudel and Spooner, 1967: 377). But by allow- 
ing Las Casas to pursue his experiments and allowing them to fail, the 
Crown further justified to itself and its critics that forced labour 
in the New World was necessary. 
The Indians obviously could and did live freely before the 
Spaniards came, governed and fed themselves. The issue in Hispaniola 
and in Mexico was the Indian's ability to readily adapt to an econo- 
mic role assigned to them. Because they could not, forced labour was 
the only alternative if economic aims in the New World were to be ful- 
filled. If Indians could-not be convinced to sell their labour, to 
view their labour as a commodity to be sold, other methods of ensur- 
ing labour had to be adopted. The Crown was careful, however, al- 
ways to present forced labour not as a means of enriching Spanish 
coffers, but as an example of humanitarian concern for the Indlans. 
Ferdinand, for example, called together a group of theologians and 
officials who after consideration of the issue of Indian treatment, 
issued in 1521, the first in what was to be a series of formal laws 
to specify the proper relationship between the Spaniards and the In- 
dians. The Laws of Burgos basically affirmed the concept of free- 
dom for the Indians, but were terribly concerned with their idleness 
(Hanke, 1949: 23-25). The Indians must work, must engage in produc- 
tive labour - not for the good of the Spanish, it was reasoned, but 
for the good of the Indians themselves. 
The Laws of Burgos contained all manner of instruction about 
good treatment of the Indians and the responsibility of the encomen- 
deros to Christianise them, but they were every bit as concerned 
with work as they were with religious instruction. Churches, for 
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example, were to be built at the mines. It was generously specified 
that the Indians were not to be prevented from doing their tradi- 
tional dances unless the dancing interfered with or caused them to 
neglect their usual work stint. The Laws were extremely detailed 
and even specified what should be done with an Indian who failed to 
come to evening prayer (Simpson, 1929: 65-70). One third of all In- 
dians were to Uork in gold mines and each Indian was compelled to 
give nine months each year to work for the Spaniards. In the other 
Litrat: tactiLho of the year the Indians were to be allowed to work an 
their own land or for the Spaniards for wages (Hanke, 1949: 25). The 
Indians were entirely free, the laws were designed only 
to prevent their living in idleness and to as- 
sure their learning to live and govern themselves 
like Christians (Altamira, 1938: 75). 
In the Laws it was stipulated that Indians were to be moved 
from their villages, nearer to the Spanish for their own good. It 
was reasoned that such a move would facilitate religious instruction, 
would prevent the deaths of Indians who got sick in their own vil- 
lages and died "because no one knows they are sick. " The many hard- 
ships the Indians suffered from being so far away from the Spanish 
were described in the text of the Laws. It was ordered that the 
Indians for their benefit, be given in encomienda and their villages 
burned since the Indians "will have no further use for them... " 
(Laws of Burgos, quoted in Simpson, 1968: 62-64). 
The Laws of Burgos while asserting the humane treatment of the 
Indians, officially sanctioned the encomienda (Ots y Capdequl , 1959: 
69). The Laws of Burgos provide the first in a long history of ex- 
amples of Spanish sophistication in terms of constructing apparently 
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humane legislation couched in acceptable terms which ensured Spanish 
economic interests, while appearing to protect the Indians. The Laws, 
for example, provided for a 'visidor' to inspect for compliance with 
the laws. This visidor, however, was to be chosen from among the 
Spaniards and given an encomienda. The visidor was forbidden to 
harbour lost or runaway Indians and was to return them to their mas- 
ters immediate-ly (Simpson, 1968: 77). One could hardly design a 
situation more likely to ensure the ineffectuality of the appointed 
visidores. The Laws had little effect. The rapacious exploitation 
of Hispaniola devastated the island in only a few years. By 1519, 
all the gold to be had was taken out and the Indians virtually eli- 
minated (See Sauer, 1966: 196-204). 
By the time of the Conquest of Mexico, slavery and encomienda 
had been in existence in Hispaniola for twenty-five years. With the 
appointment of the first Audiencia in Mexico, the Crown appointed a 
visidor -a Protector of the Indians, Juan de Zumarrage. Zumarraga's 
commission, however, was so vague and so overlapped the commission 
of civil authority, he was all but powerless. The Crown was to use 
consistently in the administration of colonial affairs the practice 
of creating overlapping authorities to play one faction off against 
the other and preserve its own authority. Zumarraga, however, did 
not take his position lightly avidhe felt compelled to at least at- 
tempt to fulfill his appointed duties as Protector. This infuriated 
the head of the Audiencia, Guzman, who refused to even recognise 
Zumarraga's c6mmission and authority. Guzman complained bitterly 
to Charles V that the excessive zeal of Zumarraga would ruin all 
his, Guzman's, work in New Spain (Simpson, 1929: 97-99). 
a 
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Zumarraga finally smuggled out a letter to Charles V relating 
his version of what was happening in New Spain even though Guzman 
had imposed a rigid censorship to prevent adverse opinions from 
reaching Spain. In his letter, Zumarraga alleged that Guzman and 
other members of the Audiencia were using Indian labour and profiting 
from them even though this was strictly forbidden by royal order. 
Members of tWAudiencia, he wrote, were declaring encomiendas va- 
cant and confiscating them for themselves and their supporters. Zu- 
marraga claimed that 10,000 people had been taken and branded as 
slaves because of Guzman, and that Guzman was selling and profiting 
from the sale of licenses to buy slaves (Simpson, 1929: 101-102,224- 
248). 
Zumarraga, by taking his commission seriously. stirred up trou- 
ble and after he started taking complaints and deputations of crimes 
from the Indians, the Audiencia decreed that he was to have no fur- 
ther authority over anything to do with the Indians. "In all the 
land, " wrote Zumarraga to Charles V "there is not a lawyer who dares 
to advise me, or come to my house, or receive me in his" (Simpson, 
1929: 235-236). Because the Indians frequently went to the cleigy 
to seek redress for the abuses Of the Spaniards, the royal Audien- 
cia forbade the appealing to spiritual authorities for redress un- 
der pain of arrest and imprisonment. The Indians were threatened 
by hanging if they even so much as talked to Zumarraga (See Steck, 
1951: 12). 
Zumarraga wrote to Charles V and recommended the removal of 
the Audiencia. The Indians, he maintained were loaded and sent like 
pack animals to the mines where many died and that many were falsely 
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branded as slaves (Simpson, 1929: 240-241). 
... it is such a commonplace to abuse these poor 
Indians by robbing them and doing them violence 
that it hardly seems a-crime (Simpson, 1929: 246). 
In answer to all his complaints, Zumarraga wrote to Charles V, Guz- 
man had "... answered that they (the Indians) had to do what the Au- 
diencia commanded them, whether they died or not... " (Simpson, 1929: 
237). n 
The Crown, concerned to ensure its own authority in the new 
territory, encouraged this direct appealing to the Crown from indi- 
viduals like Zumarraga. The Crown was concerned to prevent the con- 
centration of power in any hands but its own, and this practice of 
encouraging individuals to appeal directly to the Crown accomplish- 
ed a number of purposes. First, it diffused opposition. As long as 
all competing factions - clergy, encomenderos, royal officials - felt 
their case was being considered by the Crown, they were less likely 
to act independently of Crown authority. There was always the chance 
that the Crown would decide in their favour and act for them. Also, 
as long as everyone was appealing to the Crown, it remained the 
source of power. The Crown encouraged freedom of speech, but could 
the n decide to ignore the recommendations. Secondly, this constant 
feedback from all factions ensured that the Crown kept up with what 
was going on in these distant territories. It formed a sort of 
intelligence service. The Crown was careful to centralise and con- 
trol this information. Ferdinand had ordered as early as 1509 that 
noone should be prevented from sending letters to the Crown (Hanke, 
1946: 142). 
Ferdinand, however, also ordered that the friars in Hispaniola 
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were not to preach against the encomienda. Freedom of speech had 
to be carefully controlled. In 1531, the fr; drs were ordered that 
they were not to preach against figures of authority in the New 
World but were to send their complaints to the King (Hanke, 1946: 
142-144). Colonial administration was to be characterised by a 
d-'ep-seated distrust by the Crown of-its own officials (Haring, 
1947: 122). ChArles V in 1529, and again in 1530 ordered that there 
should be no interference by the Audiencia with letters or people 
coming to Spain. 
The Audiencia was replaced, but by 1532- the Crown had removed 
the Protector role from the missionaries entirely on the recommenda- 
tion of the new Audiencia, and from then on a body of four men were 
given the responsibility of patrolling a country several times as 
large as Spain to punish the abuses of the natives (Simpson, 1929: 
133). 
The Dominicans at the Spanish court never stopped their caur- 
paigning on behalf of the Indians and Las Casas returned to Spain 
in 1539 to make a last attempt to influence Spanish policy. For 
two years he haunted the Court arguing against the encomienda. 
When Charles V returned to Spain in 1542, he ordered a meeting to 
consider the question (Hanke, 1949: 87-88). Las Casas and others 
presented evidence of Spanish cruelty in New Spain, and in November 
of 1542, the New Laws, or "laws and ordinances newly made by his 
Majesty for the government of the Indies and good treatment and 
preservation of the Indiansý' were issued (Hanke, 1949: 91). The New 
Laws were, in appearance, strongly in favour of the Indians. Twenty- 
three of the fifty-four articles concerned Indians including clauses 
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which abolished slavery and the encomienda. There was little, how- 
ever, in the codes which was new and Mendoza's instructions carried 
little of the tone of the New Laws (Simpson, 1929: 154-156). Viewed 
in isolation from their social context, the New Laws appeared very 
humane and have received great praise from scholars. A dissertation, 
for example, on the background of Hispanic-American law (See Vance, 
1937: 148) describes the New Laws as being 'revolutionary. ' The scholar 
who wrote this dissertation maintained: 
... their enactment was an attempt to free a na- 
tion of slaves, and to destroy the foundation 
of vested rights with one stroke .... an impres- 
sive declaration of the principles of human 
freedom... 
But a declaration was all the New Laws were to be. Predictably, 
the reaction in the New World to the New Laws was one of rage. Some 
forty percent of the colonists were directly supported by encomienda 
and many more indirectly benefited (Helms, 1975: 150). The provision 
about encomienda threatened the established economic interests not 
only of the encomenderos, but of the most powerful royal officials 
and ecclesiastics in the New World. The storm of protest was heavy. 
At this time, even the fr; drs sent messages to Charles V that to 
abolish the encomienda was disasttcus.. The display of support for 
the encomienda was impressive considering the long years of work in 
the Spanish court of those like Las Casas. The fear of Indian revolt 
was stressed even by such men as the Dominican Provincial and Dean 
of Oaxaca, and the Treasurer of the Cathedral of Mexico. Even, Zum- 
arraga now strongly argued for the revocation of the New Laws (Hanke, 
1949: 92,98). The initial hostility between the fri4rs and the en- 
comenderos had lessened. By the 1540's the two groups began to 
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close ranks. The churches were receiving substantial financial sup- 
port from the encomenderos, and the encom6nderos gradually had come 
to appreciate the stabilising effects of the church (Parry, 1966: 
166-167). 
In 1545, Charles V revoked the clause forbidding the awarding 
of any more encomiendas and the inheritance of old ones. The next 
law to go was the clause providing that all suits involving Indians 
should be heard by the King himself. Also revoked in 1545 was the 
provision that if the Indians in encomienda. were ill-treated, they 
would be taken away from the encomendero who held them (Hanke, 1949: 
101j179). In reference to this series of revocations, Simpson (1929: 
180) has written "... the encomienda had triumphed again... 1aws run- 
ning counter to the interest of a majority will not and cannot be 
enforced. " Simpson, however, overlooks the fact that the New Laws 
did not run counter to the majority, but counter to the interests 
of the powerful. Had the provisions of the New Laws concerning 
slaves and the restriction of carriers been enforced they would 
have severely hurt production in the mines. They were, therefore, 
not enforced. Even though slavery was formally abolished in 1542, 
many years were to pass before'slavery as an institution ended (Pal- 
mer, 1976: 65). And even when slavery ended, debt peonage, another- 
form of slavery, took its place. 
The Crown issued in 1549, an equivocal statement on the taking 
of rebellious Indians as slaves which concluded with the instruction 
that the Audiencia was to use its discretion in the matter. The 
labour shortage in the mi. -nes was a serious problem, but the Crown 
did not want to take the formal responsibility for 1§1avery. The 
a 303 
illicit taking and using of slaves, however, continued. Also in 1549, 
the Crown issued a cedula to the Audiencia forbidding the encomenderos 
from sending their-Indians to the mines. Another cedula issued short- 
ly afterward, forbid the commutation of tribute to work in the mines, 
but added that if there were a shortage of pack animals, IndiAns- 
could be used-as carriers provided they weren't worked too hard or 
loaded too heavily. This perpetual repetition of ordinances with 
no subsequent action was one of the most common features of Spanish 
colonial lawmaking (Simpson, 1929: 180-181). Gibson (1966: 110) has 
written that the period was characterised by a "proliferation of 
paper and a paralysis of action. " 
The debate over the New Laws clearly involved a conflict between 
feudal and royalist interests in the organising of labour. The en- 
I 
comienda was always a threat to royalist power and the directives in 
the New Laws forbidding the use of Indian slaves may well have been 
designed to increase tribute coffers with the belief that free In- 
dians meant more tribute (See Hanke, 1949: 103; Gibson, 1966: 106; 
Helms, 1975: 158). The struggle to abolish the encomienda, however, 
was always conducted in terms of religion and humanitarianism (Simp- 
son, 1929: 150). Hanke (1949: 104-105) notes the wisdom of the policy 
course that the Spanish Crown pursued in these years: 
Tense situations developed in America, but few 
revolts of consequence, and the King maintained 
his position as an all-powerful monarch to whom 
the various factions fighting for favor present- 
ed their problems for resolution. 
Summary 
The interests of both the Spanish-Conquistador and the Spanish 
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state were served by the discovery of precious metals. The presence 
of these metals in Mexico largely ensured that a colonial economy 
would be set up in Mexico geared toward the production of precious 
metals. In order to exploit these metal reserves, however, and set 
up an agricultural base thatmould produce the commodities needed 
by mining, the labour organisation of the Indians had to be restruct- 
ured. And, force was used to bring about this restructuring. Many 
Indians were taken and branded as slaves. Others were forced to 
contribute their labour to mining and Spanish agricultural pursuits 
through the encomienda. Both labour forms were openly exploitative 
and openly violent. The Indians became expendable commodities - to 
be worked and used at the will of the Spanish dominant class. 
Within Spain, however, the Monarchy was attempting to bring 
about a labour organisation more consistent with emerging capitalism. 
The peasantry had been freed to a large extent from the land and 
feudal obligations and therefore freed to accept their labour as a 
commodity to be sold on the market in the form of wage labour. The 
Crown was concerned to prevent the establishment of feudal labour 
forms in the New World and therefore constantly legislated that 
the Indians should be used as wage labourers and not as slaves or 
feudal serfs. But. both because of the resistance of the Spanish 
Conquistador class and the inability of the Indians to readily adapt 
to a system of wage labour, the Crown had to accept the use of these 
pre-capitalist labour forms in order to keep gold production going. 
Over time the Crown was able to implement a form of labour organisa- 
tion which, even though it relied on labour drafts and not voluntary 
wage labour, was more directly under Crown control. The salaried 
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officials of the Crown rather than the members of the Conquistador/ 
encomendero class organised Indian labour under the repartimiento 
system. 
The struggle between feudal and royal interests with regard to 
Indian labour, however, made little difference to the Indian. His 
labour was exploited by Crown and colonist alike to maximise pro- 
fits. The apparently humanitarian legislation of the Spanish Crown 
with regard to the Indian was designed more to wrest authority away 
from the feudal encomenderos and to quell criticism from the clergy 




LEGAL SANCTIONS IN CONQUEST MEXICO 
When the Spanish Conquistadors first arrived in Tenochtitlan, 
they marvelled at the efficiency and fairness of the Aztec legal 
system (See Cortefs, 1971: 105,108,464; Prescott, 1922: 25-26). Cor- 
i tes (1971: 108), for example, wrote in a letter to Charles V: 
... these people live almost like those in Spain 
and in as much harmony and order as there... 
But Spanish admiration for the order and discipline brought about 
by the Aztec'legal system did not prevent them from imposing a Span- 
ish legal system as soon as the Conquest was completed. The estab- 
lishment of Spanish domination was required if Spanish ambitions in 
the region were to be fulfilled, and the Conquest accomplished to 
such an extent that it could not be reversed. And. to establish 
this dominance, competing systems of power and the institutions 
which were a part of those systems of power had to be eliminated. 
As Cortes made clear in one of his messages to Moctezuma, the In- 
dians could serve but one master. Additionally, however, and more 
important was the fact that the Aztec legal system was devised to 
meet the requirements of a social formation radically different from 
the one the Spaniards were to impose on Mexico and was therefore, 
after the Conquest, largely obsolete. Aztec legal codes contained 
none of the concepts necessary for the operation of a mercantile 
capitalist mining economy such as private property, ownership of 
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land, contractual money agreements, and labour as a commodity. The 
inadequacy of the Aztec legal system to define relationships in a 
way which was consistent with the needs of the new socio-economic 
system was a far more important determinant of its eventual aboli- 
tion than the fact that it represented a threat to Spanish soveriegn- 
ty. 
As Lefebife (1968: 113) has noted, more than any other social for- 
mation, the capitalist social formation requires a legal code to for- 
malise and institutionalise especially the property relations in- 
herent in that mode of production. Because of the stage of develop- 
ment of the Spanish, and indeed the western European socio-economic 
formations, concepts such as land as private property, contractual 
agreements, labour as a commodity, were requ ired for the function- 
ing of the economy and the society. In Aztec Mexico such concepts 
did not exist or existed only in the most rudimentary form. They 
were, therefore, not reflected in Aztec law. The Spaniards, there- 
fore, of necessity imposed their own system of law which contained 
these concepts. 
During the thirty year period after the Conquest - the Age of 
the Conquistador - the Spaniards enforced Spanish as opposed to In- 
dian conceptions of law in areas which were important to their in- 
terests - the definition of the nature of forced labour, the nature 
of land ownership, tribute requirements, the definition and nature 
of slavery, and the definition of 'rebellion. ' In other areas the 
Indians were left to the authority of the church and their own lead- 
ers. As was noted, however, the authority of native leaders was so 
subverted that the authority held by these leaders under the Indian 
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system all but disappeared, and the Spaniards imposed Spanish legal 
concepts on increasing areas of Indian life. 
The Spaniards, then, like the Aztecs, imposed their own law and 
legal concepts in areas which were required in order to maintain the 
sets of power relations coherent with the society and system in 
which they held power. When the Aztecs conquered an outlying pro- 
vince, they generally left civil and criminal jurisdiction in the 
hands of the natural rulers of the area (Zorita, 1965: 113). And they 
depended to a large extent on these rulers to guarantee tribute agree- 
ments. Even though the domestic system of law developed by the Az- 
tecs was widely copied by the Indians of surrounding groups, there 
was no attempt by the Aztecs to force this domestic legal system on 
conquered peoples further than that they comply with tribute require- 
ments. But. the Aztecs were not attempting to transform the basic 
economic organisation of conquered territories, and the changes re- 
quired of the conquered peoples in these territories were minimal. 
Aztec conquests meant the appropriation of agricultural surplus pro- 
duced by a labour organisation already existing in conquered regions. 
The Spanish Conquest, however, involved the imposition of an entire- 
ly new economic form, and therefore, set of social and economic re- 
lations, and therefore more fundamental changes in concepts, especial- 
ly with regard to labour. The Indian legal system, organised to 
meet the needs of a pre-capitalist social formation, was simply in- 
adequate to meet the needs of the new social formation. 
In these initial years after the Conquest, however, before the 
influx of royal officials and before the Crown gained control of 
the legal system, the imposition of Spanish legal concepts was-a 
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fairly capricious affair. The law, although based on Spinish legal 
concepts, tended to be the will of the individual encomendero. ' The 
colonial encomendero exercised in these early years, almost total 
administrative, police, military, fiscal, end religious authority 
over the Indians in his encomienda towns and villages (Tiryakian, 
1979: 20). The encomendero was by and large operating within a set 
of recognised xights and privileges established during the Recon- 
quista in which the conqueror was awarded almost total authority 
over the lands he conquered - subject only to his obligations to 
the monarch. The difference, however, between the rights of the con- Cý 
queror during the Reconquista and those rights in New Spain, was 
that the conqueror maintained the right of total authority over In- 
dian labour as well as land. 
The Indians, therefore, were conceived of and treated as the 
virtual property of the Spaniards and the encomenderos were often 
referred to in documents as "owner of Indians" (Tiryakian, 1979: 21). 
The Indians were worked, punished, and disposed of by the encomen- 
deros at will. The encomenderos exploited the Indians unmercifully. 
They overworked them in all forms of manual labour, building, far- 
ming and mining. They overtaxed them. They jailed, beat, killed 
and set dogs on Indians who refused to do what they. were told. En- 
comenderos seized the Indian's goods, disrupted their agricultural 
practices and used them as beasts of burden. They took Indian tri- 
bute and then forced the Indians to buy products at eAorbitant 
prices (Gibson, 1964: 78). Gibson (1964: 78) describes the behaviour 
of this first encomendero generation as: 
I 
... one of generalised abuse and particular atro- 
cities ... Coercion and ill-treatment were the 
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daily practices. -The first encomenderos, with- 
out known exception, understood Spanish author- 
ity as provision for unlimited personal oppor- 
tunism. 
The Spanish Crown had, however, in Spain separated the control 
of peasant labour from their own aristocracy and was determined to 
break the unchecked control of the encomenderos over the Indians in 
the New World. The sixteenth century Spanish state was the most ad- 
vanced in Europe, and Spain led the rest of Europe'in the develop- 
ment of the field of jurisprudence and in the practice of law and 
government (Parry, 1940: 2). The Spanish monarchy had effectively 
used law and legal institutions in Spain to erode the power of the 
feudal aristocracy and centralise royal control. In Mexico, the 
Spanish state would attempt to do the same (Parry, 1966: 192; Kagen, 
1981: 123-125). The establishment of fitfdoms in the New World with 
Indian labour tied to individual encomenderos was an establishment 
of feudal relations to which the Crown was diametrically opposed. 
The Crown would attempt during this thirty-year period to extend 
its centralising policies to the New World, and especially through 
the control of the law and the legal system, to prevent the develop- 
ment of a feudal form of social organisation (See Helms, 1975: 152; 
Tiryakian, 1979: 9). The monopolisation of coercive power by the 
state had been an important step in the centralisation of power in 
Spain and it was no less important in Mexico (Tiryakian, 1979: 14-15). 
This centralisation, however, up until around 1550, remained 
more theory than practice. There was an almost perpetual conquest 
situation in Mexico during these early years, communication was un 
reliable and difficult, and the encomenderos stubbornly refused to 
relinquish their perogatives. In those early years, therefore, 
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colonial administration of justice was in general left to individual 
Spanish entrepreneurs who wielded great power and authority of dis- 
cretion (Stein and Stein, 1970: 70). 
The Crown did however, make gradual progress into wresting con- 
trol over law and the administration of justice from the encomenderos. 
When the administrative body, the Audienciawas sent to Mexico in 
1528 it was given formal political, administrative and judicial con- 
trol of the new territory. The establishment of the Audiencia was 
intended to begin the process of centralising control over the law 
and the administration of justice for the Crown. Ots y Capdequi 
(1959: 256), for example, maintains that the Audiencia should be con- 
sidered the most important organ of royal jurisdiction in the New 
World. But the members of the first Audiencia were notoriously 
corrupt and they like the encomenderos saw their position within 
colonial society as a means of personal gain. They invested most 
of their energies securing their own interests; the interests of 
the Crown were secondary. 
Summary justice, then, even after the Audiencia arrived, was 
the order of the day. Motolinia (See Steck, 1951: 214), for example, 
wrote of an event which occurred in 1528 under Guzman's Audiencia. 
A man was arrested on a charge which was so trivial,. Motolinia 
writes, "... he would have been acquitted if his case had been pro- 
perly presented in court by a procurator and lawyer... " In addi- 
tion, his misdeeds had been committed such a long time in the past. 
If that the time for prosecution had lapsed. Nevertheless, as Motolinla 
writes: 
... the court refused to try his case, and so 
he was executed. 
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motolinia records three other instances during this period where men 
were sentenced to death and executed without a trial in court. 
With the appointment of the second Audiencia, the Crown again 
began a concerted effort to wrest judicial authority away from the 
encomenderos and institute a system of royal law. The Audiencia was 
given the power to confirm the election of officials and*a few offi- 
cials, corregidores, were appointed for Mexico City (Borah, 1982: 269). 
These corregidores, however, were allowed to visit their jurisdic- 
tions only by permission since it was feared that they might come 
into conflict with encomenderos or use their power to exploit the 
Indians in a similar manner as the encomenderos. Even in the 1540's 
it was customary to think of Indians as falling under the jurisdic- 
tion of either a royal corregidor or an encomendero. The authority 
of the corregidors, however, was gradually extended to cover Indians 
in encomienda as well as Indians in royal repartimiento areas. In 
the 1550's the corregidores were given civil and criminal jurisdic- 
tion in cases involving Indians and Spaniards as well as those cases 
involving Indians alone. Corregimiento, then, was eventually to be- 
come the institution of royal justice (Gibson, 1964: 82). 
In the first some fifty years of Spanish colonial juris- 
diction of New Spain, however, local town councils, or cabildos, had 
practical jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal cases. These 
municipal governmental bodies, especially in the main cities and 
towns, became immensely powerful, closed oligarchies of rich encom- 
enderos. The encomenderos required land and as members of the ca-- 
bildos, regidores, they were responsible for distributing land. As 
ranchers. they produced foodstuffs, as regidores they fixed the prices 
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at which foodstuffs were sold. As mine and land owners they needed 
labour, and as regidores played a part in the administration of na- 
tive labour. As individual citizens they were liable to be sued, 
but as regidores they chose and el ected the magistrates before whom 
any such case would be heard (Parry, 1966: 108). As Parry (1966: 108) 
notes, the cabildos became, therefore, the chief institutions for 
safeguarding the interests and expressing the opinions of the con- 
quistador class. 
The Crown gained more and more control of affairs by the appoint- 
ment of corregidores as the district official who presided over the 
cabildo and who was responsible for local law, order and justice. 
But the corregidores themselves wielded considerable autonomous power 
in the territory, and were difficult to control (Helms, 1975: 154). 
They came to have, however, almost total jurisdiction over the In- 
dians - civil, criminal, and military (Zavala, 1935: 156). 
The inroads made by the Crown into control over legal matters 
made gre4test difference to the Crown and to the encomenderos. Ro- 
yal control of the law made little difference to the Indians. For 
the interests of the Crown and the encomenderos alike were served 
by exploiting the raw materials of the region and in order to do 
this, cheap Indian labour was required. The real struggle for con- 
trol over the law and the administration of justice was over who - 
the Crown or the encomenderos - would control this exploitation and 
who would receive the most benefits from it, not whether it would 
occur. The corregidores were as nolovious exploiters of the Indians 
as were the encomenderos. Even though they were salaried officials 
of the Crown, in this early period their salaries were exclusively 
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dependent on tribute from the Indians, and the position of corregidor 
was often awarded to encomenderos. The smallest encomienda 
yielded an income larger than the best paid corregimiento and the 
salary of the corregidor was fixed, but it was easy for a corregidor 
using his position of power to supplement his income through exploi- 
tation of the Indians (See Gibson, 1964: 83). 
Even though the corregidores were Crown officials, once they 
were in New Spain and confronted with the. immense possibilities of 
accumulating vast personal wealth and power, they usually ignored 
or subverted Crown rulings. As Helms (1975: 154) notes, two sets of 
laws developed in the New World - the formally enacted laws of the 
King of Spain and those by which the Spaniards governed their lives. 
Gibson (1966: 109) remarks: 
Between the individual and the law in Spanish 
America there was always a certain irrelevance. 
Imperial law itself was, by and large, a continuing series of iso- 
lated and unconnected statements, extremely detailed and often logic- 
ally incoherent (Gibson, 1966: 109). Penal law, for example, was 
not a coherent set of stipulations gathered in one source. Elements 
of penal law were contained in many documents and drawn from many 
different sources. Even though there were certain progressive ele- 
ments stipulated such as freedom under bail, the requirements of 
judicial authorisation for jailing and the limit of two years for 
the penal process, the system was in general primitive with dif- 
ferent applications specified for those of different social classes, 
the application of torture, constant mixing of the concepts of sin 
and crime, and cruel penalties (Floris Margadant S., 1978: 105). 
Stipulations which ran counter to the interests of the encomendero 
I 
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class were largely ignored. The encomenderos and the royal courts 
alike exploited the Indians by taking the Indian's land, enforcing 
a system of forced labour, and punished Indians that proved 'trouble- 
some' by slavery, mutiliation or death. 
Tribute Requirements and the Confiscation of Land 
Immediately after the Spanish defeat of the Aztecs at Tenochtit- 
Ian, Cortes decreed that no further tribute should paid to the Triple 
Alliance - all tribute was to come to the Spaniards. In the next 
thirty years. the Indians were to be required by law to pay tribute 
to encomenderos, the Crown, the Church, and in some cases native 
rulers as well. The combined tribute demands of these sources,, ac- 
cording to Zorita i were well 
in excess of the demands of the Aztec 
ruling nobility in pre-Conquest times. Zorita wrote that after the 
Conquest one Indian paid more tribute than did six before. Zorita 
wrote a letter to Charles V complaining about this situation: 
... lei me briefly summarize what your Majesty has decreed in the matter of Indian tribute. 
In this letter Zorita goes on to detail that the Castilian King 
had decreed that the natural lords and rulers continue to receive 
their tribute and Mat enough tribute was to be paid to the encomen- 
deros to allow them to live comfortably. Additionally, Zorita 
pointed out, the Crown required that this tribute be less than was 
paid in 'heathendom'. (See Zorita, 19-65: 189). Zorita (1965: 239) 
points out: 
... although all that your Majesty provides for in these articles is most saintly and necessary; 
it seems to me impossilAe to comply with all 
their provisions ... (Zorita, 1965: 217). 
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Indeed, it was often impossible for the Indians to meet the tri- 
bute requirements placed on them. But these exorbitant demands 
worked to Spanish advantage. According to law, Indian land could be 
seized only if it was unoccupied or unused. But the confiscation 
of land was frequently used as a punishment for not meeting tribute 
requirements. The Spaniards, therefore, either received e), orlilar4 
tributes or Indian land. Once the Crown began to take control over 
law and colonial justice, a royal official, designated by the Au- 
diencia fixed tribute amounts. The encomenderos, however, had more 
or less free hand in choosing this official (Zorita, 1965: 220). 
The Spaniards disrupted the Indian agricultural system by tak- 
ing over the land and adjudging it private property, and trickery 
was often used to gain access to the land (Zorita, 1965: 111). Zori- 
ta (1965: 108) described how the encomenderos in concert with the 
. courts 
took land away from the Indians. 
Let some Spaniard observe or learn that some of 
this land is not being cultivated, and he will 
apply to the governor for it. As a rule the 
individual who is appointed to look into the 
matter has little interest in the Indians' wel- 
fare. If by some chance a good Christian is 
appointed, the petitioner usually finds ways 
and means of having him replaced ... especially if there is some possibility of collusion or 
bribery, which is ever present. As a result, 
the examiner invariably submits the opinion 
that the land can be given... It does no good 
for the people of the barrio or calpulli to 
contradict him. 
The Indian... dares not speak, nor does he know 
what to say, for all are against him. So the 
a1guaciles (officials) have the formal accusa- 
tion drawn up to their liking, and the oidor 
bases his decision upon it (Zorita, 1965: 108, 
176). 
To the Indians land was a means of production, held communally, 
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distributed according to the requirements of use. Families received 
parcels of land and other land was allocated to support certain of- 
fices or functions. To the Spaniards, land was property and the owner 
could till it, allow it to remain idle or even destroy it as he 
wished. This was subject only to the soverei n's right to tax the 9 
land or take it for public use on due com . pensation. 
In New Spain, 
the Spaniards -declared that all land vacant or unused by the Indians 
was available to be confiscated. Land, to the Spaniards. was not 
merely a means of production. Ownership of vast stretches of land, 
more than the owner could possibly use, was a visible sign of sta- 
tus within the community and a form of investment - one of the few 
forms of investment that were safe. 
The confiscation of land, through legal and extra-legal means, 
resulted in much indirect violence. Many Indians starved and others 
were forced into any kind of labour offered by the Spaniards no mat- 
ter how dangerous. And the legal system itself offered little re- 
dress for the Indians. If, for example, the Indians complained of 
excessive tributes that were making it impossible for then, to keep 
their land, they paid the cost. of sending a Spanish official to do 
a recount of tribute and were even responsible for feeding and shel- 
tering him while he was in the region (Zorita, 1965: 221). 
Forced Labour 
Since the wealth of the New World could only be extracted 
through the use of native labour, it is not surprising that the pun- 
ishments for many crimes involved sentences of forced labour. Sla- 
very and forced labour existed among the pre-Conquest Indians, but 
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under Spanish rule a "fairly benign native institution became a harsh 
and destructive form of exploitation. " Under Aztec law. even slaves 
had had rights before the courts. Under the Spanish, however, slaves 
were civilly dead, human chattel who could be worked, transported, 
and sold like domestic animals or any other type of merchandise (See 
Borah, 1982: 27-1). 
The sanct-ion of forced labour existed as a form of punishment 
within the Aztec legal system, but played only a minor role. The 
Aztec state depended on the appropriation of agricultural surplus 
from independent peasant producers, not the production of forced 
labourers. To the Spaniards, however, forced labour was the pri- 
mary form of labour organisation, necessary for the exploitation of 
the territory. Slavery became, under the Spanish, a common punish- 
ment for crimes (Zavala, 1964: 58). It was commonplace, for example, 
for the Indians convicted even of minor crimes to be sentenced to a 
certain period of service to private individuals. These individuals 
used the Indians as slaves, working them heavily, forcing them to 
serve with little food in substandard living conditions, and phy- 
sically abusing them. Even if the sentence was a fine, a private 
entrepreneur could pay the fine and thereby 'buy' the Indian, Pri- 
vate entrepreneurs therefore, were provided with a cheap labour 
force through the legal system (Gibson, 1964: 243-244). Zorita (1965: 
176) noted that a false accusation or arrest could easily result in 
a sentence of forced labour or slavery even to the official who 
brought the charge. With the Indians so sentenced - removed from 
their land, the land was not cultivated and therefore, the Spaniards 
could claim that it was available to be declared private property. 
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Corporeal Punishments 
Aside from the confiscation of land and forced labour as punish- 
vients for crimes were the various physical punishments. Whipping;,, 
for example, was a form of punishment meted out to slaves convicted 
of various offenses by both civil and religious authorities. Pal- 
raer (1976: 51) notes that at times the rules for whipping allowed 
as many -as twoýhundred lashes. And these severe physical punish- 
ments were not just administered by the whim of the individual en- 
comendero. Even as late as 1547, when the Crown had taken over a 
substantial control over law and the administration of justice, the 
cabildo of Mexico City ordered that the punishment for blacks who 
strayed into Indian neighborhoods was, on the first offense, 100 
lashes. The second offense brought two year's labour in the mines. 
The third offense resulted in exile. Other punishments proscribed 
for offenses were physical mutilation such as the cutting off of 
an ear, a hand, or a leg. Slaves were often punished by the 
dropping of hot pork fat or melted pitch on the victim's skin (See 
Palmer, 1976: 50-60). 
The death penalty was as well widely used in colonial Mexico. 
As Quiroz Cuaron (1962: 11-12) notes, it served many purposes. For 
the authorities it served as a method of coercion, a threat to In- 
dians who did not obey the will of the Spaniards. It removed In- 
dians from land which was desired and could then be declared unoc- 
cupied. For the church it was used as a method of saving souls by 
using the executed as an example. to others. Quiroz Cuaron goes so 
far as to call the use of the death penalty in colonial Mexico as a 
method of genocide. 
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From the beginn; n3 of the colonisation of the New World the 
Croim had intended to take jurisdiction of all cases punishable by 
death or mutilation. In the first years. this was impossible given 
the almost total control of the encomenderos. When the Crown did 
eventually manage to wrest control away from the encomenderos, royal 
officials were confronted with a plethora of cases which had been 
subject to theýpenalty of death or mutiliation under Indian law which 
these officials were instructed to uphold in areas which did not 
interfere with Spanish concerns. But. the number of cases punish- 
able by such extreme measures under Indian law were legion. Royal 
judges opted for two primary solutions. One was to declare that some 
offences, such as verbal insults and blows delivered by hand and 
without any weapon. should be dealt with by reprimand rather than 
trial and punishment. Another solution was to replace the more se- 
vere penalties with service in the mines. During the 1530's the 
Audiencia, with royal consent, adopted the policy of branding and 
selling as slaves those Indians convicted of crimes the punishment 
of which would have resulted in death, mutilation or torture. This 
solution was used until the 1540's when the New Laws abolished of- 
ficial Indian slavery (Borah, 1982: 276), The court officials then 
complained that since the option of slavery had been taken away, if 
they carried out the proscribed penalties, the butchery of humans 
in New Spain would exceed the butchery of animals. 
Rebellious Indians 
From the beginning of the Conquest, Indians defined as 'rebelli- 
I 
ous' were considered legally as appropriately enslaved. What exactly 
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constituted a 'rebellious' Indian, however, was alwaysi subject to in- 
terpretation. The law was used from the beginning of Spanish. occupa- 
tion of New Spain to punish those Indians who showed a reluctance to 
accept Spanish rule. Indians who practiced idolatry and human sacri- 
fice and even the observance of native religions were considered re- 
bellious and therefore severely punished (Borah, 1982: 268-269). An 
Indian priest, ýfor example, Martin Ocetotl, who persisted in prac- 
ticing the native religion was considered to be interfering with 
native acceptance of the new social order. He was brought before 
the Audiencia on several occasions, his lands seized, and was final- 
ly deported (Sweet and Nash, 1981: 128-141). 
Not only the encomenderos and the royal courts punished Indians 
considered troublesome, but the church. In 1530, for example, the 
church had an Indian who it considered an idolator executed (Gibson, 
1964: 117). It also had the Indian. cacique, or native ruler, of Tex- 
coco burned at the stake in 1539 (Borah, 1982: 269). Franciscan friars 
often heard civil and criminal cases involving Indians in Tlatelol- 
co, and even sentenced some to a Franciscan jail. Indians who absent- 
ed themselves from certain religious functions were whipped. The 
I 
Crown would move, as it had with the encomenderos, to stop these 
clerical punishments of the Indians- not because they were felt to 
be unnecessary or cruel, but because they directly challenged the 
Crown's position as the sole administrator of public law (Gibson, 
1964: 117). 
Court Appeal 
Technically the establishment of courts in New Spain meant 
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that the Indians as well as the Spaniards could appeal to the Spanish 
courts to redress the wrongs that were done to them, even by royal of- 
ficials (See Borah, 1982: 272-274). But even though royal officials 
such as the corregidores were legally responsible for their abuses 
in office, they were almost never punished (Gibson, 1964: 92). Tech- 
nically as well, cases could be appealed out of the local area and 
to the Audiencla, but even though such an appeal was theoretically 
possible, practically it meant an expensive journey : If the ap- 
peal was made against someone in a position of power, it was likely 
that he had friends and therefore. influence at the Audiencia (Har- 
ing, 1947: 141). The Indian inhabitants of Tepetlaoztoz, for example, 
were mercilessly exploited by the encomendero, Gonzalo de Salazar. 
He took their lands, forced them to build him a textile mill, and 
forbade the Indians the use of the water supply of the town. The 
Indians stated later that even though they were aware of the possi- 
bility of legal action against Salazar, they were too afraid of him 
to try this option (Gibson, 1964: 80). So although the courts were 
theoretically available to the Indians, becoming involved with the 
courts was dangerous. Indians who complained of mistreatment were 
often flogged, sent to the mines, or had their labour sold at auc- 
tion. Zorita complained bitterly to Charles V of this situation 
and wrote: "I am aware that all these procedures conform to the 
law" (See Zorita, 1965: 225-229). 
The costs and risks of bringing cases to court for the Indian 
were high. The fears of direct or extra-legal reprisals were always 
present and the Indians well knew the reluctance of officials to 
rule against their Spanish counterparts. The Indians, however, did 
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make use of the courts. Zorita (1965: 117) described the flood of li- 
tigation through which the Indians sought redress through the courts 
as the 'Plague of lawsuits. ' Litigation always favoured the clever 
and the unscrupulous (Borah, 1982: 273). Zorita wrote to Charles V: 
I 
Had these people not been allowed to engage in 
their senseless lawsuits, they would not have 
ruined each other, the deaths of many would have 
been avoided, and they would not find themselves 
in their present sorry state. Far better had it 
been to make them go to their caciques and lords, 
who know the truth of what each man claims, than 
to listen to troublemakers who were incited by 
others. This would have avoided many offenses 
to Our Lord, false swearing, hatreds, enmities, 
ruin of towns and provinces, and great wicked- 
ness on the part of those who urge them on in 
order to rob them, all leading to confusion so 
great that a solution now appears hopeless (Zor- 
ita, 1965: 118-119). 
And even with all this legal actionj the Indians usually re- 
ceived little redress for their grievances when they appealed to 
the courts. They had to resort to Spanish letrados, or lawyers, and 
other agents versed in Spanish procedure to present their cases in 
the form that Spanish law required. They had to pay fees and make 
gifts, and in the end their cases were usually found contrary to 
either reason or Christian doctrine. Zorita (1965: 224) wrote to 
Charles V: 
... they never obtain justice, for they drop the 
suit because they have run out of money or the 
encomenderos have bribed their leaders. 
Zorita (1965: 125-126) added to this letter what an Indian had told 
him: 
... you don't understand us-, and we don't under- 
stand you and don't know what you want. You 
have deprived us of our good order and system 
of government... The Indians have thrown them- 
selves into litigation because you egged them 
on to it... But they never get what they want, 
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for you are the law and the judges and the par- 
ties to the suit, and decide matters as you 
please ... When we were pagans, there were very 
few lawsuits, men told the truth, and cases were 
decided very quickly. 
The Ideology of Legal Sanctions 
The Spaniards, from the beginning of the contact with the New 
World, considered their own civilisation and its institutions super- 
ior to those of the Indian. They regarded themselves as the great 
civilisers, bringing order and justice to the barbarians. Three 
schools of thought emerged about the relation between the Spaniards 
and the Indians in the New World. One school led by Francisco de 
Vitoria, 
20 
held that the Indians had developed their own forms of 
government and institutions of law, and that the Spaniards were bound 
to uphold and defend these existing institutions and the rights 
of existing nobles and chiefs. A second school typified by the 
writings of Geronimo de Mendieta, 
21 held that the Spaniards and the 
Indians constituted two separate republics. Each was entitled to 
its own law and institutions. The Spaniards were so corrupt, Men- 
dieta reasoned, the Indians should be kept as far from them as pos- 
sible. The third view which was shared by Crown jurists and most 
of the colonists was that the Indians should be assimilated as quick- 
ly as possible into Spanish institutions. The real strength of this 
third position was that it was most consistent with a social organi- 
sation which served the economic interests of the Crown and the set- 
tlers. Most of the Crown jurists who manned the positions of colo- 
nial administration held this view (Borah, 1982: 266-267). For those 
who held this view, it was useful to make the Indians appear to be 
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as barbarous as possible. By the 1550's chroniclers such as Cervantes 
de Salazar (See Keen, 1971: 87) were denying that the Aztecs had even 
had courts of law. 
But.. the imposition of civilised Spanish law did little to en- 
sure justice or good treatment for the Indians. Laws which attempted 
to do so were largely ignored in New Spain and the question of whet- 
her or not theýCrown ever seriously intended that those laws should 
be enforced remains open. The humanitarian legislation of the Span- 
ish Crown with regard to the Indians was largely ineffective and the 
Spaniards, whether encomendero or Monarch, showed themselves to be 
more concerned with a kind of legal formalism than the actual imple- 
mentation of the spirit of the law. The concern seems to have been 
whether or not Spanish action could be made to appear to conform 
to the law not whether Spanish action actually fulfilled the intent 
of the law. 
In the chapter on warfare in Conquest Mexico it was noted that 
Cortes continually attempted to present his actions in Mexico in 
terms of a sort of legal formalism which would be acceptable to the 
Crown. The Requierimiento, read to the Indians before they were 
warred against, was an attempt to justify this warfare on formal 
legal grounds. The Indians had been told what was required of them 
and warned that if they did not comply, they would be warred against. 
The formal requirements of the law were, therefore, satisfied. That 
the Indians did not usually understand even the language in which 
this decree was given, much less the problems associated with assurrr- 
ing sovereign power as a given fact, were largely ignored. It was 
the appearance of justice, not justice itself, that the law was 
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intended to convey. 
The Monarchs in Spain had won for themselves considerable loyalty 
and support from the peasantry by presenting Crown authority as pre- 
dictable, founded on law, the just protection of individual rights 
against the capricious rule of the feudal lord. And this support 
was not unwarrented. Monarchic centralisation had resulted in a 
considerable improvement in the condition of the peasantry (Tiryakian, 
1979: 17-18). In New Spain, although Crown policy with regard to 
the Indian fluctuated (Borah, 1982: 267), the Crown intended to ap- 
pear as the defender of the Indians against the exploitations of the 
encomenderos. As in Spain, therefore, the consolidation of centra- 
lised monarchical control was presented not as the seizure of power, 
but as a humanitarian act. The Monarch wished to be seen as the 
protector of the rights of the individual. and ) as the Crown had done 
in Spain, enough concessions were made to aristocratic or encomendero 
interests to avoid an open rebellion. As has been noted, when the 
issuance of the New Laws stipulated the abolition of the encomienda 
provoked revolt in Peru and near revolt in Mexico, the Crown backed 
down. Consolidation of royal authority was a gradual process, care- 
fully pursued - the erosion of feudal power ra: 16er than its seizure. 
This explains the almost continual series of legislation from the 
Crown which was practically unworkable in the New World. The Crown 
wished to be perceived as the defender of the Indians against the 
exploitation of the encomenderos. But royal control did not end 
that exploitation, simply reorganised it in a way which benefited 
the Crown. 
Probably noone writing in the sixteenth century saw more clearly 
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the profound contradictions between the apparent humanitarian legis- 
lation of the Spanish monarchs and its effect in the New World than 
Alonso Zorita. Zorita was a judge himself and a bitter critic of 
the effects of the Spanish. -legal. isystem 
in the New World. He wrote 
a long and detailed letter to Charles V in which he attempted to 
point out the contradictions inherent in Spanish legislation. Zori- 
ta stressed thb great disparity between the law as written and the 
law in implementation. Ile steadfastly maintained that if the laws 
were but enforced, all would be well. But he himself acknowledged 
that in many cases the law could not be enforced. He pointed out, 
for example, that the Crown's stipulations regarding the amounts of 
Indian tribute were simply impossible to comply with. Zorita's ob- 
servations support the case that His Majesty's law was not designed 
to be administered. The royal law was designed to legitimate rather 
than to control- it clouded economic exploitation in legitimacy. 
Zorita wrote in his letter to Charles V: 
We have a multitude of laws, judges, viceroys, 
governors, presidentes, oidores, corregidores, 
alcaldes mayors, a million lieutenants, and yet 
another million a1guaciles... the more such men 
there are, the more enemies do the Indians have 
.... For the Spaniards care for one thing alone, 
and that is their advantage... 
The wishes of Your Majesty and his Royal Coun- 
cil are well known and are made very plain in 
the laws that are issued every day in favor of 
the poor Indians and for their increase and 
preservation. But these laws are obeyed and 
not enforced witherfore there is no end to the 
destruction of the Indians, nor does anyone 
care what Your Majesty decrees ... Indeed, the 
more laws and decrees are sent, the worse is 
the condition of the Indians by reason of the 
false and sophisticated interpretation that 
the Spanish officials give these laws, twist- 
ing their meaning to suit their own purposes... 
328 
where there is a plenty of doctors and medicines, 
there is a plenty of ill health. Just so, where 
there are many laws and judges, there is much in- 
justice (Zorita, 1965: 217). 
While Zorita came close on many occasions to drawing the conclu- 
sion that the laws were unworkable, he never made in writing at least, 
the inevitable step of logic and said that the laws were never intend- 
ed to be workable. Such questionning of royal intent would have been 
unthinkable and compara ble to questioning the intent of-the Pope. 
The Monarch was the divinely chosen representative of God, the 'vicar 
of God' on earth. 
22 
Summary 
Soon after the Conquest of Tenochtitlan, the Spaniards imposed 
in Mexico a system of legal ideas which was consistent with the eco- 
nomic structure they would impose there. The Aztec legal system al- 
though sophisticated in many ways and much admired by the Spaniards, 
was constructed to serve the needs of a dominant class operating 
within an ancient mode of production. This legal system, therefore, 
was practically obsolete within the context of a mercantile capital- 
ist social formation. Concepts, such as private property, individual 
ownership of land, contractual money agreements and labour as a conr- 
modity were integral to such a system, and had to be institutionalis- 
ed within the law. Aztec law was, therefore, necessarily replaced 
by Spanish law which defined social and economic relationships in the 
interests of the new dominant class operating within a different 
form of economic organisation. 
In the initial years of Spanish occupation, the Conquistador/ 
colonists held immense power in New Spain. Even though their 
a 
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conceptions of law were influenced to some extent by the current 
monarchic centralisation of law in Spain, an even greater influence 
was the medieval tradition which was a legacy of Spain's past. The 
Spanish in Mexico tended to regard the law as a matter of individual 
rights over the Indians under their charge, much like the rule of a 
feudal lord over his serfs. The Spanish Crown, however, was deter- 
mined that feu-dal relations such as these were not to be. allowed in 
the new territory. The Spanish Moanrchs had eroded to a considerable 
extent in Spain the local power of the aristocracy and was opposed 
to the establishment of a similar aristocracy in New Spain. Since 
taking control of the law and the administration of justice had 
been one of the primary weapons the Crown had used in Spain to ero- 
de the power of the aristocracy, the administration of the law was 
crucially important to the Crown in Mexico. 
But the economic imperatives of the time, i. e., getting pre- 
cious metals out of the ground and back to Spain, limited the extent 
to which the Crown could champion the rights of the peasantry (the 
Indians) against the rights of the aristocracy (the encomenderos). 
First, the encomenderos were needed to organise labour in the New 
World and the Crown could not afford to completely alienate them. 
Second, the exploitation of Indian labour was necessary no matter 
who did it, to maximise profits. The Crown never showed itself to 
be prepared to sacrifice its economic interests in order to bring 
about humane conditions for the Indians. 
During this period, therefore, the struggle about law and the 0 
administration of justice can most usefully be seen as a struggle 
I 
to implant the legal concepts necessary for the maintenance of a 
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capitalist economic system against concepts more appropriate to an 
ancient and feudal system. The law served the interests of the do- 
minant class by serving as the means of punishing Indians that did 
not comply with the Spanish system, confiscating lands of the Indians, 
and enforcing the payment of tribute to the Spaniards. Predictably 
in a system in which labour was of crucial importance, legal sanc- 




As Marx has noted, force itself is an economic power. in the pre- 
ceding chapters I have discussed the ways in which force functioned as 
an economic power in Mexico immediately before and after the Spanish 
Conquest. The fundamental characteristics of the Aztec and Conquest 
social formations have been outlined in materialist terms and this has 
been followed by a discussion of the ways in which particular formis of 
organised violence functioned both to maintain a dominant class in a 
position of power in relation to subordinate classes, and to enforce 
a particular set of economic relations within the social formation 
which benefited this dominant class. At this point it is possible to 
make some -eneral comments about organised violencý in Aztec and Corr- 
quest Mexico and some speculative statements about the nature of or- 
ganised violence within societies characterised by particular modes of 
economic organisation. 
Since the most important task of the state is to secure and/or 
maintain the conditions of existence which make a particular mode of 
production possible, it is hardly surDrising that the violence pursued 
by the state reflects the major problems inherent in either ma'ntain- 
ina, an existing mode of economic organisation or bringing about a new 
f0rril of economic organisation. The state does not pursue particular 
z torms of violence at random. There is a logic to the pursuit of spe- 
r-'fic violences by the state and that logic can be most clearly 0 
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understood by referring back to the mode of organisation and phase of 
development of the social formation under consideration. The economic 
organisation of society and the phase of development of that economic 
organisation broadly structures which will be crucial areas of concern 
for the state. It is in these crucial areas of concern that the state 
is most likely to resort to violence. 
Within the Aztec social formation, a dominant class of non-producers 
used organised violence to maintain a set of economic relations whereby 
the surplus production of the labouring class (both inside and outside 
the city-state) was channeled to the use of this dominant class. Be- 
cause of the level of development of the productive process, this tri- 
bute was primarily in the form of agricultural produce. The Aztec 
ruling class maintained itself in the position of surplus takers by 
ensuring that first, the Aztec group itself remained unified as a 
polity and second, by ensuring that this polity remained in a position 
of political domination over groups of direct producers. These two 
tasks consumed most of the state's energy and were the focus of most 
of the organised violence pursued by the state. Maintaining the Aztec 
polity as a polity and maintaining its dominant position with relation 
to groups of direct producers were, so to speak, the crucial battles 
of the state -iven the particular form of org _, an3. 
sation of the social 
formation. 
Maintaining the relations of domination over groups of direct pro- C. - 
ducers outside the Aztec city-state largely depended on wars of cow- Lý 
quest and intimidation. Being a part of the Aztec empire offered few 
advantages to outlying provinces. Membership in the empire brought 
With it little more than having Aztec officials appear periodically 
to collect tribute and the somewhat dubious assurance that the Aztecs 
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would defend their right to appropriate tribute by keeping other 
Indian groups from conquering their territories. In other words, C-11 be- 
ing a part of the Aztec empire assured little more than actual exploita- 
tion by one group as OPDOsed to the theoretical possibility of exploi- 
tation by another group. The Aztecs did not make any significant at- 
tempt to integrate peoples of the conquered provinces into the empire 
by offering them concrete benefits. They did not, for example, offer 
to institute their own rather sophisticated legal system within the 
provinces. Nor did they promise to redistribute any of the booty or 
tribute gained from the conquest of other territories. They did not 
even free conquered people from any existing tribal leadership unless 
this leadership was directly opposed to Aztec tribute'demands. The 
only attempt the Aztecs seem to have made at ideological integration 
o;: 1. conquered peoples was to take statues of their gods back to Teno- 
chtitlan and include them in the Aztec pantheon. Aztec domination, 
then, offered few material benefits and engendered little ideological 
identification. The Aztecs held no monopoly on land so they could 
not bargain for tribute in return for allowing producers access to 
land. The Aztecs then, primarily used the stick rather than the car- 
rot to expand their empire. It will be remembered that when the Az- 
tecs sent out negotiators to discuss tribute demands with targeted 
'groups, they did not attempt to stress the advantages of Aztec donmina- 
tion. Instead they stressed the horrors that would result as a con- 
sequence of opposing Aztec domination. Warfare, therefore, was the 
primary form of organised violence which helped to maintain domination 
over surrounding groups of direct producers, the predominant mechanism 
for securing access to surplus production. 'But warfare was also an 
it'Portant mechanism for ensuring that this appropriation continued. 
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Warfare functioned to decrease the chances of rebellion in pro- 
vinces already conquered. The violence of i-, -arfare functioned to in- 
2' timidate other groups by stressing and reaffirming the reputation oýL 
power, might, and ruthlessness of the Aztec state. The position of 
the Aztec ruling class as surplus takers depended on maintaining their 
fragile position at the c1pex of the hierarchy OZE power in Mexico and 
intimidation was of primary importance to the overall strategy of 
domination. Success in warfare was crucial, but so too was the ap- 
pearance of ferocity in warfare which acted as a warning by demonstra- 
ting the cost of entering into warfare against the Aztecs. The success- 0 L3 U 
ful demonstration of strength through success in warfare was crucial, C2 
but every war presented the possibility of failure. In this competi- 
tive environment where there was no substantial difference between 
the Aztecs and surrounding Indian groups in terms of technology of 51 Lý C3 
warfare or numbers of warriors, one failure could spell the disinte- 
-ration of the empire. If one Indian group defeated the Aztecs, 
others would be more likely to attempt subsequent rebellions. No- 
where is the fragility of the hold the Aztecs had over their empire 
more clearly derionstrated than in the series of events that occurred 
after the Spanish came to Mexico. Outlying groups had no great loyal- 
ty to the Aztecs who they saw primarily as exploiters and they were 
quick to ally themselves with the Spaniards. 'Moctezuma witnessed the 
series of defections of his provinces as the Spaniards marched across 
Mexico toward Tenochtitlan. Moctezuma was reluctant to fight the 
Spaniards most probably because he surmised that he might well lose 
and that the loss of this battle, given the Spanish gains with other 
Indian groups, might well break the hold of intimidation with which 
the Aztecs had held their empire together. But even the Aztec 
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reluctance to confront the Spaniards in battle was taken as a sign 
of weakness that helped to foster rebellion among the provinces. When 
Cortes imprisoned Aztec emissaries. with impunity and when "Moctezuma 
made a crucial gesture of deference by offering tribute to the Span- 
iards, a great deal of the ideological wor'tl-. the Aztecs had done to 
create a climate of intimidation in the region disintegrated. Any 
failure, any weakness was an open invitation to rebellion. 
Before the Spanish arrived, the Aztecs had created an intimidat- 
ing public image. The central valley had been host to the rise and 
fall of numerous dominant groups and the Aztecs were but the latest. 
The Aztecs themselves had won dominance bv conauerins their former 
mentors and any weakness on their part could prompt a take-over of the 
region by another ambitious group. Keeping the peoples of surrounding CI 
Indian groups in a state of fear was crucial to the strategy of empire. 
Often, because of this intimidating image, the Aztecs did not even 
have to fight a war to gain tribute agreements with other Indian groups. 
Targeted peoples just agreed to Aztec domination rather than submit 
themselves to the consequences of opposing the Aztecs. The gruesome 
and public sacrificing of captives taken in war was one form of vio- 
lence which served to feed this public image of ferocity. It, like 
warfare, acted as a warning to other groups of the cost of opposing 
the Aztecs. It not only served to help them avoid battles, it gave 
them a kind of psychological advanta3e when they did fight. Bernal I CJ 
Diaz, it will be remembered, commented on the fear he experienced 
when going into battle with the Aztecs after he had seen the sacri- CY C, 
fice of Spaniards. The rulers of surrounding Indian groups were 
commanded to watch ceremonies of human sacrifice and the highly cere- 
monial and public nature of this violence worked as an effective form 
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of state prODaganda. 
Within the city-state the mechanisms of domination were less 
crude. There was, so to speak, the offering of a bit of carrot back- 
ed up by the stick. It is always more effective to secure the domina- 
tion of men through 'the chains of their own ideas, ' that is by con- 
vincing them to behave in ways consistent with the interests of some 
dominant group without employing constant coercion. The Aztec ruling 
class built on the shared cornon history of struggle of the Aztec peo- 
ple and their shared set of religious ideas to bind the group together 
behind em. pire policy. The ideology of empire constructed by the ruling 
class essentially placed the Aztec people at the centre of the cosmos. 
By being part of the group, individuals were members of a chosen peo- 
ple who kept human existence going by keeping the sun in motioni The 
people within the city-state were also offered material rewards for 
being part of the dominant polity. Durin3 the period when the military C. ýj 
meritocracy existed, any man could rise within the social structure 
and gain wealth through military distinction. There were also perio- 
dic redistributions of some of the booty of wars, and in times of fa- 
mine the state opened grain stores to keep the people from depopula- 
ting the cities. The state had developed more complicated and sophis- 
ticated forms of domination within the city-state ? artly because with- 
out the support of its own citizens the polity could not survive. 
The Aztec rulina,, class also devised a sophisticated set of laws 
and court procedure which required the population to refer to establish- 
ed authority for settling all major disputes. This legal system also 
offered a more orderly existence within the city-state, and ensured 
that all expressions of violence would be directed by Cie state. 
Throu-ii the le-al syste-ni the Aztec ruling class maintained its 00U 
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dominance over its own labouring class and also integrated that la- 
bourin, class into the polity. But even within the citi-state the 
reaction to all challenges to authority were swift and harsh. The 
Aztec ruling class attempted to bind their own population by the 
chains of their ideas, but when this was not effective, the response 
was violent. Crime represented a defiance of established authority 
and the penalties for most offenses were both harsh and public. These 
sanctions were not desigrned merely to punish the offender, they T-Tere 
as well an exercise of political power. The harsh response to any 
defiance of established authority served to make a st atement about 
the power of the state. Punishments were intended not merely to re- 
dress an imbalance but to reinstate the force of authority of the 
Aztec state. 
Just as the organisation of the social formation structured the 
focus of violence, it also to some extent tempered the nature of 
that violence. Direct producers still held the means j production and 
the violence of the Aztec state had to be continually balanced off 
against the disadvantages of the disruption of production and the like- 
lilhood of generating future rebellions. Given the level of develop- 
ment of this social formation, productive potential once destroyed 
could not easily be regenerated. The Aztec state was attempting to 
maintain control within a long-term strateg,, f of domination, not Mere- 
ly within a short-term plan for the taking of booty 'Erori conquered 
provinces. This is one of the reasons the Aztec state attempted to 
avoid warfare if tribute agreements-could be made without it, and 
when wars were fought to minimise the destruction and violence. Az- 
tec warfare, then, was an integral part of the complex strategy of 
empire ifiiich while serving to maintain dominance, if pursued too far 0 
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could spell the eventual collapse of the polity. Likewise, there was 
a limit on how violently the practice of human sacrifice could be pur- 
sued. There are indications that by the time of the Spanish Conquest 
it had reached such proportions it was becomming dystunctional. Out- 
side the city-state it was provoking complaints from the conquered 
territories. Inside it was generalising into a kind of frenzy through 
the growth of such practices as auto-sacrifice. 
What we have then is a picture of a state pursuing various forms a 
of or. -anised violence which served either directly or indirectly to 
maintain the continued existence of the particular mode of production 
on which it depended. The focus of this violence was broadly struct- 
ured by the primary tasks of the state given the mode of organisation 
of the social formation, i. e., the need to maintain the polity as a 
polity and the need to naintain dominance over direct producers. In 
addition, the extent to which this violence could effectively be 
pursued was also constrained by the or-anisation of the social forma- Cal 
tion, i. e., the existence of unified tribal Zroups still on their own 
lands, the lack of a state monopoly of land, the likelihood of rebel- 
lions, and the need to maintain the allegiance of citizens. The prior 
ities of state intervention within the structure of the social forma- 
tion were, therefore, primarily within the political level. Rela- 
tively little state violence was directed toward the labour process 
itself since this mode-of production did not depend on such factors 
as the senaration of the labourer from the means of production or on 
the development of a labour process based on more complex forms of 
cooperation. The labour process existing'ifithin conquered territories U 
was adequate to rieet the needs of a social formation characterised by 
the ancient mode of production. Forced labour, therefore, in the 
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conventionally understood sense of that term, placed only a minor role 
in the Aztec economic system. Drafts of forced labourers were rarely 
used in the production process itself. The primary support for the 
Aztec ruling class was the surplus production of direct producers who 
still held the means of production.. 
If forced labour is considered in a wider sense, i. e., any in- 
voluntary labour then all labour which went toward the production of 
produce given over to the Aztec state in tribute could be considered 
forced labour. But this form of the labour process was not extremely 
violent. There were limits to how violent the exploitation of direct 
producers still on their own land could be. The Aztec state depended 
on the continued production of the direct producers and had an invest- 
ment in not taking so much from them in tribute that they starved. 
And, since the Aztecs rarely left a military presence in the areas 
they conquered, it was not practical to exploit these groups to such 
an extent that the ? roducers were provoked into rebellion. The Az- 
tec state, therefore, constantly attempted to extract as much surplus 
as possible without either devastating conquered regions or provoking 
rebellions. The more complex labour forris (drafts of forced labour 
and slaves for example) developed only in specified areas and were 
air-lost exclusively maintained by the direct intervention of the state. 
Even in the case of slavet-1, it was rare for slaves to be used direct- 
ly in the production process. Most slaves were held by individuals 
to provide personal services and there were strict rules regarding 
the treatment and the rights of slaves. The drafts of forced labour- 
ers were used primarily to work in the construction of ceremonial 
buildings. They were the most violently exploited group of labourers, 
but they formed only a small part of the total labouring population. 
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The Aztec state was not investing its energies in changing the existing 
labour form of the peoples in the outlying provinces, merely in riain- 
taining the domination which allowed them to siphon off the top layer 
of surplus produced by means of the existing labour forms. 
Once the Spaniards intervened in Mexico the socio-economic structure 
changed radically and with it the focus of organised violence. After 
the Conquest, '11exico no longer compos-ed an insulated world system, res- 
ponding only to its own internal dynamics. It became instead part of 
the interlocking division of labour within the nascent capitalist 
economic world system in western "Europe. The most crucial battles or 
tasks of the Spanish state at this time'then were very different from 
those that faced the Aztec state. There are two important factors to 
consider in attempting to understand the priorities of the Spanish 
state at this time: the particular phase of capitalist development 
that existed and the position of Nexico in the periphery of that 
capitalist development. 
The sixteenth century was a period which led up to the establish- 
ment of capitalism in western Euro-pe, not an age in which capitalist 
relations had completely taken hold in all levels of the social for- 
mation. It was a period in which the absolutist state in western 
Europe was attempting to secure the conditions necessary for the 
eventual ri-se of capitalism. one of the most important elements 
necessarv for this rise and eventual triumph was the accumulation of 
capital. This accumulation, for the various reasons mentioned in 
Chapter VII, focused largely on the discovery of precious metals. 
Precious metal discovery was the quickest and easiest forri of caDital 
accumulation at the time. Atlantic expansion itself was largely mo- 
tivated by the search for precious metals. One of the most in-portant 
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tasks of the state then was enhancing and/or securing conditions Vaich 
made capital accumulation in the form of preciousmetals possible. Most 
of the violence pursued or condoned by the Spanish state and its re- 
presentatives was focused on this endeavour. The warfare conducted 
by the Conquistadores in the name of the Spanish state was intended 
to secure precious metals. The Conquistadores thought they could 
seize great quantities of gold from the Aztecs. But because the 
wealth in precious metals that was directly seizable was not great, 
energy was then focused into the mining of precious metals. The Con- 
quistadores were representatives of the Spanish state, but they were 
also private entrepreneurs. It is in fact characteristic of this 
phase of capitalist development that private enterprise and state en- 
terprise work together. In such cases, the state does not 'nave to 
directly organise violence but merely to condone violence which is 
to its advantage. Because of the importance of precious metals with- 
in this phase of development of western European caýitalis-m, the dis- 
covery of precious metal deposits in Mexico all but ensured that 
Mexico's role within the interlocking division of labour would be 
one of precious metal production and that much of the or-anised vio- 
lence pursued or condoned by the state would be focused to this end. 
In Spain, the state was implementing other policies which would 
eventually pave the way for the rise of capitalism. In the centre, 
the state's energy was focused on undermining the power of the feudal 
aristocracy, freeing the peasants from the land, and creating a sit- 
uation where labour could be turned into a commodity for sale on a 
market. But while the state was pursuing these policies in the cen- 
tre, the task in the periphery was very different. The securing or 
precious metals was the most important concern in 'I'lexico and all 
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other considerations became secondary. As we have noted, the growing 10 
dependence of the Spanish economj on p recious metals from the New 
World influenced many of the state's policy decisions. 
The state was 'Aaced with a dilemma in this situation and the ef- 
fect of this dilemma and the way it was responded to had the effect 
of accentuating the violence of endeavour in Mexico. Paced with the 
need to erode individualistic aristocratic power in the centre and to 
free labour from its control, in the ? eriphery this proved an almost 
impossible task. Semi-feudal labour forms seemed at least for a 
while the only way to secure precious metals in t1le New World. The 
Spanish state tried to dictate a situation in which labour was sold 
on the marill-et to buyers and thereby kept out of the control of indivi- 
dual Spaniards. But the Indian population (as the Spanish state found 
out) was ill-preDared to adapt to labour forms needed within a capi- 
talist productive process. Direct producers still had access to the 
land and there was no compelling reason for them to sell their labour 
on the market. This was especially the case since Indians could not 
support themselves on the meagre wages offered by the Spaniards, U 12 - 
there was nothing for them to buy with these scanty wages, and they 
had no great inclýnation to want what products were available. Since 
there was no monopoly of land by the Spaniards, the Indians could 
also leave the area. There had to be come mechanism to make Indians 
work in mining and support activities and the encomienda, a kind of 
semi-feudal orsanisation of labour seemed for a while the onl-, va- 
to bring this about. 
U-nile forced labour, therefore, played only a minor role in the 
Aztec economic systen, forced labour was one of the primary forms of 
labour organisation in the Spanish colonial economy. Many Indians 
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were taken and branded as slaves after the Conquest. These slaves 
were used in mining and agriculture and had none ofthe rights guaran- 
teed to slaves under the Indian system. Other Indians were assigned 
much like feudal serfs to individual encomenderos to whom they owed 
tributes and labour services. The eventual take-over by the Crown 
of labour organisation in Mexico under the repartimiento system made 
little practical difference to the exploitation of the Indians. The 
corregidores, though salaried., (oyal officials, exploited Indian labour 
as ruthlessly as did the encomenderos. The economic demands of the 
period which made precious metals so valuable largely ensured that 
the labour of the Indian population would be exploited with little 
concern for their wellbeing, in order to naximise profits. The real 
struggle over labour organisation in New Spain was to be over who - 
the Crown or the encomenderos - would control the labour process and 
who would reap the greatest profits. 
Capitalism inteoJuced a new way of thinking about labour which C2 
was very different from the way in which labour had been conceived of 
in t1he ancient system. The Spanish came to Mexico in search of pre- 
cious metals, a coumodity and commodity relations, exchanC-, e values, 
were such that people themselves became looked upon as commodities - 
merely factors in the labour process. The Indians under the Spanish 
system became expendable commodities to be used in the production pro- 
cess with little concern for their reproddction. Profits were maxi- 
mised by working , the Indians ruthlessly, often to death. In the ini- 
tial years of Spanish occupation, when the Spanish encomendero class 
largely controlled labour organisation, there appeared to be an in- 
exhaustible supply of Indian labour. Dead labourers could always be 
replaced with. others. In addition, the Crown's constant threats to 
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abolish the encomienda system and therefore the encomendero's direct 
access to Indian labour only increased the violence of Indian exploi- 
tation. The encomenderos, fearing an end to the profits to be gained 0 
through the exploitation of Indian labour, only intensified exploita- 
tion in order to get as much use out of the Indians as they could. 
The Indian, then, became merely one calculation in the profit 
equasion. The cheaper the labour, the. more profits were to be gained. 
Since there seemed to be ark unlimited supply 6f labour the Indians 
were disposable in the ldbour process. There was no need to protect 
the lives of the labourers as was the case within the Aztec system 
and is the case even in some forms of slavery. The master of a slave 
often has an investment in preserving the slave's labour power since 
the master expends money on the upkeep of the slave. The Spanish, 
however, had no such investment. The Indians were forced to bring 
their own food to the mines and required to support themselves in 
the interval when they were not working. Literally working the In- 
dians to death and then replacing them was the most economically sound 
form of proceeding. Obviously there were those who objected to the 
harsh treatment of the Indians. So-tie of them, like Dartolome de las 
Casas, even pointed out that the exploitation of the Indians was fun- 
damentally connected with the mode of economic exploitation of the 
region. But these people were silenced in one way or another because 
of the economic demands of the time. The attitude of the Spanish state 
seemed to be that if the Indians could be treated humanely and profits 
still maximised, so much the better. But this was not the case and 
the Spanish Crown relented time after time when this became apparent. 
The change in focus of state violence can also be seen in the 
punishments and lax-is of the Spanish legal syste-i. The law functioned 
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to take land away from the Indians, separate them from the means of 
production, and relegate them to forced labour in the mines. The 
Spanish legal system was openly and grossly corrupt. The Spaniards had 0 C2 
little investment in integrating the Indian labouring class into a 
dominant polity, in binding them by the chains of their ideas. The 
punishments meted out by the Spanish legal system were predictably 
concerned more with ensuring a labour supply in the territory than t: ý 
with any symbolic statement about the power of the dominant group. In 
the early years of colonial occupation, the law tended to be the will 
of the individual encomendero - essentially a conception of law char- 
acteristic of Spain's feudal past. The Spanish Crown, however, had 
eroded the power of its own aristocracy in Spain through securing 
certain rights to the peasantry through Crown law. Royal justice was 
seen as more consistent and fair than the often capricious whims of 
the feudal lord. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Crown would 
attempt to , Trest control away from the encomenderos through la", 7 and 
the administration of justice. But the ability of the Crown during this 
period to champion the rights of the Indians against the encomenderos 
and still reap the economic benefits of exploiting Indian labour made 
any attempt to ensure t%eir rights as individuals largely-superficial. 
While Crown legislation appeared to be advocating humane treatment for 
the Indians, this humane treatment was never economically practical 
and never therefore actually implemented. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the focus and nature of or- 
, anised violence in these two particular social formations can be 0 
seen to relate to fundamental economic organisation. The change 10 U. 
in economic or-anisation after the Conquest and the subsequent change 00 
in the focus and nature of org-anised violence supports the theory 
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that the organisation of the social formation broadly structures the 
focus and nature of or-anised violence pursued by the state. Obviously 
further research is necessary to establish whether or not organised 
violence relates in the same way to the economic structure within 
other social formations, and how political and social factors inter- 
vene to mould the shaDe of organised violence. On the basis of this 
research, however, one would expect to find that in systems character- 
ised by the ancient mode of production state violence will be designed 
to maintain the polity and to maintain a position of domination with 
relation to some group of direct producers. The state will develop a 
rather sophisticated and complicated ideology of dominati6n and a 
fairly refined legal system in which punishments will be harsh and 
public. Within societies characterised by the beginning phases of 
capital accumulation state violence in the periphery especially will 
be focused on changing the labour process. The le-al system will 
play a less important role in terms of its integrative function and 
will reflect the concern to change the labour process by using meck- 0 
anisms to separate t1he direct producers from the means of production 
and punishing many offenses by sentences of labour. 
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FOOTNOTES 
For scholars who have merely described the organised violence of 
the Aztec and Conquest periods, see Acosta, Aguilar, Chavero, 
Clavigero, GOMara, Cortes, Diaz, Sahagun, Las Casas, Duran, 
Mendieta, Sepulveda and Zorita. Or, see more contemporary 
scholars such as Caso, Ceballos Novelo, Davies, Helps, Parry, 
Payne, Peterson, Prescott, Thompson, Soustelle, Vaillant, White, 
and Elliott. For those who have offered explanations for parti- 
cular violences see Payne, Se"Journe", Helms, Sanders and Price, 
and White. Other writers are concerned with particular aspects 
of Aztec and Conquest Mexico such as laws and judicial institu- 
tions (Alba, Altamira, Beneyto Perez, Borah, Caranca"y Trujillo, 
Toscano, Floris Margadant S., Vance, Hanke, Kagan), religion 
(Sejourne, Spence), labour forms (Bosch Garcia, Gonzalez Torres, 
Simpson), warfare (Bandelier), economy (Braudel, Castillo, Chap- 
man, Cipolla, Coornaert, Darby, Frank, Glamann, Heaton, Knight, 
Larraz, Nussbaum, Stein and Stein, Vicens Vives), land (Chevalier, 
McBride), population (Cook and Borah), precious metals (Del Mar, 
Hamilton, Jacob, Peterson, Vilar). 
2 
Hindess and Hirst, in a subsequent work (1977) rejected several 
of the fundamental concepts on which their analysis of pre-capi- 
talist social formations in the 1975 work was based. They reject- 
ed, for example, the concepts of the determining role of the 
economic, and the primacy of the relations over the forces of 
production. Their rationale for rejecting these concepts is high- 
ly complicated, and discussed fully in the 1977 work. It is not 
appropriate here to take on the intricacies of this debate, and 
Hindess and Hirst's elaboration of the characteristics of pre- 
capitalist modes of production, developed in the earlier work 
(1975) is still extremely useful for those who have not reject- 
ed fundamental materialist concepts. 
3 It should be noted that the discussion of the economic context 
of state violence in Aztec Mexico differs somewhat from the same 
discussion for Conquest Mexico. This difference results from 
the fact that the information available about the Aztec economy 
is not nearly so technical and detailed as is that pertaining to 
Conquest Mexico, and the discussion reflects in part this nature 
of the available data. 
4 
Slash and burn cultivation entailed the cutting of several acres 
of woodland or forest, allowing the debris to dry, burning it, 
and then planting. The plot of land was abandoned after a per- 
iod of years, depending on the quality of the soil, and the bush 
cover allowed to regrow. Another plot of land was then cleared 
and planted in the same manner. The process could begin again 
on the first plot after a period of years. This form of culti- 
vation is obviously extensive, that is, it requires large areas 
of land to operate effectively (See Helms, 1975: 31). 
5' The Florentine Codex was written in Nahuatl, the Aztec language, 
by the Indian students of Fray Bernadino de Sahagun, originally 
completed around 1555, the Florentine Codex was based on the re- 
miniacences of natives who had been alive during the Spanish 
Conquest (See Lebfn-Portilla, 1962: 155). - 
6 
Two-field cultivation involves the planting of one field while 
another is left to fallow. one or two years until it becomes fer- 
tile again. 
7 
The spellings of various Nahuatl words appear differently in dif- 
ferent chronicles. 
8 
The Codex Ramirez i's an Indian account in picture writing of the 
history of the Aztecs. - 
9 Fray Bernardino de Sahagun was a Franciscan fr iar who in 1557 be- 
gan compiling his Historia de las Cosas de la Neuva Espana. 
This work which was a veritable encyclopedia ot Mexican cUlture 
based on the responses of Indian-informants to questions formu- 
lated by Sahagun. Keen (1971: 114) called it "the supreme 
achievement of the Franciscan ethnographic school. " 
10 
The way in which law should be perceived in relation to the 
state and in relation to the social-formation is a matter of 
much controversy within Marxism (See for example Jessop, 1980) 
and many of the contemporary approaches to the study of law 
within Marxism have been concerned to escape the economic deter- 
minism felt to be inherent in, more traditional approaches. While 
these debates are important, a detailed discussion of them is 
beyond the scope of this study. And,. as Cain and Hunt (1979: 
xiii) note, many of Marx' and Engels' comments on and discussions 
of the law are not "capable of an economic determinist reading. " 
The economic does not determine the precise form of the legal 
system or 'the violence of legal sanctions. The-economic does, 
however, broadly structure an array of conditions within which 
the legal system functions. 
11 
Durkheim argues a similar point in Two Laws of Penal Evolution. 
12 There is a great deal of controversy over just how and why this 
economic contraction came about. There. is even some argument 
about whether or not such a decline occU! rred at all, and one's 
position depends largely on the selection of measures of de- 
pression and recession,. and the generality. or specificity of 
one's consideration. As Miskimin (1964: 470) summarises, one 
group of historians uses declining trade figures and population, 
falling levels of domestic capital andindustry to support a 
period of recession. Anoth . er group, point to rising English 
cloth exports, increased production of Italian silk and improve- 
ments in housing to argue for a generalised prosperity (See 
Cipolla, 1964; Dobb, 1963,1976; Kosminsky, 1956; Lopez, 1962; 
Pirenne, 1936; Vilar, 1976). These arguments are, however, peri- 
pheral to the focus of this study. It will suffice for our pur- 
poses to give a general description of what happened. 
13 
There is some disagreement on this point. Wallerstein (1974: 42- 
44) for example, argues that other factors such as food were more 
important than the desire for gold in motivating expansion. it 
is impossible to state categorically whether Europeans primari- 
ly sought food, gold, or feul - they sought all. The concentra- 
tion here on gold involves its centrality to the process of capi- 
tal accumulation, its eventual discovery in Mexico and the part 
it was to play in the violence that occurred there, and its power 
in influencing-individuals to explore the uncharted lands. 
14 
The spellings of different Nahuatl words appear differently in 
different chronicles. 
15 
The chronicler Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxochitl was a descendant 
of the last king of Texcoco and his major work, Historia 
Chichimeca*, was based on pre-conquest codices. 
16 
Capitulaciones were contractual agreements between a'conqueror 
and the Crown in which the rights of the Crown were specified 
while ensuring, the leader of the expedition a share of the- 
spoils of conquest. The bargain struck between the two depend- 
-in a 'tpart,, -, on'. ', th -. -. CrownJinancing was in- ýdd e-degree. to.. 1which. . -1ý11 '. 
Fgeý. 
.11.1, % -. I.., ý.. . -1 1ý- volved. The more the Crown'had ifivested in the expedition, the 
fewer rights it was called upon to bargain away in order to have 
the expedition carried out. (See Elliott, 1978: 59). 
17 
Alonso de Zorita was both a Spanish lawyer and a royal official. 
, 
His Breve y Sumaria Relacion de los*Senores de la Nueva_Espa"n"a, 
w. as written between 1566 and 1570 in response to a royal order 
which requested information on Indian and tribute problems. 
18 Fray Toribio de Benaventa Motolinia was one of the original 
twelve Franciscan missionaries who landed in New Spain in 1524. 
His major published work, Historia de 'Los indios de la Nueva 
Espa"n"a, was written in 1541. 
19 The meaning of living "in liberty" was that the Indians, like 
the Castilian peasantry, were to be'allowed to dispose of their 
labour as they chose. 
20 Francisco de Vitoria was a Dominican the 
I 
ologian, influential in 
Spanish academic court circles. 
t 
21 Geronimo de Mendieta, a Franciscan friar, came to New Spain in 
1554 and began his Historia, Eclesiastica Indiana in 1573. 
22' 
The Partidas, a multi-volumn work which defined the legal princi- 
ples of royal authority prepared in the middle of the thirteenth 
century,, defined the king as "vicar of God" (See Tiryakian, 1979: 
10). 
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